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Smuggling has been an important problem in American-Canadian relations. Yet 
the nature of smuggling is little understood; it is by definition an elusive, secretive, and 
subtle practice. This dissertation explores smuggling as a social force within a border 
community on the United States-Canada boundary. Smuggling almost always involved 
the illicit crossing of political boundaries, and as such can be used as a means of studying 
popular attitudes toward the creation of national borders. Moreover, because smuggling 
is directly related to the transition to modem capitalism, this study sheds light on the 
roots of both American and Canadian economic developn~ent. 
The Passamaquoddy region that straddles the border between Maine in the United 
States and New Brunswick in what is now Canada offers an ideal example of borderlands 
smuggling in the years following the American Revolution to the end of the War of 18 12. 
During this period, the international border running through Passarnaquoddy was 
extremely ill-defined and subject to periodic military action and diplomatic correction. 
By 1783, two oppositional groups settled Passamaquoddy. Loyalist adherents to the 
British Crown settled the New Brunswick side of Passamaquoddy Bay, while republican 
Americans settled the Maine side. Despite the ideological differences of these two 
groups, and various laws that often prohibited trade between them, Passamaquoddy 
residents engaged in a lively smuggling trade even when the United States and Great 
Britain were fighting the War of 18 12. 
The accommodation between Loyalists and Americans at Passamaquoddy 
provides an opportunity to compare the historical experience of Canada and the United 
States, both of which have developed extensive frontier mythologies. The theoretical 
basis for this study is "borderlands theory," which emphasizes modes of accommodation 
rather than conflict on the North American frontier. Smuggling thus provides a means to 
analyze the creation of the border between the United States and Canada, to compare the 
American and Canadian frontier experience, and to understand the transition to 
capitalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Smuggling has been an important problem in international relations; yet the 
nature of smuggling is little understood. It is by definition an elusive, secretive, and 
subtle practice. This dissertation explores smuggling as a social force within border 
communities, using the Passamaquoddy region on the border between the United States 
and Canada as a model. Like other forms of social banditry, smuggling can be used to 
analyze social economies, attitudes towards violence, and the rise of governmental 
authority in the decades following the American War of Independence, both in the 
American republic and the neighboring British colonies to the north. Moreover, 
smuggling almost always involved the illicit crossing of political boundaries, and as such 
can reveal popular attitudes toward the creation of national borders. Borderland 
smuggling is one means of analyzing the creation of the border between the United States 
and Canada, and of comparing the American and Canadian frontier experience. 
This work argues that smuggling was inextricably linked with the process of 
border formation, compelling the state to exert considerable efforts to control its borders. 
Government efforts to control boundaries often created an equal and opposite effect 
anlong border residents, who resisted state-created boundaries through a variety of 
actions, including smuggling. This constant struggle between the state and smugglers 
played out in areas like Passamaquoddy, where the boundary line between the United 
States and British North America was not yet permanently fixed, the local populace on 
both sides of the boundary was often sympathetic to smugglers, and state powers were 
diminished by the region's remoteness. Often the smugglers won these contests; the 
American embargo of 1807- 1809 failed because of rampant smuggling at places like 
Passamaquoddy; the American government also failed to stem smuggling there during 
the War of 18 12. Passamaquoddy's smugglers also successhlly defied British colonial 
officials, most notably in 1817 and 1820 when New Brunswick attempted to halt the 
illicit plaster trade. 
The result of these struggles were persistent efforts by American and British 
officials to control the region, and the rise of an ambivalence to state authority on the part 
of the region's inhabitants who united in defying regulations that restricted cross-border 
trade. This struggle was not unique to Passanlaquoddy; throughout the Western world 
and even beyond, smugglers and govenlments engaged in a constant battle. In many 
cases, this struggle was linked both to an increasing commercial impulse related to the 
rise of capitalistic economic systems, and the growing needs of the state to control its 
borders to tax and regulate commerce. Smuggling at Passamaquoddy thus offers an 
insight into how border formation affects local populations.' 
The most common form of smuggling involved secretly introducing goods across 
a border to evade high taxes imposed by the state or other regulations. Other smugglers 
attempted to move goods out of a jurisdiction in violation of the law. Individuals rind 
groups engaged in smuggling for varied reasons. Some sought quick profits, others 
merely to support their families, and some because of tradition or hostility to the state 
apparatus. For the purposes of this dissertation, a broad definition is used: smuggling 
was international trade conducted by illegal means.2 
The idea of illegal trade of course begs the question: who made the trade illegal? 
The answer to this is the state, as defined by the intellectual heirs of Max Weber, who 
considered the state as " a set of organizations invested with the authority to make 
binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory 
and to implement those decisions using, if necessary, f ~ r c e . " ~  This definition is the most 
satisfactory because it considers the means by which governments enforce their laws, and 
places government control within a set geographic area, or jurisdiction. But can the state 
expect people who live in a peripheral region with indeterminate jurisdiction to obey its 
laws? Are those who live at the edges of a jurisdiction equally bound by the rules the 
state asserts, and how is the state's authority enforced on its periphery, or in a contested 
region also claimed by another power? 
Passamaquoddy, a region claimed by both the British and Americans after 1783, 
offers an ideal terrain to explore these questions. This study examines Euro-American 
settlers who conducted illegal trade at Passamaquoddy despite the sometime considerable 
efforts of the state to halt it, even through use of force. Passamaquoddy's inhabitants, 
primarily Loyalist refugees who settled in what became the British colony of New 
Brunswick and American settlers seeking a new start in eastern Maine, a part of 
Massachusetts until Maine statehood in 1820, quickly forgot their differences after the 
American Revolution and established an amicable relationship based on their common 
North American frontier experience. These people were not extraordinary; it is their very 
ordinariness that makes border people important to scholars attempting to understand 
their relationship with the often troublesome imaginary line that divided New Brunswick 
from Maine. The only extraordinary aspect of these people is that they lived near a 
border and that the state often considered it a crime to conduct trade across that invisible 
line. 
Recapturing the experiences of the settlers who flooded into the Passamaquoddy 
borderland poses some challenges. Neither American nor Canadian historiography does 
an adequate job of understanding North America as a whole; instead, most scholars who 
study the period after 1783 tend to segment their research to confom~ to the physical 
borders and national mythologies of both Canada and the United ~ t a t e s . ~  The exceptions 
are those scholars who adhere to a borderlands model that suggests that the international 
boundary was a "remarkably porous d i~ ide . "~  Given these obstacles, how is a 
borderlands scholar able to reconcile the historiographical differences between American 
and Canadian scholars that separate the interpretations of everyday life in a region that 
spanned the border? 
One answer is to look for the experiences common to both Canada and the United 
States and to compare the interpretations of these events. In the case of the 
Passamaquoddy borderland, the two common qualities that loom largest in both national 
historiographies are the frontier and the legacy of the American Revolution into the early 
nineteenth century. 
To better understand these peoples, the borderlands model as defined by Lauren 
McKinsey and Victor Konrad has been used: a "borderlands is a region jointly shared by 
two nations that houses people with common social characteristics in spite of the 
boundary between them." This approach emphasizes how neighboring societies sought 
mutually beneficial accommodations to resolve their disputes. For McKinsey and 
Konrad, borderlands theory explains how different political communities blend into each 
other where they meet at a boundary; the product of this blending is "an area in which 
interaction has a tempering effect on the central tendencies of each society."6 In the case 
of Passamaquoddy, the most obvious interaction was illegal trade, or smuggling, an 
interaction that certainly tempered borderland residents' attitudes toward the state. 
The intellectual framework of this study is social history, or what Georges 
Lefebvre referred to as "history fiom below." Social history emphasizes the what, who, 
how, and why of historical events, with an emphasis on the who and why.' Many social 
historians study crowd protest, attempting to give the ordinary men and women engaged 
in protest a face, and focus on the conflict that existed between social needs, community 
demands, and individual ambitions.* Often these conflicting needs, demands and 
ambitions led to social unrest and violent collective action against state agents who too 
strictly applied regulations on an uncooperative populace. British scholars such as E.P. 
Thompson, George Rudk, Chstopher Hill and their intellectual heirs, such as Peter 
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, have deeply influenced contemporary understanding of 
crowd protest and its relationship to market economies. This work applies some of their 
models to bear on the North American f r~n t ie r .~  
Illicit trade has not loomed large in recent American or Canadian historiography. 
In the United States it is generally most touched upon as a colonial phenomenon, part of 
the growing American resistance to British rule before the American  evolution.'^ 
Geographically, chronologically, and in tenns of subject, this study is akin to American 
historian Alan Taylor's Libertymen and Great Proprietors, but instead of focusing on 
squatters and their role on the American frontier, it compares illicit frontier commerce 
from both sides of the United States-Canada border." In Canada smuggling has played 
an even less prominent historiographical role. Smuggling occasionally rises as a topic 
among historians of New France or Acadia, but among Anglophones smuggling tends to 
invoke memories of the rampant rum running of the 1920s and 1930s.I2 In terms of 
Canadian historiography, this work is most closely connected with the works of George 
Rawlyk, who analyzed Nova Scotia planter society before and during the American 
Revolution, especially in terms of how evangelical religion shaped colonial society. 
Even more significantly, Rawlyk was one of the few Canadian scholars willing to link 
Canadian history with American, avidly pursuing cross-border themes to explore 
transnational, North American history.I3 
In the North American context borders are strongly linked to the idea of a frontier. 
This study is not about the concept of the frontier in American and Canadian history; 
rather the term frontier here simply refers to a region experiencing the transition to 
pennanent Euro-American settlement. The consideration of Maine as a frontier region 
after the American Revolution has recently acquired some historiographical importance 
due to the writings of Laurel Thatcher Ulrich and Alan ~ a ~ 1 o r . l ~  These historians, 
studying the life of a midwife and land squatters respectively, have made major 
contributions to the profession's understanding of ordinary people in the early republic. 
Canadian scholars, too, have impressively analyzed the same period in the Maritimes in 
studies of Loyalists by Anne Goman Condon, Neil MacKinnon and Margaret Conrad's 
efforts in the field of Planter Studies, which includes Native Americans (First Nations in 
Canada), Acadians, and the Yankees and so-called "foreign protestants" who inhabited 
the Maritime Provinces before 1783.15 But American historiography largely ignores 
Canada after 1783, with the exception of the War of 18 12, and Canadian historiography 
has a tendency to downplay the importance of the post-Revolutionary experience in favor 
of the more triumphant story of Confederation in 1867. Yet both American and Canadian 
scholars can learn from one another; Ulrich's midwife was a Loyalist; Taylor's 
"Libertynlen" often fled to Canada for rehge; Condon's Loyalists were virtually all 
Americans; and Conrad's Planters retained strong ties with New England for generations. 
The frontier experience was truly North American. It must be studied not as purely 
American or exclusively Canadian, but compared on a regional or continental basis to 
fully comprehend it. This study attempts to understand the frontier experience of settlers 
who lived on the United States-Canada border, and how the international boundary 
influenced their daily lives. 
Historians have hotly contested the importance of the North American frontier 
ever since Frederick Jackson Turner proposed his frontier thesis over one hundred years 
ago.16 One of the most useful ideas to evolve out of the frontier debate was Herbert 
Eugene Bolton's "borderlands" model that emphasized frontier accommodation over 
conflict." One form of accommodation was trade, despite governmental efforts to limit, 
control, or eliminate commerce between various borderlands groups. Officials usually 
deemed this illicit trade smuggling, and rightly perceived it as a threat in the peripheries 
where governmental authority was already weak. 
The Passamaquoddy region offers an ideal example of borderlands smuggling in 
the years following the American Revolution to the 1820s. During this period, the 
international border running through Passamaquoddy was extremely ill-defined and 
subject to periodic military and diplomatic correction. By 1783, two theoretically 
antagonistic groups settled Passamaquoddy. Loyalist adherents to the British Crown 
settled the New Brunswick side of Passamaquoddy Bay, while republican Americans 
settled the Maine side. Despite the ideological differences of these two groups, and 
various laws to prohibit trade between them, Passamaquoddy residents engaged in a 
lively smuggling trade even when the United States and Great Britain were fighting the 
War of 18 12. The scale and persistence of illicit trade at Passanlaquoddy resulted in 
copious diplomatic, military, and law enforcement documentation that provides a wealth 
of detail concerning the dynamics of smuggling. In addition, the accommodation 
between ideologically opposed groups at Passamaquoddy provides an opportunity to 
compare the historical experience of Canada and the United States, both of which have 
developed an extensive frontier mythology, one based on peace, order, and good 
government, the other on "rugged individualism" and violence. 
Professional scholars have long noted the presence of a borderlands community at 
Passamaquoddy. The first major monograph on the subject was Harold A. Davis's aptly- 
named An International Community on the St. Croix (1604-1930), published in 1950.18 
Since then scholars in a variety of disciplines have written a number of articles, essay 
collections, and conference papers on the "Northeast  orderl lands."'^ Yet problems with 
the borderlands model exist as well. Some Canadian nationalists find the borderlands 
model threatening, and insist that locals knew who belonged on what side of the border.*' 
Furthermore, the borderlands model is difficult to distinguish from the idea of a 
"frontier," and those differences have yet to be satisfactorily ~et t led.~ '  In addressing 
issues of the frontier experience and borderlands accommodation, this dissertation seeks 
to understand the paradox of ideological enemies engaged in illicit trade at the expense of 
their respective states. 
But these frontierhorderlands smugglers were elusive even then; how can a 
scholar determine the details of smuggling centuries after the fact? Finding smugglers 
who do not want to be found was always a difficult task for customs officers; finding 
smugglers two hundred years later would seem to be an impossible task for a scholar. 
Yet smugglers seldom attempted to break the law on both sides of the border, and 
generally preferred to appear to conduct trade legally. A comparison of customs records 
uncovers inconsistencies that indicate smuggling. For example, American ships that 
cleared through customs at Halifax, Nova Scotia, during the War of 18 12 clearly engaged 
in illicit trade with the enemy, and thus may be deemed smugglers. Legal records and 
sometimes even correspondence among merchants and with officials can yield 
information about smuggling. 
The foremost source of smuggling data comes from law enforcement agencies, 
and above all from court records. Yet a number of concerns have recently arisen over the 
use of judicial and other legal archives. Some historians fear the " seductive influence of 
the archives" might cause historians to unwittingly falsify or distort the subject they 
study; another concern is that scholars attach too much meaning to primary documents, 
simply because they exist.22 Others such as George RudC fear that since officials created 
and controlled archives, the written record is biased against the masses, based on the 
presumption that those in power are inherently inimical to the interests of ordinary 
people.23 Michel Foucault lamented the terseness of the official record concerning 
people driven to crime as having "lives of a few brief lines or pages; misfortunes and 
mishaps without number, all bundled together in a handful of words."24 
Judicial officials certainly wielded power, and could and did abuse that power. 
But written records are a two-edged sword. In fact, smugglers were very adept at using 
the written record against officials. Sometimes smugglers were able to use their control 
or sympathy of lower courts to frustrate federal district or colonial vice-admiralty courts. 
Whenever possible, the use of court records has been checked against newspaper 
accounts, manuscript journals, and correspondence. Comparing Canadian versus 
American, and local versus higher jurisdiction court sources has also revealed a number 
of contradictions that assist in understanding the often complex smuggling schemes 
resorted to by borderland residents. 
While the written record is incomplete concerning smugglers, by combining 
American and colonial records from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia a wealth of details 
emerges. American federal court records provide a detailed account of smuggling, 
including the names of smugglers and their place of residence, the type of materials 
smuggled, and the methods both smugglers and law enforcement officials employed. 
Depositions and affidavits, even transcriptions of verbal examinations, are sometimes 
available in the records of Maine's federal district court. British colonial vice-admiralty 
court records provided a less substantial picture. New Brunswick's vice-admiralty court 
records have not been found, but Nova Scotia's vice-admiralty court records contain 
substantial records concerning smuggling in the Bay of Fundy. Collectively, these 
records provide a sufficient body of evidence to compare with United States federal court 
records. A database conlpiled from court and other records pernlits the tracking of 
individuals who frequently crossed the border. For example, Stephen Humbert appeared 
in New Brunswick legislative papers as a "preventative officer" who pursued smugglers 
at Passamaquoddy in 1820; but American legal records revealed that federal officials 
accused Humbert of smuggling in 1808. 
Court records certainly have pitfalls. There is the possibility that they reveal only 
unskilled or unlucky smugglers, and thus skew the study away from successful 
smugglers. But to sophisticated smugglers, who manipulated the legal system to their 
own ends, getting caught often presented an opportunity to legitimize the presence of 
their contraband goods. Smugglers often informed against themselves as a tactic to 
illicitly introduce goods into the United States, but such tactics were seldom required in 
British North America, where customs officials tended to ignore most smuggling 
altogether. Smugglers also frequently testified on behalf of other smugglers in court, or 
could be confident that a jury of their peers would simply refuse to prosecute them in 
American courts. Far from putting an end to smuggling, legal prosecution could be used 
as a means to safely introduce contraband into a forbidden market. 
Because smuggling often closely resembled legal commerce, another form of 
legal record frequently involved snlugglers: the lawsuit. Just as licit traders often sued 
one another, smugglers also sought redress in lower courts. Both Maine and New 
Brunswick county-level court records demonstrate details of borderlands accommodation 
not found in American federal and British vice-admiralty court records. Of particular 
interest are records that indicate business transactions across the border during times 
when the law forbade commercial intercourse, such as during Jefferson's embargo. By 
cross-referencing local court records with higher courts and comparing court records 
across the border, a more complete picture of borderlands smuggling emerges. The 
judicial record is thus rich in resources for the scholar of smuggling. 
Some correspondence of known smugglers survives. Sometimes found in legal 
files, but more often within the correspondence collections of fellow merchants. 
Smugglers, after all, were businessmen, and had to communicate closely with their 
partners. The references are often subtle, such as a request to keep someone's name out 
of a business transaction; but sometimes they are blatant, as when one Maine merchant 
wrote directly to the governor ofNova Scotia during the War of 1812 requesting 
permission to smuggle.25 
In organizing and analyzing the surprisingly large amount of infom~ation on 
Passamaquoddy smuggling, a topical, rather than chronological approach has been 
utilized. This work is ten chapters long, including six thematic chapters, three chapters of 
case studies, and a conclusion. 
Chapter One considers smuggling as a world-wide historical phenomenon, 
placing Passamaquoddy's smuggling in global perspective. This chapter also considers 
the importance of smuggling in the debate over the transition to capitalism in Western 
society. This chapter also introduces Stephen Humbert, a Loyalist merchant from Saint 
John, New Brunswick. A smuggler, hymn writer, and sometime customs officer, 
Humbert embodied most of the essential virtues and vices of merchants trading at 
Passamaquoddy. 
The next chapter considers Passamaquoddy within the framework of borderlands 
theory. It establishes borderlands values as a set of pragmatic attitudes shared 
throughout North American frontier society. These values concentrated at the geographic 
limits of state authority due to the dynamic created between governments attempting to 
assert their sovereignty and locals with an ambivalent or anlbiguous attitude toward the 
state, and outsiders who attempted to manipulate Passamaquoddy's ill-defined border to 
their own purposes. Toward that end, a fairly detailed geographical description of the 
region is included, as well as a consideration of the Euro-American settlers who arrived 
at Passamaquoddy after the American Revolution. The idea of borderlands theory is 
personified in the life of Lewis Frederick Delesdernier, an American customs officer who 
generally sympathized with smugglers. 
Chapter Three considers the problems the United States government had in 
enforcing anti-smuggling laws at Passamaquoddy. The laws governing commercial 
intercourse were extremely complex, and thus are explored in some detail. Locals often 
resented efforts to enforce those laws, thereby creating a tension between state officials 
and local individuals. One byproduct of this tension was corruption among customs 
officials, a crime even more well concealed than smuggling. Local sympathy with 
smugglers, even at the official level, was a major factor in the creation of borderlands 
attitudes, as was antipathy towards officials who rigidly enforced commercial laws. 
The fourth chapter is a comparative analysis of American federal customs 
administration and the British imperial customs system. While the systems were similar 
in many respects, there were important differences that underscore the changes wrought 
by the American Revolution. Attitudes toward officeholders and using violence to 
pursue smugglers were markedly different in Loyalist New Brunswick than they were in 
republican Maine. Yet official corruption, especially in tolerating smuggling at 
Passamaquoddy, was a problem in British North America, just as it was in the United 
States. The problem was keenly felt both in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 
Smuggling scandals frequently divided the elites of both colonies, resulting in political 
feuds and, on one occasion, in a famous duel in Halifax. The same can be said of Maine, 
where the state's first governor became involved in a scandal based on his own 
smuggling during the War of 18 12. 
The fifth chapter considers the evolution of borderlands values among 
Passamaquoddy7s Euro-American inhabitants after the American War of Independence. 
The local conlponent of the borderlands dynamic reveals that despite the calamities of the 
American Revolution, American citizens and British subjects continued to regard one 
another as essentially the same people. Cross-border cooperation came easily to peoples 
united by language, culture and experience, especially if it meant mutual profit. 
Untangling these connections is a vital part of rediscovering the commonalities between 
Canada and the United States, thus reducing the temptation to consider each as a sealed, 
separate identity without influence or effect on the other. 
Chapter Six considers the influence of economic adventurers and governmental 
enforcers in creating a borderlands dynamic. Young merchants, often outsiders, men 
determined to make their fortunes even if it meant defying the law, were the most 
dangerous smugglers. These adventurers strongly resembled the sort of smugglers Adam 
Smith described in his Wealth of ~ a t i o n s . ~ ~  These smugglers defied the law and created 
considerable disturbances within the border communities, yet locals and even customs 
authorities often tolerated, and even encouraged their presence. Unraveling the secrets of 
the adventurers and enforcers and why so many came to as remote a region as 
Passamaquoddy reveals that borderlands attitudes were not restricted to border regions, 
but merely concentrated there. Individuals disgruntled with the state, especially its 
commercial laws, flocked to Passamaquoddy with expectations of local sympathy and 
possibilities unavailable in areas with stronger government institutions. Conversely, 
because so many people at Passamaquoddy were unhappy with state controls, 
governments sent bureaucrats and military units to control their behavior. 
Chapters seven; Eight, and Nine present case studies of borderland conflicts 
centered around smuggling. Contemporaries described these conflicts as wars, and 
indeed the second was a declared war: the War of 18 12. The first of these confrontations 
was Jefferson's embargo (1 807-1 809), a complete American cessation of trade that 
produced the "Flour War." The failure of the embargo, despite the allocation of huge 
resources to stop smuggling at Passamaquoddy, demonstrated not only the weakness of 
the fledgling American government, but also the strength of the American commercial 
instinct. The second conflict, the War of 1812, which is considered in Chapter Eight, 
unfolded at Passamaquoddy largely as a struggle over smuggling. Initially this illegal 
intercourse was encouraged by British colonial officials to undermine the American war 
effort, but New Brunswick authorities soon found that they had to contend with their own 
smuggling problem. Chapter Nine explores the degree to which British commercial 
policy promoted smuggling after the War of 18 12, especially during the "Plaster War" of 
1820. Years of official laxity, combined with American encouragement, produced a 
border conflict that proved just as violent and ineffectual as Jefferson's embargo. The 
con~plex interactions among the state, outsiders looking for quick profits, and locals who 
maintained cross-border ties weave throughout all three chapters and produced a 
borderland dynamic that emphasized cross-border tolerance over ideological concerns. 
Chapter Ten differs from the previous ones in considering how the facts of 
smuggling were remembered and forgotten in the region. How did locals and others 
remember smuggling as a part of their past? Given the fact that smuggling was a furtive 
activity, pinning down its menlory can be difficult, but at Passamaquoddy illicit 
commerce was so massive and important it could not be ignored. Analyzing the half- 
truths, distortions, and outright lies that borderlands residents fabricated, and comparing 
those myths against documented facts are an important way to evaluate the subtler 
dimensions of borderlands thought. It also poses a serious challenge for the historian 
attempting to untangle fact from fiction. This final chapter also serves as an epilogue, 
drawing together the study's arguments about borderlands theory and why smuggling and 
other border-related crimes offer a new insight into how neighboring states interact at 
their boundaries. These include the ongoing nature of smuggling, which continued at 
Passamaquoddy into the twentieth century. All of these ideas exist on a backdrop of 
borderlands theory, which can be a powerful tool for breaking history out of the national 
boundaries that usually constrain it. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE GLOBAL' CONTEXT OF SMUGGLING 
Introduction 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century accounts of smuggling often provide 
conflicting views on the subject. Dr. Johnson's definition of a smuggler as a "wretch 
who, in defiance of the laws, imports and exports goods without payment of the customs" 
is very typical of contemporary feelings towards those engaged in smuggling, at least 
among those who allied themselves with the rising authority of the nation-state.' 
Certainly smuggling threatened the standing order and undermined deference to political 
and social leaders. A telling example of how smuggling eroded deference is shown in the 
journal of Methodist missionary Joshua Marsden, who stumbled across some smugglers 
one night in Digby, Nova Scotia and recorded the following: 
Digby is given up to smuggling, and at night, when the 
smugglers came on board, to carry their contraband goods 
ashore, we were greatly disturbed with their profane and 
worldly conversation; they continued to grow worse, and at 
last we reproved them, but this brought upon us a flood of 
reproach and invective: one of them, to show his 
importance, quoted a scrap of latin, but upon my calmly 
telling him we did not deal in scraps, his h ry  became 
ungovernable; and I believe, had it not been for fear of the 
consequence, they would have murdered us both.2 
This account is representative of how those in power reacted to smuggling. Marsden was 
a Methodist missionary and an outsider, and probably did not understand initially that 
these men working on the Sabbath were smugglers. The smugglers themselves remained 
anonymous, but at least one had some education, and while violence was not their first 
choice, they were clearly prepared to harm Marsden. This incident represents not only a 
chance encounter between missionary and smuggler, but also a very small part of the 
struggle between those in authority and common people that was unfolding in the Atlantic 
world throughout the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth cent~r ies .~  
Marsden defies the assumption, however, that he was a priggish upholder of the 
status quo. He actually came from modest origins, and had sailed before the mast as a 
common sailor. Nor was Marsden ashamed of his common origins; he wrote about them 
quite freely in his published autobiography.4 Marsden was rather more circumspect in his 
handling of the deacon who worked under him in the Saint John, New Brunswick, 
Methodist church, a pious Loyalist named Stephen Humbert. Marsden made no mention 
of the deacon in his autobiography, whom he snubbed on the grounds that Humbert 
engaged in the smuggling trade, thereby creating no small amount of tension within the 
Saint John Methodist community between the missionary and the deacon.' Thus on both 
sides of the Bay of Fundy Marsden ran into problems with smugglers, a uniquely 
interesting phenomenon given the fact that Methodists were a Christian sect with specific 
injunctions against smuggling. Methodism's founder, John Wesley, deemed smuggling 
as bad as highway robbery, and discouraged his congregations in Comwall and Dover 
from engaging in the practice.6 
Methodists are an interesting group because their values were particularly well 
adapted to the social transformations that were creating a new liberal order in western 
society. Methodist emphasis on self-discipline and sobriety fit well into the rise of an 
industrial society. British Methodist missionaries in the West Indies played an important 
role in the abolition of slavery, one of the great early liberal achievements that proved the 
viability of social progress.7 Methodists also disapproved of smuggling, one of the great 
scourges of mercantilist commercial policy, and smuggling rapidly died away as 
principles of free trade came to increasingly dominate the British commercial 
consciousness. Methodists thus placed themselves at the heart of the great controversies 
and events of the early nineteenth century, not only in Canada, the United States, and 
Britain, but throughout the Atlantic world. Their role has not been easy to track; 
apparently Methodists neither supported nor undernlined the status quo, and even the 
notable Marxist historian E.P. Thompson has accused the Methodists of robbing the 
proletariat of their anger against those who would be their  master^.^ Methodists in British 
North America, even in the relatively isolated colony of New Brunswick, shared the same 
set of internal contradictions with their brethren elsewhere. Pious Methodists like 
Stephen Humbert engaged in the forbidden but common practice of smuggling, yet at the 
same time many Methodists were fierce defenders of the status quo, of which many could 
claim membership. Humbert's sins and crimes intertwined inextricably with his 
achievements and merits. Among these was the fact that he had proven his loyalty to the 
British crown during the American War of Independence, yet Humbert, a Loyalist rehgee 
fiom New Jersey, traded both licitly and illicitly with the old American foe. How are we 
to understand the seeming contradictions between his professed devotion to Methodism 
and the British monarchy and his sinful and illegal activities as a smuggler? 
Humbert's paradoxical behavior bears examination, for it touches on some of the 
major themes in the early nineteenth century, especially the rise of free trade. The region 
surrounding the Bay of Fundy was one of the great smuggling centers of the Atlantic 
world in the first decades of the nineteenth century.9 An understanding of smuggling will 
help us better understand Humbert's actions, and in turn may shed some light on the 
conlmercial connections that linked Canada's Maritime Provinces to New England 
despite the political boundary that technically separated the two regions into separate 
political and economic spheres. 
Understanding Smuggling 
While lexicographer Samuel Johnson and other members of the privileged class 
denounced smuggling, other contemporary accounts leaned in the opposite direction. h 
addressing the new United States Congress in 1789 on the problem of smuggling, Fisher 
Ames stated, "The habit of smuggling pervades our country. We were taught it when it 
was considered rather as meritorious than ~riminal."'~ Ames referred back to the time 
before the American Revolution, when British imperial attempts to curb smuggling had 
helped to spark the spirit of revolt. Ames addressed the fact that the Revolution was 
partly initiated by angry crowds engaged in direct protest against anti-snluggling policies. 
These actions resulted in the burning of the revenue cutter Gaspee and other 
demonstrations of popular will. 
But smuggling was far more than an ideological statement, or a struggle between 
the haves and the have-nots. It was an activity participated in eagerly by all levels of 
society. Future British Prime Minister Robert Walpole himself used an admiralty barge 
to smuggle wine up the Thames, thereby avoiding heavy duties.12 The political elite of 
both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick engaged in smuggling; accusations of smuggling 
resulted in a duel in Halifax in 18 19 between the son of the provincial attorney general 
and a local merchant.13 Similarly, Maine's political and economic leaders actively 
participated in smuggling.14 Smuggling in North America was in fact "big business," as 
Francis Jemings has pointed out.'' Those charged with enforcing anti-smuggling laws 
found it a daunting task not only because of violent resistance, but also because of apathy 
or resistance from above.16 
Sympathy for smugglers surfaces in surprising places. Adam Smith, the famed 
political economist and a customs officer himself, wrote extensively about smugglers in 
his Wealth of Nations, the book that forms the basis of western liberal economic thought. 
He insisted that smugglers were essentially honest citizens but that unjust laws "made 
that a crime which nature never intended to be so."" Smith's answer-free trade-was 
the force that ended smuggling as a significant social and economic phenomenon. Free 
trade involved removing as many trade restrictions as possible, including the taxes and 
trading restrictions smugglers found so onerous. It should therefore be little surprise to 
learn that smugglers in both Britain and Passamaquoddy referred to themselves as ''free 
traders," putting into practice the very concepts that Smith advocated, even if they were 
illegal. 
The debate on illicit trade was not restricted to these few examples. Smuggling 
afflicted societies worldwide, but everywhere it had a persistent unique quality-- 
smuggling always involved crossing a border. The Bay of Fundy was one such border 
region that became notorious for smuggling after the creation of an international 
boundary on the region's southern edge in 1783. In the decades that followed, smuggling 
continued despite efforts to curb it by governmental forces on both sides of the border. 
International Examples of Smuggling 
An understanding of illicit trade on a global scale places smuggling in the Bay of 
Fundy well within the nonnal commercial impulse of the Atlantic world. Virtually all 
societies engaged in evading commercial regulations, including groups as diverse as First 
Nations women carrying furs into New York from New ~rance," Acadians trading furs 
with Massachusetts ~ a ~ , ' ~  colonial Philadelphians smuggling French rn0lasses,2~ British 
merchants introducing textiles illicitly into New ~ranada?'  Yankee smugglers trading 
with South ~ m e r i c a , ~ ~  American merchants landing tobacco at night on the Irish 
Loyalists from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia bringing gypsum to eastern Maine, 24 
and even the introduction of contraband slaves into the United States via ~ l o r i d a . ~ ~  The 
scale was enonnous. While economic historians John J. McCusker and Russell R. 
Menard have attempted to downplay smuggling as "a tiny fraction of all goods handled," 
other historians have vehemently asserted that smuggling was not only an enormous part 
of colonial trade, but also intrinsic and necessary for colonial economies.26 
Smuggling existed throughout the Atlantic basin, at many levels and in different 
societies. For the struggling poor the problem was to wrest a living, while for political 
leaders the problem was how to better control national wealth to strengthen the state. At 
first glance one might place smuggling within the tradition of proletarian struggle against 
the standing order as outlined by neo-Marxists such as E.P. Thompson, and more recently 
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus ~ed ike r .~ '  But while smugglers engaged in all the tumults, 
riots, and traditional forms of comn~unity protest that excite neo-Marxist scholars and 
others, these "fair traders" also seem to have collaborated with the rising middle class and 
actively -even enthusiastically- engaged in the new market economy. Out of this 
confusion one may surmise that smuggling played a significant role in the transition to a 
capitalistlmarket economy. 
This struggle between smugglers and governments played out all over the globe. 
Smuggling had the potential to seriously undermine the authority of the state. The 
wildest example of this is in Qing Period China between 152 1 and 1566, when smugglers 
defied the emperor's authority in fleets that sometimes numbered in the hundreds.28 
Consider also the famously violent French smuggler Louis Mandrin (1725-1775), who in 
the mid-eighteenth century gathered a small army that smuggled goods and persecuted 
customs officials until the French military finally intervened and captured him.29 Even 
the indomitable British Admiral Horatio Nelson found himself unable to stop smuggling 
in Antigua in the late 1780s, one of the few defeats in his naval career.30 These struggles 
were not necessarily class struggles, but they were clearly a struggle between the state and 
its inhabitants. Some of the fiercest struggles occurred in the first state to enter the 
market and industrial revolutions: Great Britain. 
Britain, the foremost commercial nation of the eighteenth- and early nineteenth 
centuries, and the first to enter the industrial revolution, suffered an astonishing degree of 
smuggling that threatened both the government's revenues and its authority. British 
smugglers fiequently operated in large, well-armed gangs that openly defied customs 
officers and even military units. Smugglers broke into customhouses, murdered 
informants, intimidated the legal system, bribed officials, and even rescued compatriots 
fiom London's Newgate prison. This struggle between smugglers and the government 
occurred not only in isolated coves in Comwall and Sussex, but even on the docks of 
London, where a small army of bureaucrats and enforcement officers attempted to 
regulate and tax goods imported fiom Britain's growing empire. 
Illicit trade and smuggling-inspired violence required that the Crown mount a 
sustained and expensive effort to suppress it, often when the government was fighting 
wars overseas that required the very revenue that smuggling denied. In 1767, the British 
Crown employed 2,687 men to stop smuggling; in 1783 it employed 4,235, and boats in 
proportion; yet Parliament reckoned that smugglers introduced twenty million pounds of 
tea and thirteen million gallons of brandy into Britain between 1780 and 1 783.31 
Parliament reported that smuggling gangs of up to seven hundred roamed the English 
~ountryside.~~ By 1784 there were nine cavalry regiments and fifty-six revenue cutters in 
England and Scotland dedicated to suppressing smuggling, at a cost of well over a quarter 
million pounds.33 They fided. Parliament responded with several investigations headed by 
Lord Sheffield and ever harsher laws. By 18 19 the cost of the preventative service 
amounted to £546,402. The cost in lives escalated as well; throughout the 1820s gun 
battles erupted on England's southern coast. Both smugglers and preventative officers 
died; the authorities hanged several prominent smugglers, and transported hundreds more 
to distant colonies.34 
Smuggling was not successfblly curbed in England until the 1840s when an 
enornlous army of coast guards, combined with lower tariffs, made smuggling difficult 
and unprofitable. In some ways the destruction of the smuggling trade was a triumph for 
those espousing Adam Smith's liberal economics, such as Sir Robert Peel, prime minister 
in the early 1840s. Peel found that by lowering tariffs and throwing open British ports to 
the world's shipping, many of the financial incentives to smuggle goods disappeared.35 
Yet at the same time the state had to create a massive enforcement machinery to ensure 
that trade was carried out legally, so that it could be taxed and regulated. Illicit trade 
became increasingly furtive, involving concealment and bribery in the ports rather than 
large gangs on the beaches.36 In addition the type of smuggled commodities changed: 
smuggling increasingly became a matter of moving small, high-priced items rather than 
shiploads of bulky wool or barrels of claret. By 1857 British smuggling was a mere 
shadow of what it had been due to both increased state control and the effects of fiee 
trade.37 
What drove British smuggling? British neo-Marxists such as Cal Winslow 
perceive smuggling in the same light as poaching and wrecking, a 'right' conmon people 
possessed according to custom and traditi~n.~' Ending sn~uggling, therefore, required a 
change in societal views as well, and the industrial revolution, as Hobsbawm observed, 
was "not merely an acceleration of economic growth, but an acceleration of growth 
because of, and through, economic and social tran~formation."~~ The industrial 
revolution harkened in a new age that demanded rationalization, professionalization, and 
respect for the law. Not surprisingly Methodists, a sect particularly attuned to this new 
age with its emphasis on improvement, self-control, sobriety and abolition of slavery, 
were early opponents of smuggling as well.40 
The industrial revolution thus played an important part in ending the social 
economy of smuggling. The smuggler did not fit well into the scheme of modem 
commerce, which tended to confine international trade to fewer ports with larger and 
more modem facilities. But these causes were probably secondary to the rise of free 
trade; Britain entered into a period of unfettered trade that made most smuggling 
unne~essary.~' The transition from mercantilism to economic liberalism put many 
smugglers out of work and made them conform to new economic realities. Those who 
remained in the trade practiced it through bribery, subtlety, and concealing cargoes within 
vessels. This practice, true to the age, was dubbed "scientific smuggling.'42 
Smuggling and the American Revolution 
The American Revolution had a profound effect on North American history. Not 
only did it create the United States, but it also ultimately contributed to the development 
of Canada as a part of North America that consciously rejected revolution and American 
ideology. For many American historians, smuggling played a role in developing both an 
American identity and an American ideology. Generally these studies cast American 
patriots as smugglers, even revolutionary leaders such as John  anc cock.^^ 
Serious colonial problems with royal customs began in 1762, when Parliament 
passed an act calling for renewed vigilance on the part of customs oficers stationed in 
North America. Since American colonies had long ignored crown trade regulations, 
colonists saw the sudden vigilance of royal customhouse officers as a dangerous 
precedent.44 In contrast, the British government saw smuggling as "a Practice carried on 
in contravention of many express and repeated Laws, tending not only to the Dimunition 
and Impoverishment of the Publick Revenue, at a Time when this Nation is labouring 
under a heavy Debt incurred by the last war for the Protection of America; but also to 
expose every fair Trader to. . .even Danger of Ruin by his not being able to carry his 
Commodities to market on an equal footing with those who fraudulently evade the 
Payment of the just dues and ~ustoms.'"~ To counter the threat of smuggling, the British 
government appointed a host of new customs officers, used the Royal Navy to enforce the 
Navigation Acts, and even tampered with the colonial vice-admiralty courts that had 
previously been very lenient with colonial smugglers. This latter action, especially the 
removal of vice-admiralty jurisdiction to Halifax, Nova Scotia, alarmed many colonial 
smugglers, who rightly perceived that renewed imperial vigilance would cut into their 
profits. Some colonists saw these actions as dangerous innovations that threatened their 
liberty; others were less concerned. 
The northern commercial colonies were the most outspoken in their opposition to 
new custonlhouse regulations, especially Massachusetts Bay. The means used by 
Massachusetts varied from legal action to violence. Lawyers such as the young John 
Adams and James Otis successfully frustrated crown officials in court. The irritation of 
crown officials with Otis became so intense that a customhouse officer beat him over the 
head with a cane, permanently debilitating him.46 When legal methods ultimately failed 
against the determined royal government, the colonials adopted extra-legal methods. 
Mobs throughout New England met the use of lightly armed revenue cutters with force. 
Naval vessels met with yet more resistance, including the destruction of HMS Gaspee in 
Rhode ~sland.~'  Mobs in Massachusetts were equally adamant in obstructing royal 
customs officials. The most famous incident involved John Hancock's sloop Liberty in 
1768, which directly resulted in the garrisoning of Boston with regiments of regulars. 
Bostonians harassed the troops constantly, resulting in the Boston massacre of 1770. 
Notably, the crowd had been provoking the guard posted at the cus tomh~use .~~  One
rumor circulating in Boston even asserted that customs officials fired muskets out of the 
second story windows of the customhouse into the crowd.49 
Maine, the third admiralty district of colonial Massachusetts, went through a very 
similar process of resistance to crown authority. The only customs officials in Maine 
were those in the port of Falmouth (later Portland). From there they sometimes ranged up 
the coast to suppress smuggling and enforce the Navigation Acts. Events paralleled those 
in Boston. Local courts supported ~ v o l o u s  lawsuits against customs officials, but 
refused legal proceedings initiated by crown collectors. In 1766, the people of Falmouth 
protested the Stamp Act by mobbing the customhouse, demanding the parcel of stamp 
paper, and burning it in the street. Later that year a mob in Falmouth rescued a cargo of 
smuggled West India goods seized by customs officials. The unpopularity of the crown 
officials in Falmouth continued to grow as their powers became more arbitrary. In one 
instance a crowd armed with pistols forced a customhouse officer to name an in for~ner .~~  
The most despised of Falmouth's crown officials was Comptroller of Customs 
John Malcom. This man had already become notorious in Rhode Island and North 
Carolina for his obnoxious political views and enforcement of unpopular commercial 
laws. Malcom proved to be just as unpopular in his native Maine as he was in other 
colonies. In 1773 local merchants and magistrates incited a crowd of sailors to rough-up 
Malcom after he seized a vessel in Wiscasset, Maine. The mob broke Malcom's sword (a 
token of crown authority), and tarred, feathered, and paraded him around the settlen~ent.~' 
Malcom fled to Boston, where he suffered fiu-ther abuse at the hands of another 
The lesson was not lost on his fellow customs officers. In the spring of 1775, most of 
Falrnouth's customs officials fled to the safety of HMS Canceau, including men like 
Thomas Wyer, who spent much of the war at a British outpost on Penobscot Bay in 
eastern Maine, and later became a merchant and local official at St. Andrews, New 
Brunswick, on Passamaquoddy ~ a ~ . ~ ~  
Boston saw the most smuggling-related violence, however. The Boston crowds 
identified Crown customhouse officers with royal government because they were the 
most obvious manifestation of British authority until the British army garrisoned the 
town. Some scholars have attempted to link revolutionary fervor with smuggling, but this 
does not seem to be a compelling argument. Yet it may be possible to link customhouse 
patronage with loyalism. Virtually all of Boston's customhouse officers joined the 
Loyalist cause in 1775 and 1776. When the British were forced to evacuate Boston in 
March 1776, a young Loyalist customs officer named Edward Winslow removed the 
royal coat of arms that hung over the entrance to Boston's customhouse. Winslow did 
not want the royal arms defaced by the American forces, and hoped to return them to their 
rightful place someday. That dream proved unrealistic, but Winslow held onto the coat of 
arms and eventually hung them in the council chamber of New Brunswick, a Loyalist 
province created by the British for refugees like himself after the war. Winslow always 
hoped for a customhouse position himself, but like his dream of a Boston under royal 
rule, it too never came to be.54 
Could Loyalists be smugglers as well? The issue has not been addressed by 
American scholars who assumed that only patriots smuggled. But Falmouth and Boston 
Loyalists retained their old business contacts and continued to trade with their American 
counterparts during the war from places like Penobscot and ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ' ~  After the 
war, too, Loyalists in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia continued to conduct illicit trade 
with Americans, even providing some American merchants with false shipping papers 
that allowed them access to forbidden British  market^.'^ Unpopular customs officers in 
the Maritimes were often harassed in a manner similar to Falmouth's and Boston's before 
the war. Sometimes these attacks seemed to have ideological overtones, as when some 
"ill minded and disloyal person or persons" stole the royal coat of arnx hanging over the 
door of the customhouse at Saint John, New Brunswick, in July 1814.'' 
These attacks appear less ideological than immediate responses to unpopular 
taxation and the often heavy-handed methods of British crown customs officers. In 
addition, many Loyalists shared the same commercial values as the republican 
Americans, and smuggling was simply a profitable means of conducting business. 
Lorenzo Sabine, who had been an American customs officer at Passamaquoddy and 
author of a two-volun~e biographical dictionary of Loyalists, noted the Loyalist propensity 
for smuggling and its seeming contradictions with their political principles: 
The Loyalists who, at the peace, removed to the present British 
colonies, and their children after them, smuggled almost every 
article of foreign origin from the frontier ports of the United States, 
for more than half a century, and until England relaxed her odious 
commercial policy. The merchant in whose counting-house I 
myself was bred, sold the "old Tories" and their descendants large 
quantities of tea, wine, spices, silks, crapes, and other articles, as 
part of his regular business. I have not room to relate the plans 
devised by sellers and buyers to elude the officers of the Crown, or 
the perils incurred by the latter, at times, while crossing the Bay of 
Fundy on their passage homeward. But I cannot forbear to remark, 
that, as the finding of a single box of contraband tea caused the 
confiscation of vessel and cargo, the smugglers kept vigilant watch 
with glasses, and committed the fatal herb to the sea, the instant a 
revenue cutter or ship of war hove in sight in a quarter to render 
capture probable. When a spectator of the scene, as I often was, 
how could I but say to myself,-- "The destruction of tea in Boston, 
December, 1773, in principle, how like!'"8 
Loyalists were not blind followers of a royalist ideology. Canadian scholar Esther Clark 
Wright found "that the Loyalists were rather ordinary people subjected to an 
extraordinary e~~erience." '~  In many cases they faced the same rough frontier experience 
as their republican counterparts, especially in New Brunswick, where there was little 
British settlement before 1783.~' One Loyalist response to New Brunswick's primitive 
conditions and uncertain economic conditions after the American Revolution was 
smuggling, a practical commercial stratagem adopted by many of their predecessors in the 
Bay of Fundy region. 
Smuggling in the Bay of Fundy 
The Bay of Fundy, as a part of the greater Atlantic economy, conformed to certain 
patterns. Smuggling was no exception. Throughout the seventeenth century, trade existed 
between the various groups surrounding the Bay of Fundy, including Native 
While governments may have deemed much of this trade smuggling, that term seems 
much too specific for a region so hotly contested, with many overlapping claims of 
sovereignty. Nor were commercial regulations well developed; trade restrictions, such as 
limiting the range of trade goods Indians received for furs, especially rum, seem to have 
been honored more in the breech than in practice.62 Furthemlore, there were no real 
customs agents in the area; seizure of contraband was a military function, and probably 
cases never went to a civilian court. Archaeologists studying the remains of seventeenth- 
century trading posts concluded that commerce with one's potential or actual enemies 
was "a way of life on a frontier where opportunity took precedence over political 
allegiance."63 Pragmatic aptly term describes the activities of the region's inhabitants, 
who suffered a high degree of tunnoil and uncertainty in their lives.64 
During the eighteenth century, as the British exerted control over the area, 
smuggling developed as a means of ameliorating the harsh circumstances of life on a 
frontier. The Acadian people of what is now Nova Scotia technically fell under British 
control after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, yet they traded with whom they pleased.65 
French influence in the Bay of Fundy endured until British forces captured Fort 
Beauskjour in 1755, and New England merchants continued to trade with their French 
colonial neighbors despite the law. Some of these smuggling vessels were heavily amled. 
The Boston smuggling sloop Nancy and Sally carried five swivel guns and a variety of 
muskets and musketoons on board.66 When a British naval vessel attempted to board the 
Nancy and Sally, the smugglers resisted with force, and killed two Royal Navy sailors. A 
court convicted three of the smugglers of manslaughter, branded them on their left hands 
with the letter "M," and imprisoned them for three months. Upon their release, the Royal 
Navy promptly impressed them.67 
The New England settlers who came to the region in the mid-eighteenth century, 
known as Planters in Nova Scotia, also smuggled in much the same way that their 
Massachusetts Bay relatives did. But the scale was unremarkable, involving basic trade 
goods such as rum, wool cards, or a few gallons of molasses. The settlements 
surrounding the Bay of Fundy were too small to support a significant trade licit or 
otherwise.68 Furthermore, between 17 13 and 1775 the region was unified under British 
rule. British regional domination meant that the two local colonial entities, 
Massachusetts Bay and Nova Scotia, operated under similar regulations and markets. 
Nonetheless, British warships such as HMS Jamaica occasionally patrolled the Bay of 
Fundy in the 1760s to suppress smuggling.69 
The American Revolution changed this situation because it created new 
opportunities for those willing to risk crossing the border. When the United States broke 
with Britain, new smuggling opportunities arose as governments attempted to regulate 
and tax trade. American timber merchants were especially eager to sell masts to the 
Royal Navy in Halifax, and gladly received contraband British goods that fetched high 
prices in ~ o s t o n . ~ '  The Loyalists at the British post at Penobscot actively participated in 
this contraband trade, as did various people at Passamaquoddy. The local American 
commander described Passamaquoddy as a hotbed of smuggling, and frequently reported 
his frustration at not being able to stop illicit trade.71 Soon after the end of the war in 
1783, and largely due to the arrival of Loyalists, Britain created the new colony of New 
Brunswick on the northern shore of the Bay of Fundy. One of the first problems its 
administrators faced was controlling smuggling, especially at Passamaquoddy, which was 
divided at the Treaty of Paris in 1783 by the newly created border between the United 
States and the remaining British North American colonies. The problem was exacerbated 
by the Loyalists from Penobscot, who at the end of the war removed to St. Andrews on 
the northeastern shore of Passamaquoddy Bay. Merchants from St. Andrews quietly 
continued their illegal trade with American merchants after the war.72 Other regions in 
the Maritimes suffered from an influx of contraband American goods as well, to the point 
where one Nova Scotia merchant complained in 1787, "that you can scarce enter a House, 
but you see an American package."73 
Smuggling became a more important phenomenon in the region with the approach 
of the War of 1812, when its scope and scale became truly remarkable. Smugglers 
illicitly brought thousands of cattle to Nova Scotia, funneled millions of barrels of flour 
through the Maritimes, and secreted thousands of tons of gypsum across the border from 
New Brunswick into Maine. From 1806 to 1826 a roaring smuggling trade evolved, 
largely as a result of a struggle between American demands for free trade and British 
mercantilist policies that slowly eroded in the early nineteenth century. This constantly 
fluctuating comnlercial war had consequences for the entire Atlantic community, 
reaching from the Caribbean sugar colonies to the Newfoundland fishing industry. On an 
official level, this struggle evolved as a series of trade negotiations and treaties between 
Britain and the United States. But at the local level it often created greater incentives to 
smuggle because protective tariffs created greater incentives to engage in illicit cross- 
border trade. During this time smuggling in the Bay of Fundy closely followed the 
English model of escalating violence and resistance, first on the American side through 
the War of 18 12, and then in the Maritimes after the war. 
Smuggling clearly represented a struggle over trade regulations, but what can it 
tell us about attitudes toward national boundaries? The immediate answer is that the 
borders imposed by the Treaty of Paris in 1783 were contested by the people who lived 
on either side of them. Benedict Anderson's contention that nations were an "imagined 
community" seems particularly apt here, because that imagination had limits.74 The 
residents of Passamaquoddy refused to believe that their neighbors across the border were 
somehow different from themselves. The American citizens of Passamaquoddy must 
have had great difficulty in imagining that somehow the plantation owners of the South 
were somehow closer to themselves than the fishermen of Campobello or Grand Manan 
on the British North American side of the border. The first component of understanding 
borderlands, however refers not to a place, or a process, but to an attitude that rejected the 
arbitrary authority of the state. The most obvious manifestation of this disregard for 
governmental interference in the economy was smuggling. The more government forces 
attempted to halt unregulated trade, the more apparent it became to locals that the state 
was an unwelcon~e and alien force. 
A measure of the importance government attached to the smuggling trade was the 
scale of the effort to halt it. The level of enforcement in the region, especially at Eastport, 
Maine, increased dramatically on the American side of the border. In 1807, the federal 
presence in Eastport consisted of an unarmed customs collector and perhaps half a dozen 
part-time assistants. By 1812, the federal government bolstered that presence with a new 
and more effective collector, a permanent U.S. deputy marshal, a small fortification 
garrisoned by a half company of artillerists, and a revenue cutter. During the war 
additional troops, up to five hundred, patrolled the area to suppress smuggling. In fact the 
only shots discharged in anger by the cannon of Fort Sullivan at Eastport were at 
smugglers: the British captured the post in 1814 without a shot being fired on either 
side.75 However the American forces at Passamaquoddy completely failed, in no small 
part because the local judicial system often favored the smugglers, as did minor customs 
officials and militia.76 
On the New Brunswick side of Passamaquoddy, too, officialdom mustered its 
strength to combat smuggling. The region's Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries 
operated a cutter that occasionally captured smugglers.77 But the custon~s officers in both 
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were pitihlly weak, and often The Royal 
Navy sometimes interfered with smuggling, but the best tool it had to stop smuggling - 
impressment- was no longer in use after 18 15. Nor was the authority of the Royal Navy 
necessarily respected; smugglers on more than one occasion rescued vessels seized by 
naval units.79 The British imperial government as a whole did not seem to be interested 
in promoting colonial commerce over that of the United States, and the colonial 
governments were not capable of halting illegal commerce even when they acted in 
concert. 
An example of this is the effort by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick officials to 
control the carrying trade in gypsum after the War of 1812. Gypsum, mined at the head 
of the Bay of Fundy, was highly desired by American farmers as a fertilizer in the Mid- 
Atlantic and Upper south.'' Until the 1820s Nova Scotia was the foremost producer of 
gypsum in North America. Producers generally shipped it to Passamaquoddy, where 
American merchants bought it in lots of twenty to sixty tons. The plan failed in part 
because of American diplomatic pressure, but also because smugglers at Passamaquoddy 
persisted in selling gypsum to the Ameri~ans.~' Despite the intentions of the provincial 
governments, the small fanners and coastal mariners who carried gypsum to the 
American lines clung to their illicit trade and rejected the centralization of commercial 
authority.82 The manner in which the gypsum smugglers rejected government regulations 
was not subtle: it involved kidnapping government officers, shooting at customs officials, 
and arnling vessels with cannon and muskets. In 1820 a "plaster war" broke out between 
New Brunswick officials and plaster smugglers. At its height, plaster smugglers lashed 
together rafts of up to ten schooners and brigs for self-defense and sailed down 
Passamaquoddy Bay in open defiance of the provincial official appointed to regulate the 
plaster trade. That official was Stephen Humbert, a Methodist deacon and sometime 
smuggler. He proved powerless to resist such determined opposition, and could only 
watch as the plaster vessels made their escape.83 
Like the British model, smuggling in the Bay of Fundy eventually lessened 
through a combination of state intervention and economic liberalization. Illicit trade at 
Passamaquoddy diminished because it became less profitable and more risky, but it is less 
clear that any social transformation occurred in either northern New England or the 
Maritime provinces that made smuggling unacceptable. Small-scale smuggling persisted, 
but the new economic liberalism with its emphasis on fiee trade meant that the days of 
large-scale illicit trade ended in this region by the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Reciprocity, a trade policy whereby British colonies in North America could trade with 
the United States on virtually the same footing as American shippers, proved especially 
effective in removing the incentives to smuggle. The continued development of the 
American customs system, and its counterparts in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 
further discouraged contraband trade at Passamaquoddy. 
Despite regulations, ideology and a variety of other forces, much of the populace 
at Passamaquoddy refused to accept the idea that the border created in 1783 meant that 
people on the other side of it were "foreigners." The state created mechanisms that 
attempted to separate American citizens from British subjects, but despite the law 
Maritimers and New Englanders mixed and seemed to feel it was their right to trade, 
especially at Passamaquoddy. Because the state imposed the border in the very area 
where governmental authority was weakest, locals could and often did choose to ignore 
that borderqS4 Border populations could ignore the authority of distant governments with 
some impunity; they could also offer criminals safe haven. Passamaquoddy's isolation, 
low population density, cross-border marriages and connections fostered by locals, and 
common frontier experiences resulted in a common rejection of commercial regulations 
as bothersome and unnecessary restrictions: smuggling was thus tolerated, and even 
received approval in border communities. Border residents even extended this 
acceptance of illicit trade to "adventurers," smugglers from as far afield as New York 
City, Liverpool, England, or even Sweden and the Caribbean, who in turn reinforced 
resistance to governmental control. 
The Smugglers 
Passamaquoddy's smugglers were not usually cutthroats or pirates; generally they 
were ordinary merchants, farmers, and sailors seeking to augment their incomes or 
support their families.85 As Adam Smith noted in his Wealth of Nations, it was not the 
actions of smugglers that made them lawbreakers, but rather the oppressive laws they 
evaded that made their acts ~riminal.'~ Legal records often named merchants as 
smugglers. Some engaged in the practice habitually, while others indulged only 
occasionally. International accounts agree that smugglers were highly individualistic. In 
China, the term for smuggler, literally translated, means "operating for one's private 
benefit."" In Europe, smugglers were part of a bandit tradition that pitted the poor 
against the powerful, but again, this was an individual rebellion, not part of a mass 
revolt." In England, too, smugglers pursued a doctrine of individualism when they 
claimed freedom from unpopular laws.89 While smugglers were seen as highly 
individualistic, popular belief often championed them as defenders of traditional 
community rights.90 For this reason, public opinion often refused to associate smuggling 
with crime; after all, smugglers provided valuable services to the community.9' In the 
Maritime Provinces, like China, England, and the United States, smuggling had 
widespread support.92 
There were many reasons to smuggle: sometimes it was a carefully calculated 
practice, other times it happened when an unusual opportunity arose, and sometimes it 
happened by mistake, either feigned or actual. Several factors promoted smuggling. 
Political control of mercantilist economies actively attempted to deny certain goods to 
other states, and smugglers often stepped in to provide contraband goods despite 
commercial laws. In effect, the political economies artificially inflated prices by 
regulating or taxing foreign goods; this meant that smugglers could and did often offer 
goods at prices below those set by law-abiding merchants. Furthermore, banking and 
financial systems were too crude to accommodate all merchants in the Atlantic world, 
especially given the perpetual shortage of specie; often merchants and mariners had to 
receive foreign goods in exchange for their own rather than cash. Mercantile culture, too, 
encouraged participants to "buy cheap and sell dear," a maxim that encouraged all 
manner of illicit activity, such as diluting barrels of rum.93 Few assumptions may be 
made about the general honesty of those engaged in conunerce; sharp bargaining became 
increasingly common with the erosion of pre-market values.94 Smuggling was simply a 
part of this mix for many merchants throughout the Atlantic world, especially in regions 
like Passamaquoddy, where the indeterminate border offered unusually good 
opportunities to engage in illicit trade. 
Passamaquoddy's reputation as a smuggler's haven drew merchants such as John 
Clap of New York to the region. He attempted to smuggle a cargo of provisions into 
New Brunswick "in eight different boats, vessels, & rafts," but American officials seized 
his goods and successfully prosecuted him.95 Another example is Nathan Appleton, who 
during the War of 1812 smuggled British manufactured goods into the United States via 
St. Andrews, New Brunswick. He in turn channeled his profits into a manufacturing 
venture sponsored by Francis Cabot Lowell of the famous "Boston Associates" who 
constructed the first large textile mills in the United The lure of profit drew 
adventurers to Passamaquoddy. 
It is less easy to divine the reasons why common fishermen, farmers, and 
timbernlen smuggled. Many undoubtedly engaged in it for profit like the adventurers; 
others wanted to support their families, or found themselves trapped in unusual 
circumstances. Fishermen regularly engaged in smuggling on a small scale, trading 
American provisions and products like shoes to their Maritime counterparts in return for 
fish. This saved the American fishermen a great deal of labor, provided New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia families with food and other goods at reduced prices, and had the added 
bonus that the practice was virtually impossible to detect.97 American fanners frequently 
drove their cattle to the border to sell in British North America, even when their own 
government forbade it. American farmers regarded this practice as their right, even during 
time of war with Britain, when their cattle provided provisions for the British military. 
When government officials attempted to interfere, farmers fought back.98 American 
timbermen, too, engaged in smuggling when their New Brunswick employers chose to 
pay them in goods rather than specie. When they attempted to re-cross the border into the 
United States, American customs authorities sometimes seized their hard-earned British 
goods as ~on t r aband .~~  
In New Brunswick and Nova Scotia smugglers also came from all walks of life. 
Poor mariners and wealthy merchants alike engaged in illegal commerce. Moreover, 
British adventurers from afar canle to the region to smuggle. One such adventurer was 
John Young, a Scottish merchant who ventured to Castine, Maine, to partake of the 
profitable trade with the enemy under the aegis of British troops it's occupation from 
18 14- 18 15. Apparently he was not a man for half measures. Not only did he buy 
smuggled goods from willing Americans, but he in turn avoided the five percent duty 
imposed by British customs officials there. Young packed contraband tobacco, soap, 
candles, and other American goods in barrels of codfish. His justification was of ancient 
vintage: "We are you know creatures of imitative habits & as all around me are 
smuggling I am beginning to smuggle too."'00 Like their American counterparts, some 
Maritimes smugglers used their ill-gotten gains to hnd  more noble ventures. Christopher 
Scott, founder of the Bank of New Brunswick, made his fortune as a smuggler "on the 
lines," as many referred to the border.lO' Samuel Cunard, as a young captain of his 
father's coasting schooner, engaged in the Passamaquoddy smuggling trade, thereby 
launching the career of the man who founded the most famous shipping line in history.'02 
Ordinary Maritimers smuggled, too. Like their American counterparts, they 
participated in a pre-commercial economy that emphasized community bonds. They 
sought to wrest a living by farming, lumbering, or fishing, and feared taxes that had to be 
paid in cash.lo3 Seeking out lower prices, high-quality goods, and easy profits at the 
expense of the govemment was a rational survival strategy that often gained the 
acceptance or at least acquiescence of entire communities. Smuggling at Passamaquoddy 
quickly became something of a local tradition: one New Brunswick local who lived close 
to the border recalled smuggling as one of the region's most important trades, "which 
some are in the habit of styling Contraband-but whlch we call free trade. Our 
geographical position exposes us to great temptations in this respect.-- ,, 104 
With the exception of John Wesley and the Methodists, and a handful of honest 
govemment officials, it is difficult to find a group that found smuggling immoral. 
Common people traded illegally to survive, and local traditions often condoned the 
practice.10s Capitalists smuggled for profit, but even the smuggling adventurers often had 
a very strong strain of Christian morality; often the most religious merchants were the 
most successfd busine~smen. '~~ 
Four out of the five Tappan brothers are a dramatic example of this phenomenon. 
During the War of 18 12 they continued their silk importation business by smuggling 
through Canada. Arthur Tappan, later a renowned Abolitionist famous for his role in the 
Amistad trial, conducted business out of Montreal for part of the war; he later introduced 
contraband cargoes through Castine, Maine."' His older brother John, who taught Arthur 
the mercantile trade, smuggled goods through Halifax and the Bay of Fundy. lo8 Younger 
brother Lewis also seems to have introduced goods illegally into the United States fiom 
British North America. In 18 13, he and his partner George Searle petitioned Congress for 
relief fiom the penalties incurred whde importing goods into the United States through 
Passamaquoddy. Lewis went on to create the nation's first credit information agency, and 
was equally zealous as Arthur in promoting Abolitionism and other moral ref~rms."~ 
The fourth brother, Charles, was involved in collusive capture schemes during the War of 
1812, and admitted as much as an elderly man."' The Tappans became very successful 
businessmen, but early in their careers they smuggled.ll1 Yet at the same time they were 
strictly moral Christians who even forbade their clerks to attend performances at theaters. 
Clearly the public did not perceive smuggling as a morality issue. Even Adam Smith 
thought smugglers were essentially honest people forced into a life of crime by the state's 
commercial laws.' l 2  People who criticized smuggling tended to be those who favored 
government, and thus it was the state and its supporters who tended to brand smuggling 
as an immoral, unpatriotic, or grossly criminal act while most of the public ignored, 
acquiesced, or participated in illicit trade. 
Conclusion 
Smuggling in the Bay of Fundy was a complex phenomenon. It insinuated itself 
into many aspects of the region's history. But did smuggling bind the region together, 
creating a "special relationship" between New England and the Maritimes? While there 
is ample evidence that there were cultural sympathies between New England and the 
Maritimes, it is also apparent that smuggling was business, conducted in line with Adam 
Smith's dictum that a merchant "is not necessarily the citizen of any particular 
country."113 More compelling is the idea that smuggling was a regional and traditional 
response to the centralization of commercial wealth and power."4 Certainly there is an 
element of that in the case of Passamaquoddy. But the presence of so many adventurers 
from distant ports indicates that smuggling was not merely a local phenomenon, but part 
of a larger process that encompassed the entire Atlantic basin: the transition to a market 
economy. Some of the great smuggling merchants invested their profits in the new 
commercial economy then developing. More clear is the idea that smuggling represented 
a challenge to government on both sides of the border. It led to disorder, loss of revenue, 
and higher taxes. Smugglers and government were locked in combat, and sometimes the 
smugglers won, as in the case of the Plaster War. Nor was this struggle confined to the 
Bay of Fundy: smuggling was part of a worldwide struggle that struck at state authority 
and required massive law enforcement efforts and social transformation to defeat. 115 ~n 
the Bay of Fundy, where jurisdictions were unclear or underdeveloped and governmental 
authority weak near the international border, smuggling thrived into the nineteenth 
century. 
In part smuggling thrived at Passamaquoddy and other coastal smuggling havens 
because it was more convenient to conduct illicit trade there than to obey the burdensome 
commercial laws imposed by the state. Another reason smuggling thrived at 
Passamaquoddy was because the border between two great commercial powers ran 
through it. Smuggling was closely related to the border, an invisible line between the 
United States and British North America that profoundly shaped the daily lives of 
Passamaquoddy residents. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
PASSAMAQUODDY AS BORDERLAND 
Introduction 
Lewis Frederick Delesdemier had delayed his report to Secretary of the Treasury 
Alexander Hamilton as long as possible. Delesdernier, the United States Customs 
Collector for the District of Passamaquoddy, belatedly started his report to Hamilton in 
October, 1789. Hamilton demanded that the customs collectors write a detailed report 
outlining the boundaries and economic activities of each customs district. Delesdernier 
set out to complete this task, but Passamaquoddy was a remote and recently settled 
coastal region on the border between Maine and New Brunswick, with a scattered 
population and no roads. It proved difficult to write, in no small part because 
Delesdernier's district was uniquely troubled by the conflicting claims of Britain and the 
United States to sovereignty over the region's several islands. In point of fact, 
Delesdemier kept the United States customhouse on Frederick Isle, a tiny island 
repeatedly claimed by New Brunswick. 
Another of Delesdernier's difficulties was determining exactly what 
Passamaquoddy was; the word meant different things to different peoples. The word 
itself is Native American, and translates roughly as "place where the Pollock are," or 
"place where the Pollock leap entirely out of the water," a reference to the area's 
bountifid fishing grounds.' Euro-Americans generally referred to the indigenous peoples 
who hunted and fished local waters as the Passamaquoddy tribe. The United States 
Congress picked up the term in 1789 when naming customs districts, thus making 
Passamaquoddy a distinct administrative term. But the most common use of the word 
Passamaquoddy was imprecise, denoting the lands surrounding the bay and its numerous 
islands. The eastern shore of the bay was generally conceded to be British-held territory 
after 1783, and the western side American; but both governments claimed jurisdiction 
over the islands in the bay.2 The term Passamaquoddy had many meanings; it was a 
fishing ground, a body of water, a nation, an administrative unit, and a border region. 
Often locals shortened the tern1 to 'Quoddy. 
Passamaquoddy's location on the border between the United States and the 
British colony of New Brunswick complicated Delesdernier's duties in several ways. 
The 1783 Treaty of Paris that established boundaries between the remaining British 
possessions in North America and the newly created United States did so in only vague 
terms, and the new nation and colonial power disagreed on the exact location of the 
border line (see Map 2. I ) . ~  Conflicting claims on both sides meant that local officials 
could not agree where the border was, resulting in legal tangles when law officers 
attempted to impose their authority. Delesdernier's experience of this confusion was 
direct; in December, 1788, armed New Brunswick officials landed on the shore beneath 
his own home and claimed jurisdiction over the island he lived on. Delesdernier 
defended his house with an ax, thereby protecting hearth and home as well as the 
sovereignty of the United ~ t a t e s . ~  
-u=-=u Boundary claimed by Britain 
-"--I,--- Boundary claimed by the United Statu 
- --- - Boundary agreed upon by the commission 
Figure 2.1 : Conflicting Boundary Claims at Passamaquoddy, c. 18 18 
Source: ~arro l ;  A Good and Wise Measure, 45.  
Delesdemier sought a solution to the problem of jurisdiction, and in his report to 
Hamilton requested that he look into the matter. In the mid 1790s the American and 
British governments created a commission to establish a stable border.' But the presence 
of a border or line that allegedly separated American citizen from British subject did not 
mean that people respected the various laws designed to keep the jurisdictions distinct. 
Delesdemier was deeply troubled by the behavior of the people who lived near the 
border. As a customs officer, he was essentially a tax collector, levying tariffs on 
imported goods, regulating shipping, and prosecuting those he caught attempting to evade 
federal commercial laws. Because Delesdemier could not discem the limits of his 
authority until a definite border was established, his efforts to impose federal laws were 
of little avail, especially in attempting to halt illegal commerce. The most troublesome 
spot for Delesdemier was Moose Island. He described the inhabitants of this island as 
"acting in a kind of neutrality (if the expression may be admitted)." Delesdemier's 
apology for the term neutrality is in itself revealing. The collector seemed to feel that this 
behavior was unusual - even embarrassing- to report to the federal government in distant 
New York 
Delesdemier was not the only government official who was troubled by the 
seeming lawlessness of the Passamaquoddy region. George Leonard, Superintendent of 
Trade and Fisheries in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, laid an especially harsh 
judgment on the people of Passamaquoddy. Leonard stated that on top of the smuggling 
activity at Passamaquoddy, "These Islands are the asylum of deserters from the British 
Navy and Army, criminals and absconding debtors from Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick."' Notably, Leonard was a Crown officer whose position largely entailed 
pursuing smugglers; he was also among the most zealous of New Brunswick's Loyalist 
elite, and thus was predisposed to criticize the inhabitants of a region that had been 
especially vexatious to him.8 He was not alone; an American observer suggested in 1802 
that the islands of Passamaquoddy were so troublesome and crime-ridden that they were 
best given to the ~ r i t i s h . ~  As early as 1791, a Scottish traveler stated Moose Island was 
"inhabited by Yanky smugglers, that carry on a contraband traffic with the colonies on 
each side."" Even President Thomas Jefferson referred to the region's inhabitants as the 
"rascals of ~assama~uodd~.""  External observers, especially agents of state authority, 
agreed that crime was endemic at 'Quoddy, and that smuggling was the most common of 
these crimes. 
Border-related crime, and above all smuggling, united Passamaquoddy's 
population despite the ideological differences that separated Maine's republican settlers 
from New Brunswick's Loyalist refugees. Even during the War of 1812, when Britain 
and the United States were at war, British subjects and American citizens mingled on the 
islands of Passamaquoddy Bay to conduct a lively illicit trade. The international 
boundary that ran through Passan~aquoddy was much more than a dividing line; it was an 
interface between two political entities where people mixed and traded, resulting in a 
curious overlapping zone where state authority held little power. The border was the 
central fact of life for Passamaquoddy's residents, who manipulated it to their own ends 
in a way the state often deemed illegal. Understanding the dynamic between crime and 
the border requires a grasp of the region's geography, knowledge of the peoples who 
settled Passamaquoddy, especially those arriving after the American War of 
Independence, and an understanding of how the region's population coped with the 
international boundary. 
Geography of a Smuggler's Haven 
Passanlaquoddy lent itself to smuggling. The border was not only vague, but the 
region itself was remote from governmental authority; even the weather conspired against 
the law. Until 1806, there was no road or even path connecting the American settlers to 
the rest of Maine' s settlements. Beaches often served as footpaths, but the preferred 
mode of transportation was by boat.12 On the New Brunswick side, too, no road 
connected the Loyalist settlements to the rest of the colony until about 1 808.13 Europeans 
and Americans traveled to and from Passamaquoddy by sea for decades after its 
settlement. The geography of Passamaquoddy favored smugglers in several ways. First, 
the cultural geography imposed by Europeans took decades to sort out; the border 
remained hard to place, and both the United States and Britain had conflicting claims of 
sovereignty, especially over the region's many islands. The United States laid claim to 
several islands based on the fact that there was no navigable water between them and the 
United States mainland; in effect it claimed all the islands west and south of the main 
shipping channel.14 The British, however, claimed all of the islands in Passamaquoddy 
Bay. Smugglers utilized these conflicting claims to their own ends. The marine 
geography of Passamaquoddy, especially as it related to navigation, was almost as 
important for smugglers as it was to law officials. 
Figure 2.2: Benjamin R. Jones's "A Map and Chart of the Bays, Harbours, Post 
Roads and Settlements in Passamaquoddy & Machias with the Large Island of Grand 
Manan," 1 8 19. 
To understand that geography one must see the region through the eyes of a 
mariner. Sailors approaching Passamaquoddy had several concerns. The average tidal 
range at Quoddy is from eighteen to twenty feet; during the monthly spring tides the tidal 
difference increased to twenty-seven feet." The tides did not merely rise and fall; the 
greater the tides, the greater the currents associated with them. Twice every day a 
staggering seventy billion cubic feet of water entered and exited Passamaquoddy Bay, 
creating rapid currents, eddies, and even whirlpools. Furthermore, these waters were 
cold. In warmer months, the combination of warm air and cold ocean waters resulted in 
thick fogs that reduced visibility to a few feet; those fogs could last weeks. The 
combination of currents and fog was particularly dangerous to sailing vessels. The perils 
were many: currents might sweep even large ships onto ledges, or cliffs; currents could 
spill passengers from smaller boats into chill waters; fogs hid reefs and other vessels; and 
the combination of the two compounded these problems. To overcome these dengers the 
New Brunswick provincial government authorized aids to navigation and licensed pilots, 
while the American federal government constructed a lighthouse on West Quoddy Head 
in 1808. These efforts helped, but ships continued to wreck. Even the aid of a pilot 
might not help. For example, a New Brunswick court stripped a pilot of his license for 
his improper conduct that led to the loss of the mast shlp Britannia near Campobello in 
1798.16 
Grand Manan Island dominated the approaches to Passamaquoddy and proved a 
formidable obstacle to mariners. The island is cliff-bound on its western and northern 
sides, with numerous shoals, rocks, and rips on the eastern side. Grand Harbor, the best 
port on the island, offered shelter only for smaller vessels such as those used by the 
island's fishermen." Contrary winds, or lack of wind, left sailing vessels at the mercy of 
the tides, inexorably drawing the vessels onto the ledges and rocks that surrounded the 
island.18 Many ships failed to weather Grand Manan and wrecked on its rocky shores.19 
Ideally mariners left Grand Manan to the east as they approached Passamaquoddy. 
If a shipmaster wanted to enter Passanlaquoddy, he had several choices. A 
prudent mariner picked up a pilot with local knowledge to guide him through the 
treacherous channels. A more daring captain might trust the printed sailing directions for 
the area, such as Edmund Blunt's The American Coast Pilot, which was available in 
annual editions fiom the 1 7 9 0 s . ~ ~  Few had access to nautical charts. The cautious 
mariner, on enquiry, discovered there were three channels into Passarnaquoddy: Western 
Passage, Head Harbor Passage (often referred to as the Ship Channel), and Letite 
Passage. The Western Passage was a shallow channel between West Quoddy Head on 
the American mainland and Campobello Island in New Brunswick that narrowed to 
perhaps two hundred feet. Currents, a crooked channel, and shoals dictated that only 
smaller craft use this entry. Sometimes smuggling craft used this entry to elude pursuing 
customs craft. At the eastern end of Campobello lay the main channel, which while full 
of tiderips and boils, was a wide and tremendously deep passage that even the largest 
sailing vessels could enter. The harbor that lay between Moose Island and Campobello 
however was extremely deep and sheltered. Blunt's American Coast Pilot described it as 
"sufficient for 100 sail of the line to lie in."21 The narrow Letite Passage on the eastern 
end of Deer Island was generally too dangerous for sail driven or oar propelled vessels to 
navigate; even modem cruising guides note that its currents run at six to eight knots, with 
eddies, boils, and numerous rocks and ledges.22 On one occasion a New Brunswick 
preventative officer used this channel to escape a wrathful assembly of plaster 
smugglers.23 Most ships used Head Harbour Passage; locals might on occasion use the 
other channels, but they were risky choices. 
Canlpobello offered sailors a sheltered anchorage surrounded by islands, some 
American-held and some British. Most of the islands fell within the British jurisdiction, 
but the American government claimed some as well, especially Moose, Dudley, and 
Frederick islands. Campobello, claimed by the British, was the largest island in the bay. 
Its seven and a half mile length formed a barrier between Passamaquoddy Bay and the 
Bay of Fundy. Campobello had several anchorages, the most important of which was 
Broad Cove. Campobello's handful of settlers rented their land fiom the island's resident 
proprietor, a Welsh eccentric named David  wen.^^ In 1803, about 245 people of all 
ages lived on Campobello. Campobello's populace were mostly fishemen, who operated 
a few dozen open fishing boats and a handful of small trading  schooner^.^' Canlpobello 
was ideally situated for smuggling; its proximity to both the American mainland and 
American-held Moose Island, and its gentle cobble beaches and anchorages provided 
smugglers with a base to quickly introduce contraband into the United States and vice 
versa. 
Deer Island, on the British side of the border, was the second largest island in the 
bay. In 1803, about one hundred and seventeen people, mostly fishermen and their 
families, populated its shores. Despite the fierce currents between Deer Island and the 
American-held islands, it was a smuggler's haven as well. On still nights people on 
American-held Moose Island could hear smugglers loading and unloading boats on Deer 
Island. 
Smallest of the three major islands was Moose Island, settled mostly by 
Americans, but claimed by New Brunswick until 18 18. The British claim to the island 
was sufficiently strong for the British to occupy and garrison Moose Island in 181 4, 
during the War of 18 12. The British retained possession of the island until 18 18, when 
international arbitration restored it to American control.26 Moose Island was the most 
populous of the islands, with a large settlement incorporated by the Conunonwealth of 
Massachusetts as Eastport in 1798. This community grew steadily, 244 in 1790, to 562 in 
1800, over 1500 in 18 10, and almost 2,000 in 1820, making it the largest in the region.27 
Although a fishing community, it increasingly became a commercial center and notorious 
smugglers' den.28 
A mariner sailing through the Bay would also have noted the numerous smaller 
islands that dotted Passanlaquoddy Bay. The most important of these was Indian Island, 
which despite its tiny size had warehouses, piers, stores, and periodically a customhouse 
operated by New Brunswick a~thor i t i es .~~  American authorities claimed jurisdiction over 
Dudley and Frederick Isles, both of which were located between Moose Island and the 
Western Passage. New Brunswick officials claimed sovereignty over these islands until 
after the War of 18 12, too, leaving them in a sort of legal limbo. For several years 
Delesdernier established these islands as American territory by keeping his custon~s 
office there. Numerous other smaller islands dotted the bay as well, many of them 
inhabited by fishermen and merchants who sought to be on the water, Most notorious of 
these was Green Island, better known as "Pope's Folly." This island, claimed by both 
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American and British authorities, was scarcely more than a rock. Despite its tiny size an 
American smuggling merchant named Pope built a wharf and store on the island around 
1 807.~' 
Continuing up Passamaquoddy Bay, mariners faced another challenge. One by- 
product of the tidal currents is "Old Sow," the world's largest regularly occumng 
whirlpool. The unusual name is attributed to the strange noises that emit from the 
whirlpool, an odd combination of grunts and roaring. Old Sow sits astride the present 
border, between Moose Island in the United States and Deer Island in Canada, in the 
main shipping channel to Passamaquoddy Bay proper. A current of three knots is typical 
in the area, but near Old Sow the current can exceed seven knots. Associated eddies and 
countercurrents further complicate n a ~ i ~ a t i o n . ~ '  In an age when motors were unknown, 
Old Sow's currents provided a serious navigational challenge that required prudence, 
patience, and local knowledge to overcome. People periodically perished in Old Sow; a 
New Brunswick paper noted in 18 17 the deaths of five men whose boat "was caught in a 
whirlpool near Dog Island while leaving Moose ~sland."~* 
Passamaquoddy Bay proper lay north of Old Sow. While there were still fierce 
currents there, there was often less fog.33 In 1784, Loyalists founded a substantial port 
community known as St. Andrews on the northern end of the bay. St. Andrews was the 
principal Loyalist community in Passamaquoddy, and besides serving as a commercial 
center it was also the shire town of Charlotte The county's jurisdiction 
included the islands of the bay, Grand Manan, and the entire western shore of 
Passamaquoddy Bay and the St. Croix River. Like Eastport, St. Andrews was a notorious 
smuggling port.35 
On the American shore opposite St. Andrews a small American settlement called 
Robbinston developed. John Brewer, the local postmaster, militia officer and innkeeper 
who also engaged in shipbuilding and the timber trade led this community in the early 
nineteenth century. Typical of local refusal to let the boundary interfere with their 
livelihoods, Brewer married the daughter of Nehemiah Marks, a prominent Loyalist who 
helped found St. Stephen, New Brunswick. This action, combined with his close 
dealings with New Brunswick merchants and his occasional smuggling ventures, ensured 
the enmity of some Americans who viewed him as a traitor, both to the United States and 
the Commonwealth of ~as sachuse t t s .~~  Nonetheless, Brewer rose to local prominence, 
became a brigadier general in the Massachusetts militia, and on occasion took it upon 
himself to defend American soil fkom encroaching British army officers, whom he 
verbally chastised.37 
The St. Croix River - often known as the Schoodic - is nearly a mile wide at its 
mouth; it flows into the northwest corner of the bay between St. Andrews and 
Robbinston. The border now runs down the middle of the channel, but for years after the 
American Revolution both American and New Brunswick officials debated which river 
was the 'true' St. Croix. The Americans claimed it lay east of the Schoodic, while British 
colonial officials claimed it lay to the west. The dispute was finally resolved in the mid- 
1790s by Loyalist Robert Pagan of St. Andrews, who uncovered the remains of an old 
French fortification dating to the early seventeenth century on an island mid-stream in the 
St. Croix. The ruins proved that the St. Croix was the border as intended by the 1783 
Treaty of 
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The St. Croix's head of navigation lay about ten miles upstream from its mouth; 
settlements formed there on both banks. On the American side lay Calais, and on the 
eastern bank lay St. Stephen, New Brunswick, barely a hundred yards away. Shipping 
could not go beyond this point, but smaller craft navigated the St. Croix, and rafts of 
timber floated down from the forests upstream to the sawmills at the falls that lay 
between the two c~mmun i t i e s .~~  Here, too, the border proved awkward. For example, 
the New Brunswick assembly refbsed to grant a license to operate a ferry from St. 
Stephen to Calais because it lacked the powers to pern~it an international voyage.40 
Fog was a constant concern to mariners in this region. Combined with currents, it 
conlpletely disoriented sailors. Fog hindered all mariners, but state agents seemed to find 
it more frustrating than the smugglers. For example, the captain of an American gunboat 
complained of the fog in a letter to the secretary of the navy: 
In consequence of the extraordinary fogs, which have 
completely enclosed us since our arrival in these boats, it is, 
at times, utterly impossible to designate the exact boundary 
line of the United States. I have been extremely particular 
in my orders to the officers of the guard, relative to 
encroachments on the dominions of Gt. Britain, but yet it 
frequently happens that when one imagines himself within 
a few yards of shore, he may, in consequence of the tides 
and eddies, which run with remarkable velocity and from 
every point of the compass, be some miles out. About three 
weeks since, a boat was sent from No. 42, with orders to 
return in fifteen minutes, and altho' the officer of the boat 
exerted utmost of his abilities to obey his instructions, he 
was nearly sixteen hours absent, before he was able to find 
his ~ e s s e l . ~ '  
The elements truly seemed to favor the smugglers at Passamaquoddy. At the very least, 
Passamaquoddy's environment made patrolling the border difficult. But the region's 
inhabitants, who had their own ideas about the border, made state control of the 
Passamaquoddy border a farce. 
The People of Passamaquoddy 
The same pilot who guided mariners into Passamaquoddy probably had to inform 
shipmasters where the border lay and which lands fell under British or American 
jurisdiction. Having arrived at Passamaquoddy, there were precious few clues for the 
mariner to discern which settlements were inhabited by American citizens or those by 
British subjects. The vernacular architecture was identical and the people themselves, 
with the exception of the Indians, were very alike.42 The only clear indicators were the 
flags that flew above fortifications in Eastport and St. Andrews. 
Although it was not always obvious to visitors, several groups - divided by race 
and ideology - occupied the Passamaquoddy landscape. The first was the 
Passamaquoddy Nation, the original inhabitants of the region. The second were British 
colonists who arrived before 1775. The Loyalists, the largest group of settlers, arrived 
very suddenly in large groups in 1783 and 1784. On the American side of the border a 
steady trickle of fishern~en, timbermen, merchants, fanners, and a few artisans slowly 
developed a community of Moose Island and along the west shore of the St. Croix. Each 
of these groups had a different relationship with the border that encouraged cooperation 
rather than conflict with others. 
The most isolated of these societies was the Passamaquoddy Nation, separated by 
race, religion and language from neighboring Euro-American newcomer's. Numbering in 
the several hundreds, the Passamaquoddy maintained their traditional lifestyle as best 
they could in the face of white invasion and pressures for assimilation. This traditional 
lifestyle included hunting in the region's forests and fishing the ocean waters. The 
Passamaquoddy were in many ways a marine people; observers noted their abilities to 
navigate the area's rough waters, especially when hunting porpoise.43 The border 
constructed in the Peace of 1783 bisected the Passamaquoddy homeland. The 
Passamaquoddy suffered directly from the 1783 Treaty of Paris in that Loyalist settlers 
displaced the native community, causing conflict - but not bloodshed - between the 
Indians and British colonists. These troubles peaked in 1784, when the Passamaquoddy 
captured and held a Loyalist surveyor encroaching on their lands. The surveyor soon 
escaped, and the tensions eased when John Allan i n t e r~eded .~~  Jay's Treaty of 1796 
recognized the right of Native Americans to cross the border unhindered, including the 
Passamaquoddy. But that border also offered no protection to the Passamaquoddies; 
whites on both sides plundered valuable timber from Indian lands.45 Correctly perceiving 
their perilous situation on a border between aggressive Loyalist and American settlers, 
the Passamaquoddy pursued a cautious diplomacy with both New Brunswick and 
Massachusetts officials, utilizing their border position to play one side off the other. The 
result was that whites perceived the Passamaquoddy as essentially neutral, and therefore 
worth courting on occasion. For example, both sides sought Indian depositions in the 
1790s when a commission met to determine the location of the St. Croix ~ i v e r . ~ ~  By 
staying aloof and neutral, the Passamaquoddy seem to have steered clear of smuggling. 
However, there is some evidence that they may have sold canoes to smugglers, or even 
acted as guides to smugglers who used Indian trails and canoe routes to bring smuggled 
goods away from Passamaquoddy during the War of 18 1 2.47 
The Passanlaquoddy were a constant presence in the region, but remained 
outsiders largely shunned by white settlers. Euro-American observers often noted Indian 
activities as indicative of the region's exotic nature.48 During the Revolution, the 
Passamaquoddy for the most part supported the revolutionary cause, and were arguably 
the crucial factor in making eastern Maine American territory.49 The American veterans 
who fought alongside the Passamaquoddy, especially John Allan and Louis Delesdernier, 
acted as their advocates after the war. But this friendship seems to have been with a few 
white leaders such as Allan, or David Owen of Campobello, local patriarchs who seemed 
to acquire prestige from their contact with the Indians. Other borderland residents had 
more difficulty. Moose Island merchant Nathaniel Goddard recorded several scuffles 
with Indians who came to his store, but it remains unknown how common this experience 
was.50 These sort of misunderstandings between white merchants and the Indians were 
largely a function of the increasing marginalization of the Passamaquoddy. Because the 
Indians were increasingly viewed as outsiders even in their ancestral homeland, they 
were excluded from the "in group economic morality" and treated less charitably in 
business dealings.51 Their exclusion was based on several factors, the most obvious 
being race and culture. 
Very few Passamaquoddy could speak English, a fact that shielded them from 
Protestant missionaries and other interlopers. 52 Even fewer settlers could speak 
Passamaquoddy, and the language used to communicate was probably French. 
The poor communication and lack of understanding of the Passamaquoddy resulted in a 
degree of fear on both sides of the border. When the War of 18 12 broke out, local leaders 
on both sides of the border hastened to meet with and pacify the Passamaquoddy Nation 
with gifts, although the Passamaquoddy could muster only about sixty men capable of 
waging war.53 The Passamaquoddy, too, reacted to news of the war with fear. Many 
families fled to the woods, and the Passamaquoddy convened a number of meetings with 
other native groups to discuss the war and how they should react to it. 54 
Most Passamaquoddies adhered to the Catholic faith brought to them by French 
missionaries in the early seventeenth century. This, too, set them apart from early white 
settlers, most of whom were Protestant. Religion was very important to the 
Passamaquoddy, and they insisted on and received from Congregationalist Massachusetts 
both a Catholic chapel on Pleasant Point and the services of a priest, all paid for by the 
Massachusetts General The priest for much of the period was Father RomagnC, 
a refugee from the French Revolution. One of his many strengths was his ability to speak 
French, English, and the Passamaquoddy tongue as Romagnk reported the 
presence of a few Catholics among the settlers, too, notably the crypto-Catholic Dunn 
family of St. Andrews. The Dunns were an influential family of office holders in 
Charlotte County. Their secret adherence to Catholicism is especially interesting because 
British office holders were required to deny the authority of the pope." 
If the Passamaquoddy people were distinct and separate from the people who 
arrived later in the region, they were also the reason the first English-speaking settlers 
came to the region. Fur traders were the earliest settlers; they came to trade 
manufactured goods for Indian furs. Fishem~en followed the traders, lured by the 
bountiful fisheries. The most significant settlement emerged on Campobello. The 
wealthy Owen family from Wales received this island as a land grant, and by the early 
1770s attempted to create a farming community named "New Warrington." Many of 
these early settlers were English, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish; others were Yankees from 
New ~ n ~ l a n d . ~ % u r i n ~  the Revolution some sided with the British, others with the 
Americans, and some remained neutral or left. Moreover, some of these early settlers 
were willing to play off one side against the other by engaging in smuggling. As early as 
1778, Passamaquoddy became known as an unstable border region, the refuge of 
smugglers, deserters, and bandits. Both British and American forces kidnapped and 
otherwise harassed locals. 59 John Allan, the local American commander, deemed the 
region "a nest of  illa an^."^^ A few early settlers remained at Passamaquoddy after the 
War of Independence, but their sparse numbers were quickly subsumed by the arrival of 
the Loyalist refugees and American settlers, many of whom were veterans of the 
American War of Independence. 
New Brunswick's Loyalists were refugees from the American War of 
Independence, a diverse group including Germans, Scots, Irish, blacks, southerners, 
Quakers, New Englanders, New Yorkers, and others. Many were fornler members of the 
British military; others were civilians who sought refuge in British-held garrisons at New 
York or Castine, Maine, until the end of the war.61 The Loyalists arrived en masse at 
Passamaquoddy in late 1783, and several thousand settled on the eastern shore of 
Passamaquoddy the following year. Many were members of the "Penobscot 
Association," both civilian and veteran Loyalists who had collected in eastern Maine 
during the latter phase of the war.62 St. Andrews was the main settlement, planned on a 
rigid grid system by military engineers as a commercial center and regional port.63 
Within a few years it became the shire town of newly-created Charlotte County within 
the British colony of New Brunswick, which the imperial government had agreed to split 
off from Nova Scotia to create a new Loyalist province.64 
The post-Revolutionary settlers on the American side arrived more slowly. A few 
veterans, such as Allan and Delesdernier, settled at Passamaquoddy immediately after the 
war. In the 1780s fishermen from Cape Ann and other Massachusetts fishing 
communities began to settle on Moose Island, squatting on the land without any legal 
title. Along the shores of the bay and up the west bank of the St. Croix small 
communities began to develop by 1790, mostly focused on the timber trade. Both 
timbermen and fishermen farmed on the side because the region's soil was thin and 
seldom productive enough to support large pioneer families through agriculture alone. 
Development was slow until 1808, when Jefferson's Embargo created a set of conditions 
highly conducive to a profitable illicit trade with the British colonies across the border.65 
Canadian scholars have long battled a myth promoted by groups such as the 
United Empire Loyalists that emphasized the social superiority of Loyalists as the source 
of that nation's much vaunted "peace, order and good government."66 A local history of 
St. Andrews, New Brunswick, entitled The Diverting History of a Loyalist Town, 
reinforced this idea by portraying the community's leaders as elegant gentlemen who 
bowed to each other across muddy streets, and only reluctantly put away their silks and 
broadcloths for the frontiersman's buckskin.67 Since the 1950s, Canadian scholars such 
as Esther Clark Wright have struggled to abolish the myth of Loyalists as wealthy 
patricians, venal office holders, arrogant military officers, or vile traitors such as 
Benedict Arnold.68 Wright instead emphasized the rough frontier nature of Loyalists 
settlements in New Brunswick, and not only found Loyalists ordinary people, but that 
they were often far from industrious and sober.69 Canadian legal historian David Bell 
built on Clark's work by exploring the tumultuous political history of early New 
Brunswick, and concluded that many Loyalists had democratic expectations greatly at 
odds with their leaders' aristocratic fantasies. The source of these democratic leanings 
was the American colonial political culture they experienced before the  evolution.^^ 
The Loyalist experience at Passamaquoddy was thus a typical North American 
confrontation between settlers and what they deemed a wilderness. The basic impulse 
was for survival by creating, maintaining and reproducing a largely subsistence economy 
through resource extraction and agriculture. Merchants may have sought profit, but hard 
money was extremely ~ca rce .~ '  Instead, settlers engaged in a pre-market economy in 
which they constantly exchanged labor and commodities with one another, a system that 
encouraged a rough sort of egalitarianism. The two great fears among such pre-market 
peoples were debt and taxes, both of which required scarce hard cash.72 
The harshness of the conditions at Passamaquoddy and the identical nature of the 
extraction economy tended to suppress the differences between the peoples on both sides 
of the border. Passamaquoddy and white, loyalist and republican, all found 
accommodation more advantageous than confrontation. Trade was the obvious 
manifestation of this accommodation, the most remarkable example of this being 
Benedict Arnold's occasional business trips to Passamaquoddy in the early 1790s. 
Arnold's presence drew a variety of reactions from the American population. One soldier 
who had fought under Arnold in the Continental Army burst into tears of anguish when 
he saw his old commander near Campobello. Others reacted more negatively, especially 
those who had suffered in his raid on New London, Connecticut, after he joined the 
British side.73 Fanlily ties stretched across the border, too, among all groups in the 
region, including the Fundy shore of Nova ~ c o t i a . ~ ~  Harder to trace, but nonetheless 
important, were the cross-border friendships among the mercantile leadership that 
evolved out of and expedited commercial relationships, transactions that built cross- 
border trust. However, the creation of Masonic lodges and churches with transnational 
menlberships in the nineteenth century indicates that there was a genuine feeling of 
community that spanned the border.75 
Strangers to the region reported no difference in the appearance of 
Passamaquoddy's white population; they dressed alike, spoke alike, ate alike, and worked 
alike. The fisherman on Campobello sat down to a noontime dinner of milk and potatoes 
much like that of his American counterpart on Moose Island, and lived in a very modest 
log home until a better structure could be The similarity created considerable 
official confusion about who belonged on what side of the border. Laborers moved 
freely back and forth across the border, including woodsmen, fishermen, sailors, and 
shipbuilders. Americans served in New Brunswick's militia; British subjects held 
commissions in the Massachusetts militia in Eastport. This confusion seems to have been 
especially marked among the so-called "late Loyalists" who arrived in New Brunswick 
from the United States after 1784. An American citizen named Joseph Porter served as a 
Charlotte County representative to New Brunswick's legislative assembly; late Loyalist 
William Vance moved from that same county into Washington County and served as a 
representative in the Maine state legislature after 1820.'~ 
Passamaquoddy developed as one region after 1783, divided by a border that 
enriched and complicated the lives of its residents even as they seemingly ignored it 
entirely. This experience was not unusual in North American societies in the early 
nineteenth century. American settlers in the West, late Loyalists in Upper Canada, 
Tejanos in Texas, and Native Americans everywhere all developed modes of localized 
accommodation in the name of making life easier or safer. Nor was this experience 
restricted to areas of North America settled by Euro-Americans; a similar situation 
developed in the Pyrenees between Spain and ~ r a n c e . ~ ~  
Borderlands Theory 
For generations, United States historians, operating in the shadow of Frederick 
Jackson Turner's "Frontier Thesis," emphasized the importance of a violent democratic 
frontier that insistently pushed westward, inevitably enriching the English-speaking 
peoples who conquered North A m e r i ~ a . ~ ~  But Turner's thesis has some distinct 
problems, especially when taken out of the United States. In Canada, for example, 
French-speaking peoples were the first Euro-Americans to settle the West, and did so 
with relatively little violence, mixing easily with the Indian~.~' Loyalists, a diverse group 
that according to Canadian historical myth rejected the violent egalitarian democracy 
promoted by the American Revolution, founded two of Canada's provinces, yet despite 
their pioneering experiences did not become notably dem~cratic.~' Furthermore, 
Canadian historical traditions have long emphasized the peacehlness of the Canadian 
experience when compared to the A m e r i ~ a n . ~ ~  Many Canadian scholars have rejected 
Turner's thesis because it represents a sort of American scholarly imperialism that 
clashes with Canada's own historiographical  tradition^.^^ Even in the United States, the 
Frontier Thesis has encountered problems; the American Southwest, for example, had a 
Spanish-speaking population of Euro-Americans hundreds of years before English- 
speaking invaders arrived, bringing into doubt Turner's idea of a great sweep of 
advancing civilization from east to west. Even Turner himself had to make exceptions 
for certain groups of Americans, such as fishern~en, who did not go west, but often north 
towards Canada; many of the American inhabitants of Passarnaquoddy were just such 
settlers.84 
Despite these problems, Turner's shadow is a long one, and continues to heavily 
influence American historical thought. Bernard Bailyn in particular has picked up on 
Turner's idea of the North American frontier as a violent place, "a ragged outer margin of 
a central world, a regressive, backward-looking diminishment of metropolitan 
accomplishment," where "overt violations of civil order" could be expected.85 Given the 
massive violence and violations of civil order at colonial metropoles such as Paris and 
London in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Bailyn's assumptions about an 
extraordinarily violent periphery of Euro-American settlement in the New World seem 
flawed.86 One need only consider the massive violence associated with English 
smuggling, which occurred at the core of Bailyn's "metropolitan accomplishment" to 
realize that it was at least as violent as the "ragged outer margin of a central world, a 
regressive, backward-looking diminishment of metropolitan ac~om~lishment ."~~ 
A more useful model of inquiry is the "Borderlands model,'' originally developed 
by Herbert Eugene Bolton, an historian of New Spain and a contemporary of Tunler. 
Bolton emphasized the accommodations made between invaders and indigenous 
peoples.88 Furthermore, Bolton argued that borderlands always needed to be considered 
with reference to metropolitan agendas.g9 This borderlands model remains strongly 
linked with the American Southwest, but increasingly historians of northern North 
America have usefidly applied it to the interaction between regions in what is now 
Canada and the United states." 
Canadian scholars have uncovered considerable evidence of regional ties across 
the United States-Canada border that continued to link the American northeast with the 
Canadian Maritimes, even after the 1783 Treaty of Paris. For example, Reginald C. 
Stuart recognized that New Englanders viewed the Maritime Provinces as an extension of 
their own commercial enterprises through the War of 1812.~' George Rawlyk and Neil 
MacKinnon have explored the enduring connections between Maritimes Loyalists and 
republican New England after the American  evolution.^^ Graeme Wynne has stated 
that "the boundary established by the continental division of 1783 was a remarkably 
porous divide," and that ethnic ties bound Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to the 
American northeast in a "greater New England of experience."93 Despite these scholarly 
works, there is a lingering nationalist resistance among some scholars about Borderlands 
thought as applied to the Northeast, notably illustrated in the work of historian Phillip 
~ u c k n e r . ~ ~  However, Bolton's emphasis on borderlands interaction with the metropolis 
meshes neatly with Canadian historiography, which has generally emphasized the 
importance of imperial centers.95 
Defining the composition of a borderland remains a challenge however. Jeremy 
Adelman and Stephen Aron have created a borderlands model as "the contested 
boundaries between colonial domains," and places where accommodation played an 
unusually strong part in the decisions people made.96 Yet Adelman and Aron's views 
seem too confined to a spatial analysis of a borderland as a region that developed from a 
violent frontier to an accommodating borderland to a rigidly divided "bordered land."97 
A more applicable interpretation of borderlands theory is to see it as a set of values and 
attitudes based on very pragmatic principles of self-help. In considering Passamaquoddy, 
the most useful definition of a borderlands may be Lauren McKinsey and Victor 
Konrad's: a "borderlands is a region jointly shared by two nations that houses people 
with common social characteristics in spite of the boundary between them." For 
McKinsey and Konrad, borderlands theory explains how different political comnlunities 
blend into each other, especially in econon~ic terms, where they meet at a boundary. The 
product of this blending is "an area in which interaction has a tempering effect on the 
central tendencies of each society."98 
Smuggling, the activity for which Passamaquoddy was most famous, acted as one 
of the most important interactions that tempered the "central tendencies" of both British 
colonists and American citizens. Smugglers resisted state-imposed commercial 
restrictions and taxation, usually in a peaceful manner, but occasionally utilizing violent 
crowd protest to achieve their ends. But the smugglers who operated at Passamaquoddy 
were not solely locals; many were from far away, suggesting that the borderlands 
dynamic was not just a border phenomenon, but a commonly held set of beliefs that were 
concentrated in border areas. 
Exploring the cross-border interactions and their "tempering effects" is a complex 
process, in no small part because borderlands residents often concealed their actions and 
thoughts. In a borderland, even representatives of the state engaged in misleading their 
superiors. To outsiders, such officials appeared almost hypocritical in their enforcement 
of regulations that they themselves broke or bent. But to locals, the understanding 
manner in which customs officers and others turned a blind eye to illicit trade was a 
positive good. To better understand the subtleties of borderlands attitudes, the 
circumstances of individuals who lived there deserve closer attention. 
Lewis Frederick Delesdernier: Model of a Borderlands Resident 
Lewis Frederick Delesdernier, the American customs collector at Passamaquoddy, 
is an example of the seemingly contradictory forces at work within a borderlands society. 
An analysis of his life as a borderland resident reveals the contradictory stresses created 
by official demands and local needs. 
Born in Nova Scotia to Swiss parents, so-called "foreign Protestants," young 
Delesdernier responded to the American Revolution by joining pro-American forces in an 
attempt to seize the colony from British control.99 The effort failed, and Delesdenlier 
was among the number of Nova Scotia refugees who spent the remainder of the war in 
Machias, Maine. At Machias, Delesdernier served as an aide to Colonel John Allan - a 
fellow refugee fiom Nova Scotia - and sometimes as commander of a company of Indians 
who served under Allan. Delesdernier either learned the local Indian language or 
communicated to them in French, the language used in his parent's home. Throughout 
hls life he served as an interpreter between locals and the Passamaquoddy. At Machias 
Delesdernier met a fellow Swiss, a young Genevan nobleman named Albert Gallatin who 
had come to the region specifically to see Indians. The two became friends, and this 
chance meeting served Delesdernier well for many years."' 
After the American Revolution, Delesdernier moved with his fornler commander 
to the shores of Passamaquoddy Bay. Each occupied an island adjacent to Campobello in 
order to assert the sovereignty of Massachusetts as far east as possible.'0' In so doing, 
they guaranteed a degree of friction with neighboring Loyalists because New Brunswick 
claimed sovereignty over all the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. 
After 1786 the state of Massachusetts appointed Delesdernier as the local "naval 
officer," a position that required him to tax and regulate shipping. Delesdernier garnered 
other positions as well; he served as the first postmaster for the area, acted as a justice of 
the peace, and served briefly as a deputy sheriff. After the Constitution took force in the 
United States in 1789, the federal government made Delesdernier's state-appointed 
position as naval officer into a federal one with the title "customs collector," an office he 
held until 1809. His resolve as an American customs officer was soon tested. A 
Campobello, New Brunswick, woman named Ann Storrow fled her overbearing landlord, 
to whom she and her absent husband were in debt, and sought refuge at the home of 
Delesdernier on nearby Frederick Isle. The landlord was none other than David Owen, 
the tenlperrnental proprietor of Campobello, who also claimed Delesdemier was 
squatting on his property. Owen sought to recover debts from Storrow, establish his 
claim to the island, and reinforce New Brunswick's claim to all the islands of 
Passarnaquoddy all in one blow. In his capacity as justice, Owen summoned the 
Charlotte County sheriff to assist him in arresting Storrow. Sheriff John Dunn and a 
posse duly arrived with Owen on Frederick Island, and demanded Delesdemier surrender 
her. Delesdemier refused, apparently brandishing an ax. Owen then ordered Dunn to 
break down Delesdemier's front door. The sheriff, doubting whether the island was 
within his jurisdiction, refused. The posse balked too, because its members also 
questioned the legality of these measures. lo2 Frustrated by Dunn and the posse, Owen 
agreed to leave, but only after seizing Storrow's cow and carrying it back to Campobello, 
muttering that it was Storrow's "damnable tongue that had provoked him to commit this 
outrage." Storrow was a hard woman to silence: she swore out a complaint against Owen 
in the Charlotte County courts, "more to vex Owen, than from the idea of getting any 
redress," and even publicized the matter in the United States. Delesdernier, too, swore 
out a complaint against 0wen.'03 
The Storrow incident revealed several facets of borderlands life. First, the 
uncertain boundary line between the United States and New Brunswick made a very 
ordinary incident an international matter. Second, the incident involved little actual 
violence, but a great deal of bluff and bluster. Third, although the men involved in this 
incident differed greatly in their politics, in a very short time they would be acting in 
concert. In 1805, Delesdernier traveled to Saint John, New Brunswick, to testify on the 
behalf of Dunn on charges of complicity in smuggling. Even more startling, David Owen 
, presided over Delesdernier's second marriage in 18 1 5.1°4 Conflict between republicans 
and Loyalists was not inevitable; they could live side by side and even become friends 
despite ideological differences. 
As local American shipping increased, however, Delesdernier's position as 
collector became both more demanding, increasingly engaging him in border conflicts.105 
In 1802 the American Congress pernlitted foreign vessels to land goods at 
Passamaquoddy, thus opening international trade, even from nearby New Brunswick. In 
1805 Delesdernier moved hls office to the rapidly growing town of Eastport on Moose 
Island, establishing his offices close to the increasingly busy wharves of that community. 
The plaster trade grew during these years, with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick vessels 
bringing their cargoes to Passamaquoddy to sell to American merchants and traders. The 
trade was profitable to both sides, and as a community leader Delesdernier did his best to 
promote the trade by bending, and even breaking, the federal laws he was supposed to 
enforce. 
Delesdernier's mode of accommodation permitted British ships to anchor 
alongside American vessels and transship their cargoes of plaster directly into American 
holds. This saved the labor of depositing the cargo on either the American shore or 
wharves, and then reloading the plaster onto an American vessel. But it also violated the 
principle that foreign cargoes come under customhouse scrutiny, whether they be in- 
bound or o u t - b o ~ n d . ' ~ ~  But plaster entered the United States duty free, so Delesdernier 
did not defraud the United States government in so doing. However, Delesdernier clearly 
broke American commercial regulations when he permitted American coasting vessels 
perform "international" voyages, even if that voyage consisted of a few hundred yards 
across the harbor into British waters, and there exchange cargoes of American produce, 
especially flour, for foreign cargoes.lo7 
A few British colonial officials railed against the practice, which defrauded New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia customs duties far more than American. George Leonard, a 
doctrinaire Loyalist and rigid enforcer of colonial trade regulations, often con~plained 
against the plaster trade, and eventually took drastic measures against it.'08 The British 
admiral in command of the Halifax station reported that Delesdernier "appears to be an 
agent for smuggling teas and East India goods into our colonies."'@' But Delesdernier 
was not acting alone; in fact he was acting in concert with John Dunn, the Loyalist sheriff 
who had refused to break down his door in 1790. As the presiding customs officers in the 
region, Dunn and Delesdernier worked out a compromise whereby they deemed a portion 
of the harbor between Campobello, New Brunswick, and Moose Island, Maine, as 
"neutral waters." Notably, this was a purely local arrangement by the two officials, one 
that caused considerable diplomatic difficulty in what is known as the Falmouth 
incident .I1' 
Further diplomatic problems between the United States and Great Britain, such as 
Jefferson's Embargo from December, 1807 to March, 1809, revealed the problems of 
attempting to accommodate traders at the borderline. The embargo called for a complete 
cessation of commerce with British North America, a virtually impossible task. 
Nonetheless, Delesdernier took on the onerous duties of sealing the border, an act that 
angered the various smugglers gathered at Passamaquoddy. Indeed, they threatened to 
burn the collector's home."' The collector faced smugglers from as far away as New 
York, so-called "adventurers" unrestrained by local ties and anxious to make a profit no 
matter what the risks. Federal authorities sent revenue cutters, soldiers, and naval vessels 
to support Delesdernier, who does appear to have made an honest effort to obey his 
superiors. Ultimately, however it was not the strangers who undermined the collector; 
his neighbors and acquaintances betrayed him by breaking open a government warehouse 
and smuggling goods across the border in the customhouse boat."* Federal authorities 
blamed Delesdernier, removed him from his position as collector in 181 1, and brought a 
civil action against him. Locals reacted to Delesdernier's removal by promptly electing 
him as Eastport's representative to the Massachusetts legislature.'13 
During the War of 18 12, Delesdernier again took a lead in promoting cross-border 
harmony when he assumed leadership of Eastport's committee of safety. This 
organization, hastily brought together the day following the news that the United States 
had declared war on Britain, actively communicated with New Brunswick officials and 
residents to ensure the conflict did not devolve into the sort of petty raiding and 
kidnapping the region experienced during the War of Independence.'I4 The committee 
went so far as to communicate their peaceful intentions to New Brunswick's lieutenant 
governor. Delesdernier also resumed his old duties as a translator between the 
Passarnaquoddy and the American military. He helped to assure Indian neutrality for the 
duration of the conflict.115 Delesdernier may have possessed at least ambivalent feelings 
toward the American federal government by this time; occasionally he still worked as a 
subordinate officer at the customhouse, but by late in the war the federal government 
arrested Delesdernier for debt related to his removal from office. During his absence in 
Machias jail, his wife died and the British military occupied Eastport, two blows that 
must have grieved the old veteran mightily. At least he had the knowledge that his son, 
captured by the British and sent to Halifax, was relatively safe thanks to the intercession 
of Delesdernier's cousin by marriage, John Uniacke, the attorney-general for Nova 
scotia.'16 
In later life Delesdernier faded from the public eye, with one exception. He 
remarried in 18 15. Living in British-occupied territory, the couple appeared before 
David Owen and had the justice marry them, despite the fact that his new wife does not 
seem to have gained a divorce from her forn~er husband.'" When eastern Washington 
County returned to American control after the war, Massachusetts authorities deemed the 
union illegal because they did not recognize the authority of a New Brunswick justice to 
marry two Americans; undeterred, the couple married again. Sometime in the 1830s, 
Delesdernier died after a long period of disease and mental illness, financially broken and 
apparently alone. 'I8 
Delesdernier's life and the border were woven together in a sometimes surprising 
fashion. Like his neighbors on both sides of the boundary, Delesdernier struggled to 
match official expectations, actual and imagined, with the realities of frontier life at 
Passamaquoddy. In the eyes of the federal government, Delesdernier failed; but locally 
he remained popular even after his removal from office, and his memory remains strong 
in local histories published since his death. 
Conclusion 
Defining Passamaquoddy as a borderland improves our understanding of how and 
why the region's residents, divided by a political boundary after 1783, continued to 
interact despite their ideological differences. The common history of all the groups who 
lived at Passamaquoddy was one of sporadic violence and dislocation during the 
American Revolution, a pattern revealed in the life of Lewis Delesdernier. After the 
peace of 1783, these groups, united by a common geography, sought to create a more 
stable, peaceful community despite the boundary line that theoretically divided Loyalists 
from republicans. The goal of harmony was pragmatic, a set of attitudes that encouraged 
cross-border cooperation for the mutual benefit of the communities surrounding 
Passarnaquoddy Bay. In pursuing this goal, the borderlands peoples defied, twisted or 
broke with the policies of their respective political institutions. Borderlands officials 
created their own rules, and borderlands peoples pursued their livelihoods even when it 
broke with the commercial regulations of distant central governments, often by 
smuggling or acquiescing to illicit trade. The borderlands experience was thus a dynamic 
between officialdom and pragmatism, and a set of attitudes held by various peoples who 
lived in proximity to the boundary between the United States and British North America. 
In times of crisis, such as Jefferson's Embargo or the War of 1812, outsiders often ' 
flocked to Passamaquoddy for their own reasons, an unofficial recognition that 
borderlands attitudes were not limited to the border area, but were commonly-held beliefs 
throughout North Anlerican society. The origin of borderlands attitudes was located in 
the interaction between officialdom, locals, and strangers. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
AMERICAN ENFORCEMENT METHODS 
Introduction 
Lewis Delesdernier's friend John Allan warned the Treasury Department in 1800 
about widespread smuggling at Passamaquoddy. Allan embarked on a campaign to 
convince Congress to open the Passamaquoddy customs district to foreign trade by 
deeming it a "port of entry and delivery for foreign vessels." This foreign trade would 
include New Brunswick, just a few hundred yards across the border from the American 
town of Eastport. Allan argued that 
The proximity to the British govenment-the connection 
and intimacy which naturally exists between the inhabitants 
on each side of the line by reciprocal communications- 
The affinity and sameness with every kind of business that 
arises from the nature of our local situation, will ever 
induce the people to screen and cover vessels that may 
come on our Shore however unjustifiable, while a general 
and total prohibition continues.-Was it a Port of Entry 
&c., and vessels admitted, it would alter the situation 
materially. For there would not be that friendly care & 
sympathy, nor would they dare to screen and shelter vessels 
or illicit trade, as is now the custom.- 
Allan continued by stating the advantages opening trade to New Brunswick vessels 
would bring to the region and to the federal government. Opening trade to foreign 
vessels would permit American produce to flow into British North America, and colonial 
produce, especially plaster, to enter the United States. Opening Passamaquoddy to 
international trade was consistent with the American revolutionary ideal of free trade that 
encouraged dropping exclusionary commercial policies.' In contrast, the British Empire 
still attempted to pursue a mercantilist economic policy that excluded foreigners, 
including Americans, from the much-vaunted commercial privileges given to its own 
subjects.* Allan also argued that by permitting the trade it could be regulated and taxed, 
whereas previously it had been conducted illicitly with the sympathy of many Americans 
at Passarnaquoddy. Allan concluded that if Passamaquoddy were opened to foreign 
trade: 
The Revenue Laws will be better supported.-The duties & 
other emoluments will be considerably increased.-Illicit 
Trade & Conduct reduced.-The fair, honest & uninformed 
Trader (who in fact are the only people that suffered, some 
very considerably) will be encouraged & protected- 
navigation & trade increase & flourish, & give great 
content & satisfaction through the  settlement^.^ 
Allan's successful efforts to open the Passamaquoddy customs district to foreign 
trade outlined some of the problems of border enforcement. Cutting off all trade between 
the United States and the remaining British colonies only encouraged violation of the 
law; for Allan the best way to regulate trade at the border and defend American 
sovereignty was to legalize it. Furthermore, Allan's efforts to cooperate with 
government, and govenunent's duty to respond to the needs of its citizens, was indicative 
of the changes wrought by the American Revolution whereby commercialization and 
democratization worked in te ra~t ive l~ .~  The control of the Passamaquoddy border by 
American customs officials was one reflection of that interaction between commerce and 
government, both in its successes and its failures. 
Customs officers were the primary enforcers of the Passamaquoddy border. 
Customs officers enacted the elaborate commercial regulations that theoretically 
restricted or occasionally completely denied trade between the United States and British 
North America. Even in the best of times, customs officials faced the overwhelming task 
of controlling cross-border trade. In times of crisis, militia, naval, and regular military 
units joined them. But in a borderland these agents of centralizing tendencies often found 
themselves divided in their loyalties, under pressure to moderate or even pervert the very 
regulations they were sent to enforce, or even overwhelmed by a variety of largely 
peaceful tactics designed to undermine their authority. The longer officials spent in 
Passamaquoddy, the more likely they were to buckle under these pressures and either 
ignore, permit or actively promote illicit trade; some even went so far as to engage in 
smuggling themselves. 
Borderland Residents and State Authority 
Deciphering borderlands attitudes towards state authority is difficult, but it reveals 
that borderlands residents shared with the rest of North American society an ambiguous 
relationship with agents of state authority. At Passamaquoddy conflicting claims of 
sovereignty put forth by both the United States and Great Britain reinforced this 
ambiguity. In order to assert sovereignty, both nations often exerted extraordinary efforts 
to enforce their laws and regulations, especially commercial regulations that provided 
valuable tax income. Law enforcement on the often troubleson~e border dramatically 
shaped the lives of borderlands peoples during repeated efforts to quell illicit trade at 
Passamaquoddy. 
The problem of catching and prosecuting smugglers proved a thorny one for 
government officials on both sides of the border. They took it seriously; smugglers 
reduced government revenue and encouraged defiance of the law. Governmental efforts 
were not consistent, however, and officials varied in their conduct from strict 
enforcement to blatant corruption. The perennial question for the various governmental 
authorities was: how much enforcement would suffice? The general American impulse 
until 1816 was to regulate and tax trade as little and as conveniently as possible.5 But in 
times of crisis, such as Jefferson's embargo of 1807-1 809 or the War of 18 12, civil 
authorities had to call in the military to enforce unpopular commercial laws that restricted 
international trade. The overall pattern was one of governmental inconsistency, running 
from draconian military intervention to the grossest apathy and corruption. That 
inconsistency was further exacerbated by frequent instances of inter-agency jealousy and 
lack of cooperation. This was most notable during the War of 1812, when the district's 
assistant collector inquired of Maine's United States marshal, "whether the Military have 
the wight [sic] to make Seizures the same as custon~ house  officer^."^ 
Border residents faced a different question: how much cooperation with 
officialdom was sufficient? Here their pragmatism came to the fore. Some of 
Passamaquoddy's residents risked alienation by acting as law enforcers or informants, 
occasionally endangering their lives. The majority however only obeyed laws that 
conformed to their own views on justice, while ignoring those deemed unjust and 
victimless, especially commercial restrictions. In so doing, they created a set of 
community values well adapted to their unique situation in a frontier region contested by 
the United States and Great Britain. The border community often persecuted individuals 
who deviated from these norms, even if those norms stood in opposition to federal laws.' 
Thus at Passamaquoddy the relationship between law enforcement and the local 
population was seldom what it appeared to be on the surface. Local officials often 
continued to adhere to local values that contradicted national goals, even federal customs 
collectors. Eastport, a community described as "lawless," in fact frequently petitioned 
the Massachusetts General Court for more courts and jails.8 Infornlants worked both 
sides of the law, such as Jabez Mowry, a notorious smuggler who routinely "informed" 
on his own contraband as a means of legitimizing its presence in the United ~ t a t e s . ~  
Lawyers such as Jonathan D. Weston also profited by defending smugglers in court and 
by expediting their business through consular services.1° Criminals arrested by local 
authorities sometimes turned out to be those who interfered too much with smuggling. An 
example is when Eastport officials arrested Patrick Campbell for attempted murder: in 
fact he was a United States soldier performing his duty when he attempted to stop, and 
finally shot, a smuggler." Nor was this true only on one side of the border. These 
conditions existed both in New Brunswick and in Maine. 
In some ways the state exerted more effort at the border than elsewhere, simply 
because of the perceived need to control entry and exit as a function of sovereignty. But 
at the same time the border was distant from the central authorities in London or New 
York, and later Washington. This made government intercession into border matters 
erratic. Centralizing tendencies were weak in general, and typically consisted of unarmed 
customs officers who were often in sympathy with smugglers and others who violated 
border regulations. On occasion the arrival of soldiers or warships to enforce the border 
demonstrated the authority and power of the state, but their presence was usually 
temporary. Passamaquoddy residents reacted in a variety of ways to these forces, but 
they constantly applied pressure on governmental forces to operate with prudence and 
moderation. Furthermore, state agents became more vulnerable to the values and nornls 
of Passamaquoddy society the longer they stayed, especially if they established local 
friendships or relationships. The weakness and vulnerability of state institutions and 
officials generally left border residents to their own devices, allowing them to develop 
attitudes towards the international boundary that often violated the laws of their 
respective states. 
American Customs Regulations 
When the American government established itself in 1789, it faced the task of 
funding its own operation. Toward that end, Congress quickly established the Treasury 
Department and a system of customs houses to charge imported goods a special tax 
known as a duty.'* While more efficient than the British system and tightly controlled by 
the Treasury Department, the new American customs system was quite similar to the 
British one, a reassuring fact for the new nation's merchant community. 
The cooperation of the merchants with the customs system was a crucial 
component of the American constitution's s~cce s s . ' ~  Customs duties comprised 
approximately ninety percent of the American government's income during most of the 
period considered.I4 The system relied heavily on an honest and well-organized customs 
collector operating under the administrative scrutiny of the Treasury secretary and the 
fiscal scrutiny of Congress, which took an enormous interest in customhouse affairs. 
Federal law provided stiff penalties for any collector who falsified a ship's manifest, 
over-charged duties, or colluded with merchants to defraud the nation's revenue. The 
Treasury Department dismissed those who neglected their accounts, one of the charges 
that ultimately led to Delesdernier's downfall as a customs collector in 1808." 
In his role as a customs collector, Delesdernier acted primarily as a tax gatherer 
and enforcer of commercial shipping regulations. Complex commercial codes strictly 
regulated the conduct of shipping. Masters of all vessels coming from foreign ports were 
obliged to surrender their paperwork within twenty-four hours of arriving in port to the 
collector before unloading, and pay duties on goods imported, or post a bond that those 
taxes would be paid by the consignee. Customhouse officials returned these papers or 
issued new ones when the vessel prepared to depart. Coasting vessels, which is to say 
those vessels licensed by the government to operate only within national limits, had less 
stringent requirements.I6 The problem was that in Passamaquoddy Bay a coasting vessel 
might find itself in foreign waters because of insufficient wind, strong currents, tidal 
change, or the design of cunning mariners intent on smuggling. Federal officials had to 
sort out the honest from the deceitful, by balancing their own judgment, regulations 
imposed by Congress, and Treasury Department circulars. 
Customs collectors were bureaucrats who processed a variety of paperwork to 
collect revenue and regulate shipping. Essentially the federal government spun a web of 
paperwork to document minutely a vessel's activities. Every vessel carried documents 
issued from the custon~house, which were in turn used by customs authorities or consuls 
in other ports to verify the ship's identity and cargo; the larger the vessel and more 
valuable the cargo, the greater the amount of paperwork, regulations, fees, and duties. 
The most important documents carried by a vessel were its enrollment (if engaged in the 
coasting trade), its registration (if engaged in foreign trade), or its license (if a small 
vessel under twenty tons). American vessels received several benefits over foreign 
vessels, such as lower duties and coasting privileges that allowed them to go from one 
port to another largely unimpeded.I7 Vessels that failed to comply with the commercial 
laws faced severe fines. A merchant who violated the commercial laws faced not only 
fines, but the loss of his vessel and cargo at government auction, as well as forfeiture of 
sizable bonds. l 8  
In a period of extreme profitability for the American merchants as neutral carriers 
during the Napoleonic Wars, conformity to the laws, however bothersome, made good 
business sense. While European powers fought each other during the French Revolution 
and subsequent Napoleonic conflicts, American shipping thrived supplying all sides, 
especially with provisions such as wheat flour.I9 The federal government supported this 
maritime boom by pursuing a diplomacy that opened new markets to American 
merchants, and even created a navy specifically to defend shipping.20 The merchants' 
conformity to the commercial laws in turn generated steadily growing revenue for the 
fledgling American government (see Table 3.1). The Jefferson administration adopted 
these Federalist policies when it came into power in 180 1. Albert Gallatin, the young 
Swiss immigrant who met Delesdernier during the American Revolution, was the 
Treasury secretary during both Jefferson administrations and most of the two Madison 
administrations. Gallatin closely adhered to established Hamiltonian policies, with the 
exception that he colluded with Congress to abolish most federal internal taxes.21 That 
policy left the federal government almost entirely reliant on customs duties; by 1807 
almost ninety-seven percent of government revenue came from commercial shipping (see 
Table 3.1). 
The federal government did not rely solely on the good will of the merchants. 
Revenue cutters and customhouse boats patrolled the waters to detect smugglers. 
Congress allowed the collectors to use armed force in pursuing suspected smugglers and 
granted them legal authority to board any ship within four leagues of the coast. On shore, 
collectors could ask local magistrates for search warrants to enter buildings suspected of 
hiding c~n t r aband .~~  For example, by 1809 Delesdernier had recourse to use a deputy 
U.S. marshal, the local revenue cutter, or federal troops if any were present. Congress 
also empowered the collectors to call out the militia under certain circwn~tances.~~ 
In addition, a host of laws controlled ship movement. Congress carefully 
designated the harbors that shipping could use; -every customs district possessed a 
customhouse located in a "port of entry and delivery." In the Passamaquoddy customs 
district, there was only one such port, but essentially it comprised the entire bay and 
reached up the St. Croix River. Federal law required masters of vessels to submit their 
paperwork to the customhouse for inspection and calculation of tariffs, tonnage duties, 
and other fees within twenty-four hours of anchoring. Often a customs inspector boarded 
a vessel soon after it anchored to look over the ship's paperwork; sometimes the inspector 
remained on board the vessel if he suspected it of smuggling. Delesdernier kept vessels' 
paperwork in an iron trunk bolted to the floor of the customhouse while they remained in 
port, ensuring that the master returned to fetch it before departure. This ensured that 
Table 3.1 : Customs Receipts and Federal Revenue, 1791 -1 8 15 
Year 
-
1791 
1792 
1793 
1794 
1795 
1796 
1797 
1798 
1799 
1800 
1801 
1802 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
181 1 
1812 
1813 
1814 
1815 
Customs Receipts 
$4,399,000 
3,443,000 
4,255,000 
4,801,000 
5,588,000 
6,568,000 
7,550,000 
7,106,000 
6,6 10,000 
9,O8 1,000 
1 O,75 1,000 
12,400,000 
1 O,4OO,OOO 
1 1,000,000 
12,900,000 
14,600,000 
15,800,000 
l6,3OO,OOO 
7,200,000 
8,500,000 
1 3,300,000 
8,900,000 
l3,2OO,OOO 
6,000,000 
7,300,000 
Total Federal Revenue 
$4,409,000 
3,669,000 
4,652,000 
$43 1,000 ' 
6,114,000 
8,377,000 
8,688,000 
7,900,000 
7,546,000 
10,848,000 
12,935,000 
14,900,000 
1 1,000,000 
1 1,800,000 
l3,5OO,OOO 
l5,5OO,OOO 
l6,3OO,OOO 
17,000,000 
7,700,000 
9,300,000 
l4,4OO,OOO 
9,800,000 
l4,3OO,OOO 
1 1,100,000 
15,600,000 
Customs % of Total 
99.77% 
93.84% 
91.46% 
88.39% 
91.39% 
78.40% 
86.90% 
89.94% 
87.59% 
83.71% 
83.1 1% 
83.22% 
94.54% 
93.22% 
95.55% 
94.19% 
96.93% 
95.88% 
93.50% 
91.39% 
92.36% 
90.8 1 % 
92.30% 
54.05% 
46.79% 
Source: Percentage calculated fi-om figures provided in Curtis P. Nettels, The Emergence 
ofa  National Economy (New York: Harper & Row, 1969; reprint, Amlonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 1989), 385. 
vessels complied with all requirements before sailing.24 Vessels thus faced the scrutiny 
of the customhouse both on entering and leaving a customs district. For most of the 
period under consideration the American customhouse was at Eastport on Moose Island, 
but it shifted according to need. In the early years, Delesdernier kept his custom office 
on Frederick Isle, but sometimes the custom house was on the mainland in Lubec. 
Congress strictly controlled shipping. Federal statutes banned foreign vessels 
from smaller collection districts. Delesdernier, his fiiend John Allan, and other local 
residents success~lly petitioned Congress to pennit both American and foreign vessels to 
enter Passamaquoddy from foreign ports in 1803, although vessels that arrived from 
beyond the Cape of Good Hope were not allowed.2s Federal statutes also banned foreign 
vessels under thirty tons from entering American ports, a regulation difficult to enforce at 
Passanlaquoddy due to its proximity to the border. Delesdernier and other customs 
officials at Passamaquoddy seem to have largely ignored this last regulation. Small 
boats, especially fishing vessels from Campobello and other islands on the New 
Brunswick side of the border, regularly appeared at Eastport's wharves, even during the 
War of 1812.'~ These small vessels were almost indistinguishable from their American 
co~nte rpar t s .~~  American customs authorities sympathized with these small producers, 
and the effort to distinguish them from American vessels would have required an 
enormous effort. Furthermore, prosecution would have cost more than the money 
recouped from their seizure; there was simply no incentive to harass people involved in 
what was local business, even if it did cross the border. 
Federal law required all vessels to have their name and homeport clearly painted 
on their stem to identify them. But smuggling vessels often concealed or falsified their 
name and h0me~0t - t .~~  National flags do not seem to have been required; some masters 
flew them, others did not. Federal law forbade merchants to move or unload goods after 
sunset.29 Vessels that changed their appearance, rig or name required new registers or 
enrolln~ents.~~ Collectors held enormous bonds on the legal behavior of a vessel, 
sometimes up to three times the value of the ship and its cargo. Departing ships did not 
receive their registers and other customs paperwork until all bonds, paperwork, and other 
requirements were complete. Most merchants saw the wisdom of conforming to 
American conlmercial laws. Compared with the British colonies, American regulations 
were relatively simple and inexpensive, a fact noted with envy by some of New 
Brunswick's  inhabitant^.^' Delesdemier seems to have used his office to facilitate trade 
as much as possible; before 1808 he made few seizures and made special 
accommodations to ensure that trade on the border proceeded as smoothly as possible. 
While larger ports possessed a trio of customhouse officers who held presidential 
commissions (a collector, naval officer, and surveyor), at Passamaquoddy and other small 
ports the collector performed all three functions. The collector's primary duty was to tax 
imported goods at rates set by Congress. Secondary duties included recording all such 
transactions and hiring individuals to assist in collecting government revenue. Naval 
officers countersigned customhouse documents after carefully checking the collector's 
figures, and assumed charge in the absence of the regular collector. Surveyors were in 
charge of registering vessels and all scales and other measuring devices, such as 
hydrometers to measure the alcohol content of spirits, and hence the amount of duty. 
Compensation for collectors was initially fairly generous without being ostentatious. 
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton believed in generously compensating the 
collectors to ensure that talented men were drawn to the position, and to prevent the 
temptation to embezzle.32 Later Jeffersonian administrations were more frugal in their 
approach; in 1802 Congress set the limit of a collector's emoluments - including both 
salary and fees - at five thousand dollars, even for ports as large as New York 
Passamaquoddy's Customs Collectors 
The Passamaquoddy customs district had three collectors between 1783 and 1820, 
all of whom illustrate the tension between local needs and desires and the demands of the 
federal government. During his tenure as collector, Delesdernier exhibited a decidedly 
pragmatic approach to office holding, an attitude shared by his successor, Lemuel 
Trescott, who took charge of the Passamaquoddy customhouse in 18 10. Trescott adopted 
many of Delesdernier's policies by largely ignoring cumbersome rules and seeing hlmself 
as a facilitator of trade. Both community boosters sought to develop the regional 
economy and both were popular local leaders. Stephen Thacher [varies as Thatcher] 
replaced Trescott on the latter's retirement in 18 18. Thacher was a very different sort of 
collector: a political appointee with no local connections who rapidly became unpopular 
for his rigid enforcement of the letter of the law. 
Louis Delesdernier became collector of Passanlaquoddy in 1789, and continued in 
that post to 18 10. During that period he oversaw substantial improvements in his district. 
First, successfully petitioning Congress to open the Passarnaquoddy customs district to 
international arrivals in 1803, thereby legitimizing the already substantial plaster trade 
with the Maritime Provinces that passed through the bay.34 By opening his district to 
American vessels returning from foreign ports and to foreign vessels, Delesdernier made 
Passamaquoddy much more competitive. Local shipping tonnage made an immediate 
increase in 1803 after remaining relatively flat for years (see Appendix A). His second 
major achievement was the construction of West Quoddy Lighthouse in 1808 on the 
approach to the Western Passage. This aid to navigation was a considerable 
improvement in helping mariners negotiate the treacherous and foggy waters of the 
Delesdernier's local boosterism also seems to have involved a high degree of 
tolerance for illicit trade across the border, especially in the plaster trade. American 
goods, notably provisions such as flour, Virginia tobacco, American anchors and sails as 
well as East India goods such as tea, West India goods such as rum and sugar, flowed 
across the border at Passamaquoddy in exchange for plaster, millstones, fish, timber, and 
other products from New Brunswick and Nova ~ c o t i a . ~ ~  Delesdernier even agreed with 
his opposite number in New Brunswick to facilitate this trade by creating an unofficial 
"neutral zone" wherein American and British vessels could lay alongside one another and 
exchange cargoes. British colonial officials viewed Delesdemier as an accessory and 
facilitator of smuggling, a fact that bolstered his local popularity.37 
Delesdemier's success as a collector was due in part to his closeness with Albert 
Gallatin, one of the most influential - and longest serving - Treasury secretaries in 
American history. Gallatin stayed with the fellow Swiss Delesdemier family during the 
American War of Independence, and they remained friends for decades. Delesdemier 
and Gallatin often exchanged personal news in their official correspondence, especially 
about Delesdernier's father, who had gone mad.38 The collector utilized this connection 
to pursue local improvements, and undoubtedly counted on Gallatin to shield him fiom 
criticism, which the secretary did by expressing his opinion to President Jefferson that the 
collector was honest and sufficiently diligent for the post, but not especially talented. 
Despite Gallatin's fiendship with Delesdernier, the secretary removed him fiom his post 
in 1810 for failing to enforce Jefferson's embargo.39 It is difficult to trace Delesdernier's 
subsequent movements, but the government did not entirely abandon him. His successor 
employed the former collector in various ways around the custon~house.~~ 
The federal government replaced Delesdemier with Lemuel Trescott, who had 
previously served as the collector of nearby Machias. Trescott was a Continental Anny 
veteran made famous by his successful attack on a Loyalist outpost on Long Island in 
1780. He probably owed his appointment to fellow veteran Henry Dearborn, the 
secretary of war under Thomas Jefferson. After the war he became a merchant in the 
Passamaquoddy area, and was active in the Order of the Cincinnati, the ~reemasons.~' 
Similarly to Delesdernier, Trescott was a local booster; he was involved in early attempts 
to establish a bank at Eastport and took an active interest in civic affairs,42 Like 
Delesdernier, he seems to have attempted to facilitate local trade as much as possible, 
especially before and during the War of 1812. One example of this was Trescott's refusal 
to close the port during a ninety-day embargo that preceded the declaration of war 
because he had not received official word, which was delayed by a washed-out bridge. 
His port hummed with activity as shipping hurriedly cleared out, until at last he ran out of 
official papers for them, thus preventing further departures until an official circular that 
closed the port finally reached him.43 Trescott retired in 181 8, a wealthy man fiom the 
emoluments of his eight-year tenure in office. Probate records estimated his estate at 
over $30,000, including mahogany furniture and large amounts of cash, much of which 
was willed to local charities.44 Trescott, too, enjoyed local popularity; shortly after his 
death the people of Eastport commemorated his memory by erecting a lyceum and 
schoolhouse, suitably named 'Trescott ~ a 1 1 . ' ~ ~  
Stephen Thacher was a very different sort from Delesdernier or Trescott. Thacher 
was neither a Revolutionary War veteran nor a local. Instead, he was a Yale-educated 
lawyer from southern Maine, appointed to the collectorship of Passarnaquoddy as a 
political favor.46 His legal training is significant; one historian has termed lawyers the 
"shock troops of capitalism," and claimed that they were the "main purveyors of 
capitalist ideology.'A7 This ideology dictated that regional pre-market economies must 
subordinate themselves to the national one.48 True to his training and adherence to 
capitalism's larger goals, Thacher was inflexible and legalistic, quickly becoming 
unpopular with a borderlands populace used to his predecessors' lax enforcement. 
Probably the least popular of Thacher's actions was his enforcement of the federal law 
that banned foreign vessels under thirty tons from entering American ports.49 Letters to 
the local newspaper castigated Thacher as an avaricious political appointee, a poor 
replacement for the affable Trescott. One local merchant and noted smuggler complained 
of Thacher, that the collector was "the most vexatious man I ever saw, or heard of."50 
One newspaper picked up on Thacher's former position as a Massachusetts judge, 
nicknamed him "Judge Snatcher," a reference to the rapacity with which he seized even 
boats carrying c o r d ~ o o d . ~ '  
It would be easy to conclude that Passamaquoddy's first two collectors were 
rogues, defrauders of government, and perhaps even traitors. Evidently this is not the 
case; the federal government did dismiss and prosecute Delesdernier, and eventually 
jailed him for malperformance as collector, yet it did not refuse him a Revolutionary War 
pension.52 Trescott, who certainly facilitated some smuggling during the War of 18 12, 
also impeded much illicit trade, a fact that directly lead to his capture by British forces in 
18 14 when they occupied Moose Island. While attempting to escape with the 
customhouse papers, a well-known smuggler seized Trescott by the collar and held him 
until British soldiers arrested the old veteran. It would also be difficult to brand Trescott 
with any unpatriotic motives, given his service in the Continental Army and high esteem 
the federal government had for him; he was even offered the command of a U.S. Army 
regiment in 1 8 1 2, a commission he declined.53 These conflicting actions and motives of 
the collectors, some based on personal welfare, others on community interests, clashed 
with the demands of the distant federal government and national economy. This dynamic 
between regional and national economies created strains on borderlands residents, often 
resulting in a wary or even hostile attitude toward government officers. These same 
conflicts were reflected in the subordinate customhouse officers and even in the revenue 
cutters that occasionally patrolled Passamaquoddy Bay. 
Lesser Customhouse Officers and Revenue Cutters 
The collectors did not carry out their duties alone. Various subordinate customs 
officers and the crews of the several revenue cutters that patrolled Maine waters 
supported them. The most consistently present were the inspectors, generally part-time 
employees who did the outdoors work of the customhouse, such as boarding vessels, 
checking paperwork, and pursuing smugglers in small open boats. Below them worked 
an assortn~ent of boatmen and guards. Less frequently, the Treasury Department's patrol 
vessels, known as "revenue cutters," appeared at Passamaquoddy. Locals served both as 
subordinate customs officers and on revenue cutters. Like the collectors, a knowledge of 
their activities reveals the attempts of these officials to reconcile local needs with official 
demands. 
Chief among the lesser customhouse officers was the deputy collector, who took 
charge of the customhouse in the absence of the collector. Unlike the other inspectors, 
the federal government paid the deputy collector a small annual salary. 
Passamaquoddy's first deputy collector was William Coney, who also served as the 
region's deputy U.S. marshal after 1808.'~ The official record reveals Coney as a man 
deeply concerned with money, petitioning government for his share of seizures or 
questioning the right of the U.S. military to make seizures from which he would not 
benefit." Coney made a number of seizures, but he, too, seems to have taken an interest 
in facilitating trade, especially during the War of 18 12. Notably, the two men who posted 
bonds for his service as deputy marshal, Samuel Tuttle and Jabez Mowry, were both 
notorious smugglers.56 A Boston newspaper claimed in 1814 that: " He has been in the 
British interest some time, and was in the habit of giving every facility to smugglers."57 
Coney's career ended with the British occupation of Eastport in 18 14. Rather than 
remove to American territory, he remained under British jurisdiction, and even took a 
loyalty oath to the British crown.'* Coney apparently preferred the comforts of retaining 
his property to the abstractions of national loyalty. 
The lesser customhouse officers remain relatively anonymous, but some of their 
names appear in legal records. A few were direct relatives of the collectors, such as 
Delesdernier's son William. Others, such as John Swett, served intermittently for many 
years; a number worked for the custonlhouse less often. The pay could be lucrative, 
usually two dollars a day, paid in hard-to-find cash.59 Much of this work was done by 
patrolling in open boats, or guarding warehouses, or serving as tidewaiters who remained 
on board vessels prior to their sailing to ensure additional cargoes were not illicitly 
loaded at the last minute. Generally it was not dangerous employment, and customhouse 
officers were unarmed. But during Jefferson's embargo, Collector Delesdernier had to 
a m  his employees.60 Gunplay was fairly common during Jefferson's embargo, and on 
occasion smugglers did assault or even kidnap these  officer^.^' Sometimes these officers 
betrayed the trust put in them by the collector; on at least one occasion the alleged assault 
on a customs guard was a fraud.62 Others succumbed to bribes and threats.63 Gauging 
the honesty and effectiveness of these officers is extremely difficult because of a scarcity 
of records. Those who betrayed the trust placed in them and were caught are most 
evident, but this leaves questions about the more conscientious customhouse officers as 
well as the ones who may not have been caught aiding or abetting smugglers. 
The United States Treasury Department operated two revenue cutters in the Gulf 
of Maine from the early l79Os, with more added before 18 1 2 . ~ ~  Early in 18 12, the 
federal government conlrnissioned a cutter exclusively for Passamaquoddy, which was 
promptly captured by the British Navy, and another after the war.65 The mere presence 
of a cutter forced those engaged in illicit trade to work much harder and carefidly than 
they normally would have. Cutters maximized their utility by sending out smaller craft to 
patrol. For instance, in August, 18 1 1, the American revenue cutter New Hampshire's 
boat approached more than a dozen vessels anchored off West Quoddy Head. When the 
anchored vessels realized the craft approaching them was a revenue cutter's boat, they 
immediately got under way. Despite this precipitous flight, the cutter's boat boarded and 
seized three coasting schooners with a total of 2 10 tons of gypsum illicitly introduced 
from New ~ r u n s w i c k . ~ ~  Nonetheless, the presence of revenue cutters was temporary, and 
only hindered rather than stopped smuggling. 
Like the collectors and other customhouse officers, the captains of the revenue 
cutters displayed a spectrum of tolerance for smuggling. While Benjamin Trevett of 
Lubec earned the nickname "capt. Ketchum" and epithet "pirate," other cutter officers 
seem to have been quite popular. This was especially true of Hopley Yeaton, captain of 
the cutter New Hampshire from 1803 to 181 1. Yeaton is a significant historical figure in 
that he was the first commissioned officer in the United States Revenue Cutter service, 
and has thus been deemed the "father of the United States Coast ~uard ."~ '  Yeaton seems 
to have become acquainted with Passamaquoddy while captain of the New Hampshire, 
and moved to what is now Lubec, Maine, around 1800. Yeaton, who was a fisherman 
himself, seems to have acted with restraint and forbearance when dealing with local 
mariners. The man who replaced Yeaton as captain of the New Hampshire offered a 
vivid contrast. William P. Adams was a former naval officer, and it showed in his 
imperious attitude. Even his superiors thought him too haughty for the position; one 
claimed "he is not possessed of the discretion requisite for the command of a Revenue 
Adams's unpopularity and arrogance soon caught up with him: the federal 
government removed him from command in 18 12, despite his appeals to the press.69 
Positions on cutters were political plums widely sought after by many mariners. 
They provided steady employment, and paid cash, with the potential for prize money or 
portions of the proceeds of vessels seized and condemned in court. While a position on a 
cutter was sure to make a mariner unpopular with some people, there never seems to have 
been a shortage of men willing to serve on these vessels. One recommendation for Zenas 
Morton to be the commander of the cutter at Passamaquoddy even noted his smuggling 
past. The author stated: "it would be improper of me to recommend a man to support the 
laws that I knew he himself had violated, but this will not exactly apply to Capt. Morton; 
[but] it is true that I think he was concerned in the illegal importation of some wine into 
this distri~t."~' Collector Trescott did well not to forward the application to the Treasury 
Department, for within weeks Morton stood accused of participating in plaster 
smuggling7' 
Catching and Punishing Smugglers 
Delesdernier, Trescott, and Thacher rarely captured smugglers or seized 
contraband themselves. Instead they relied on a system of informers, officers under their 
direct control, and patrols by revenue cutters'- the forerunners of the United States Coast 
Guard. The collector, once informed of a seizure, then collected evidence and sent it to 
Maine's federal district judge. Complex or appealed cases could go to the Massachusetts 
Federal Circuit Court, and on occasion the United States Supreme Court heard smuggling 
cases from Passarnaquoddy as well. Under American federal law there was no such 
crime as "smuggling." Generally government officials seized contraband "for a breach 
of the Revenue-Law of the United States." The U.S. district attorney usually brought 
charges against the vessel or goods involved, rather than the smugglers, except when 
there had been violent resistance to federal officers. If the district court successhlly 
prosecuted the contraband, the local U.S. marshal then auctioned off the goods involved, 
with a portion going to the government and a portion going to the officers or informants 
involved. 
Infornlation was a key element in combating smuggling. Collectors had to keep a 
sharp lookout for vessels or cargoes that might be involved in smuggling. Informants 
were one such source, and could reap large rewards. However, such actions entailed 
enormous risks and complications. In a comnlunity known for smuggling, infornlants 
were very unpopular, especially as they stood to gain by somebody else's loss.72 
Furthermore, motives to inform varied, ranging from personal gain, to revenge, to 
twisting the legal system so that it would actually promote smuggling. Even the 
collectors sometimes disliked infornlants; Trescott referred to one as a "~coundrill."~~ 
Customs inspectors caught most of the smugglers who were brought to trial. 
Often patrolling in an open rowboat, these officers boarded vessels, inspected their 
paperwork, and sometimes searched it for evidence of illicit trade. If the officer 
suspected or found a vessel that contained contraband, he seized it and its cargo for trial 
before a federal judge. Once seized, customs officials handed the vessel over to the local 
deputy US.  marshal for care until the district court determined what to do with it. 
Sometimes officials had the seized vessels beached and stripped of their sails and rudder 
to prevent escape, or as it was termed, "rescue" the vessel. Passamaquoddy's collectors 
sometimes sent seized vessels or cargoes as far westward as Portland to ensure their 
safety from rescue.74 Sometimes customs officers seized only a vessel's cargo, or part of 
cargo, and placed it in a secure warehouse to await trial. If the owner or the master of the 
vessel had sufficient resources and was deemed trustworthy, the court might permit him 
to post bond for the vessel and cargo before trial and thus retrieve them while the slow 
legal process ground on.75 
Many smugglers took advantage of this bonding'system as a means of 
legitimizing their goods, especially during the War of 18 12. The system relied on court- 
appointed local merchants to assess the value of the seized goods. These supposedly 
honest merchants, however, often valued the goods far below their market price - 
sometimes at only ten percent of their true market value.76 The claimant of the 
contraband had to post bond for the assessed value, or up to three times the value of the 
goods in certain cases, upon which his goods were released to him after paying bonds of 
only a fraction of the contraband's value. The system actually encouraged smugglers to 
inform against themselves because they could recover the informant's share of the 
proceeds.77 Furthemlore, if the smuggler successfully defended his case, he recovered 
the bonds; if that failed, he could always petition the Treasury secretary or Congress, as 
many merchants did.78 The system outraged the American military commander at 
Eastport, who complained bitterly about a practice that undermined his efforts to stop 
wartime s n ~ u ~ ~ l i n ~ . ' ~  Collector Trescott's motivations in permitting bonding seem to 
have been two-fold. First, it got both the contraband and its claimants out of his district, 
saving him considerable time, effort, and worry about rescues or storing the illicit goods. 
Second, he received gifts of cash from relieved merchants; on one occasion a New York 
merchant gave him $1 00 for assisting in the bonding process.80 
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The collectors frequently attended the federal courts themselves to aid the federal 
district attorney in prosecuting the case, necessitating long trips to the westward. Often 
they had to collect extensive written depositions from witnesses to support their case; 
federal law excused witnesses from having to travel more than one hundred miles, and 
often pernlitted transients such as mariners to make sworn statements rather than 
appearing in person. This was in keeping with revolutionary ideals that justice be 
accessible and relatively cheap. Sometimes witnesses did have to travel to the federal 
courts to testify, but they were reimbursed for their expenses by the district's U.S. 
marshal. Unfortunately for the witnesses, U.S. Marshal Thomas G. Thomton sometimes 
took years to pay their bills.81 
Written depositions leave the impression that Eastport in particular was a 
community of eyes and ears. Some depositions are completely based on the rumbling 
noises of barrels loaded in the dark; others attempt to establish the exact location of a 
vessel's anchorage.82 Not all depositions were especially usehl, however; many 
witnesses exhibited a sort of willhl ignorance, claiming they did not know the names of 
people, or forgetting other key pieces of information. It is also probable that smugglers 
chose to work in relative anonymity, not revealing their names to one another. These 
depositions were made before local justices, many of whom were smugglers themselves, 
or sympathetic to smugglers. A degree of caution must therefore be used when 
considering this evidence. However, they also provide a wealth of details about ordinary 
life at Passamaquoddy. 
The collector worked with the United States district attorney to prosecute the 
case. The basic facts, including the date, parties involved, list of contraband, and specific 
laws broken, were taken down on a printed form known as a "libel." Legal proceedings 
were generally against a vessel or against the contraband goods. Vessels in maritime law 
had a corporate identity similar to a person; it is one of the reasons the law required them 
to have names, and why smugglers often changed or obscured the name of their vessel 
and its port of call.83 Sometimes the accused smugglers stepped forward to legally 
defend their actions and claim the goods. If that occurred they were entitled to a trial by 
jury, one of the few American departures from British admiralty law, which seldom used 
juries. If no claimant stepped forward, no jury was required and the federal judge 
decreed or "condemned" the goods. The judge then ordered the U.S. marshal to auction 
the goods off publicly after advertising the sale in local newspapers. Generally half the 
proceeds of the auction went to the U.S. Treasury and the captors, usually the collector 
and informant or officer involved, received the other half - or one "moiety" - after the 
court deducted the cost of the trial. 
The trials were held far from Passamaquoddy. The nearest sitting of the federal 
court was in Wiscasset, hundreds of miles to the west of Eastport. The U.S. federal court 
system was a humble institution during its first few decades of existence. It rotated 
between York, Portland, Wiscasset and occasionally Castine. Usually it sat in 
courthouses or meetinghouses borrowed from Massachusetts, but sometimes it convened 
in the federal judge's own home. When state courts needed those courtrooms, the federal 
court found itself sitting in "Mechanic's Hall" in Portland or "a room over the bank" in 
Wiscasset, The district's sole federal judge and other court officers had to travel to these 
10cations.~~ 
The American system for prosecuting smugglers was far from perfect; it created 
tensions within small communities and it was open to abuse. For example, locals 
harbored deep grievances against both inspectors and informants who enriched 
themselves at the expense of their neighbors, and violence, threatened or real, could 
ensue after a seizure. If the owner of the seized vessel was a poor man, a seizure could 
impoverish him and his family.85 Sometimes there was bickering about the just allotment 
of the proceeds of successfully prosecuted seizures. Clever smugglers sometimes 
informed against themselves, knowing they could recoup their losses through various 
ploys, including gaining the informant's share for themselves. Furthemlore, the 
collector's tolerance of smuggling was often exceeded by the lesser customhouse 
officers. Delesdernier's downfall during Jefferson's embargo was the result of his 
subordinates breaking into a customs warehouse and using the customhouse boat to 
smuggle goods across the lines.86 
The American system of suppressing smuggling had some features that made it 
very different from the British colonial system. These differences were based on the 
American pre-Revolutionary experience of smugglers. Trial by jury within a reasonable 
distance of one's home was clearly a reaction against pre-Revolutionary efforts to have 
all smugglers tried in Halifax, Nova ~ c o t i a . ~ ~  Appointing locals as customs officers was 
another; American colonials had deeply resented British appointees. Importantly, 
Maritimers also detested British officials sent to regulate them after 1 7 8 3 . ~ ~  So too, the 
American system was relatively non-violent as well. Customs officers were not armed, 
except during extraordinary times such as Jefferson's embargo. Even the revenue cutters 
seemed to have operated with little implied or actual violence. This was in keeping with 
the spirit of a Treasury Department circular issued by Alexander Hamilton to the first 
revenue cutter captains in 1791, which enjoined them to act with "a cool and temperate 
perseverance in their duty, by address & moderation rather than by vehemence or 
~iolence."'~ 
Conclusion 
The reaction of borderlands residents to the centralizing authority of the United 
States government was remarkably con~plex, in no small part because some served as 
federal officers themselves. Passamaquoddy's customs collectors often found themselves 
trapped between local interests and government regulations, a situation they often 
attempted to ameliorate by making local exceptions to federal regulations or perceiving 
their duty as one of facilitating trade rather than halting it. The border populace loathed 
inflexible or imperious customs officers, and quickly generated editorials, petitions, and 
complaints against them. 
Passamaquoddy's citizens, in common with other American frontier peoples, had 
an abiding fear of taxes. 90 During peaceful times, Passamaquoddy's residents paid their 
customhouse duties and fees fairly happily; maybe more happily than most American 
mariners because they probably knew how expensive and corrupt New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia customs systems were. However, during times of turmoil and financial 
hardship, locals resented taxation and regulation that threatened their livelihoods, and 
naturally resisted them. When federal courts called on them to account for their behavior, 
they responded with a variety of excuses, or fled to British North Ameri~a.~ '  
Despite their misgivings about paying taxes, many locals sought employment at 
the customhouse or on board revenue cutters to augment their incomes. But 
Passamaquoddy's populace were almost entirely reliant on maritime trade, and when the 
federal government acted in an arbitrary or heavy-handed manner, as it did between late 
1807 through the War of 18 12 they deeply resented it and resisted conmercial 
regulations. The American residents near the border were active participants in 
American democracy, and petitioned with some success for internal improvements such 
as the West Quoddy lighthouse. This did not prevent them from manipulating American 
commercial regulations for their own benefit, or occasionally defying the government 
outright, but in the early republic this sort of pragmatic, regional response was common 
throughout the United States. The so-called "Whiskey Rebellion" of 1794 in western 
Pennsylvania was one such tax revolt, as was the "Nullification Crisis" of 1832-1 833. 
Passarnaquoddy's three American customs collectors, even those who apparently 
winked at illicit trade, faced a difficult task in controlling the border region. While 
Delesdernier and Trescott seemed to have been in sympathy with smugglers, even they 
made seizures from time to time. Thacher's approach was less sympathetic, in part 
because he was a political appointee with no local connections. The popularity of the 
first two collectors and the unpopularity of the last was due to their enforcement of laws 
designed to control smuggling. This popularity was directly linked to the methods used 
by customs officers and the legal consequences for smugglers once caught, as well as the 
rewards to customs officers for catching smugglers. A similar dynamic operated on the 
New Brunswick side of the boundary. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
COLONIAL ENFORCEMENT 
The Falmouth Incident 
New Brunswick's colonial customs officials faced some of the same problems 
enforcing commercial regulations as did their American counterparts. But there were two 
important differences between the American and British customs systems and the 
problems they faced. First, the British colonial customs system continued to suffer from 
salutary neglect after the Revolution, and possessed none of the administrative vigor 
displayed by Americans such as Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Second, 
the colonial customs system was divided between two kinds of officers, those who 
regarded their offices as profitable sinecures and those who wanted to reform the system 
to operate efficiently. The result was that corruption was rife, scandals were frequent, 
and customs officers spent much of their time defending their reputations. The event that 
illustrates the problems of New Brunswick's customs officers most clearly is the 
Falmouth incident of 1 805. ' 
On the surface the Falmouth incident appears unremarkable. On October 24, 
1805, the captain of the Union cutter acting under the authority of the Superintendent of 
Trade and Fisheries seized the American sloop Falmouth for violating British 
commercial laws that forbade American vessels to trade while within New Brunswick 
waters. The Falmouth was engaged in the illicit plaster trade, whereby Maritimes plaster 
producers exchanged gypsum for American goods, especially flour, at the border by 
simply transferring cargoes from one ship to another. George Leonard, in his capacity as 
Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries, had been battling this form of smuggling for some 
years. As recently as 1803 he had success~lly prosecuted two American vessels engaged 
in the plaster trade.2 Expecting this seizure to proceed in a routine manner, the Union 
escorted the Falmouth to Saint John for adjudication by New Brunswick's vice-admiralty 
court. 
Leonard sought to encourage British shipping and colonial control of the plaster 
trade, but his greater concern was smuggling. In a letter to his patron Thomas Carleton, 
the absentee Governor of New Bnmswick, Leonard wrote the following: 
These evils [of the plaster trade], tho' great, are however 
comparatively small when the clandestine trade, that is 
encouraged by these illicit practices, is taken into 
consideration; for the above articles are principally, if not 
altogether, paid for, by Teas and coarse cottons imported 
from the East Indies by the Americans, adulterated 
brandies, and other spirits, coarse shoes and Boots, and 
other articles, principally the manufactures of the United 
States, received in return for the Plaister and Grindstones. 
These contraband articles, thus received, are afterwards 
easily distributed by boats and small craft tho '  every part 
of this Province, and also tho '  that valuable and populous 
part of the Province of Nova Scotia lying upon the Bay of 
~ u n d ~ . ~  
Leonard went on to detail how American merchants at Passamaquoddy also received 
timber, lumber, furs, and fish in return for their goods. He concluded: "Accordingly it is 
to be seen that the subjects of the United States near the boundary line and especially 
upon Moose Island, where they have a Custom house established are becoming very 
wealthy and have large stores erected for carrying on this species of Commerce, altho' 
their soil and its products and harbors are inferior.'* Leonard believed correctly that 
because of these American traders, British merchants found it impossible to compete 
unless they themselves became smugglers. The same reason accounted for what he 
termed "the appearance of lack of property in general among the inhabitants on the 
British side."5 Eliminating smuggling at Passamaquoddy became something of a 
personal quest for Leonard, one that would earn him many enemies within the province. 
The Falmouth case became a difficult one for Leonard. First, the American 
captain proved especially willing and able to defend his case in court. Second, New 
Brunswick's customs establishment opposed Leonard's rigid enforcement of the 
Navigation Acts. Third, because the possession of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay was 
still undetem~ined, the matter drew the attention of both the United States and British 
governments. The Falmouth incident thus underscores many of the problems colonial 
customs officials faced in stopping smuggling at Passamaquoddy. 
In January, 1806, the Falmouth case quickly went on trial before William 
Botsford, New Brunswick's vice-admiralty court judge.6 The captain of the Falmouth 
and his lawyers put up a skillful defense. They contended that the sloop was in American 
waters at the time of seizure, and that the American customs collector had given him 
permission to proceed to what was termed a "neutral area" where it was customary for 
American vessels to take on cargoes of plaster directly from British vessels.' This 
defense was problematic because both Britain and the United States claimed jurisdiction 
over the waters in which the Falmouth anchored. Diplomats had yet to decide what 
nation should possess Moose, Dudley, Allan, and Pope's Folly islands. American 
citizens lived on and claimed all the islands as part of Massachusetts, but New Brunswick 
officials claimed them as well. Furthermore, the "neutral zone" the Falmouth lay in was 
an unofficial construction made in 1799 between the American customs collector, Lewis 
Delesdernier, and his New Brunswick counterpart from St. Andrews, Deputy Customs 
Collector John ~ u n n . '  
The prosecution countered with its own arguments. Foremost among these was 
the point that the Falmouth was anchored in British waters because all of the islands in 
Passamaquoddy Bay were part of New Brunswick according to the 1783 Treaty of Paris. 
The prosecution also attacked the idea that local customs officers could create a neutral 
zone on their own authority. The defense contested the allegations of British sovereignty 
over all the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, and brought forth New Brunswick's customs 
collector and comptroller as witnesses to attest to the validity of the "neutral zone." They 
even brought the American customs collector to Saint John to testify. 
The Falmouth case was a struggle between the province's customhouse 
authorities and the superintendent of trade and fisheries, with the Falmouth and the vice- 
admiralty court judge in the middle. Leonard brought some damning evidence against 
the customhouse authorities, including the fact that the agent for the Falmouth's cargo of 
gypsum was the custonls surveyor and searcher, Colin Campbell; the owner of the cargo 
was Campbell's son, Colin ~ r . ~  Judge William Botsford found against the Falmouth, and 
ordered the vessel and cargo condemned, but refused to fine the owners or captain 
because they were engaged in a trade that had been tolerated for so long. Botsford also 
found that all of the islands in the bay should be considered as within New Brunswick's 
jurisdiction, and that the customs authorities had indeed exceeded their authority in 
creating a neutral zone. However, the judge also condemned Leonard for his conduct in 
bringing unfounded charges against the owners of the vessel. The mixed results of the 
trial hardened the rivalry between Leonard and New Brunswick's customhouse 
establishment. l o  
Mercantilism and the British Empire 
The struggle to control commercial shipping and eliminate smuggling was not 
restricted to New Brunswick; it occurred throughout the British Empire, including 
England, and London itself. The issue was the entire conception of trade: was trade to 
serve the interests of the state, or did the state exist to support trade? The former concept, 
known as mercantilism, was the dominant paradigm in the eighteenth century, but by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century it was just beginning to be challenged by free trade. 
However, ordinary people had always challenged mercantilism at the popular level by 
resisting the many restrictions and taxation it imposed. Resistance or support of 
mercantilism entered political debate, newspaper editorials, street theater, and smuggling. 
In many ways, the reaction to mercantilism is related to the ideology of the British 
Empire. This ideology was a loose set of ideas that propounded the empire as 
"Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free."" However, support of mercantilist policies 
did not necessarily equate with unequivocal support for the empire or vice versa; the 
issue was always clouded by pragmatic commercial concerns, or those who worried that 
the state was encroaching on their traditional liberties. Furthermore, those who loudly 
supported mercantilism often subverted those very policies by engaging in smuggling. 
Mercantilism is a modern label for an eighteenth-century concept. Adam Smith, 
the man most responsible for the demise of mercantilism, invented the tern1 "mercantile 
system" in the late eighteenth century. More recently, Smith's phrase has been shortened 
to "mercantilism," a term that implies far more rational thought and consistency than 
actually existed.I2 At the time, when people referred to British trade policies they 
generally discussed the "Navigation Acts," a series of laws passed by Parliament, starting 
in 165 1, which endured until about 1850. These laws embraced three principles. First, 
only British ships could trade with British colonies; the ship had to be built within the 
empire, and the law required that its captain and three-quarters of the crew were British 
subjects. Second, the laws restricted the kind of commodities British colonies sent to the 
mother country; for instance, a New Brunswick merchant could not ship tea bought in the 
United States to Britain. Third, goods from outside the British Empire were supposed to 
pass through Britain first, where they would be taxed before distribution to colonial 
markets. l 3  
These laws enriched the British Empire at the expense of its ~ o m ~ e t i t o r s . ' ~  
Mercantilism deprived foreign governments of valuable shipping and markets, while 
enhancing British customs revenue and shipping. Britain's rise to preeminence among 
the European powers was often attributed to the Navigation Acts, and many believed that 
this system promoted national and commercial security.15 Offenses against the 
Navigation Acts were therefore deemed as a direct assault on the British Empire's safety 
and prosperity. Nova Scotia's vice-admiralty court judge, while prosecuting a smuggler, 
claimed that every deviation from the Navigation Acts was a "nail driven into the Coffin 
of the British empire."16 Some colonial officials, such as George Leonard, would have 
agreed. But given the scale of smuggling in British North America, it is apparent that 
many were willing to sacrifice the needs of the empire for their own pragmatic concerns, 
even in a Loyalist colony like New Brunswick. Many Maritimers believed it was "a 
crime to support the fair [legal] trader by repressing smuggling."" Moreover, some of 
those who acted contrary to the Navigation Acts were the very individuals who should 
have been enforcing it, such as New Brunswick's custon~ouse officers.'* 
The Navigation Acts were a mixed blessing for New Brunswick. Shipbuilders 
liked them because the laws deemed colonial-built vessels as British, and allowed them 
access to the vast imperial markets.19 Timber merchants also appreciated the benefits of 
imperial privileges.20 Others complained about commercial restrictions, or evaded the 
laws through a wide variety of schemes. There is a growing body of evidence that the 
Navigation Acts seldom performed in the manner intended; Canadian historian Gerald S. 
Graham categorized contraband as a crucial staple of North Atlantic trade.21 American 
historian Francis Jennings has gone so far as to say that smuggling was "necessary and 
intrinsic" to colonial trade.22 One of the problems with British mercantilism was that the 
British North American economy was too underdeveloped to perform its assigned role 
within the imperial economy, and thus attempts to enforce the Navigation Acts "only 
produced smuggling and evasion."23 
Another problem with the Navigation Acts was that the United States remained 
both an important market and producer for colonial and British merchants.24 The 
Maritime Provinces needed American commodities such as wheat, and the British wanted 
access to America's growing demand for manufactured items. Con~mercially aggressive 
American merchants, farmers, and fishennen sought access to colonial markets, and 
frontier colonies like New Brunswick had difficulty in excluding American goods from 
their markets, so Saint John's customs officials used their discretion in bending, or even 
breaking the Navigation ~ c t s . ~ '  Attempts were made by the colony's officials to 
discourage smuggling, and one of Lt. Governor Thomas Carleton's first actions was to 
forbid illicit and illegal trade with the United States, or the aiding or assisting therein.26 
Therefore, when authorities arrested Gillam Butler of Campobello for smuggling 
American whale oil that he claimed was British, provincial authorities acted in a manner 
intended to discourage further illicit trade with the United States. The courts found 
Butler guilty, and attempted to make an example of him when it fined him £500 and 
sentenced him to three months in prison.27 
Yet Carleton and his successors could not consistently pursue rigid enforcement 
of the Navigation Acts. In order to obtain supplies necessary for colonial enterprise such 
as shipbuilding, Carleton had to press imperial officials in London to change the laws, 
and occasionally they did.28 But overall, imperial officials pursued policies for the 
benefit of the imperial core rather than the colonial periphery. Sometimes these policies 
benefited the colonies, but often they did not. As Adam Smith, himself a customs officer, 
noted, the system was often corrupt and unproductive.29 In New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia, the mercantilist system benefited some merchants, but hurt others and drove up 
prices for ordinary consumers. With a few exceptions, such as George Leonard, colonial 
and imperial officials often turned a blind eye, or even actively participated in, 
smuggling. Far from discouraging smuggling, crown customs officers often shielded 
smuggling activity. 
New Brunswick's Customs Officials 
Like the United States, New Brunswick had difficulty stopping smuggling at 
Passamaquoddy. Controlling cross-border trade was hard enough, but when the border 
was as indefinite as that which ran between the United States and New Brunswick, 
enforcing anti-smuggling laws became an administrative nightmare.30 Furthermore, the 
United States produced in abundance low-cost, high-quality foodstuffs, especially flour, 
the very products New Brunswick could not provide for itself and that the British markets 
could not provide.31 New Brunswick's attempts to control trade with the United States 
were often undercut by British imperial policy; sometimes the Colonial Office in London 
encouraged trade with the United States, while on other occasions it forbade it. The 
complex relationship of the Loyalist population, with its strong commercial and 
emotional ties with the United States, further complicated the issue; from its inception, 
New Brunswick struggled to control illicit trade with the United States and usually 
failed.32 These problems are best understood through New Brunswick's customhouse, a 
remarkably corrupt and lax establishment even by contemporary standards. 
New Brunswick's customhouse establishment is fairly typical of the colonial 
customs service. New Brunswick's customs authorities operated out of Saint John, the 
colony's largest port and site of its only full-fledged customhouse. A small number of 
lesser officials worked in the province's other ports, which were known as "outports." 
Saint Andrews was always one of New Brunswick's more important outports. From the 
founding of the colony at least one customs official, deemed a sub-collector, operated at 
Passamaquoddy, generally at Saint Andrews. But as the plaster trade became more 
important, another customs officer served shipping interests fhther down the bay at 
~ a m ~ o b e l l o . ~ ~  
Most New Brunswick's customs officials, like their counterparts in the rest of 
British North America, proved extremely tolerant of illicit trade. In this they closely 
resembled the behavior of Crown customs officers in the thirteen American Colonies 
before the Revolution. Often locally appointed colonial custon~s officers were lax, and 
Crown customs collectors appointed from Britain were unpopular due to their venality, 
corruption or inflexibility.34 
British imperial officials showed little interest in colonial reform following the 
American Revolution, and largely continued a policy of 'salutary neglect' after 
establishing New ~ r u n s w i c k . ~ ~  The king appointed a lieutenant governor who in turn 
chose a council that acted as advisors. The council represented the interests of the 
colonial elite, and was composed of wealthy and powerful individuals who often held 
other offices as well, such as supreme-court judges.36 An elected Legislative Assembly 
represented the interests of ordinary New Brunswickers. Largely composed of 
merchants, the Assembly introduced new legislation for the approval of the lieutenant 
governor, who in turn sent it to England for Crown approval. The Assembly, as Leonard 
noted, was often in sympathy with smugglers owing to its own predominantly 
commercial composition.37 Despite this sympathy, members paid lip service to the very 
Navigation Acts they flaunted by arranging a portrait of arch-mercantilist Lord Sheffield 
to hang in the Assembly chambers, a perfect representation of the differences between 
Loyalist action and ideology.38 
Figure 4.1: New Brunswick's Customs Establishment, c. 1784-1820 
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The political system was neither egalitarian nor especially democratic, nor was it 
intended to be.39 The political ideals of New Brunswick's Loyalists were based on a 
concept of deference whereby the middling and lower social orders supported a wealthy 
educated elite who in turn were supposed to reciprocate by doing their best to bring 
stability and prosperity to the colony.40 Central to this idea of deference was the rule of 
law: New Brunswick's supreme court judges sat in the governor's council, where they 
vigorously defended status and privilege.4' Furthermore, Loyalists were obsessed with 
legal technicalities, and were quick to sue.42 Despite ideals of good order, rule of law, 
and elite government, New Brunswick almost immediately developed a lively political 
climate in which the middling and lower classes challenged the assumptions of the 
colonial elite.43 New Brunswick's political dynamic quickly began to resemble to that of 
the pre-Revolutionary colonies, an uneasy and fractious relationship in which the 
governors and council, assembly, and Crown office holders competed for power.44 
The most lucrative offices in the colony were in the Crown customhouse in Saint 
John. The highest-ranked customs officer in the colony, ternled the collector, sometimes 
made more in a year than even the lieutenant governor, both from a salary and fees 
extracted from shipping.45 Those customs officers, directly appointed by the Customs 
Commissioners, held their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown, which was 
essentially an appointment for life. Lesser officials held their office on the pleasure of 
the customs collector. The entire customs hierarchy existed outside of the colonial 
government's direct authority (see Figure 4.1). It formed almost "a state-within-a-state- 
connected with, but basically independent of, the various other royal  official^.'^^ The 
primary duties of these officers were to regulate shipping by enforcing the Navigation 
Acts, and to tax incoming goods with imperial duties that went to the Crown and 
supported colonial government. These offices were both prestigious for the office holder 
and genuinely important to the colony as a whole, and this excited the interest of other 
government bodies and the jealousy of other office holders, especially George Leonard. 
The customs collector was the most important officer in the customhouse. The 
Board of Customs Commissioners in London directly appointed this official and charged 
him with overall regulation of customs matters in New Brunswick. This included a 
considerable patronage network, whereby the collector appointed minor officers to 
control the province's outports. The collector was responsible only to the customs 
commissioners and to the Colonial Office; even the lieutenant governor had little 
authority over customs issues. While the annual salary was only £50, the collector was 
also entitled to gather fees for every service rendered to shipping, such as an entry or 
clearance certificate. While these fees were usually just a few shillings per transaction, 
they were numerous enough to provide a substantial income for the collector. Between 
1807 and 1808 the collector's income averaged £ 800; by 18 16, the collector garnered a 
stunning £2,900 - £900 more than the lieutenant-governor's salary - thereby initiating an 
extensive investigation by the Assembly into the fee structure at the Saint John 
custon~house.~~ The Assembly committee found extensive abuse in the fee system, and 
the Treasury censured him and fined him £250; nonetheless, he remained in office.48 The 
corruption within Saint John's customhouse highlights the inconsistencies between 
Loyalist myth and reality in New Brunswick. 
Loyalist Ideology, Officeholding, and Corruption 
Determining the ideology of the Loyalists is no easy task, but a crucial one in 
recovering the "mentality" of New Brunswick officials.49 George RudC defined ideology 
as a blend of two elements, one of popular beliefs and the other adopted ideas fiom 
outside, what he termed "inherent" versus "derived" influences that overlapped one 
another. Inherent ideology tended to be backward-looking, demanding the restoration of 
traditional rights. Derived ideology tended to be forward looking, seeking reform rather 
than re~toration.~' Rudt's model of ideology underscores the essential difference 
between American republican ideology and the Loyalist ideology of the remaining 
British colonies in mainland North America. 
American scholars in recent decades have created a large body of knowledge on 
the ideology of the American Revolution. Generally this has concentrated on the 
"Patriot" cause, the revolutionaries who emerged victorious in the American War of 
Independence. Republicanism was in some ways a dynamic driven by the tension 
between an inherent ideology, such as preserving the "rights of Englishmen," and derived 
ideological concepts, such as virtue.51 For officeholders the key elements of this derived 
ideology was virtue, whereby they defined their interests and duties in terms of the 
common good; they subsumed personal interests for public ones. Sociologist Max Weber 
identified the creation of a bureaucracy based on merit and technical qualifications as an 
important factor in the rise of the modem state; but Loyalist officeholders possessed an 
ideology that revolved around pre-modem ideals of privilege and social status.52 
Much less has been written on the ideology of the Loyalists, which was largely 
based on ancient but loose British ideals of Protestantism, commerce, maritime power, 
and The strongest element of Loyalist ideology was essentially backward- 
looking, seelung to restore the pre-1775 world to create an hierarchical society based on 
deference and loyalty. Loyalists attempted to put these ideals into practice when the 
British imperial government created New Brunswick as a separate colony at their request. 
Prominent among the Loyalists who sought the creation of New Brunswick was the 
former Massachusetts attorney general, Jonathan Sewall, an officeholder who had 
strongly resisted the rise of Boston radicals in the 1770s. Yet even Sewall, one of the 
most outspoken Tory pamphleteers, had acted to defend Boston smuggler and equally 
outspoken Whig John Hancock fiom the imperial Customs ~ o a r d . ' ~  Loyalist ideology 
accommodated both the ideals of an orderly society and more pragmatic economic 
concerns, but sometimes these values conflicted, as with smuggling. This created an 
ambivalence, perhaps even hypocrisy, among Loyalist officials. These conflicting 
desires were born of their pre-Revolutionary experiences and traveled with them when 
creating and administering New Brunswick. 
The behavior of customs officials in Sewall's pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts 
largely explains the behavior of New Brunswick's customs officers. In Weber's tern~s, 
these colonial officials viewed their posts as patrimonial, an office they owned based on 
their loyalty to the king, and being so far fiom the king's authority, they quite naturally 
pursued personal agendas." In colonial Massachusetts this meant that many customs 
officials "bent with the wind" and ignored or even expedited illegal intercourse. In 
cooperating with smugglers, customs officers avoided a great deal of trouble, profited 
from official and unofficial remuneration, and gained the esteem and fhendship of 
colonial merchants without loss of self respect, social esteem, or even much risk of 
censure from the Customs Commissioners. Their official dereliction of duty could be 
tolerated because of their public profession of loyalty to the king and the widely held 
conviction that the growth of the British empire's trade was better served by disregarding 
the unreasonable restrictions embodied in the less-popular clauses of the Navigation Acts, 
such as those prohibiting trade with French islands in the West in die^.'^ 
New Brunswick's Creole Customs Collectors 
New Brunswick's custom officers seem to have retained this pragmatic view of 
officeholding. Most of them identified more with the colony's merchants than they did 
with the interests of the crown. In his study of the British customs service in colonial 
America, Thomas Barrow termed these officials "Creoles." Barrow posited that these 
officials' interests had degenerated from those of the Crown to a more local concern due 
to their great distance from London, a factor Weber noted was common in patrimonial 
bureaucracies. This was especially true when their pay was based on fees collected 
directly for their services.'' In contrast to the creoles were the "schematists," customs 
officers who attempted to enforce the laws more rigidly and reported frequently to 
~ n ~ l a n d . " ' ~  The Falmouth incident, which unfolded in New Brunswick's courts, can 
largely be seen as a struggle between Creoles and schematists in the customs service. 
New Brunswick's first customs collector was William Wanton, a Loyalist from 
Rhode Island and son of its last colonial governor. Wanton received his commission as 
collector in 1784 as a means to recover the financial losses his family suffered from the 
Revolution. He held the office until his death in 18 16, at age eighty-two. Wanton's 
Loyalism was of a moderate kind; he claimed before the Revolution his bbprinciples were 
that Great Britain had no right to tax America but the family were never for opposing G. 
Britain by arms," a conclusion that indicates his creole sympathies.59 The source of 
Wanton's attitudes toward officeholding were probably inherited from his father, who as 
Rhode Island's governor proved remarkably tolerant of smugglers and had done his best 
to impede official investigations of the burning of the revenue cutter Gaspke in 1 772.60 
Wanton was a popular man in Saint John social circles and maintained an 
epicurean lifestyle on the emoluments of his office. Knowing that the province relied on 
trade, Wanton spent little effort suppressing smuggling. Instead he quietly collected his 
fees from shipmasters and merchants who were eager to pay them so long as he ignored 
their illicit trade. Wanton regarded his position as collector as a sinecure, in keeping with 
Weber's dictum that patrimonial bureaucrats considered their office as a personal right 
rewarding them for their personal loyalty to the m~narch .~ '  Wanton's malfeasance 
proved extremely profitable; in his final year in office alone he garnered over £5,500 in 
fees.62 As with creole customs officers in colonial Massachusetts, merchants honored 
and rewarded Wanton for his laxity. 
Not all of New Brunswick's Loyalists found Wanton's actions laudable. George 
Leonard leveled repeated charges against the Saint John customhouse, frequently 
accusing it of corruption. Wanton's defense against charges of laxity were calm and 
reasoned. His accusers exaggerated their points, he argued, and he expressed a mild 
shock at the various accusations made against him.63 After repeated complaints a 
commission arrived from London in 1812 to investigate smuggling in New Brunswick 
and neighboring colonies. The commission found that in 1810 smugglers brought into 
New Brunswick nearly all the tea; three-quarters of the wine; nine-tenths of spirits such 
as gin; seven-eighths of all soap and candles; most of the indigo, starch, mustard, 
tobacco, and East India textiles; and all of the nankeens, sailcloth, cordage and anchors. 
Much of this contraband arrived fiom the United States via ~as sama~uodd~ . "  In that 
same year the colony's top five customs officials earned £2,780 to prevent smuggling, the 
collector's share netted £871. Yet the Customs Commissioners did not remove Wanton 
fiom office, or even reprimand him; they tacitly countenanced his beha~ior.~ '  To pacify 
Leonard, the Crown gave him greater powers to pursue smugglers, and provided him 
with a new cutter to carry out the task.66 
Henry Wright, who succeeded Wanton on his death, shared Wanton's views on 
office holding as a personal privilege. However, Wright proved far more rapacious than 
his predecessor.67 In his first year in office, he collected more than £1,000 in fees above 
what Wanton had by arbitrarily raising them by a third. Furthermore, Wright installed his 
son-in-law as the deputy collector at Indian Island at Passarnaquoddy and installed his 
son - not yet age twenty-one and therefore ineligible for office - as the deputy collector at 
~ i r a m i c h i . ~ ~  He also dismissed the deputy collector at St. Andrews, an act later found to 
be Whereas Wanton extracted his fees and turned a blind eye to smuggling, 
Wright raised the customhouse fees and pursued smugglers, making him increasingly 
unpopular. Wright even went so far as to pursue a smuggling case against General John 
Coffin, a popular Loyalist leader, member of the Lieutenant Governor's council, and 
forn~er conmanding officer of the New Bmnswick Fencible Regiment during the War of 
1812.~' 
Wright may have been more aggressive than Wanton in pursuing smugglers, yet 
he also fits into Barrow's model of a creole officeholder. Wright had no interest in 
reforming the customs system, but merely wanted to harness it more effectively for his 
own gain. Nonetheless, Wright was not a perfect creole in that he was an outsider, an 
Englishman with no local connections. Wright seemed to have an Englishman's disdain 
for colonials, an attitude that led him into conflict with General John Coffin, a powerhl 
member of the governor's council, whose brother sat in the British House of ~ o m m o n s . ~ '  
Wright's men seized a boat belonging to Coffin at Passamaquoddy Bay because they 
found American contraband on board. The ensuing public power struggle embarrassed 
many of the colonial elite, including Wright, Coffin, and the influential lawyer Ward 
~ h i ~ m a n . ~ ~  Coffin even challenged Wright's comptroller to a Finally the case 
was brought before the Customs Commissioners in London, who supported Wright's 
position but also launched an investigation into the collector's conduct.74 Smuggling 
scandals such as the Falmouth incident and the Wright-Coffin affair thus rocked New 
Brunswick society from time to time, much as they had Massachusetts before the 
 evolution.^^ 
George Leonard, Schematist 
Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries George Leonard is exactly the sort of 
official Barrow had in mind when he coined the term "schematist." Barrow defined a 
schematist as an officeholder, "either English or colonial, who by dint of continually 
submitting reports and suggestions on the operation of the system created a reputation for 
knowledge and diligence, thus earning themselves a place in the [customs] service."76 
From the 1780s to the eve of the War of 18 12, Leonard launched a personal campaign to 
eradicate smuggling in the Maritime Provinces. This should not be surprising in a man 
that historian William S. MacNutt deemed the most zealous of the New Brunswick 
Loyalists, a man who refused to temper his loyalty with "either caution or business 
acumen," and who professed to believe that "the War of the American Revolution was 
still being fought on New Brunswick Leonard's hatred of Americans and bitter 
memories of the War of Independence fueled his zealous enforcement of the Navigation 
Acts, blinding him to the fact that during the Napoleonic Wars imperial authorities were 
more interested in maintaining amicable commercial relations with the United States than 
in rigidly enforcing commercial laws.78 
Leonard's feud with the Saint John customhouse seems to date back to the years 
immediately after Britain established New Brunswick as a separate province. Leonard 
had occupied a temporary position as Comptroller of Customs with a mandate from 
Governor Carleton to suppress the illicit trade with the United In June, 1786, he 
displayed his customary rashness by seizing two American vessels at Passamaquoddy 
without warning, and driving a third on shore in its effort to escape him.80 This incident 
provoked a minor diplomatic crisis in which Massachusetts requested the aid of the 
Continental Congress. However, Massachusetts did not pursue the matter because it soon 
became embroiled in a tax revolt in the western part of the state called Shays' Rebellion, 
and the American Continental Congress was rapidly losing power. New Brunswick 
officials also wanted to keep peaceful relations, and the incident was quickly forgotten as 
more pressing needs arose." 
Leonard seems to have been disappointed that the Customs Commissioners did 
not choose him to become a pennanent customs official. Consequently his patron, 
Governor Carleton, found him a more demanding and less remunerative position, that of 
superintendent of trade and fisheries. In this capacity Leonard once again had a mandate 
to prosecute those engaged in illegal trade with the United States. He also used his 
position as an opportunity to criticize New Brunswick's customs establishment for its 
laxness. From 1798 to 18 12 he was unrelenting in his efforts to convince the Custon~s 
Commissioners, the Secretary of State for Colonies, the New Brunswick Assembly, and 
other provincial officials that something must be done to halt smuggling with the United 
Leonard's efforts as a schematist, especially with the constant flow of reports and 
recommendations to the Customs Commissioners, and even trips to England in 1787 and 
1797, seem to have paid off. In 1796 the Customs Commissioners extended his 
commission to include all of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and what is now known as 
Prince Edward Island; in 1800 they granted him an annual subsidy to operate a 33-ton 
sloop carrying two small three-pounder cannons as a patrol vessel.83 In 1801 the 
Commissioners made him a preventative officer with broad powers to seize vessels and 
property engaged in contraband trade. In 18 10 they gave him a more substantial grant to 
operate a larger revenue cutter capable of patrolling the Bay of Fundy year-round. The 
vessel was virtually a miniature naval vessel, armed with eight 12-pounder carronades 
and a crew of 25.84 
Whether as Comptroller of Customs or Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries, 
Leonard's strict enforcement of the Navigation Acts made him enemies. Nova Scotia's 
governor complained that Leonard's actions "have entangled us in constant Disputes and 
Broils with the United States," and that he interfered with Nova Scotia's customs 
 officer^.^' As early as 1798, an anonymous letter to Lord Portland mocked Leonard as 
"an illiterate, silly, contemptible fellow," who was "even ignorant and weak enough to 
suppose that he has the right to control the customs house."86 Leonard was glad to return 
the favor, writing to his friend Edward Winslow that Collector Wanton and Comptroller 
Parker were afraid that he would expose to the public how much they made from the 
illicit plaster trade at ~ a m ~ o b e l l o . ~ '  Leonard then embarked on a campaign to harass and 
embarrass New Brunswick's customs officers even as he attempted to eradicate 
smuggling at Passamaquoddy. This campaign would directly impact smuggling and 
borderland relations until war broke out in 18 12. 
Aftermath of the Falmouth Incident 
Leonard con~plained bitterly about the Falmouth incident and the opposition of 
the customs authorities to his cutter to all who would listen. Displeased by the judge's 
verdict on the Falmouth, Leonard published an advertisement in the New Brunswick 
Royal Gazette that despite his respect for Botsford, he would continue to pursue 
smugglers at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  However, by early 1806 diplomatic pressure was 
building for Leonard to ease off on his anti-smuggling campaign. At the request of 
Anthony Merry, Britain's minister to the United States, the president of the provincial 
council ordered Leonard to abstain from seizing any more U.S. vessels at 
~ a s s a n l a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  Leonard complied, but continued his campaign from afar, informing 
Merry that the "evils" in Passamaquoddy Bay "have greatly increased" since the 
Lieutenant Governor ordered h ~ m  "to abstain from any seizures of American vessels" that 
were in situations similar to that of the sloop ~ a l r n o u t h . ~ ~  By September Leonard 
reported that the illicit trade on the lines has become worse than ever, American 
smugglers were becoming bolder, and the more their demands were acceded to, the more 
demanding they became. In October he began to call for an investigation into the 
activities of the deputy collector at Passamaquoddy. In 1807 the feuding went before the 
House of Assembly, with both the customhouse officers and Leonard claiming the 
proceeds of fourteen barrels of contraband rum seized by the superintendent. 91 
The Saint John customhouse reacted to accusations of corruption with the 
blandest of denials. Collector Wanton and Comptroller Robert Parker responded, 
"Where countries border on each other, it is utterly impossible to put an effectual stop to 
illicit intercourse between the Inhabitants on each side." They thought that Leonard 
exaggerated the scale of smuggling at Passamaquoddy, and were astonished at Leonard's 
accusations, but of course items manufactured in India did find their way into New 
Brunswick from the United 
Increasingly frustrated by his inability to patrol Passamaquoddy, Leonard finally 
was able to prevail upon the commander of the small Royal Navy schooner Porgey to go 
to Passamaquoddy and ruthlessly eliminate its thriving smuggling trade. Lt. James 
Flintoph took to the task eagerly; he printed an advertisement in the Royal Gazette with 
his intentions: 
PUBLIC INFORMATION 
To prevent as much as possible any interruption 
being given to the carrying trade between these provinces 
and the United States of America; notice is hereby given to 
all concerned, that any vessel employed in carrying plaster 
of paris and grindstones, from the quarries of Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick to the places of consumption 
southward and westward of Portland, shall pass free and 
unmolested; and I pledge my word of honor that I will not 
interrupt them in their lawful pursuits, unless it shall appear 
that they have on board deserters from His Majesty's navy 
or army; the same special regard will be paid to all persons 
conling within the description of fishermen. And to 
discourage and punish all those concerned in illicit traffic, I 
am detem~ined to treat with the utmost severity such as are 
found delivering their cargoes into American vessels in the 
Bay of Passamaquoddy or its neighborhood, or who may 
clandestinely introduce any articles either provinces 
contrary to law. 
J. Flintoph, Lieutenant ~o rn rnande r~~  
True to his word, Flintoph sailed for Passamaquoddy and immediately began to 
seize American vessels engaged in the plaster trade. According to the American 
collector, Flintoph "arrived on the evening of the 5th instant, fired his guns 
promiscuously, and in every direction, even among houses. The shot is in my possession 
that rolled between innocent children, to the great alarm of the peaceable inhabitants of 
both Governments in this vicinity."94 Flintoph's methods, typical of Royal Navy 
enforcement, were crude and violent. He fired cannon, impressed sailors into naval 
service, and his men beat or threatened to shoot mariners who resisted.95 A few weeks 
later the Porgey returned and seized two more American vessels with additional violence 
and gunfire, despite the protest of the American collector and Charlotte County 
Flintoph's tough methods at the behest of Leonard were his undoing. Complaints 
about his behavior soon began to reach Admiral Berkeley in Halifax, who was 
undeceived by Flintoph's bland report of his actions at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  Flintoph also 
suffered from a stroke of bad luck. Americans were in a rage over the unprovoked attack 
of HMS Leopard on the United States Frigate Chesapeake off the Virginia coast on June 
22, 1808, and Admiral Berkeley faced criticism from his superiors for his role in that 
action. Flintoph's over zealousness at Passamaquoddy only added to Berkeley's 
problems, so the admiral apparently asked for and received Flintoph's resignation. Other 
Royal Navy officers who patrolled Passamaquoddy grimly noted Flintoph's fate and 
hoped to avoid a similar situation.98 
Crown Customs Officers at Passamaquoddy 
The lesser customs officers at Passamaquoddy seem to have taken their cue from 
the customhouse in Saint John in tolerating, encouraging, and perhaps even participating 
in illicit trade at the border. The mentality of these lesser officials was undoubtedly 
creole, governed by their desire for good relations with their borderland neighbors, 
friends and families. Undoubtedly, too, they wished to avoid confrontations with 
schematists like Leonard. Only one office defied this pattern: the surveyor and searchers 
were often initially vigorous law enforcers, but with time they also became increasingly 
lax. 
New Brunswick's surveyor and searcher was supposed to be an "outdoor officer" 
who spent most of his time on the waterfkont searching for smugglers. The province's 
collector expected the surveyor and searcher to travel to the various outports and patrol 
the wharves and piers of Saint John, observing shipping and looking out for smugglers. 
With a "writ of assistance," British law empowered the surveyor and searcher to enter 
warehouses and even private homes in search of contraband, using force if necessary. 
Writs of assistance were spectacularly unpopular in the American colonies before the 
Revolution, and became the center of several controversies in Boston; they proved to be 
just as controversial in colonial New ~ r u n s w i c k . ~ ~  
The least popular surveyor and searcher was Richard Batchelor, who served in 
that capacity from 1790 to 1793.1°0 Batchelor used very violent means that earned him a 
great deal of trouble throughout the province in incidents at Saint John, Campobello 
Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, and Cumberland at the head of the Bay of Fundy. At 
midnight, August 13, 179 1 at Portland Parish (across the harbor fiom Saint John proper), 
Batchelor beat William Comely's dog to death with the butt of his pistol before beating 
down the door to Comely's residence. Comely resisted this intrusion with force; during 
the ensuing fkacas, Batchelor ordered his assistant to blow Comely's brains out. 
Batchelor claimed he acted the authority of a writ of assistance, but Comely promptly 
sued Batchelor anyway.'01 A few weeks later, Batchelor broke into a house on 
Campobello looking for contraband goods fiom the United States. The islands 
headstrong proprietor and Charlotte County Justice David Owen ordered Batchelor 
arrested. Batchelor resisted, escaped, and apparently assaulted Owen himself with a 
knife.lo2 In July, 1792, Batchelor seized a vessel for smuggling at the head of the Bay of 
Fundy. A crowd subsequently rescued the vessel, and troops had to be called in twice 
before the vessel arrived safely at Saint ~ o h n . ' ~ ~  
Not only did Batchelor's actions make him very unpopular, they also resulted in 
lawsuits against him and no doubt in his resignation and return to England in 1793 for "ill 
health."lo4 David Owen's comments on Batchelor's activities at Passamaquoddy are the 
most telling. In a letter to his brother, Owen noted that a New Brunswick court had 
recently indicted the searcher of customs, "a man lately sent out from London," for 
breaking open stores on Campobello by virtue of a writ assistance. The courts also 
indicted Batchelor for stealing one of Owen's boats and resisting two men who attempted 
to recover it. Owen noted that "This fellow has occasioned almost a civil war," and 
concluded that "There is much general clamor and discontent such as preceded the 
Rebellion in 1774" due Batchelor's actions. Owen's letter indicated that New 
Brunswickers were not tolerant of outsiders who used violent methods, and that colonial 
courts would prosecute officers who used writs of assistance. Both facts were highly 
reminiscent of resistance to customs officers in Boston during the 1770s.'05 
Batchelor's replacement was Colin Campbell, a Passamaquoddy resident who had 
served as the deputy customs collector at St. Andrews. Like Batchelor, Campbell proved 
willing to use violence, at least early in his career, but soon took a more relaxed position 
on illicit trade. Canlpbell initially was a vigilant officer. In late 1795, he seized the 
American vessel Mary for bringing corn to a gristmill on the New Brunswick side of the 
St. Croix River. The owners rescued it from the surveyor and searcher, and Campbell 
had to call in militia to assist him. Local magistrates complained that Canlpbell was 
destroying the goodwill they had built with their American neighbors.lo6 Governor 
Carleton agreed and ordered the Mary returned to her American owners, who later sued 
~ a m ~ b e l l . ' ~ ~  
In 1796, Campbell continued his anti-smuggling campaign when he testified that 
some of Charlotte County's most prominent men, including several magistrates, were 
involved in smuggling tea, wine and brandy from the United States and that they hid 
them in "houses, warehouses, and other outhouses" on various islands throughout 
~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ' ~ ~  Later that year another violent incident took place at 
Passamaquoddy. Campbell had seized an American vessel for smuggling and placed 
armed guards on board the boat, which was anchored off Grand Manan Island. On the 
night of October 2 1, the guards shot and killed an American smuggler during an effort to 
rescue the vessel. The guards responsible faced only a cursory trial, but after this 
incident Campbell's tactics changed.lo9 
After 1796, Campbell had become more interested in the timber trade than in 
acting as surveyor and searcher, and no more reported episodes of violence involved him. 
Perhaps Collector Wanton, Governor Carleton, or some other individual encouraged him 
to modify his ways; there is no real way to account for the change. However, Campbell 
by this time was one of several Charlotte County notables reported for plundering the 
King's forests. lo His apostasy was clear by 1805, when his involvement in the illicit 
plaster trade became known, but the gears of British imperial bureaucracy ground very 
slowly; the Customs Commissioners did not remove him from office until 18 16. The 
Lieutenant Governor recommended one of George Leonard's sons as a replacement, but 
the Customs Commissioners instead chose Patrick Kelly, who Collector Wright restricted 
to operating only within Saint ~ohn."' 
What were the reasons for Campbell's conversion to creole behavior? Economic 
incentives surely played a role, but do not seem to be the sole reason he abandoned his 
duties as surveyor and searcher. However, the dilatory but profitable mode of Collector 
Wanton certainly earned Campbell a profitable living; in 18 10 he earned £464, 
considerably more than his counterparts in ~ r i t a i n . " ~  There must have been social 
pressures, too, as his fellow Charlotte County magistrates and merchants - many fellow 
Scotsmen like himself - sought accommodations with their counterparts in Washington 
County, Maine, including commercial connections. Painful lawsuits, and probable 
censure fiom other Crown officials, and lack of support by the Customs Con~missioners 
probably fiu-ther persuaded him to turn a blind eye to smuggling and adopt the creole 
mode of office holding. 
Passamaquoddy's other Crown customs officers seem to have always acted as 
creoles, a mode of action that dovetailed nicely with other forms of borderlands 
accommodation. From the founding of the province in 1784, St. Andrews had a deputy 
customs collector. Initially Campbell himself, who John Dunn, co-creator of the "neutral 
zone" exposed in the Falmouth case, replaced him at an early date. Dunn, who also 
served as the Charlotte County sheriff and deputy naval officer, also had a spiritual 
reason to adopt the borderlander's resistance to centralized state authority. Dunn and his 
family were secret adherents of Catholicism, despite laws that forbade Roman Catholics 
from holding office.'13 To circumvent these restrictions but remain true to his faith, he 
had his children secretly baptized by the missionary priest to the Passamaquoddy Nation 
in nearby Pleasant Point, ~ a i n e . '  l 4 He continued in office until after 1820, despite 
Leonard's call for his removal in 1806 and an extremely negative report based on a 
special inquiry made by the Customs Commissioners. l 5  As deputy collector he earned 
£602 in fees in 18 10, without collecting even one penny for the King's revenue in either 
duties or se iz~res . "~  Dunn's creole leniency with smugglers made him a popular man. 
An American smuggler during the War of 18 12 had dinner with Dunn at St. Andrews, 
and found him "a very open warm hearted ~rishman.""' This description seems 
appropriate, given that Washington County, Maine's highest ranked militia officers also 
dined with Dunn that night, notwithstanding the war.'18 Like Collector Wanton in Saint 
John, or his American counterparts Delesdernier and Trescott, Dunn was remembered by 
a local historian as a "man proverbially kind, liberal, and hospitable."l l 9  
In response to the needs of shipping, especially the plaster trade, customs 
authorities appointed another deputy collector to Passamaquoddy. Generally this deputy 
collector kept his office on Campobello, but during the British occupation of Moose 
Island the office relocated there. After the Americans regained possession of Eastport in 
18 18, the ofice moved once again to Indian 1sland.120 Thomas Henderson, too, came 
down in local memory as an affable character. Appointed to oversee the largely illicit 
gypsum trade passing through Passamaquoddy, Henderson largely kept out of the official 
record, making him the perfect creole official: honored, rewarded, and mostly 
invisible.12' 
Conclusion 
The Falmouth incident, the abuses by customs officials, and their creole attitudes 
display some of the less flattering aspects of Loyalist and colonial society. New 
Brunswick's colonial population, like its Nova Scotia counterpart, had a double standard 
when it came to govemment. As Neal MacKinnon observed about the Loyalist 
experience in Nova Scotia, "if the government was obliged to be honest and 
conscientious towards them, it did not mean that they in tum had to be honest and 
conscientious towards the government."'22 This pragmatic, even hypocritical colonial 
attitude toward the state seemed to grow in power with distance from the imperial core in 
London. Far from embracing modem ideas of a bureaucratic state, New Brunswick's 
elite had a decidedly pre-modem view based on their entitlement to multiple offices, life- 
long tenure, and a proprietorial interest in collecting fees for their own en~ichrnent. '~~ 
William Wanton's attitude towards the collectorship seems to have always been creole in 
nature. Colin Campbell's early efforts to rigidly enforce the Navigation Laws quickly 
collapsed when social peers applied pressure and when other avenues to wealth became 
apparent. Moreover, colonial society had effective ways of dealing with non-creole 
troublemakers like Richard Batchelor. 
The ambivalence of colonial society to state authority, especially customs 
officers, meant that many borderland residents already resisted the centralizing 
tendencies of govemment even before they arrived in Passamaquoddy. Most Loyalists 
who came to the region were North Americans, and thus shared more in common with 
their republican neighbors than with peoples in the British Isles. Even non-North 
American Loyalists, such as the lowland Scots, arrived with a prejudice against the 
London Furthermore, the wilderness situation in which they found 
themselves meant that the idea of a Loyalist haven in New Brunswick, led by an 
aristocratic elite, remained only a dream. The North Americans habitually resisted 
imperial commercial restrictions, even in a province founded by self-proclaimed 
Loyalists. In New Brunswick, the very officers commissioned to enforce these laws 
often turned out to be violating them, and assisting their neighbors in doing so as well. 
Thus the lure of illicit trade transcended their Loyalism. Sometimes these underlying 
contradictions between officeholding and corruption became a public struggle between 
creoles and schematists, as with the Falmouth case.125 
Customs officers at Passamaquoddy, whether loyalist or republican, merely 
reflected more widespread attitudes when they turned a blind eye to smuggling. The 
British and American governments fkther confused the issue by occasionally 
encouraging smuggling to undermine the trade policies of the other. In this manner, 
government itself promoted borderlands attitudes by attempting to subvert the 
commercial loyalties of foreign merchants. Merchants and officials thus colluded in the 
creation of the Passamaquoddy borderlands. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE BORDERLAND EXPERIENCE 
Dr. Faxon Goes to a Tavern 
An important element of the borderlands mentality is how locals perceived 
themselves and their relationship to the state. Determining how borderland residents felt 
about themselves and their situation is difficult. Loyalties seemed to shift continually as 
dictated by circumstances, a perpetual reassessment that occurred throughout British 
North America and the newly-created United States. Living on or near the border 
between the two simply amplified the necessity of suppressing ideology in favor of 
pragmatic concerns. An illuminating example of this ambivalence toward state loyalties 
occurred in 1807, just as Britain and the United States seemed to be on the verge of war. 
Dr. Jonathon Faxon, an American expatriate living on Grand Manan, New Brunswick, 
happened to be in an Eastport tavern. The conversation turned to the recent Chesapeake 
affair; some of the Americans present began to criticize the British government. Faxon, 
who had taken an oath of loyalty to the British monarchy, stepped forward and defended 
the British government, nearly precipitating a brawl.' 
What are we to make of Faxon's actions? Here was an American citizen, a 
veteran of the Continental Army, who had departed the United States and taken an oath 
of loyalty to the same British monarchy that he had once fought against. Where was the 
revolutionary ardor and ideology that American scholars have made so much of?2 Why 
was he permitted to live in a Loyalist province? The answers lie in the pragmatic 
borderland attitudes at Passamaquoddy. 
Examining Dr. Faxon's life reveals a gap between revolutionary ideals and the 
realities of everyday life. Faxon was born in Rhode Island, served in the Continental 
Anny while still a teenager, and attended Brown University. He arrived on Grand Manan 
sometime after 1800, and became popular both with the island's Loyalist proprietor, 
Moses Gerrish, and the other settlers because of his "industry," which included 
smuggling flour during Jefferson's embargo.3 Faxon brought additional settlers, built 
ships, wharves and mills, and engaged in co~nmerce.~ Some even claimed he "forwarded 
the settlement of Grand Manan more than any three men that ever was on this ~sland."~ 
Yet rumors persisted that Faxon was unfriendly to the British government. As 
late as 1807, Gerrish defended Faxon as "exemplary in his conduct, and [he] has 
expended a considerable sum of money in promoting a settlen~ent."~ Faxon provided 
evidence to New Brunswick authorities as to his character, including the statement on the 
Eastport tavern argument about the merits of British governance. But tensions 
concerning deeds and property rights were building on Grand Manan; the details are 
unclear, but people complained of personal assaults, the destruction of their buildings, 
and dishonest land deals by ~errish. '  Faxon was implicated in these matters, and soon 
Gerrish turned on him. By 18 10, Gerrish claimed Faxon was "the most accomplished 
villain that ever fell to my lot to be acquainted with," that a "small volume of his knavery 
and viciousness" should be written, and that he should be banished from the province. 
Gerrish concluded his letter with an indictment against the American settlers on the 
island, particularly Faxon: 
The People on this Island (with few exceptions) 
who have been citizens of the United States did not leave 
their principles behind them they have no attachment to this 
Government only from matters of Private interest; they are 
still republicans in heart, lip & life and in case of a rupture 
between the States & Great Britain, I should be under 
greater apprehensions from a party of these people, 
combined with the Indians than all the forces the United 
States would send against us.-Report says, that the 
celebrated Dr. Faxon has aided and assisted a junto at 
Moose Island in framing a petition to Congress for this 
Island to be annexed to the United states.* 
The conflicting views of Faxon's conduct point out a conflict between North 
American revolutionary ideology and actual experiences. How are we to understand how 
borderland residents interpreted their world, and especially their precarious position on 
the boundary between two ideologically opposed states? 
Borderlands as Frontier 
On a regional basis there has been a great deal of study on the frontier experience 
and its inter-relationship with the American Revolution. Maine has benefited from two 
exemplary works: Laurel Thatcher Ulrich's A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha 
Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812 and Alan Taylor's Liberty Men and Great 
Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820.~ The idea 
of New Brunswick as a frontier has not been explored to the same extent, a somewhat 
ironic development given that many American scholars such as Bernard Bailyn use 
Patrick Campbell's painting "An American landscape hewn and enclosed, with Native 
Americans canoeing by" as the archetypical American landscape. Actually it depicts a 
portion of the Saint John River in New Brunswick in the 1790s." However, Canadian 
historiography is not silent on the frontier experience in New Brunswick. Esther Clark 
Wright's The Loyalists of New Brunswick, first published in 1955, found that the Loyalist 
experience was one of hardships very akin to American settlers." 
Ulrich's and Taylor's works are some of the most influential examinations of the 
frontier experience. Ulrich achieved this by closely examining the journal of a Maine 
midwife; Taylor did so by studying frontier agrarian protest against wealthy land 
speculators. Both works could be instructive for Canadian scholars in that Ulrich's 
midwife was probably a Loyalist and Taylor's "Liberty Men" frequently fled the law by 
seeking asylum in British North America. On the Canadian side, one of the most useful 
works that examines everyday life for the Loyalists is Neil MacKinnon's This Unfriendly 
Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1 783-1 791 .I2 While Taylor's agrarians 
often fled to the British provinces to escape the avarice of land speculators, MacKinnon's 
Loyalists often moved back to the United States when their commercial dreams failed in 
the Maritime Provinces. Other Loyalist studies, such as Jane Errington's The Lion, the 
Eagle, and Upper Canada, and Esther Clark Wright's Loyalists of New Brunswick, also 
emphasize the fact that Loyalists faced a frontier experience identical to the American 
one, yet developed a different set of political ideals.13 
Taylor examined four themes that are applicable to the Passamaquoddy 
borderlands: migration to the frontier, the creation of property out of wilderness lands; 
evangelical religion; and organized resistance against land speculators and proprietors. 
Taylor linked all of these themes to the American Revolution and the different 
interpretations the wealthy proprietors had from poor land squatters, stating that the 
frontier poor "believed in a different American Revolution, one meant to protect small 
producers from the moneyed men who did not live by their own labor, but instead, preyed 
on the many who did."14 
The problem with Taylor's revolutionary settlement thesis is that there was a 
nearly identical process in New Brunswick, a Loyalist province that presumably rejected 
all the egalitarian ideals espoused by revolutionaries. New Brunswick Loyalists moved 
to a frontier much like ~a ine ' s . "  Loyalists also believed they had a God-given right to 
improve wilderness lands; evangelical religion was also prominent in British North 
America.16 Moreover, there was organized resistance to authority on a number of issues, 
sometimes resulting in collective actions that ended in violence." Loyalists even drank 
in the same prodigious amounts that Taylor's Libertymen did.'* Close examination 
reveals a North American viewpoint that eschewed the British social model for one better 
adapted to the frontier.I9 Even in loyalist New Brunswick, only a few individuals 
possessed a real connection or adherence to Britain, and often even those few had 
powerful emotional, familial, or commercial connections to the United 
Migration to the Frontier 
Taylor posited that post-revolutionary settlers came to the Maine frontier seeking 
refuge. It was a life of poverty and hardships for most, but the hope of establishing 
economic independence sustained them. Settlers sought independence from wage labor 
and debt by establishing a competency that supported their farnilie~.~' In New 
Brunswick, a province created largely for rehgees from the American War of 
Independence, the frontier offered refhge to the war-weary. On both sides of the border, 
veterans of the conflict went to the frontier, expecting land. Like their American 
counterparts, many Loyalists preferred to work on their own lands, eschewing wage labor 
in favor of working on their own farms.22 The primary difference seems to have been 
that the British government was far more forthcoming in giving lands and support to its 
veterans than were the American state and national governments. Military settlers were 
given tools, provisions, and free land. Many settlers left, however, after finding frontier 
life too difficult. 
Many Aniericans had few reservations about moving to loyalist New Brunswick. 
Campobello's proprietor noted this tendency with some alarm, claiming they were "by no 
means friendly to the Government of the Province," and "have actually defied the 
proprietor" of Deer ~ s l a n d . ~ ~  Many were so-called "late Loyalists" who moved from the 
United States to British North America in the late 1 7 8 0 s . ~ ~  Late Loyalists displayed 
remarkably little allegiance to either the American or British political system. Men such 
as Joseph Porter from New Hampshire easily crossed and re-crossed the border. Amving 
at Passamaquoddy in 1786, he moved into New Brunswick after marrying the daughter of 
Nehemiah Marks, the same prominent Loyalist who allowed another daughter to marry 
an American militia general, John Brewer of Robbinston. Despite some concerns about 
whether he was actually a British subject or not, he eventually became a magistrate and a 
representative to the provincial assembly.25 
Another example of late Loyalist pragmatism is William Vance, who moved to 
Passamaquoddy from New Hampshire in 1784. By 1786 colonial authorities made him a 
justice of the peace. Sometime before the War of 1812 he relocated to the American side 
of the St. Croix River. When New Brunswick magistrates threatened to arrest him for an 
illegal dam he had constructed, Vance discovered a new American patriotism within 
himself. A Charlotte County observer noted "This Mr. Vance soon after the late 
American declaration of war removed from the county, publicly declared his adherence 
to the American cause, and his determination to maintain his American allegiance, and 
had actually two cannons mounted on his American premises, whereby we are assured he 
avowed his intention of using hostily if a t t a~ked . "~~  Vance's preparations were to no 
avail; when he crossed the river on business provincial authorities arrested him. Later 
Vance became an enthusiastic Jacksonian politician, and even served in the Maine 
~e~ i s l a tu re .~ '  
Before, during, and after the War of 1812, many Americans moved to New 
Brunswick, seeking jobs, land and opportunity. Their presence was often accepted with 
little difficulty if they took a loyalty oath and behaved well. United States citizens 
frequently petitioned for and received provincial lands.28 In 1807, the provincial 
government even offered free land to those Americans willing to take an oath of 
loyalty.29 Pushed by a sour American economy and pulled by New Brunswick's newly 
prosperous economy, the Americans came in droves. Charlotte County proved especially 
attractive to Americans due to its proximity.30 Sailors, timbennen, fishermen, merchants, 
and even preachers moved easily across the border. American fishernlen had long 
encroached on New Brunswick's shores, exploiting the fishing resources of 
Passamaquoddy Bay, the Bay of Fundy, and even the Gulf of St. Lawrence. American 
timbermen, too, had long participated in the region's economy, especially in St. 
~ t e ~ h e n . ~ '  
Fishermen illustrate the growing accommodation with the American Revolution 
in the Maritime provinces. Many lived in remote settlements, often on islands, and had 
little direct contact with government. Furthermore, American markets consistently 
provided not only better prices for their catch, but higher quality provisions at lower cost 
than colonial n~erchants .~~ These pragmatic concerns drove fishermen into illicit trade 
with their American counterparts, to the consternation of officials such as George 
Leonard, who embarked on a vigorous campaign to stop it.33 
Fishern~en do not seem to have been prone to ideological concerns; they came to 
Passanlaquoddy Bay in pursuit of fish. They crossed and re-crossed the border at will, 
paying little heed to international boundaries. James Kent is an example. Originally 
from Boothbay, Maine, Kent arrived at Eastport in the 1780s. Sometime in the 1790s he 
moved to Grand Manan, and in 1806 he swore an oath of loyalty to the British crown. In 
1812, alarmed by the onset of war, Kent attempted to relocate to the United States where 
federal officials promptly arrested him. Kent was clearly willing to go through the 
motions of proclaiming loyalty to the crown, but when it came to war he refused to 
support the British cause. Given his treatment by the U.S. marshal, however, Kent 
returned to Grand Manan, where he eventually landed a coveted position as a lighthouse 
keeper.34 
Settlers also came to Passamaquoddy seeking refuge. Many colonials came to 
Eastport fleeing debt prosecutions; Americans fled to New Brunswick for the same 
reason.35 Others fled bad marriages, like Col. George Peck of Rhode Island, who despite 
his Revolutionary War service fighting the British, fled to Campobello when his marriage 
failed.36 Yet others were criminals such as John Stedman Beckwith, who in 1812 
assaulted David Owen while he was asleep. Owen raised a "hue and cry" against 
Beckwith, who took refuge in Eastport, just a few hundred yards away from Owen's 
Campobello home.37 Beckwith lived there, within site of Owen's house but beyond his 
legal reach until his death in a boating accident in 18 1 9.38 
Perhaps the most remarkable refugee at Passamaquoddy was Tyler P. Shaw, an 
American smuggler caught selling supplies to the Royal Navy that were destined for the 
American garrison at Fort ~ u l l i v a n . ~ ~  A jury found Shaw guilty; the judge sentenced him 
to hang. However, relatives helped Shaw escape federal authorities in Massachusetts in a 
daring jailbreak, another example of popular resistance to state authority.40 Eventually he 
found his way to New Brunswick despite a $300 reward for his capture. Once at 
Passamaquoddy, Shaw published a newspaper article protesting his innocence, even 
invoking his father's Revolutionary War service. President Monroe eventually pardoned 
him, but Shaw never returned to the United States. He married into a Loyalist family and 
eventually receiving land grants from the province after becoming a British subject in 
1827.~' 
The frontier experience on both sides of the border was remarkably similar North 
American phenomenon.42 The post-war frontier in both Canada and the United States 
shared remarkable similarities; most or all of their actions were marked by pragmatic 
rather than ideological motives.43 Those at the top of the social ladder might have dreamt 
of establishing stable hierarchical agricultural societies, but generally those dreams 
crumbled.44 Daily life was a fierce struggle in which settlers attempted to farm the land 
or more likely extract timber or fish from the forests and coastal waters; few had the time 
to reflect on the political nature of their c~rnmunities.~~ Moose Island's settlers knew this 
fact well, stating the following in a petition to the Massachusetts legislature: "The fate of 
first settlers, in a new Country, is well known, to work hard, and fare hard."46 This 
struggle to gain a competency consumed much of their energy, leaving little time for 
ideological con~ems.~ '  
Wilderness Improvements 
The North American frontier presented similar challenges and responses to both 
American and Canadian settlers. For example, David Owen, the proprietor of 
Campobello Island, described the situation of his tenants in terms that many settlers 
would have found familiar, even if most of the people he described were fishernlen. 
Owen found that the settler 
fixes upon a spot for his house.- Takes his axe and cuts 
down Fir Trees which he afterwards junks to twenty or six 
& twenty feet length, dovetails them at the four comers of 
his Cottage, which made up of these logs and well stuffed 
in the seams with moss serves for his House.- A cellar is 
built underground in the same manner to preserve his 
potatoes from and thus in one year's time has something to 
live upon.- A pig is next wanted and a cow.- The cow 
feeds in the Woods with a Bell round her neck to discover 
where she is.- And the Pigs are often two or three months 
away & come home frequently in Autumn full fed & fit to 
kill. 
Owen discovered that initially, personal possessions were few, as were other amenities: 
"The breakfast and supper of a Labourer is Fish, Potatoes 
and Tea sweetened with Molasses-his Dinner Pork & 
Potatoes.- His Bed a Blanket upon the floor.- Custom 
makes his sleep easy-all Payments are made in Barter.- 
There is no Specie in the Bay.- Dried Fish is the 
Common Truck at 1216 a Quintal upon an average.- Fish 
are not so plenty as formerly, so that now the land begins to 
be cultivated: for a Fisherman will never cultivate.- He is 
like an Indian in that respect.-- ,, 48 
Because the region straddled a border, Owen assumed that "Smuggling will naturally 
take place," a phenomenon he did not seem to find offensive.49 In years to come, he 
would on occasion defend smugglers from the wrath of New Brunswick's customhouse. 
Owen's account of the settlers' lives in New Brunswick is especially important 
because it matches closely with the American frontier experience as described in Charles 
Seller's The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 181 5-1 846.50 Sellers found that 
agrarian settlers in America possessed a number of values that were often at odds with 
the state and the market. Like Owen, Sellers believed that many frontier whites were very 
attracted to the Indian way of life. Both Indians and settlers practiced what Sellers 
deemed a "premarket mode of use-value production" that emphasized subsistence rather 
than profit.5' An important characteristic of Seller's model was the "hard-won folk 
wisdom about how to utilize their labor-power and technology to extract sufficient use 
values from their resource base."52 That folk wisdom prescribed both behavior and labor, 
norms established through shaming and physical punishment. Sellers portrayed a 
patriarchal society that attempted to reproduce the values of the parents in the children. 
To reinforce those values, the oldest child was frequently named after its same-sex 
parent, a pattern readily confirmed in Eastport's censuses in families known to have 
smuggling connections, such as the extensive Clark family.53 These dynamics 
discouraged individuality and competition not only between family members, but other 
members of the community as weLs4 
The economic impetus of premarket communities relied on a neighborhood 
division of labor, a phenomenon detailed in Ulrich's A Midwife's  ale." Frontier 
neighbors constantly exchanged labor and con~modities, satisfying local needs before 
offering them to an impersonal market. Money thus played a limited role in most 
settlers' daily lives.56 The only real difference between Owen's and Seller's accounts of 
pioneer life was that Sellers considered agrarian settlers, whereas Owen described a 
fishemlan's life. 
Many of Passanlaquoddy's settlers were fishermen, especially on the islands. A 
census of Moose Island taken in 1800 reveals that out of 66 heads of household, over 
83% were fishermen; only one individual was listed as a "fa~nler."~' Fishermen were the 
most numerous on the region's islands; further up the bay and the St. Croix River 
timbering dominated the economy. Farming on the side was common; Moose Island's 
fishermen had a few cleared acres - generally less than ten acres - and some cows. On 
both sides of the border families engaged in composite farming, whereby all family 
members engaged in production both for the family's use and for exchange purposes. 
There was never any question at Passamaquoddy of creating a "self-sufficiency."58 The 
land was too poor to feed families; locals needed markets for their timber and fish so that 
they could buy provisions, West India goods, and even salt to continue their commercial 
fishing. Borderlands residents thus farmed, fished, timbered, and conducted other 
activities to survive. These activities included weaving, making lime, shoes, or set 
themselves up as traders and  merchant^.'^ Trade was a natural and everyday occurrence; 
smuggling was a pragmatic premarket response to bothersome trade regulations that 
interfered with family economies. Some officials found this way of life offensive; 
George Leonard described Passamaquoddy's fishermen as a "lawless rabble," and 
complained of their extensive violations of sovereignty and smuggling.60 
Although farming was not the primary economic activity at Passamaquoddy, land 
ownership remained important. Both Massachusetts and New Brunswick claimed 
jurisdiction over Moose Island, preventing either from giving meaningful deeds to land 
there. In the meantime a few hundred squatters quietly took possession, enjoying the fact 
that contested jurisdiction meant they paid no taxes to anyone, a fact that annoyed both 
governments. Finally, Washington County's sheriff took matters into his own hands. He 
arrived at the island with an arnled party. After some hard words and an incident in 
which the settlers destroyed his boat, he finally reached an agreement with them whereby 
the island residents received legal deeds and guarantees of a five-year tax exemption in 
return for their adherence to the laws of ~assachusetts .~ '  Moose Island thus became 
American soil not by the efforts of the federal government, but largely through armed 
intimidation by local officials. Even after Eastport's incorporation as a Massachusetts 
township, Moose Island residents remained indifferent to the sort of improvements that 
marked a permanent community, such as public roads, schoolhouses, and even churches. 
Most notably, they resented and resisted the idea of creating wider streets, preferring to 
use the beaches as rudimentary roads, climbing over rocks where n e ~ e s s a r y . ~ ~  
Moose Islanders' defense of their way of life was a reasonable response to 
external forces attempting to impose order on the squatters, a struggle that played out all 
over North ~ m e r i c a . ~ ~  Their view was essentially local and libertarian, and extended to 
other parts of their lives, including religion, social nornx, and commerce. 
In settling what they considered a wilderness, Loyalists and revolutionaries shared 
a common experience in which the border and ideology played little role. Within a 
generation of the end of the Revolutionary War, Passamaquoddy's settlers created a 
transborder society with its own values that often clashed with state interests. One of 
those values was a right to land and resources, especially if the settlers had made 
improvements to it or expended labor in procuring timber or fish. Taylor illustrated this 
view in central Maine, and it clearly extended to New Brunswick and eastern ~ a i n e . ~ ~  
Settlers on Campobello, Deer Island, and Grand Manan, who also engaged in collective 
violence against wealthier proprietors, shared these North American views.65 
Land was one of the contested resources. Sometimes officials would "quiet" 
settlers with no legal rights to their land by confirming their property rights, as happened 
on Moose Island. Sometimes matters were more violent. When David Owen arrived on 
Campobello to reassert his family's claims to the island, he faced opposition fiom 
Loyalists who thought they had a right to the land because of a provincial grant, and pre- 
Loyalists such as the Wilson family who claimed ownership through continued 
possession and improvement. Owen easily swept aside the Loyalist claims because his 
family's grant pre-dated the establishment of New Brunswick in 1784. But the courts 
found in favor of the squ@atter Wilson family.66 similar disputes, some of them violent, 
occurred on Deer Island and Grand Manan, New Brunswick, and Calais, Maine; the 
entire colony of Prince Edward Island experienced similar problems.67 
The desire for land and independence was not purely a result of the American 
Revolution. Most Loyalists were North Americans; their views toward land and their 
right to improve wilderness were almost identical with their republican neighbors. When 
settlers felt they were denied the right to wilderness land, they generally fought the 
system or simply moved across the border. This attitude spilled over into other aspects 
of the settlers' lives, even their sense of spirituality. When established religion failed to 
ease their spiritual needs, settlers opted for an evangelicalism that transcended borders, 
thereby reinforcing the premarket attitudes that tolerated activities such as smuggling. 
Borderland Religion 
To the followers of more established denominations, such as Congregationalists 
and Anglicans, the emotional religious experience of the evangelicals appeared chaotic. 
The emotional excesses, the lack of a trained clergy, the spontaneous meetings in fields 
and barns during the week that sometimes ran late into the night challenged the 
established order, both in the newly-created United States and in Britain's remaining 
North American c~lonies.~' In the United States religious tolerance and a desire for 
social acceptability brought most evangelical sects to a more conservative understanding 
of their faith. Religious groups that had previously been considered as radical, such as 
Calvinist Baptists, increasingly sought a more conventional form of worship led by a 
trained minister in a proper meetinghouse. The exception was on the frontier, where 
radical evangelicals prevailed, because as Taylor noted, they "harmonized with the 
frontier's conditions and culture."69 Furthermore, the shared fervor of evangelical 
religion reinforced the cooperative work ethic of the settlers and confirmed their 
suspicion of hierarchy and authority.70 
Maritime evangelicals conformed to these patterns of frontier religion. 
Evangelicals such as Henry Alline (1 748-1 784) of Windsor, Nova Scotia, had a profound 
impact on the Maine fr~ntier .~ '  Alline embodies the transborder spirit of the borderlands 
and the religious fervor of frontier settlers. Born in Rhode Island, his parents moved to 
Nova Scotia in the 1760s. During the Revolution Alline had a dramatic conversion 
experience that deeply influenced many Nova Scotians and New Englanders. Alline 
emphasized an other-worldliness, undermining ideas of deference and loyalty to the 
state.72 Religion, rather than nationality, formed the primary cultural identity among 
evangelical ~ a r i t i r n e r s . ~ ~  Alline's religious message prospered on both sides of the 
border because there was no significant difference between northern New England and 
the Maritimes before 1783. Ethnically, one could find the same mix of Yankees and 
foreign Protestants. Both societies were rough and tumble frontier communities, exactly 
the sort of areas where sectarian impulses thrived. Alline's message, and that of other 
evangelicals, resonated with American and Loyalist borderland residents because they 
could recognize him and other lay preachers as people very much like themselves. Often 
the established church, such as the Anglican Church in New Brunswick, was associated 
with those in power who wished to oppress settlers. Campobello's proprietor was also 
Anglican minister; the squatters whom he so detested were ~ a ~ t i s t s . ~ ~  Anglican clergy 
had a difficult time gaining converts among ordinary settlers, but recent immigrants and 
colonial elites maintained the state-supported church.75 Another example is George 
Leonard, a devout Anglican whose perpetual anti-smuggling campaigns mirrored that 
faith's demands for social order.76 Despite Anglican efforts, evangelical faith continued 
to flourish in British North America. 
In the years between the Revolution and the War of 1812 Maritime Baptists 
resisted conservative impulses and retained a radical, fervent, and highly emotional form 
of religious experience. One Canadian scholar has suggested that because Baptists in 
what is now Canada did not have to support the "baggage of civic humanism, 
republicanism, and the covenant ideal and possessive individualism" propounded by the 
Revolution, they became "more radical, more anarchistic, more democratic, and more 
populist" than their American  counterpart^.^^ These Canadian forms of evangelicism 
spilled across the border into northern New England in the years between the Revolution 
and the War of 1812; much of Moose Island's American populace seems to have adhered 
to Allinite religious principles.78 
Two Maritimes Baptists who have been "silently excised from Maritime Baptist 
history" reveal something about the religious principles of Passarnaquoddy's borderlands 
population.79 James Murphy was a Nova Scotian of Loyalist parentage who became a 
Baptist in 1793. Within the year he was spreading the Allinite version of Baptist faith in 
eastern Maine. By 1800, Murphy had founded a church in Eastport, Maine. Like many 
radical Baptist preachers, Murphy seems to have suffered from occasional doubts, and 
sometimes his peers shared those concerns. Murphy was also typical of radical 
evangelicals in that he refused to write a formal sermon, believing that "if the preacher 
was sent by God he would be taught what to say."80 Furthermore, the community in 
which Murphy settled does not seem to have accepted his presence wholeheartedly; 
moreover, Massachusetts Baptist authorities criticized his brand of Baptist faith. Murphy 
thus represents the radical nature of Maritime Baptist faith. His unfortunate death also 
reflects the rowdy and non-genteel nature of Allinite preachers. Murphy had an argument 
with his brother-in-law, who violently threw him to the ground. Murphy died within a 
few hours.8' 
Gilbert Harris was another Maritime Baptist who crossed the border and thereby 
departed the memory of Canadian historians. Harris had long been a controversial figure 
among New Brunswick Baptists, but when he illegally married a couple in 18 11 - only 
Anglican priests were allowed to officiate over marriages at that time - he had to flee the 
province. In 1812 he found refuge in Eastport, where Murphy's death conveniently 
provided him with a new flock. Harris's defiance of the law typified that of many Baptist 
preachers, and represented the borderland rejection of state authority in all matters, 
including spiritual, as well as how Passamaquoddy could shelter those hiding from the 
law, even during time of war.82 
Murphy and Harris were not alone in attempting to spread salvation south across 
the border. There seems to have been a concerted Baptist "offensive" aimed at eastern 
Maine until roughly 1802, with more sporadic attempts through 1 8 1 2 . ~ ~  The implications 
of this effort indicate that Maritime Baptists not only persisted, they also sought to 
expand; typically they ignored the worldly concept of a political border in so doing. In 
fact the Maritime evangelical tradition proved extremely resilient to American incursions; 
the American Methodist church stopped sending missionaries to Nova Scotia when it was 
found that these missionaries seem to have been more affected by Maritimes New Lights 
than vice versa.84 
Two connections linked borderland religion and smuggling. First, evangelical 
faith reflected settlers' pioneer experience, dampening allegiance to hierarchy and the 
state by emphasizing spiritual concerns. At Passamaquoddy, these religious impulses 
spanned the border, thus encouraging locals to disregard the international boundary and 
the officials who enforced trade laws. Second, evangelicals' religious beliefs correlated 
with economic beliefs. Evangelical religion reinforced resistance to market rationality in 
favor of communal bonds, by emphasizing "egalitarian l~calism."~' Borderland settlers 
bolstered by this sense of duty to fellow congregants engaged in smuggling to help 
themselves and their community. 
Borderland Deference 
Both the New England and Maritimes elite had a vision of the world whereby 
"natural leaders" received the respect and deference of the rest of society. In return the 
leadership would ideally create an economic order that benefited all, with the leadership 
taking the lion's share.86 In contrast, American settlers believed that "laboring families 
had a natural and divinely ordered right to free wilderness lands, a right that preexisted 
and morally superseded all subsequent human acts and legi~lation."~' Taylor linked this 
idea to the ideals of the American Revolution, but this leads to a paradox since British 
colonial officials essentially gave away free land to settlers, even those with little or no 
allegiance to the Crown, whereas in the United States land speculators attempted to force 
settlers to pay high prices for frontier lands. New Brunswick's liberal land policy did 
require that settlers pay a small fee, but squatters often ignored even that minor 
requirement because they felt they had a "right" to unimproved wilderness lands.88 The 
promise of free land drew many Americans, including Continental Army veterans such as 
Dr. Faxon, to British North Ameri~a.~' 
Ulrich and Taylor, along with many other American scholars, have attempted to 
establish that the American Revolution produced a lessening of deference in American 
society. But the same sort of comments about egalitarian attitudes existed in profision in 
a loyalist colony like New Brunswick: for example, one British military officer 
complained of his colonial escort at Passamaquoddy: "The manners of my boatmen 
savoured of the American equality. They were perfectly familiar, joined in our 
conversation, and not seemingly disposed to carry up our portmanteaus to the inn, we 
took them under our own arms." Observers found that even Loyalist offspring behaved 
in a "yankee" manner. Like the United States, poor New Brunswickers felt no 
compulsion to observe deference because the availability of land elsewhere fostered 
independence.g0 
The island of Campobello offers further evidence of how poorly deference 
worked in North America, even in a Loyalist colony like New Brunswick. The island's 
proprietor was David Owen, a member of the Welsh gentry, educated at Cambridge, 
sometime tutor to future British prime minister William Pitt the Younger, and Anglican 
clergyman. Owen attempted to establish his superiority by expressing his contempt for 
New Brunswick officials, defying other Charlotte County magistrates, and expressing his 
contempt of Loyalists settlers. Owen even considered himself above trade regulations; 
Royal Navy officers accused him of taking steps "in favor of the smugglers," and he 
proved willing to rent wharves and warehouses to well-known American smugglers like 
Jabez ~ o w r y . ~ '  
Owen ran his island like a feudal estate, leasing out plots of land rather than 
selling them, and by turn bullying and attempting to charm his tenants.92 Often Owen or 
his tenants resorted to violence. Angry tenants assaulted Owen numerous times, 
sometimes in his own house. Servants betrayed him, tenants in arrears burned 
outbuildings, and Owen in turn physically attacked, swore at, and used legal proceedings 
against his opponents. 93 Deference played little role in everyday life at Passamaquoddy 
in part because most settlers possessed frontier ideas of equality that had little to do with 
American revolutionary ideology. 
Lack of deference meant that the people felt little compulsion about taking justice 
into their own hands when necessary. The beating of a mariner in 18 12 illustrates how 
this violence was deliberate and planned. The witness testified that "three men pursued 
us in a boat and when they came near to us, they then pull'd off their jackets, turned up 
their shirt sleeves & took off their handkerchiefs very deliberately made their boat fast to 
ours jurnp'd onboard of our boat & swore they meant to have a satisfaction." 94 The 
methodical manner in which the three assailants stripped indicates that this was not a 
random act, but a deliberate punishment. Furthermore, they did not seek the costly and 
uncertain process of law to redress their grievances, prefening instead to take matters into 
their own hands. This "rough justice" also reflected the same borderland communal 
egalitarianism that allowed locals to condone smuggling as a form of community self- 
help.95 
Lack of deference meant that borderlands residents naturally resented customs 
officers as representatives of the state. The fact that customs officers demanded taxes 
from them that had to be paid in scarce cash hrther aggravated locals. Worse yet, when 
customs officers seized contraband goods and smuggling vessels, they profited at the 
expense of their neighbors. American customs officers who sought popularity attempted 
to ameliorate these circumstances through community boosterism and advocating 
leniency to federal court officials and the Treasury Department; New Brunswick officials 
sought accommodation through a "creole" strategem that profited themselves and 
colonial merchants. 
The lack of deference at Passamaquoddy seems to have been less a function of 
American revolutionary ideology than a practical response to local conditions. Like other 
North American frontiers, Passamaquoddy's borderland populace resented outside 
authority because it usually meant taxes, bothersome regulations, and interference in how 
they lived. Attempts to impose a deference-based system on the settlers failed, despite 
the life-long efforts of men such as David Owen. The tenuous hold of the law and other 
state functions in such a distant and newly-settled area compounded these factors. Most 
borderlands settlers lived a subsistence lifestyle based on resource extraction. Their 
views were essentially libertarian, and it shocked some outsiders who thought the 
region's inhabitants ill-educated, heavy-drinking barbarians with a complete disregard for 
authority and a penchant for smuggling. 
Borderland Commerce 
Passamaquoddy produced two staple items for export: fish and timber. Both 
fishermen and lumbermen were proverbial for their poverty and disorder. A Loyalist 
wrote in 1784, "The people, as a Body, will ever be poor and miserable-From my own 
observation at Passamaquoddy, I am persuaded that a coast calculated for fishing is so far 
from being a benefit, that it really is a curse to the Inhabitants. Who ever knew a 
Fisherman ~ h r i v e ? " ~ ~  Fishermen paid little heed to the border, pursuing schools of fish 
throughout the bay, the small boats from both sides crowded together around the shoals 
of fish. Many New Brunswick fishermen chose to sell their catch on the American side 
of the border, where they could purchase flow and other necessities at a more reasonable 
price.97 Even during the War of 1812, colonial fishermen came to Eastport to sell their 
catch. 98 American fishermen frequently took advantage of this by trading with their 
colonial counterparts; they could legally load their vessels with provisions, swap the 
foodstuffs with a New Brunswick fisherman's catch, and both would benefit. Fishermen 
were an ideal smuggling population, living on the border, with an intimate knowledge of 
local waters, access to boats, and suffering a grinding poverty that compelled them to 
augment their living any way they could. 
Passamaquoddy varies somewhat from American economic models of the frontier 
in that the local economy was based on exploiting the region's resources in fish and 
timber, rather than on agriculture. A resource-extraction frontier closely matches the 
"staples" economic model of Canadian historian Harold ~ n n i s . ~ ~  Nonetheless, the 
hardships, poverty and hope described by American historians to an agricultural frontier 
apply equally to the Passamaquoddy borderland. Passamaquoddy's fishermen shared the 
ambivalent response to capitalism American scholars ascribed to agrarian settlers.Io0 
They participated in markets, but commercial transactions were not yet impersonal events 
that could be divorced from community needs. 
On a resource frontier like Passamaquoddy, production for market had always 
been crucial. Fishermen sold or bartered their catch, timbermen and sailors sold their 
labor, and farming families engaged in weaving, construction, renting out oxen, or 
making shoes. Self-sufficiency was never a way of life among the region's settlers, and 
markets were absolutely vital to raise the money required to buy essentials like flour, 
molasses, rum, and other goods. Fishing was primary experience for many, but if timber 
prices rose, fishermen abandoned their nets and took to the woods.'01 Many sought to 
engage in wage labor to load ships, mill timber, or construct buildings, returning to their 
scratch farms and fishing boats when there was no demand for their labor. This 
opportunism meant that when smugglers offered high wages to pull their oars or move 
their contraband, locals jumped at the opportunity and asked few questions. For example, 
when Robert Little was standing on a hill on the American side of the St. Croix River in 
May, 1808, he told William Sherman he would pay $53 to get 53 barrels of tar across to 
the New Brunswick side of the river. Sherman never asked if it was legal, nor did he 
warn Little, despite the fact that Jefferson's embargo strictly forbade the exportation of 
any American goods in 1 8 0 8 . ' ~ ~  
When opportunities arose for borderland residents to profit by working in the 
woods, they eagerly abandoned their fishing boats for timber camps. For example, when 
timber prices rose dramatically in 1807 and 1808, many fishermen went up the St. Croix 
to work in the woods.lo3 Again, they paid little heed to what side of the border they 
worked on; during the War of 18 12 many able-bodied men working in the New 
Brunswick woods decamped for their native United States rather than serve in the militia. 
Nonetheless, several American woodsmen served in the first drafts of militia made at St. 
stephen.lo4 Yet timbermen were also poor. Their homes were rude cabins, and like 
many fishermen, they lived in perpetual debt to merchants, the very sort of dependency 
many North Americans abhorred.lo5 To external observers timbermen in both Maine and 
New Brunswick were little more than a shiftless drunken banditti.lo6 New Brunswick 
historian William MacNutt noted that the timber trade "induced free thinking rather than 
respect for authority," including stripping Crown forests of their valuable trees.''' 
Timbermen, too, were smugglers, often not from choice but because colonial merchants 
paid them in British manufactured goods. When they crossed the border, American 
customs officials could and sometimes did seize these goods as contraband.''' 
This opportunism bridged the temporal world to the supernatural. Many frontier 
settlers believed in what has been termed a "nocturnal" or supernatural economy.'09 
Many settlers were undoubtedly superstitious. Passamaquoddy mariners sometimes 
reported sighting sea monsters, like Freeman Smith of Lubec, an experienced whaleman 
who reported the serpent's body was six feet in diameter, and that its head stood fifteen 
feet above the water."' Smith was just one of many New England mariners who claimed 
to have seen sea-serpents after 18 15." ' Passamaquoddy's fishermen sometimes believed 
in witches, and nailed horseshoes to the masts of their boats for protection from them.'12 
Some individuals manipulated folk beliefs for their own profit, such as Daniel Lambert, a 
Maine farmer who claimed to have supernatural powers to uncover buried pirate treasure. 
Lambert was a fraud, but when he was found out and fled, he was arrested while en route 
to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . " ~  Frontier society, poor especially in terms of specie, fantasized 
about buried treasure chests. Passamaquoddy had its own incidents, such as when a boy 
reportedly found a large gold nugget on a beach at ~ a s t ~ o r t . " ~  The idea of buried 
treasure may have had even more currency at Passamaquoddy than other frontier regions 
because of the remains of old French settlements in the area; Campobello residents 
reportedly wasted much of their time digging for Captain Kyd's treasure.'15 Loyalist 
officials in fact dug up Samuel Champlain's abandoned settlement on Bone Island to 
protect the province from American claims to the Passamaquoddy region. If the British 
and American border commissioners could dig up ruins to prove sovereignty, then surely 
ordinary people could find buried treasure.'I6 Such superstitious beliefs may have served 
smugglers well, allowing them to explain away sudden prosperity. 
Passamaquoddy also had a uniquely nocturnal economy as well, both legitimate 
and illicit. Fishermen frequently fished at night, a legal and legitimate practice, using 
torches to attract fish to their nets. Smugglers operated at night in direct contravention of 
both American and British laws that forbade loading or unloading vessels of any size 
after dark. During peak smuggling times a man might make several weeks wages in one 
night; the highest amount recorded in one night was $47, paid in cash."' Unfortunately 
there is no recorded response of wives and children to tired husbands and fathers 
returning at dawn after a night spent illegally transporting goods across the border. But 
perhaps smugglers explained the unexpected appearance of cash or goods in supernatural 
terms. 
Borderland residents had complex attitudes toward commerce, possessing both 
pragmatic and naive elements, in common with most of North American society. The 
basic goal for most families was survival and ideally a comfortable independence from 
debt or competency, but none could hope to avoid engaging in a market economy. At 
Passamaquoddy this pragmatic response, and the need to cross and re-cross the border to 
take advantage of the region's natural resources and opportunities, meant that common 
people paid little heed to the border, and asked few questions when opportunities to make 
a quick profit arose. Smuggling was just another way to augment family incomes on a 
poor frontier. But borderland merchants smuggled for other reasons, including capital 
acquisition and issues related to the balance of trade. 
Borderland Merchants 
Passamaquoddy's merchants were the most significant component of the 
borderland population in terms of smuggling. The merchants were the vital link with the 
outside world. They understood markets and profit, and they owned the wharves, 
warehouses, and ships that made smuggling possible. Like the less wealthy borderland 
population, the region's merchants engaged in varied mercantile pursuits; few merchants 
could afford to specialize in any one activity. Clearly this was a group that engaged in 
smuggling for profit, as opposed to fishermen and laborers who resorted to illicit trade to 
augment their meager incomes. Yet they were also pursuing culturally supported goals. 
Financial success increasingly defined the American character after the War of 
Independence, an attribute frequently ascribed to a distinctive American culture that 
honored individual initiative.Il8 Many of these merchants came to Passamaquoddy 
specifically because they wanted to engage in smuggling. Three groups of merchants 
dominated Passamaquoddy's commerce, both licit and illicit: Scots, Loyalists, and 
Yankees. 
The common denominator for Passamaquoddy's mercantile community was the 
need to connect North America with external markets. Almost always these markets 
were somehow connected with British imperial interests. For example, American 
merchants from Eastport were heavily concerned in exporting flour to Portugal and Spain 
from roughly 1 809 to 1 8 14. Yet that flour was not headed for markets in Lisbon or 
Cadiz; instead it was destined for the British army fighting in the Iberian Peninsula. As 
they attempted to establish themselves in the decades after the American Revolution, 
Passamaquoddy's merchants had to develop new markets for themselves because older 
well-established mercantile firms in the metropolitan core already dominated traditional 
trade routes. Thus Passamaquoddy's mercantile community had to break into the British 
commercial system, not an easy task given the fierce commercial rivalries of the age.'l9 
Passamaquoddy's merchants broke into the British commercial world by 
establishing trade relations with British conquests in the Napoleonic Wars. For example, 
Britain wrested Demerara in South America from Dutch control in the early 1800s. By 
1808, Passamaquoddy supplied Demerara with large quantities of timber and provisions 
to support its slave plantation economy.'20 The Caribbean islands with which 
Passamaquoddy merchants tended to trade in this period were often those recently 
captured 6om the French, or Spanish colonies whose usual mercantilist policies were 
disrupted by Napoleon's invasion of the imperial homeland. 
Lowland Scots held a large amount of economic influence within the British 
Empire. Keenly competitive and clannish, they were often detested by non-Scots. An 
example of this is Loyalist merchant and smuggler on Campobello, who resented 
Charlotte County's predominantly Scottish officials and blamed his political problems on 
them.'*' As a whole Scots merchants in British North America seem to have been avid 
free-traders who chafed under the mercantile domination of English ports, especially 
London. For these men Scotland was finally achieving the wealth it deserved. This 
ethnic viewpoint meant that Scots tended to trade with their homeports such as Greenock 
and Leith, thus developing a reputation as being cliquish or narrow in their views; 
certainly they tended to trade almost exclusively with fellow Scotsmen. Their 
unpopularity may also have been because of their success. Scots merchants dominated 
both Halifax and Saint John, and initiated the true capitalist institutions in the region, 
such as banks, insurance, and steamships.'22 Successhl ethnic minorities frequently 
received criticism for their secretiveness, clannishness, and kinship links, and in this 
sense the Scots were no different from contemporary Jews and ~ u a k e r s . ' ~ ~  
There did seem to be some grounds for this resentment. Many of the foremost 
commercial figures in Charlotte County were Scots, including Robert Pagan, Colin 
Campbell and his son, the McMasters family, and Christopher Scott. All belonged to the 
St. Andrews Society in Saint John. 124 They controlled the county's courts, the region's 
most advanced and productive dam and sawmill complex at St. Stephen. Scott 
established the area's first bank, and built St. Andrew's Presbyterian church.I2' All of 
Charlotte County's Scottish merchants were well-known smugglers or colluded with 
them, including Colin Campbell, a customs officer who colluded with smugglers. Yet the 
numbers of these Scots merchants was never large, just a few dozen at most in both New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 
Foremost among the Scots at Passamaquoddy was Robert Pagan (1 750-1 82 l), of 
St. Andrews, New Brunswick. Pagan emigrated to America in 1768, establishing himself 
at Falmouth, ~a s sachuse t t s . ' ~~  The Revolution forced him to flee; Pagan chose to 
remain as close to the American market as possible. First he established himself at the 
British post at Penobscot. While there, Pagan smuggled British goods into British 
territory by arranging for the sham capture of his vessels.12' When the British evacuated 
that post Pagan settled in what became St. Andrews, New Brunswick, within eyesight of 
the American side of the border. Significantly, many of Pagan's activities were illicit in 
some manner. Pagan plundered Crown timber reserves, illegally imported American 
timber, sold fish to American merchants contrary to the law, and actively violated 
Jefferson's embargo.'28 Many of his fellow merchants and countrymen pursued similar 
endeavors. Even in shipbuilding, Pagan and other Scots had to smuggle American 
ironware and Scottish copper fittings to complete the ~ e s s e 1 s . l ~ ~  
Loyalist merchants, in this instance meaning those born in North America who 
fled to the remaining British North American colonies after 1783, were equally 
avaricious. They participated in all the illicit economic activities that the Scots did, and 
engaged in illicit trade in the West Indies as well. One important difference is that 
Loyalist merchants did not have the narrow ethnic viewpoint of the Scots. The Loyalist 
merchants were also more provincial and lacked the connections to places like Lowland 
Scotland where the Industrial Revolution and capitalist institutions such as the banking 
system were developing so rapidly. Instead, in keeping with their conservative ideology, 
Loyalist merchants sought to reconstruct the old trade patterns that existed before 1775, 
especially the West Indies conne~t ion . '~~  Compared with the Scots and the Yankees, 
Loyalists made poor capitalists; rather than compete or be innovative, they often looked 
to government for bounties or trade privileges. Neither Nova Scotia nor New Brunswick 
flourished until roughly 1808, when British demands for colonial timber and Jefferson's 
embargo combined to invigorate the colonial colonies in no small part because the British 
Board of Trade encouraged smuggling British manufactured goods into the United States 
via the Maritime provinces.'3' 
Because aggressive American merchants success~lly shut out Maritime 
merchants from the West Indies trade, New Brunswick and Nova Scotian traders soon 
found themselves in a secondary role. Loyalist merchants sold their fish and timber to 
Americans who camed it to the West Indies. Direct trade with the West Indies was 
limited to small vessels that operated on a seasonal basis.'32 At Passamaquoddy, the most 
prominent Loyalist merchant was Christopher Hatch. Originally a Boston merchant, 
Hatch served with distinction as a captain in the Loyal American Regiment during the 
War of Independence. After the war he established himself as a merchant on Campobello 
before moving to St. Andrews, where he specialized in the plaster trade.133 Hatch 
maintained friendly relations with Benjamin Lincoln, a fellow Bostonian and general in 
the Continental Army during the war. Lincoln established one of his sons in Dennysville, 
just across the border fiom St. A n d r e w ~ . ' ~ ~  While there is no hard evidence besides his 
participation in the notorious plaster trade, it seems likely he smuggled. But Hatch never 
fully committed himself to commerce. He retained an interest in military matters, serving 
as a colonel in the militia, and was one of Charlotte County's foremost magistrates, as 
well as an occasional member of the assembly.135 Given his powerful political position 
as both a justice and a militia officer, it is not surprising that no one pointed an accusing 
finger at him. So many of Charlotte County's leaders participated in smuggling that the 
chances of one of them upsetting the widespread illicit trade that benefited them all 
appear slim. 
American merchants were aggressive and forward-looking like the Scots, but 
without ties to specific ports. Rather than link themselves with one or two ports in 
Scotland, American merchants actively and aggressively sought new markets the world 
over, even if those markets were closed to legal trade.136 New Englanders especially 
were known for their sharp bargaining.13' Smuggling was just one tactic among many to 
secure profits, and Yankees even took some pride in their pre-revolution smuggling. One 
Massachusetts congressman confessed, "The habit of smuggling pervades our country. 
We were taught it when it was considered rather as meritorious than criminal."138 Post- 
revolutionary Americans, too, could justify smuggling as an expression of American free 
enterprise and democracy. American borderland merchants were mostly Jeffersonians; 
they generally disliked big government, high taxes and the patrician principles of the 
Federalists. Even during Jefferson's embargo, when the federal government attempted to 
completely halt all sea-borne commerce, Eastport remained a Democratic-Republican 
s t r~ngho ld . ' ~~  Those voting patterns should not be surprising when one considers that the 
erratic commercial policies of Jefferson and Madison ironically brought prosperity to 
Passamaquoddy just as surely as they ruined merchants in Baltimore and Philadelphia. In 
the United States smugglers could claim with some justification that if what they did was 
illegal, it was the government rather than themselves who were in the wrong.I4O 
Foremost among Passamaquoddy's Yankee smuggler merchants was Jabez 
Mowry of Eastport and later Lubec. Mowry specialized in importing plaster and 
exporting provisions; he moved to Passamaquoddy from Rhode Island in about 1806 to 
engage in this trade. Mowry emerges from the written records as a central figure in 
Passamaquoddy smuggling. His reach was transatlantic; he even shipped flour from 
Eastport to Cadiz, Spain. He had warehouses on both sides of the border to facilitate his 
activities. Mowry appears frequently in court documentation, yet he remains as elusive a 
figure in death as he was in life. For example, when U.S. Deputy Marshal George Smith 
attempted to serve Mowry papers in 18 16, he reported the following: 
I went down to Lubeck the moment I received 
information that Mowry had returned-- my arrival in that 
quarter was not known, excepting at the major's [Trescott], 
until I landed at the Narrows-- On inquiry of W. Wheeler 
(after I had been in Mowry's store) where Mowry was, I 
was informed that he had gone from the Narrows & which 
proved to be the case, he having passed me in the fog on his 
way to the customs house.-- It appears that he landed a 
little way below the majors & sent a man up to look out for 
me. 141 
Mowry then "went immediately to Campobello where he had some plaister vessels 
landing plaister, directly opposite the stores at the Narrows & where he keeps all the time 
except when he shuts himself up on this side." Mowry slipped across the border 
whenever American law officials anived, taking advantage of his local connections and 
even the fog to evade them. Mowry proved equally adept at dodging British officials. He 
even dressed in woman's clothing when he visited Eastport during the British occupation 
to conduct business. His fiiends met him at the beach to "proffer the attentions due to a 
lady, were sorely tasked to preserve their gravity as they accompanied him through the 
streets; because he stepped off so long and in other respects demeaned himself with so 
little grace and propriety as a woman, that both he and they, in spite of all hints and 
lessons, were objects of attention to passing persons by whom they did not wish to be 
recognized."'42 
While Mowry was one of a handful of Federalists in a sea of frontier 
Jeffersonians, a smuggler and trader with the enemy, he is remembered in popular history 
as a local booster, a man who gave freely for the construction of churches and Lubec's 
first schoolhouse, and a merchant who employed dozens.'43 In his old age he delighted in 
telling stories about his smuggling e ~ ~ 1 0 i t s . l ~ ~  
Scots, Loyalists and Yankee merchants, like all smugglers, justified their 
smuggling for various reasons. Scots claimed it was their due because English 
commercial policies discriminated against them. Loyalists asserted that the British 
government's debt to them for their loyalty and suffering remained unpaid, and thus they 
were reclaiming what they had lost in the Revolution. During Jefferson's embargo and 
the War of 18 12, they could even claim smuggling as a patriotic enterprise that 
undermined the American economy. In the United States, American smugglers could 
claim that the Revolution freed them to pursue the wealth that guaranteed demo~rac~ . ' ~ '  
Practical aspects of commerce also encouraged borderlands merchants to engage in illicit 
trade, the foremost of which was the region's perpetual shortage of specie and credit. 
Coins were rare, and even paper money scarce: both were readily counterfeited, 
even by 10cals.l~~ Bills of exchange and letters of credit were also easily forged, and 
relied on merchant's personal contacts with other  merchant^.'^^ As David Owen pointed 
out, fish were often used as a sort of currency in the 1790s at Passamaquoddy. 148 A 
decade later, timber or lumber was a common form of paying debts to merchants like 
Joseph Porter, a St. Stephen "late ~ o ~ a l i s t . " ' ~ ~  Sometimes when dragged before a judge 
for smuggling, individuals claimed they tried to get cash for their goods on the other side 
of the border, but there was no specie to pay them, so they took contraband goods 
instead.''' 
Had cash or credit been available, smugglers probably would have preferred to 
conduct their business legitimately, but the underdeveloped economic institutions of the 
day prevented it. The answer for merchants was the creation of banks that would pool 
credit, create a stable paper money, and increase the speed with which money passed 
from one merchant to another.I5' Borderland merchants, including Lemuel Trescott, 
sought the creation of a state-chartered bank at Eastport as early as 1807.''~ In 1820 
Eastport had its first bank, the "Bank of Passamaquoddy," with none other than Jabez 
Mowry as its president. By 1825 St. Andrews had a bank as well, with the equally 
notorious smuggler Christopher Scott as its president. Smugglers, self-proclaimed 
"free traders," were also early capitalists. Banks and capitalist institutions that promoted 
free trade gradually lessened the need to smuggle. 
Conclusion 
After the Revolution the common frontier experience brought Americans and 
Loyalists together, encouraging cooperation even if it meant smuggling. The ideological 
differences between Loyalists and Patriots rapidly faded.lS4 For the ordinary settlers this 
was largely a pragmatic consideration that ensured survival, an outgrowth of the 
frontier's egalitarian communalism. But the region's merchants rationalized illicit trade 
for other reasons, including ethnicity, perceptions of social standing, or revolutionary 
ideology. The justifications for smuggling are as diverse as the people who participated 
in illicit trade. Participants in the "dark trade" made excuses for their behavior, acting in 
ways that sometimes appear hypocritical, devious, or even traitorous. Examining these 
contradictions reveals that everyday life brought borderland peoples into conflict with 
social ideals, national ideologies, and the power of the state. These struggles existed 
throughout North America, but the presence of the border meant that Passamaquoddy's 
settlers had unusual stresses and opportunities that brought these contradictions to the 
fore, as they did with Dr. Faxon when he went to that Eastport tavern in 1807. 
The smuggling merchants were especially important at Passarnaquoddy because 
they also made up the overwhelming majority of the local political machinery, including 
the county-level judiciary. As early as 1796, a New Brunswick customs officer found 
contraband tea and liquor in the homes, warehouses, and other outbuildings belonging to 
the leading figures and magistrates on Grand Manan, Indian Island, and Campobello. 
The list included Grand Manan's Moses Gerrish and Campobello's Thomas Henderson, 
who in subsequent years would serve as a highly indulgent customs 0 f f i ~ e r . l ~ ~  Most of 
the American magistrates at Passamaquoddy were also involved in smuggling to some 
degree. Somehow these individuals rationalized their borderlands experience, permitting 
them to defraud the state and organize banquets celebrating their patriotism 
simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
ADVENTURERS AND ENFORCERS 
Introduction 
A letter dated from 1812 indicates the game of cat-and-mouse played between 
smugglers and government officials at Passamaquoddy. Unsigned, addressed to a New 
York City merchant and smuggler conducting business on the border, the letter concludes 
with the warning "look out for the Revenue Cutter at East Port. LOOK OUT."' It is 
exactly the sort of mysterious correspondence one would expect a smuggler to write. The 
importance of this letter and the others that accompany it lies not only their content, 
which is rich in detail about smuggling and includes codes to conceal participants' 
names, for they also reveal something about those who came from distant places to 
engage in illicit trading on the remote shores of Passamaquoddy Bay. A number of 
merchants from Manhattan came to Passamaquoddy and vicinity to trade, as did 
Philadelphia, Boston, Salem, Portsmouth, and Portland traders. Crossing the border into 
British territory, even during the War of 1812 posed few problems, and the United States 
Supreme Court actually upheld American citizens' rights to cross into enemy territory at 
~ a s s a r n a ~ u o d d ~ . ~  
A variety of government officials arrayed themselves against these adventurers. 
The representatives of law and order could be a troublesome presence to locals. Military 
and naval units, revenue cutters, customs officials, and other law officers came to impose 
order and trade restrictions. Community leaders on both sides of the border dealt with 
these external forces cautiously. Magistrates usually felt obliged to support these 
external forces. As leaders charged to protect the community, however, these 
representatives of the law threatened to upset the harmonious borderland relationship. 
Certainly some leaders worried that these outside law enforcers would ruin the smuggling 
trade and the region's prosperity. All were concerned that these government officers, 
who were often heavily armed, would initiate violence that could devastate the region. 
As a result external forces often received only tepid welcomes, and occasionally faced 
outright hostility from the borderland populace. 
Outsiders helped to create the borderlands identity both as lawbreakers and law 
enforcers, often trapping local residents between their conflicting demands. Smuggling 
merchants sought obedience to the laws of supply and demand, while government 
officers required allegiance to the state and its laws. These differing viewpoints created 
unusual stresses within the borderland community itself, changing conventional attitudes 
toward authority, the pursuit of wealth, and the importance of the ideologies that emerged 
from the American Revolution. Tom between welcoming the outsiders who could bring 
prosperity and the need to create a civil society that respected legal authority, locals did 
their best to moderate the actions of both extremes. Essentially they were caught in a 
struggle between capitalism and the state, between "adventurers" and "enforcers." 
The Adventurers 
At the cutting edge of the transition from mercantilism to capitalism were a set of 
ambitious young merchants deemed by many as "adventurers," young men unconnected 
with Passamaquoddy who came to make money fast. Most departed as soon as their 
business concluded, but others remained in the area for years, and some even settled at 
Passamaquoddy. These were men on the make with few constraints on their personal 
ambition, exactly the sort of entrepreneurs who led the way towards ~a~ita1ism.j They 
were also the smugglers who Adam Smith described in Wealth of Nations. Smith thought 
smuggling "the most hazardous of all trades," and bemoaned the fact that unfortunately, 
"The dangerous and hairbreadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening 
young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them."4 Ambitious, worldly, and 
clever, these adventurers worshipped profit, and seldom appear to have paid much mind 
to the demands of the state: as Smith himself lamented, merchants were not necessarily 
the citizen of any particular country.5 Nova Scotia's attorney general mirrored Smith 
when he complained, "I am sorry to say that we are surrounded by a description of 
unprincipled men [smugglers] who are one day British subjects and the next citizens of 
the United States, as it best suits their  interest^."^ 
Smith's model of a smuggler was an over-optimistic adventurer drawn by the lure 
of easy profits, and the fate of smugglers was almost always bankruptcy due to seizures 
by customs officers and other penalties for being caught.' Smith deplored this travesty 
since he defined a smuggler as "a person who, though no doubt highly blamable for 
violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural 
justice, and would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen had not the laws of his 
country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so."* Smugglers reacted 
against unnatural laws imposed by the state; at first their actions might be "rather 
imprudent than criminal," but in Smith's mind the smuggler "too often becomes one of 
the hardiest and most determined violators of the laws of society."9 As a customs 
administrator, Smith believed that part of the blame lay with a lax customs 
administration; he argued that "not many people are scrupulous about smuggling when, 
without pe jury, they can find any easy and safe opportunity of doing so."" Smith also 
found that the public generally sympathized with smugglers who offered the consumer 
low-cost goods. Public tolerance encouraged smugglers to consider themselves as 
engaged in an innocent activity; thus when customs officials did move to seize 
contraband goods, the smugglers often fiercely defended themselves and their 'rjust 
property."11 Passarnaquoddy smugglers defended their actions by terming themselves 
"free traders," a label that underscored their freedom from commercial regulations.12 
This freedom and the rise of capitalism came at a cost, however. American 
sociologist Robert Merton argued that American society more strongly than other 
capitalist societies held out the goal of personal wealth and success to all its citizens. 
Often this commitment to wealth and success meant that individuals had to break the law 
to achieve these goals. Merton's sociological arguments are echoed in those of historians 
such as Appleby, who found that the American Revolution created "a distinctive 
American society that honored individual initiative.13 The argument may also be held out 
for elitist Loyalist society as well. New Brunswick's merchants and leaders constantly 
sought more money to recoup their losses from the Revolutionary War and support their 
social pretensions.14 Many did not hesitate to break the law or subvert state interests to 
do so. 
However, government control, geography, and other factors limited the ability of 
aspiring capitalists to achieve their goals. Efforts to support the ideologies that emerged 
out of the American Revolution conflicted with the economic imperative to acquire 
wealth. The tension between ideology and economy created stresses too great for 
borderlands society to cope with, resulting in what sociologists term "anomie," a 
condition often associated with economic disaster, rapid economic growth, or 
deregulation of business.15 Jefferson's embargo and the War of 1812 were economic 
disasters for the United States that severely upset social relations, especially in New 
England where pro-trade Federalists openly debated secession.16 During this period the 
ability of society to regulate itself deteriorated and social norms and expectations became 
twisted. Adventurers and troublemakers could be warmly accepted into a community 
while the agents of state control faced hostility. The machinations of the state in 
controlling, restricting or forbidding trade were less comprehensible to borderland 
residents who preferred lax or nonexistent commercial regulations.17 At Passamaquoddy 
this meant that magistrates sheltered smugglers, but prosecuted soldiers for performing 
their duty. 
Despite diverse backgrounds, the adventurers shared several characteristics. First, 
they were all young and single men. Second, they were ruthless in their search for profit. 
Third, they were often only a temporary presence at Passamaquoddy. The experiences of 
James Colles, Richard Hasluck, Constantino Llufrio, and John McMaster illustrate how 
adventurers interacted with the community and conducted their illicit trade. 
James Colles 
James Colles of New York City is an ideal representative of the American 
adventurers, in no small part because so much of his personal correspondence survives 
today. Colles came from a prosperous Manhattan family of Irish descent. About 1810, 
he became a clerk in Hugh Kennedy Toler's mercantile firm, which was heavily engaged 
in importing British manufactured goods, especially textiles, from ~ i v e r ~ o o l . ' ~  New
York had already achieved fame as the home of commercially aggressive entrepreneurs 
and the heart of the American market.lg New York smugglers began to use 
Passamaquoddy as an illicit trade center during Jefferson's embargo and continued to 
come to the region in subsequent years. Collector Trescott estimated in 18 1 1 that "not 
less by estimation than one hundred Merchants from New York and other places" 
engaged in smuggling at ~ a s s a m a q u o d d ~ . ~ ~  
New Yorkers continued to come to Passamaquoddy to smuggle during the War of 
18 12. As a result of the troubled relations between Britain and the United States, Toler 
and other merchants began to deliver goods to ports in British North Ameri~a.~'  Once his 
goods arrived there, Toler could either import them legally, or smuggle them into the 
United States if Congress banned trade with Britain. To that end, Toler sent Colles to 
Passarnaquoddy in the spring of 1812 to bring goods stored in St. Andrews and Saint 
John into the United States. 
Colles moved on both sides of the border in 18 12 and 18 13 in order to illicitly 
introduce Toler's goods into the United States. Most of these were British manufactured 
goods such as textiles, including silk ribbons and other luxury items. On occasion 
American privateersmen harassed Colles on suspicion of smuggling, but he apparently 
talked himself out of trouble.22 Colles's method of smuggling at Eastport was to 
cooperate as closely as possible with American customs officials. He used his social 
acumen and promised financial remuneration for the officials' time and trouble. Colles's 
tactic was to smuggle Toler's goods fiom New Brunswick into Eastport and then turn 
informant against his own cargo. The officials then seized the goods with Colles's 
permission, and auctioned them off after an uncontested court hearingz3 Colles, at his 
employer's urging, arranged to have the goods under-appraised by at least fifty percent, 
apparently by providing the appraisers with a good meal, as "a good dinner has a great 
tendency to soften men's hearts."24 Because of the false appraisal, Colles bought back 
the goods at a fraction of their true value, pocketed twenty-five percent of the proceeds of 
the auction as the informant, and acquired customhouse certification that the goods had 
legally entered the United States. In the meantime, Toler petitioned Maine's federal 
district court for remission of the seizure entirely.25 While this was a convoluted and 
expensive way of conducting business, high wartime prices ensured a sizeable profit. 
A variety of local merchants assisted Colles, including Jabez Mowry in Eastport, 
Robert Pagan in St. Andrews, Nehemiah Menitt in Saint John, and Edward Blackford in 
Halifax, most of whom were well-known borderland smugglers. Colles sometimes 
stayed in their homes, received mail at their offices, borrowed money from them, and 
undoubtedly paid to store his contraband in their wa reh~uses .~~  These were business 
transactions, but there was a social element to them as well, primarily a recognition, 
despite their various nationalities and degrees of wealth, that they all pursued similar 
goals. Face-to-face transactions, kinship and marriage links, and socialization remained 
an important part of conducting business because it was a means of transmitting the 
information so vital for  merchant^.^' In this way commercial society promoted personal 
relations, a concept in direct opposition to one shared by many scholars who maintain 
that the market revolution and commodification discouraged or dissolved social bonds.28 
Nonetheless, it reinforces Adam Smith's perception of commercial friendships. The 
adventurers who came to Passamaquoddy depended on the sympathy and cooperation of 
locals to evade commercial restrictions, thereby creating a mutual dependence that 
reinforced suspicion of government anti-smuggling efforts. 
Not all of Colles's plans succeeded, despite his charm and connections. In 
February 1813, Colles attempted to bring forty-two packages of English goods from St. 
Andrews into ~astpor t .~ '  Working in concert with Toler, Colles carefully laid the 
groundwork for introducing the goods into the American market. First they employed the 
services of Jabez Mowry, one of the wealthiest American merchants at Passamaquoddy 
and a veteran smuggler. Together Colles, Toler, and Mowry approached Collector 
Lemuel Trescott. They presented their case, and asked what Trescott would do if they 
brought the goods to Eastport. Trescott stated he would seize the goods and transport 
them to Portland for auction after adjudication, a satisfactory answer because it brought 
the goods into the American market via an auction process that could easily be 
manipulated, especially if Toler or Colles informed against the packages themselves. 
They planned to bring the goods directly into Eastport and land them on John Kendall's 
wharf, where the deputy collector, William Coney, would seize them." 
Toler and Mowry then proceeded to meet with the commander of the American 
garrison to procure a pass to cross the border into British territory. Typical of most 
smugglers, they chose to work within the law whenever possible. The commander, 
Colonel George Ulmer, gave the men a pass to cross the border. But Ulmer must have 
suspected their intentions to smuggle goods into the country. Or perhaps somebody 
tipped him off. Ulmer ordered a party of soldiers to go to Clark's Head, some three miles 
north of the American army post and four miles north of Kendall's wharf. The soldiers 
spotted a vessel coming from the British side of the border and boarded the suspected 
smuggling vessel, which turned out to be the schooner Polly of St. Andrews, loaded with 
Toler's contraband goods. The sergeant in charge questioned Colles about his intentions, 
but on receiving what they deemed as evasive answers, the soldiers seized the Polly and 
sailed for the town landing in Eastport. 
In the meantime, the would-be smugglers were waiting at Kendall's wharf with 
the deputy collector. Soon word arrived that soldiers had seized the Polly; the deputy 
collector immediately set out to intercept the Polly in the customhouse boat, and boarded 
it within half an hour of its seizure. Deputy Collector Coney questioned the sergeant's 
authority to seize the vessel, and called the soldier's actions illegal. Coney claimed he 
had jurisdiction over the vessel and seized it in the name of the United States in an 
attempt to avoid a potentially very embarrassing ~ituation.~' Arguments about whose 
jurisdiction the seizure fell under continued; ultimately Collector Trescott was awakened 
and Colonel Ulmer consulted on the matter, but they disagreed as well. Ulmer resolved 
the issue by ordering twelve soldiers to take custody of the vessel, and threatened to 
remove the goods by force if necessary to the safety of Fort Sullivan's b lockh~use .~~  
The scandal continued, as Trescott and Coney complained bitterly about Ulmer's 
interference in what they saw as customhouse affairs.33 Ulmer in turn charged the 
customhouse officers with actively colluding to facilitate smuggling. Trescott sent the 
contraband to Portland under federal custody, libeled in the name of Ulmer's troops.34 
However, the federal district court favored Trescott's version of events. The federal 
court condemned the goods and auctioned them for roughly $100,000; Trescott and 
Mowry each received $25,000 as their share of the seizure, with Mowry immediately 
remitting his share to ~ o l l e s . ~ '  Toler apparently lost out, but nonetheless seemed pleased 
at how the U.S. marshal auctioned the contraband; he later sent U.S. Marshall Thomas G .  
Thornton one hundred dollars "as a gift" via Colles, who continued to operate in Maine 
and New Brunswick for another year.36 
The Polly incident reveals that adventurers such as Colles cooperated closely with 
locals, both merchants and customhouse officers, to bring contraband across the border. 
The adventurers chose to cloak their activities with a veil of legality, a tactic that 
promised success so long as other outsiders, in this case the U.S. Army, did not intervene. 
The non-violence of the methods also stands out; Colles and Toler interacted closely with 
locals. Only Col. Ulmer threatened violence. Moreover, Colles seems to have possessed 
a charisma that smoothed his way in the commercial world. 
Colles's correspondence reveals a man at home in the Loyalist salons of Saint 
John, where he was familiar with the influential Wetrnore family. His easy interaction 
with Loyalists was no doubt aided by his own Federalist politics. Colles also moved 
among an elite circle in New York, including the Roosevelt family. He lived at a 
fashionable Manhattan address -42 Pearl Street- and drank his tea from custom-ordered 
monogrammed china from Canton. Colles was an ambitious young man, full of self- 
confidence, tightly bonded with his social peers, accustomed to a life of privilege, yet 
unceasing in his pursuit of wealth.37 Yet at the same time Colles was quite capable of 
haggling on the docks of a rough-and-tumble a frontier town like Eastport in order to 
move British manufactured goods across the border. He hired experienced smugglers 
such as one Captain Osgood to bring contraband goods concealed under plaster of paris 
to New York 
When Colles's business was done at Passamaquoddy he moved on to other 
ventures. He became a merchant in his own right, and even served as president of the 
New Orleans branch of the Bank of the United States. Unlike Smith's image of the 
typical smuggler, Colles did not become bankrupt, although he did face trial before the 
New York Federal District Court on charges related to illicit trade.39 In fact Colles 
became very wealthy. He had a long life, a large family, toured Europe, and built a 
thirty-room mansion in Morristown, New Jersey, that still stands today. 
Richard Hasluck 
While Colles represents the efforts of American merchants desperate to bring 
contraband goods into the United States, Richard Hasluck represents British merchants 
who were equally desperate to enter the American market, even during time of war. 
Hasluck, like Colles, was an adventurer, an ambitious young merchant willing to take 
risks to conduct illicit trade at Passamaquoddy. He also embodied some of the problems 
adventurers brought with them to Passamaquoddy, both as victims and as victimizers. 
Hasluck came to Passamaquoddy during Jefferson's embargo when large profits 
could be made smuggling American provisions into New Brunswick. Originally Hasluck 
came fiom Birmingham, at the center of the English industrial heartland. Hasluck 
operated as an agent for Birmingham hardware merchants Alexander Walker, Sr. and his 
brother Thomas H.   as luck.^' Hasluck's job was to bring British hardware into the 
lucrative but often closed American market. Hasluck also engaged in the contraband 
provisions trade during Jefferson's embargo. His abilities as a smuggler were limited; 
American authorities interfered with his operations several times. The first of these 
occasions was on the night of April 5, 1808, when customs officials caught Hasluck 
attempting to illegally export 135 kegs of butter in a gondola fiom Calais, Maine, to St. 
Stephen, New ~runswick.~'  
Undaunted, Hasluck continued to engage in the illicit exportation of American 
foodstuffs. Undoubtedly he was successful some of the time, but in October 1808, he 
once again ran into problems. Hasluck had procured a large quantity of American flour 
and loaded it on his partner's ship EIiza at Snug Cove, Campobello, within sight of 
American customs officers at Eastport. The customs officers must already have 
suspected the Eliza was carrying contraband, but somebody who had helped smuggle the 
d"- informed flour onto the vessel -whom Hasluck referred to as "a notorious b 
Collector Delesdemier of the ship's illicit cargo.42 While the vessel was in British waters 
the collector could do nothing, but the Eliza strayed into American waters almost 
immediately after raising anchor; Passamaquoddy's fierce tides almost wrecked the 
vessel on some rocks, and the captain brought his vessel to anchor near Rice's Island, 
which Americans claimed lay within their jurisdiction. An American customs officer 
immediately boarded the vessel, soon followed by U.S. Navy gunboat No. 43, which 
anchored alongside the Eliza and took possession of the British ship. Probably alerted by 
Hasluck, the captain of a nearby Royal Navy vessel demanded that the commander of the 
gunboat immediately release the Eliza, but received the answer "that he had possession of 
her and nothing but bloodshed and hard fighting should take her from him.'43 The Royal 
Navy officer responded by anchoring a warship in British waters in Snug Cove, just a few 
hundred feet from where the Eliza lay. The situation was extremely tense; in the 
aftermath of the Chesapeake incident, American naval officers were anxious to assert 
their fighting ability. A shooting war could easily have broken out between Britain and 
the United States. Fortunately, Collector Delesdernier agreed to return the Eliza, thereby 
defbsing the crisis. 
Hasluck's luck continued to be bad however. Thieves robbed the messenger 
carrying the $2700 Hasluck used to pay for the cargo of the Eliza. Hasluck posted a 
reward of $500, apparently without success.44 Hasluck was a victim of the very 
lawlessness that customs officers accused adventurers of bringing to Passamaquoddy. 
Hasluck remained at Passamaquoddy after the embargo, engaging in both licit and 
illicit trading, especially in Birmingham-produced hardware. During the War of 18 12 he 
continued smuggling, encouraged by the depressed prices of Birmingham manufactures 
and the conversely inflated price of British manufactured goods in the United 
Hasluck stayed for several years, married into the locally prominent loyalist McMaster 
family, and eventually returned to England with his wife.46 
As an adventurer, Hasluck represents the need for industrializing societies to find 
new markets for manufactured items, using means both fair and foul. Hasluck's 
involvement in the Eliza affair illustrates the mischief adventurers could bring to the 
border, and how these minor border matters threatened to become major incidents that 
could result in war. But the chaos adventurers brought with them to Passamaquoddy 
could have unintentional consequences, as when robbers stole a large sum of money from 
Hasluck's messenger. Like James Colles, Hasluck developed local connections that 
made business possible. Ultimately, however, he left Passamaquoddy despite his 
marriage connections to the area. 
Constantino Llufrio 
When looking through legal records that consider smuggling at Passamaquoddy, 
the name of Spanish Floridian merchant Constantino Llufrio stands out. How did this 
individual come to engage in smuggling in as remote a corner of the world as 
Passamaquoddy? The answer, in part, seems to be that Llufrio was one of a number of 
merchants who combed the Atlantic world, seeking profits where they could find them, 
even if it meant breaking the laws of one nation or another. Llufrio claimed that, "trading 
on my own account," he had made about twenty voyages before 18 12 to the West Indies, 
the Spanish Main, the United States, Holland, and Having engaged in illicit 
trade at Amelia Island between American Georgia and Spanish Florida, another 
borderland where smuggling was rife, Llufrio eventually made his way to Saint John, 
New Brunswick, where he learned of the potential profits to be had at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  
Llufrio was born in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1787, a Spanish subject. His 
nationality made him a neutral during the War of 1812, thus he could trade legally with 
both British and American merchants. Llufrio capitalized on his neutrality by using it to 
ship high-value British manufactured items like textiles to Eastport from Saint John. 
When British forces occupied Eastport, Llufrio simply moved his destination to nearby 
Lubec on the American mainland. During the British occupation of Castine, Llufrio 
again moved his base of operations to that port. Under the laws of neutrality, this was 
legal; but under British commercial law, foreign merchants were not allowed to live and 
conduct trade in colonial ports. Llufrio also had a difficult time persuading American 
judicial authorities that he was the true owner of these goods passing into the United 
States. A fellow passenger on the brig Llufrio was on when captured by a privateer said 
that the Spaniard claimed the goods as a ruse to fool his captors; in fact the fifty-two 
packages of dry goods belonged to a British merchant, and thus were liable to seizure.49 
Another remarkable aspect of adventurers like Llufrio is that borderland residents 
seemed to have accepted him with few questions. Llufiio operated in Passamaquoddy for 
months on a vessel flying the neutral Spanish flag, surely a rarity in that part of the world. 
Yet his enduring presence was ignored; he only appears in the legal record because an 
American privateer captured him, thereby giving officials an opportunity to interrogate 
him. The acceptance of Llufrio at Passamaquoddy stands in contrast to places like 
Liverpool, Nova Scotia, where the presence of a Spanish merchant created some concern, 
even an official inquiry by local magistrates. But in Passamaquoddy, the presence of 
such foreigners passed with little remark, probably because the community recognized 
the need for di~cretion.~' 
Llufrio represents the international character of smuggling at Passamaquoddy. By 
using his neutral status as a cover to introduce contraband British goods into the United 
States, Llufrio displayed just how aware smugglers were of the various technicalities and 
laws that could be used to smuggle goods across the border. The presence of Llufrio and 
other neutrals at Passamaquoddy is testimony not only to the widespread recognition 
Passamaquoddy received as a smuggling center, but also to the ability of a community to 
maintain almost perfect silence about the presence of so many foreigners. If it were not 
for the legal record, there would be no recoverable memory of the presence of these 
relatively exotic strangers' at Passamaquoddy. This silence should be contrasted with 
that of Liverpool, Nova Scotia. When a Spanish merchant appeared there in 18 10, 
magistrates immediately confronted the man, and a local diarist noted the e ~ e n t . ~ '  
Passamaquoddy was a region that could keep its secrets. 
John McMaster 
John McMaster was the most troublesome of the adventurers at Passamaquoddy, 
and in some respects best reflects Adam Smith's model. McMaster is the only adventurer 
who can be associated with a smuggling-related murder. It is impossible to pin down 
McMaster's nationality; he seems to be one of those smugglers who changed their 
nationality at will. McMaster also delighted in defying state authority, what Smith termed 
"hair-breadth escapes."52 McMaster also suffered the fate Smith prescribed for 
smugglers: bankruptcy due to government prosecution.53 
McMaster arrived at Passamaquoddy during Jefferson's embargo. He was a 
slippery character; in various documents he claimed to reside in Castine, Buckstown, and 
Eastport in Maine; Boston, Massachusetts; and Halifax, Nova Scotia. He may have had 
connections with the McMaster family of St. Andrews, New Brunswick, which had 
branches in Halifax and Augusta, Maine. McMaster engaged in the profitable provisions- 
smuggling trade at Passamaquoddy in 1808. In the spring of that year customs officials 
found McMaster illegally exporting flour, and confiscated the cargo. Undeterred, 
McMaster ordered a shipload of American flour to be delivered to him at Passamaquoddy 
in the autumn of 1808, but Collector Delesdernier refused to permit McMaster to unload 
the vessel and forced him to store the flour in a warehouse guarded by federal officers on 
remote Isle au Haut, almost one hundred miles west of Passamaquoddy. 
McMaster's reaction to this setback was to plot to free his flour and get it to 
market in Nova Scotia. He hired the Nova Scotia schooner Peggy and recruited a large 
crew at Passamaquoddy that he armed with muskets and other weapons. The Peggy 
sailed to Isle au Haut, and on a dark night the crew landed and attacked the guards at the 
warehouse holding his flour. One guard died in the gunbattle and one of the Peggy's 
crew suffered a severe wound. The smugglers succeeded in carrying off McMaster's 
flour, but a revenue cutter pursued the Peggy and captured the smuggling vessel without 
resistance. Federal prosecutors uncovered McMaster's connection with the Peggy 
incident, and tried him in Maine's federal district court in September, 1809. A jury found 
him guilty of breaking the embargo laws and fined him $10,000.~~ Unable to pay this 
staggering sum, McMaster went to the Lincoln County jail in Wiscasset for debt. He 
remained there for years, initially chained and confined to a cell, but later was given the 
liberties granted to other debtors. He petitioned Congress on several occasions for 
release. Congress ignored his pleas, and McMaster was still confined in Wiscasset when 
a drunken sailor murdered him in August 18 15 .55 
McMaster's failure reinforces Smith's model of a smuggler. McMaster's 
violence and persistence in continuing to smuggle even after being caught reflects his 
own ruthlessness. His ability to recruit what amounted to a gang of mercenaries at 
Passamaquoddy also indicates that the region had truly become a refbge for the lawless.56 
McMaster's punishment also displays the determination of the American government to 
suppress smuggling. 
The Enforcers 
Adventurers were a troublesome presence at Passamaquoddy, encouraging 
lawlessness and violence on the border. But law enforcers proved just as bothersome a 
presence as lawbreakers, by adding to the violence and disorder. Military and naval units 
especially brought many problems with them, and were often resented by borderland 
settlers. Outside forces brought into Passamaquoddy to establish law and order on the 
border appear to have been considerably less popular with locals than the adventurers, 
who enjoyed some level of local support. Locals often ostracized outside law enforcers. 
Pressure fiom borderland society meant that the longer these representatives of external 
authority remained in Passamaquoddy, the greater the chance that they would conform 
with local expectations of their conduct. The power of borderlands society to overwhelm 
external forces should not be underestimated; while the methods were generally non- 
violent, they were extremely effective. 
If the adventurers represented the advent of unrestrained market forces at 
Passamaquoddy, then the military and naval units brought in to control the rampant 
smuggling represented the determination of nation-states to bring their populations under 
control." Even in the United States, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the national 
government sought to impose its values on the people, using military force if necessary. 
While it is widely recognized that American Federalists attempted to overawe certain 
segments of society with a military presence during the so-called "Whiskey Rebellion," it 
is less known that Presidents Jefferson and Madison did exactly the same.58 The issue is 
equally thorny in Canadian historiography, in which British naval and military forces are 
generally perceived as protection from an aggressive United States. In both British North 
America and the United States, military and naval units often policed restive populaces, 
especially in newly settled regions such as Passamaquoddy. 
Naval Officers 
British warships, sent there to enforce British sovereignty and to pursue 
smugglers, were a common presence in the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay. They acted as 
occasional and often reluctant allies to customs authorities; naval officers seldom pursued 
this mission with enthu~iasm.~' Locals did not always resent their presence; Britain was 
almost continually at war with France after 1792, and merchants frequently sought 
additional protection for their vessels. In 1796 a British warship pursued and captured a 
French privateer at Campobello. British merchants also sought the protection of Royal 
Navy warships, during Jefferson's embargo, fearing that American gunboats might enter 
British waters and seize suspected smugglers. Until at least 18 15 however, the presence 
of British warships had a lethal effect on all water-borne traffic in Passamaquoddy, licit 
or not. If a British naval vessel was nearby, both American citizens and British subjects 
stayed off the water, for fear of being impressed into the Royal ~ a v ~ . ~ '  
American naval vessels came to Passamaquoddy as well, although not with the 
frequency of British warships. During Jefferson's embargo and after the War of 1812 
American naval units patrolled the area for smugglers and attempted to establish national 
sovereignty in Passamaquoddy ~ a ~ . ~ '  The most important difference was that American 
warships could not impress men into service. Furthermore, locals could bring political 
pressure more effectively on the tiny American navy than the vast British fleet. The use 
of United States warships in domestic waters to enforce commercial laws was an unusual 
role for the American navy, which until the War of 18 12 engaged primarily in protecting 
American shipping overseas and engaging enemy fleets in the undeclared Quasi-War 
with France (1798-1801) and the Barbary Wars of 1801-1805. When the U.S. Navy did 
patrol American waters to regulate commerce, it proved unpopular with both the public 
and naval officers.62 
Royal Navy officers were proverbial for their imperiousness.63 The conduct of 
officers such as Lt. Flintoph of His Majesty's schooner Porgey did nothing to enhance 
the image of the navy at Passamaquoddy. When Flintoph embarked on his ill-fated 
attempt to suppress Passamaquoddy smuggling in 1807, his use of force outraged 
magistrates on both sides of the border.64 Notably, Flintoph resigned his commission 
within months of his two raids on Passamaquoddy Bay, probably pressured to do so by 
his superior officers. But the antipathy sometimes felt both by Americans and colonials 
toward Royal Navy officers was not unique to Passamaquoddy. Attempts to impress 
sailors in Saint John and Halifax met with resistance, sometimes devolving into riots.65 
Royal Navy captains threw local magistrates off their vessels, expressed disdain for 
colonial society, and on one occasion kidnapped a young woman from Saint ~ o h n . ~ ~  
American naval officers were apparently no better. After USS Wasp arrived in 
the region during Jefferson's embargo, its captain arrested a number of smugglers and 
held them on board his vessel for days.67 Not content to merely grumble about American 
warships patrolling against smugglers, borderland residents took action against their 
perceived oppressors. The same gunboat commander who almost precipitated a war in 
the Eliza affair suffered from the retaliation of locals who correctly perceived his 
weakness for liquor. Somebody plied the young officer with an abundance of alcohol, to 
the point that he did not emerge from his cabin for weeks at a time. His incapacity 
became known locally. Soon an anonymous letter tipped off the Secretary of the Navy to 
the gunboat commander's behavior and he was relieved of his ~ommand.~ '  
A more significant case of resistance to naval authority occurred in the summer of 
1809. American resentment of British naval activities at Passamaquoddy ran high. 
During Jefferson's embargo both adventurers and locals experienced problems with 
British naval units. Residents resented it when the commander of vessels such as HM's 
schooner Plumper threatened to impress any British subject engaged in violent acts while 
smuggling.69 On the other hand, merchants applied to the commander of HMS Squirrel 
to protect them from USS Wasp, which had seized a British schooner involved in evading 
the Embargo ~ c t . ~ '  In spring 1809, however, there was no fear of American warships 
anymore, and a good deal of resentment that British warships were interfering with the 
smuggling trade. In addition, people expressed the usual concerns about impressment.71 
Throughout North America, whether in the United States or British North 
America, there was one popular weapon with which to strike back at imperious naval 
officers: encourage the desertion of sailors. The sailors needed little encouraging. Many 
were in the service involuntarily, and the conditions on naval vessels were notoriously 
bad. Mutinies were an occasional threat, although they were seldom suc~ess fu l .~~  
On July 4, 1809, a mutiny broke out on HMS Columbine as it lay at anchor 
between Campobello and ~ a s t ~ 0 1 - t . ~ ~  The date itself was significant for the mutiny was 
lead by an American sailor, but the location may have been a bigger factor; if the sailors 
could cross the border, they would be fiee men. Over the course of twenty-four hours 
many of the crew attempted to jump ship. Some stole ship's boats, others simply jumped 
in the water and swam away. Some drowned, others escaped, and yet others were shot by 
loyal crewmembers. The captain himself shot the ringleader, and placed more than 
twenty men in irons under guard. However, he had by this time lost so many men that he 
could not move his vessel, and had to send for assistance from British army units 
stationed in Saint ~ o h n . ~ ~  
The captain knew that many of the deserters had taken refuge in Eastport under 
American jurisdiction. He asked Eastport's magistrates to return the men; the selectmen 
replied the deserters had already departed, and could not be returned unless the 
Columbine were in American waters.75 Hills attempted to impress sixteen men from 
nearby shipping to supplement his depleted crew. Four of the impressed men persuaded 
seven of the Columbine's crew to desert with them to the American shore.76 The captain 
soon learned that the deserters remained at Eastport, and discovered a few were hiding on 
Campobello in British territory, but magistrates on both sides of the border refused to 
give up the sailors.77 Eventually Columbine left, and the men presumably went free. But 
why did locals shelter these deserters? 
Taking in Royal Navy deserters was one way to strike back against state 
authority. Borderland residents resisted the centralizing tendencies of the state, and in the 
age of sail warships were an icon of state power. Passamaquoddy residents may also 
have realized what the fate of the sailors would have been had they returned to their ship. 
The Royal Navy brutally flogged several of Columbine's mutineers with 300 to 500 
lashes, ordered others transported to Australia, and hanged six men. Authorities hung six 
of the mutineers' corpses at the mouth of Halifax harbor, a public warning that the 
authority of the Royal Navy was not to be taken lightly.78 
But the attitudes of borderland residents toward the Royal Navy were not always 
hostile. When it served their purposes, locals might be happy to have British naval units 
nearby. During the War of 1812, American citizens often welcomed the Royal Navy 
because the presence of a British warship anchored on the boundary discouraged 
American officials from pursuing smugglers too closely. After the British occupation of 
Eastport in 18 14, the Royal Navy found itself actually promoting American smuggling. 
The British garrison desperately needed provisions, and so Royal Navy officers such as 
Thomas Masterman Hardy wrote permits that allowed American smugglers to pass 
unmolested by British naval units.79 The commanders of some Royal Navy vessels, such 
as HMS Boxer, also profited by escorting American smugglers along the Maine coast, 
protecting them from American officials and privateers.80 
Passamaquoddy residents remained ambivalent at best when considering the 
presence of naval vessels in Passamaquoddy Bay. For example, when the War of 18 12 
broke out, colonial subjects clearly appreciated the protection of the navy. After the war 
however, they often resisted British warships that attempted to enforce the Navigation 
~ c t s . ~ '  Smugglers, both British and American, continued to undermine the authority of 
both British and American naval officers when they rescued seized vessels, attempted to 
avoid seizure through flight, or argued with naval officers face-to-face. 
Army Units 
Attitudes towards army units were equally mixed in the borderland. 
Land-based army units came to Passamaquoddy for the same reasons naval units did: to 
defend national sovereignty and suppress smuggling. Just like their naval counterparts, 
military units represented external authority attempting to police a sometimes unruly 
populace.82 For example, British military units were called in to quell election riots in 
Saint John in 1 7 8 5 . ~ ~  However, whereas naval units were constantly on the move, army 
units stationed in fortifications had to confront civilians on a daily basis. Army units thus 
faced even more pressure from borderland communities to conform to local expectations. 
Fort Sullivan in Eastport best illustrates the problems army officers, both British 
and American, had with the borderlands community. The American government built 
and garrisoned Fort Sullivan in 1 8 0 8 . ~ ~  In 1814 a British force captured the post and held 
it until 18 18, when international arbitration determined that Moose Island lay within 
American jurisdiction. After 181 8 American forces again occupied it. No matter 
whether British or American, military garrisons were unpopular with locals, who 
correctly perceived that the primary role of these forces was to police their behavior. For 
example, during the War of 18 12 the American government manned Fort Sullivan not 
because of its strategic importance, but to stop smuggling8' 
Captain Moses Swett commanded the first garrison at Fort ~ u l l i v a n . ~ ~  The 
American federal government ordered Swett's unit to Passamaquoddy to enforce 
Jefferson's embargo. Swett initially reported that Eastport was in a virtual state of 
rebellion, a view echoed by the local customs collector and naval officers. Swett's 
sentries fiequently challenged, and occasionally shot at embargo violators. In turn, the 
locals undermined Swett's authority by encouraging his men to desert; within a few 
weeks of arrival almost a quarter of Swett's men, encouraged by cash bribes and liquor, 
absconded across the border.87 Yet by the time he departed in 18 10, Swett had become 
so popular that local worthies asked him to stay. 88 HOW can this change in popularity be 
accounted for? 
Swett was able to persuade locals that his intentions were not hostile. The federal 
government's repeal of the embargo acts early in 1809 did a great deal to soothe local 
qualms. But Swett also proved able to understand borderland issues. The best example 
of this is Swett's attempts to recover deserters from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 
He held British deserters, and then exchanged them for his own American deserters.89 
Swett also made himself useful, offering to incarcerate some men charged with piracy in 
Fort Sullivan's blockhouse until local officials could transfer these dangerous criminals 
to another facility.90 Swett also celebrated the end of commercial restrictions with Britain 
in 1809 by firing the fort's cannon and participating in a dinner with guests from both 
sides of the border, thereby establishing a sympathetic bond between the garrison 
commander and the borderland populace.9' 
Other American commanders did not fare so well. Locals and adventurers 
threatened to tar and feather Colonel George Ulmer in 181 3, for example.92 It was 
Ulmer's very great misfortune to have orders to eliminate illicit trade with the British 
provinces during the War of 1 8 1 2 . ~ ~  Ulmer faced all manner of opposition such as 
personal threats, encouraging his troops to desert, and supplying the garrison with poor 
provisions. Eventually Eastport suffered from escalating violence between the garrison 
and borderland populace, including rioting and assaults against his soldiers. At issue was 
Ulmer's draconian methods in attempting to stop smuggling. Locals succeeded in having 
Ulmer removed from command in August 18 13, less than nine months after he arrived in 
Eastport. The subsequent commander winked at smuggling; his successor did not. After 
firing on a smuggling vessel with the fort's cannon, the local community ostracized him 
and his officers, cutting them off from society and other comforts of Eastport. For its last 
few weeks in Eastport, the garrison was under a virtual siege. It lifted only when a 
British fleet anchored off the port and demanded the fort's surrender, which the American 
commander did without firing a shot." 
The British garrison was considerably larger than its American counterpart, but 
nonetheless it faced problems controlling smuggling. The British commander usually 
ignored smuggling, an approach that made it considerably easier to govern the populace 
and provided the garrison with smuggled American provisions. By 18 17 it became 
evident that Eastport's population was introducing large quantities of American 
contraband not only onto the island, but into New Brunswick proper as New 
Brunswick's lieutenant governor, George Smyth, a military man himself, complained that 
"it is notorious that in the present state of that Island, under colow of providing supplies 
for its Inhabitants, it is made a Depot for the reception of American manufactures and 
merchandize of every description."96 
British military officers attitudes towards smugglers is illustrated by an incident in 
which Saint John's customs collector came to Moose Island to search for contraband 
from ~ u b e c . ~ '  On arrival he immediately informed the commander of the garrison why 
he was there and asked his permission to search for the smuggled goods, which was 
granted. The collector and his men searched the store of Leonard Pierce, and seized two 
chests and two boxes of tea, a bag of cotton wool, a quantity of saddlery, and several 
casks of cut nails. In another store belonging to a merchant named Child he seized a cask 
of French red wine. Both Pierce and Child freely admitted these goods came from 
Lubec. Wright put the contraband goods in a military warehouse that was always 
guarded by a sentry, and continued his search. But when Wright attempted to enter other 
stores in Eastport, he found their "doors & windows industriously & effectively closed, 
thus rendering the farther peaceable prosecution of my duty impracticable." Wright 
asked the garrison commander for a writ of assistance or search warrant, but the officer 
refused, thereby stopping the search for smuggled goods. Much to the disgust of the 
collector, Leonard Pierce later broke into the military warehouse "in defiance of the 
sentry," and rescued his goods.98 
The military and naval officers operating at Passamaquoddy experienced the same 
challenges that customs officers did. Customs officers and military officers were both 
bureaucrats, in that they were state servants promoted by merit based on the technical 
knowledge.99 Like the creole customs officers, army and navy officers faced continual 
pressure to conform to community standards. But the military, especially the navies but 
to a lesser degree the armies in both Britain and the United States, were becoming more 
professional by 1808. loo This included eliminating aristocratic prerequisites for entry and 
requiring a basic level of technical training and competence. Professional officers, 
imbued with the idea of service to the nation state, found it nearly impossible to conform 
to regional ideals. The exception was the British army, which continued to adhere to the 
older aristocratic model.lol The British officers on Moose Island pursued a leisurely 
lifestyle, racing horses, walking about town with their hunting dogs, and eating off silver 
plate.102 New Brunswick's smuggling problems were not theirs to solve; there was no 
honor and a great deal of trouble to be had in strictly enforcing commercial regulations. 
The result was that the American residents of Moose Island found the British garrison a 
tolerable presence; when the British relinquished control of Eastport in 181 8, the leading 
citizens sent the last garrison commander a letter thanking him and his predecessors for 
their good conduct.lo3 
The impulse to professionalize bureaucracies was largely a result of the 
development of capitalism, which needed sophisticated, stable and efficient institutions to 
develop.lo4 In this way the same forces that brought adventurers to Passamaquoddy 
brought military and naval officers as well. On the one side of the border however, 
American ideology tended to extol the virtues of commerce, and regarded a professional 
military with deep distrust, a conflicting desire that added tensions to the already 
fractious transition to a market economy.'05 Smuggling adventurers and the professional 
military officers who attempted to stop them both represented different forces within 
capitalism. In many ways they were similar, ambitious men seeking prestige and social 
recognition, constantly on the move advancing their goals. Capt. Swett, a young 
professional military officer, recognized those similarities with his opponents and used 
them to advantage. Col. Ulmer, an aging veteran of the American Revolution, failed 
merchant and occasional politician, did not understand the new direction American 
society was taking. Stuck in a revolutionary dichotomy of patriots and traitors, Ulmer 
could not identify with the people of the borderland, nor could they sympathize with him. 
The Transition to Capitalism 
Explaining the impact of capitalism on Passamaquoddy poses a challenge. The 
adventurers and enforcers who represented the onset of capitalism were both a blessing 
and a curse. The adventurers brought the promise of wealth and development, yet they 
also brought disruption and potential violence to the region. Law enforcers, too, were 
viewed with mixed feelings. Whlle they brought the promise of order to Passamaquoddy, 
they also could destabilize the fragile borderland agreements that benefited people on 
both sides of the border; fkrthermore, these agents of state authority brought with them a 
threat of violence far greater than that posed by the adventurers. How are we to 
understand the conflicting desires of Passamaquoddy's borderland society? 
Scholars in a variety of fields have noted that the onset of capitalism could be 
tremendously disruptive to rural communities, and this seems to hold true for 
Passamaquoddy. In many ways the adventurers represent the disruptive elements of 
capitalism. Unconnected with the community, pursuing wealth with little regard for the 
consequences to others, and roving the Atlantic world, these adventurers were at the 
forefront of those building a society where the unconstrained pursuit of profit was seen as 
a positive good. Note that Colles became a wealthy merchant and banker; Richard 
Hasluck was an agent to the burgeoning industrial might of Birmingham, England; 
Constantino Llufrio roamed over Latin America, Europe, and North America in his quest 
for profit. Only John McMaster completely failed, suffering bankruptcy, imprisonment, 
and an ignoble death. Smuggling clearly beckoned as a means of rapidly attaining 
individual wealth, as opposed to supporting communal ideals of self-help. 
Why risk the fate of McMaster? Personal greed is part of the answer, but that 
greed was part of a cultural construction that increasingly emphasized the importance of 
wealth. Western society was becoming increasingly market-based and capitalistic, 
freeing property from community-based constraints and separating producers from the 
means of production through a division of labor. Passamaquoddy's merchants and 
mariners eagerly participated in the commercial system of the day and advocated trade 
unrestrained by state rules when it suited their needs; conversely they also sought state 
protection when market conditions were less favorable. Merchants wanted to accumulate 
wealth, create new markets, and pursue the development of their own ports. While their 
resources, capital, and credit were limited compared to those of merchants in bigger 
communities, there is no evidence that they shrank from either competing or cooperating 
with bigger mercantile interests. When abroad, the region's merchants and mariners 
participated in risky ventures in distant parts and acted the part of the outsider, just as 
adventurers came to Passamaquoddy when the conditions were right to conduct a 
profitable trade. Similarly, Passamaquoddy residents acted in other places like 
adventurers did in their own region, conducting smuggling operations in Chesapeake Bay 
or even committing piracy off Demerara.Io6 Conducting maritime trade was a rough 
business. Passamaquoddy's mercantile community had no interest in becoming victims 
of changes in the world economy, and should be considered as full participants in the 
process. Their transatlantic connections and their full participation in the commercial 
transactions of the Atlantic world demanded that they accept outsiders, even adventurers 
as dangerous as John McMaster or as exotic as Constantino Llufrio, just as they hoped to 
be accepted in foreign markets. 
The ability of Passamaquoddy's mercantile community to adapt to different 
situations was critical because the English-speaking world experienced a profound 
economic change in the period from 1783 to 1820. Capitalism, defined by Joyce 
Appleby as "a system that depends upon private property and the relatively free use of it 
in economic endeavors," was changing society.lo7 The leadership of Britain and the 
United States was increasingly adopting the economic liberalism of Adam Smith, freeing 
markets from old paternalistic regulations that confined the activities of merchants and 
manufacturers. This transition was regarded with some trepidation by the colonial 
leadership in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick who relied on imperial protections for 
their markets.lo8 In the United States there was also concern about this economic 
transition, with political leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson actively 
seeking to curb commercialism, especially as represented by banks.lo9 
The American transition to capitalism was fractious and inconsistent, yet the 
pursuit of wealth as a staple of American identity continued to grow. This unrelenting 
pursuit of gain was best personified in the itinerant Yankee peddlers who revolutionized 
the retail trade."' The aggressive and clever Yankee peddler was a familiar icon in the 
Maritimes as well. For example, Thomas Chandler Haliburton's fictional peddler, "Sam 
Slick," represented many of the American virtues Nova Scotians should have 
emulated."' In New Brunswick, Yankee peddlers were also associated with 
smugglers.1 l 2  
Historians have identified the American Revolution as the crucial event in the rise 
of capitalism; the worship of work was central to the American contribution to 
capitalism. Early economic commentators such as William Manning (1 747- 18 14) saw a 
huge social struggle between those who labored and those who did not work; in the latter 
group he placed great merchants, professionals, and judicial officers of government.'13 
Manning's ideals are especially important when compared with the Loyalist ideals of 
New Brunswick's leadership, which was composed of merchants, lawyers, and judges. 
Trade was regarded with some disdain by New Brunswick's founders, as is illustrated by 
the removal of the provincial capital from commercial Saint John to more agrarian 
~redericton. "4
This is not to say that New Brunswick and Nova Scotian society was adverse to 
gain, profit, or the market economy, but even the most doctrinaire of Loyalists noted the 
American propensity for business. For example, George Leonard railed against the 
prosperity of the American settlements at Passamaquoddy. ' l 5  Yet many Loyalists 
preferred the strictures of the paternalist mercantile economy that reinforced traditional 
social relations to the capitalist economy that eroded concepts of deference and privilege 
even as they deplored their miserable economic condition. Similarly, Loyalists looked to 
the government for bounties and protectionist policies such as the Navigation Acts, and 
looked to Britain as the source of dry goods such as textiles, tin ware, and  porcelain^."^ 
Sometimes adherence to these policies brought a degree of wealth to the fortunate; New 
Brunswick's timber trade flourished under imperial protection after 1807, and Nova 
Scotia benefited from military spending during the War of 18 12, but very little of that 
wealth remained in the Maritime ~rovinces.'" 
The historiography of economic development in the Maritime Provinces and 
much of the rest of Canada is dominated by the staples theory of Harold 1nnis.'18 Much 
of it is backward looking, defeatist, or depicts the region's populace as passive victims of 
external economic forces. A popular myth of prosperity during an age of wind, wood and 
water has prevailed until recent scholarship revealed that Nova Scotia and the Maritimes 
in general never did enjoy a golden era of prosperity.''9 Marxist-influenced scholars 
have attempted to establish the Maritimes as an "underdeveloped" economy that suffered 
from the propensity of the larger United States economy to strip away badly needed 
capital from Atlantic canada.120 Unlike American historiographical trends, there is no 
Canadian parallel to the American "transition to capitalism" debate sparked by James 
Henretta, with the possible exception of ~ u e b e c . ' ~ ~  
An exploration of Atlantic Canada's transition to capitalism quickly reveals that 
loyalist ideals clashed with the economic realities of living in newly settled colonies with 
long winters and short growing seasons. Americans frequently derided Nova Scotia as 
"Nova Scarcity," and seldom deigned to notice New Brunswick at all. Few Britons paid 
much attention to the colonies around the Bay of Fundy either, with the exception of Lord 
Sheffield, the last great champion of mer~antilism.'~~ Sheffield's economic policies 
matched the backward-looking ideals of the loyalist elite, who sought to profit from the 
West Indies trade under the protectionist policies provided by the Navigation Acts. New 
Brunswick held him in so high esteem that the Assembly - at the instigation of George 
Leonard, who may have admired Sheffield's strong anti-smuggling stance - hung 
Sheffield's full-length portrait over the Speaker's chair.'23 But Britain was already 
moving away from mercantilism and adopting the economic liberalism of Adam Smith. 
Smith's principles were not unknown in British North America; in fact one of his 
servants emigrated from Scotland to the Miramichi in New ~ r u n s w i c k . ' ~ ~  Scottish 
emigrants to the colonies such as John Young, a famous Nova Scotian economic reformer 
and smuggler, in 18 14 ordered his son to read Smith's Wealth of Nations as preparation 
for a life in trade.'25 Yet Smith's free trade principles were anathema to most commercial 
interests in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. In part this was because the United States 
federal government adopted Smith's principles so whole-heartedly, but mostly because 
economic liberalism threatened to strip away the privileged trade status of British 
colonies, a factor on which Saint John and Halifax merchants relied for their 
prosperity. 126 Merchants, in common with other settlers in the region, had to make 
difficult choices when faced with the economic changes brought on by capitalism. 
Conclusion 
The adventurers and enforcers who came to Passamaquoddy to engage in 
smuggling during times of diplomatic and commercial crisis between Britain and the 
United States provide a sample of how the transition to market economies created strife 
and conhsion in the borderlands community. Adventurers found a welcome at 
Passamaquoddy, whereas agents of state authority were often regarded with hostility. 
The economic and social stresses broke down existing social and political 
obligations, W h e r  weakening the borderland's tepid identification with the parent state. 
The strongest manifestation of this phenomenon was the rampant smuggling that 
occurred even during wartime at Passamaquoddy. Adventurers not only perceived 
Passamaquoddy as a geographic area appropriate for smuggling, but also realized that the 
local population was disposed to assist them in their endeavors. Governments had to 
react to smuggling by posting military units at Passamaquoddy to defend their 
sovereignty. This external realization by both law breakers and law enforcers that state 
authority and loyalty was weak at the periphery was a crucial element in the formation of 
a borderlands identity. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
THE FLOUR WAR 
Introduction 
The trial of the New Brunswick sloop Industry in the United States federal court 
system reveals some of the difficulties American officials at Passamaquoddy had in 
enforcing commercial laws when opposed by determined smugglers.' David Way, 
captain of the 47-ton Industry, left Eastport on March 18, 1808, with the stated intention 
of sailing for Halifax. But instead of proceeding to Halifax, Way hovered just outside of 
United States jurisdiction, receiving American produce on board from small boats, in 
direct contravention of federal law. Way conducted his business in plain sight; American 
customs officials watched while smugglers loaded the Industry with contraband, such as 
Virginia superfine flour. Finally, on March 28, Way wandered into American 
jurisdiction, and Collector Delesdernier seized the vessel in the name of the United 
States. However, federal law made no provision for arresting or otherwise detaining 
people involved in breaking the embargo. Only the vessel and cargo were detained, 
leaving Way fiee to act as he pleased. Something about Way's actions must have alerted 
the collector. Fearful that Way might attempt to rescue the vessel, the collector arranged 
to have the vessel sent to another port for safekeeping.2 
The trial of the Industry and its contraband cargo illustrates the tensions involved 
when people in a small community turn on themselves. Witnesses and depositions 
revealed something similar to a small war being fought between customs officials and 
smugglers. In fact local historians have ternled it the "Flour War," after the most popular 
~ontraband.~ A question put to customs inspector John Swett by the United States district 
attorney is especially telling: "Have you found difficulty in preventing the running of 
goods across to the British line-in executing the Embargo laws?" Swett responded, 
"Yes: a great deal-we have been fired at-people have come over from the other side.'* 
Collector Delesdernier, usually tolerant, even supportive of borderland smuggling, 
suddenly found himself in the very awkward position of attempting to stop all 
commercial intercourse with New Brunswick. 
United States v. the Sloop Industry was a struggle in which the defense attorney 
pitted his evidence against that of Maine's U.S. district attorney. Witnesses disagreed on 
events; some probably tried to distort the facts. Perhaps the defense's attorney, Jonathan 
D. Weston, a man well known for his sympathy with smugglers, prompted them to do so. 
John Kendall, the owner of the warehouse the flour was stored, swore he saw no boats 
from the American shore approach the ~ndustry .~  Yet a witness for the prosecution swore 
he had personally assisted in the smuggling. The defense countered by questioning that 
witness's ~ r e d i b i l i t ~ . ~  
A closer look at the sources reveals more troubling facts, however. The Industry 
not only contained American contraband, but items forbidden by British commercial 
regulations from entering New Brunswick as well. For instance, the American customs 
officers found trunks of tea on board the ~ndustry.' Tea could not be legally exported 
during the embargo; nor could tea fiom the United States be legally imported into New 
Brunswick because all tea consumed in British North America was supposed to have 
been brought from Britain, where the East India Company held a legal monopoly on all 
tea sales.' The Industry's owner, Stephen Humbert of Saint John, New Brunswick, 
knowingly violated the laws of both the United States and the British ~ m ~ i r e . ~  
Local residents had grown increasingly used to engaging in illicit trade at 
Passamaquoddy, and local customs officers had largely tolerated, and even encouraged 
illicit trade. Accustomed to official sanction, American and colonial smugglers used the 
border to their own advantage. True to Smith's model, when government attempted to 
stop their accustomed trade, smugglers proved willing to use violent methods to defend 
their illicit trade.'' 
However, American borderland residents were not united in their opposition to 
the embargo. Some, such as Delesdernier and his supporters, attempted to enforce the 
embargo. Others played both sides, taking every opportunity presented during the 
embargo to make money. Examples of these include the smuggler who turned inforn~ant 
against the Industry, and even some of Delesdernier's customhouse employees, who 
aided and abetted embargo violators. The embargo thus divided Passamaquoddy society, 
creating tensions between neighbors. Adventurers fiom as far away as Britain and New 
York con~pounded these tensions when they incited further resistance by taking 
advantage of borderland opportunism and smuggling expertise. Adventurers opposed the 
embargo wholeheartedly, and did everything in their power to undermine the American 
government's measures to enforce it. On the New Brunswick side of the border, the 
reaction was less con~plex, yet equally opportunistic. For Maritimers, breaking 
Jefferson's embargo was a profitable patriotic chore that promised to bring a new degree 
of wealth to New Brunswick and Nova ~cotia." The borderland community was already 
ambivalent about government before Jefferson's embargo. The crisis brought about by 
the American government's total cession of trade sparked resentment against commercial 
restrictions; adventurers and colonial merchants fanned that resentment into open 
resistance. 
The American government's ability to police the region was already weak, as 
evidenced by Delesdemier's collaboration with smugglers. When faced with the 
opposition of both settlers and adventurers, federal civil authority in the region collapsed, 
and the military had to be called in. Ultimately the contest between smugglers and the 
state led to the downfall of Collector Lewis F. Delesdemier who failed to reconcile 
differences between his community and his nation. 
Jefferson's Embargo 
Jefferson's embargo was the result of increasing diplomatic tensions between the 
United States and Great ~ r i t a i n . ' ~  Aggressive American commercial policies were at 
odds with Britain's naval strategy during the war against Napoleon. The issue of 
impressment, whereby British naval vessels removed seamen fiom American ships was 
an especially sensitive one.I3 The issue came to a head when Rear Admiral Berkeley - 
the same officer who had sent the Porgey into Passamaquoddy Bay in 1807 - gave orders 
for the recovery of British naval deserters to the commander of HMS Leopard. The 
captain of the Leopard aggressively followed his orders, to the point where he attempted 
to stop the American frigate Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia. When Chesapeake 
refbsed to con~ply, Shannon fired into the unprepared American warship, quickly 
overwhelmed it, and removed the suspected deserters.14 
The Chesapeake incident sparked a vociferous anti-British movement in the 
United States. Many people called for war; Congress began a program of expanding the 
military and building coastal fortifications; and the British envoy departed Washington. 
President Thomas Jefferson could have asked Congress for a declaration of war and 
undoubtedly would have received it. Yet he did not. Under the influence of Secretary of 
State James Madison, Jefferson chose a different route. Late in 1807, Jefferson asked 
Congress for a complete embargo on overseas shipping. American vessels were 
forbidden to depart for foreign markets, and foreign vessels could not bring American 
cargos away from the United states." 
Jefferson's embargo was gambled on Britain's need for American agricultural 
produce, especially flour. British North America, the West Indies, including a whole host 
of colonies recently captured from Napoleon and his allies, and even British armies 
operating on the Iberian Peninsula relied on American provisions produced in the Mid- 
Atlantic states and Upper ~011th.'~ Jefferson and Madison hoped that this embargo would 
force Britain to negotiate with the United States without having to resort to war." 
Congress complied with Jefferson's wishes, and on December 22 passed the Embargo 
Act, which was followed by supplementary embargo legislation and various enforcement 
acts that gave federal officials a wide range of powers. 
Jefferson's embargo was a complete failure. It created an American economic 
crisis and political problems that affected all sectors of society. Seaports suffered huge 
unemployment and a near cessation of all economic activity. Farmers lost the lucrative 
overseas markets for their produce, which declined drastically in price; land speculators 
could not afford to sell land on credit to frontiersmen; sailors found themselves 
unemployed. Intricate credit network collapsed throughout the nation. Resistance to the 
embargo sprang up across the country, especially in the form of exporting American 
goods illegally to British colonies. This happened in every American port and along the 
borders with British North America and Spanish Florida. With more resistance to the 
embargo came more federal efforts to enforce it, including increasingly draconian laws. 
President Jefferson and Congress authorized the use of the militia, regular military, and 
naval units to enforce civil laws. At least one scholar has attributed the collapse of the 
embargo in part to the borderland interests that combined to defeat it.'* 
The embargo also failed because it did not produce the desired effect on British 
colonies. Between American smugglers and alternate sources of provisions, the embargo 
proved but a small hindrance to British colonies, and for some it proved an economic 
boon, such as New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. American shipping had forced colonial 
vessels out of the lucrative West Indies trade.19 But with the United States merchant 
marine locked in port, Maritimes merchants suddenly had no competition. American 
sailors flocked to New Brunswick to work onboard British shipping. Eager to promote 
colonial trade at the expense of the Americans, colonial administrators opened trade with 
the United States. In New Brunswick, the acting administrator and the council agreed to 
legalize American imports of provisions and naval stores, as did their counterparts in 
Nova ~co t i a .~ '  A royal decree later sanctioned actions that encouraged both British and 
American merchants to violate the embargo.21 For instance, they permitted American 
ships to arrive in colonial ports even if they did not have the appropriate paperwork. 
Soon a number of American ships did just that, having escaped from American 
a~thor i t i es .~~  
Passamaquoddy was one of the regions most affected by the embargo, which 
reinforced the region's reputation as a smuggling   enter.^' Passamaquoddy ranked 
second to none in terms of the federal government's effort and failure to enforce the 
embargo; the smugglers' scale, persistence and success in evading the law; and in the 
stresses that fractured the community. In part these stresses emerged because New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia officials undermined the embargo by encouraging Americans 
to illicitly export goods through Passamaquoddy. 
The Colonial and British Response to the Embargo 
The extent to which the British undermined the embargo has seldom received any 
attention from American scholars, who tend to concern themselves with the federal 
enforcement effort when considering the embargo's failure. A royal directive dated April 
11, 1808, ordered British naval vessels to not interrupt neutral vessels loaded with 
provisions, timber and other enumerated goods that were sailing to British colonies in the 
West Indies or South America, "notwithstanding such vessels may not have regular 
clearances and documents on board."24 This order was clearly designed to encourage 
Americans, the primary providers of provisions and timber to the West Indies, to break 
the embargo. A further incentive was added, pernlitting those same neutral vessels to 
take cargoes away from those same colonies.25 An extract of a letter published in 
American newspapers gives some clues as to colonial and British attitudes toward the 
embargo. Dated Halifax, May 25, 1808, and addressed to an unknown American, the 
letter concluded, "Your Embargo may ruin your own merchants, and many others; but if 
it is continued, will make the fortunes of the traders in this province." Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick merchants saw the embargo as a great opportunity to revive their 
flagging trade, especially with the West in die^.^^ 
At Passarnaquoddy local loyalist merchants such as Robert Pagan and James 
McMaster acted to undermine the embargo.27 They eagerly participated in the 
contraband provision trade, and cooperated with adventurers and local American 
merchants to bring tens of thousands of barrels of flour, provisions, and naval stores 
across the border. During the embargo, these merchants bought flour and other 
commodities at low prices fiom a glutted American market, and sold them at high prices 
in the West Indies. Flour worth $6.50 at Eastport fetched $12.50 on Indian Island, New 
Brunswick, and up to $40.00 per barrel in West Indian markets such as St. Thomas. 
Smith's "invisible hand" of the market created a wide divergence in prices that created 
more incentive to smuggle.28 
New Brunswick officials eagerly worked to subvert the embargo because they 
correctly perceived that it would benefit the province's trade. The colony's agent in 
London wrote as early as May, 1808, that "The American Embargo must be highly 
advantageous to New Brunswick in many respects-A great Emmigration of shipwrights, 
sailors, and fishermen must take place, as well as of other settlers." He continued, "I 
applaud Jefferson very much as an Englishman, and especially as a New Brunswick agent 
and planter for the measure of the Embargo." In 18 10 the provincial secretary expressed 
his opinion that "The late American embargo has given a spring to the commerce, and 
thereby extended the improvements to an incredible degree. The banks of the St. Croix 
(formerly Scoudiac) which in 1796, were on both sides deserts, now exhibit uncommon 
scenes of enterprize-industry & activity, the American settlements being directly 
opposite to ours causes a spirit of emulation which is highly beneficial to both." He 
concluded his thoughts on the embargo: "Their [the Americans] trade-their wealth and 
their comfort-have all been sacrificed on the altars of envy & spite.-Such are the 
effects of their imbecile measures that hundreds of their industrious inhabitants 
merchants mechanics & others are now soliciting admission into this province."29 
New Brunswick officials worked to undermine the embargo. They created a 
scheme whereby "the port of St. Andrews, Indian and Marvel1 Island and other places in 
Passarnaquoddy Bay might be pointed out as places of deposit, where such craft having 
nothing but enumerated articles on board would find an asylum and the proprietor be at 
liberty to sell to whom they pleased or reship them in British bottoms to a British 
market-by this means His Majesty's ships would be supplied with tar; pitch, turpentine 
& rosen." The Royal Navy would not be the only beneficiary of this plan. Other parts of 
British North America and the West Indies would receive American tobacco, provisions, 
and other articles, all transported on New Brunswick vessels once smugglers brought the 
contraband across the border. The British customs inspector on Indian Island was 
especially blithe in considering the mountains of provisions that appeared at night on the 
small island. According to local tradition, as he strode along he would playfully tell the 
smugglers: "Just clear away a path for me to walk through, so that I will not break my 
legs, and that will do!"30 
The embargo and subsequent commercial restrictions benefited New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia because their laws only permitted the export of these comn~odities in 
British-flagged vessels. New Brunswick, already experiencing an economic revival by 
1807 due to increased British demand for timber, witnessed a revival of its moribund 
West Indies trade.31 St. Andrews, New Brunswick, was already enjoying an economic 
revival due to the resurgent New Brunswick timber trade; between March 1 and August 
1, 1808 twenty-two brigs, fifteen ships, and numerous schooners and sloops entered the 
port.32 The embargo compounded the port's prosperity by providing a steady source of 
cheap American labor to work in the forests and on the ships involved in the timber trade. 
Collector Delesdernier and the Embargo 
Uncovering Delesdemier's activities during the embargo is a difficult task. Very 
little of his correspondence survives, although it is often alluded to in correspondence 
between Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and President Thomas Jefferson. 
Clearly Delesdemier faithfully attempted to enforce the embargo, an act that must surely 
have distressed a man who had so actively promoted the region's shipping interests. It is 
just as clear, however, that Delesdernier ultimately failed in his effort to enforce the 
embargo when his subordinates betrayed him. Understanding Delesdemier's actions 
offers a glimpse into the conflicting desires of borderland residents to obey the law while 
pursuing their own economic interests. 
By February 1808, the Treasury Department indicated its concern that it would be 
difficult to enforce the embargo at Passamaquoddy. Gallatin wrote to his old friend 
Delesdemier and asked him to watch both warehouses and boats suspected of attempting 
illegal exportation. He also authorized hiring more customs inspectors and two or three 
boats to be armed with swivel guns and muskets. In addition, Gallatin ordered the 
revenue cutter New Hampshire to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  In March, Gallatin warned 
Delesdernier that many embargo violators from Boston and New York were headed to 
Passamaquoddy with vast quantities of flour and other American goods intended to be 
smuggled into New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and to markets as far away as Jamaica and 
Demerara. These reports came from customs collectors in northeastern ports. For 
example, the Boston customhouse warned that: "vessels are daily loading here for 
Eastport with Flour, Beef Pork & c . " ~ ~  In early April, the captain of the revenue cutter 
reported that Delesdemier's "vigilance has defeated attempts to evade the Embargo 
Laws," but that officer's assessment appears to have been o v e r ~ ~ t i m i s t i c . ~ ~  Newspaper 
accounts indicated that Passamaquoddy suffered extensive smuggling, both in American 
and British vessels.36 One summed up the situation at the end of March: 
Within these few days, the collector, who is extremely 
vigilant, has received additional instructions from 
Washington, in consequence of which he has appointed a 
large number of inspectors to watch every place where 
property is stored, and has engaged several boats in his 
service which were intended for transport business. 
Several seizures have been made-one the last night, a 
sloop with flour. Boats are employed rowing round the 
island every night that weather will permit, so that no 
property can be passed over without manifest danger.37 
The federal government responded to this threat by forbidding any vessel to clear 
for Passamaquoddy without presidential pennission. Realizing that Passamaquoddy and 
other customs districts near the border with British North America already had a huge 
amount of American provisions and naval stores, Congress passed an act in mid-April 
that authorized customs collectors to take these goods under federal custody. On passage 
of this act, Gallatin immediately ordered Delesdernier to take all flour, provisions, lumber 
and other American goods into his custody, and if necessary to remove them to a safe 
place where they could be guarded "both for the protection of the articles & to prevent 
their being carried away [to be smuggled across the border]." The secretary of the 
treasury ordered Delesdernier to seize any goods not voluntarily placed under his control; 
he was to hire inspectors, boatmen, and other revenue officers "with out regarding the 
expense." Any person who wanted to remove their property from federal control had to 
pay a bond worth twice the value of the goods as a security that the goods would not be 
exported illegally.38 
The federal government further reinforced Delesdernier with military and naval 
units. At the end of April, the secretary of war wrote to Delesdernier that he was sending 
troops to Passamaquoddy to assist him.39 This must have been welcome news indeed for 
the collector, who was under increased pressure from adventurers. Newspapers reported 
a letter from Delesdernier wherein he complained that "there were upwards of a hundred 
vessels at that place, and he found it impossible to execute the laws. The mob had 
threatened to burn his house, and unless a force was immediately sent there, he was 
apprehensive that he should be obliged to quit his station.'40 
Passamaquoddy became an armed camp during the embargo. In June, an artillery 
unit commanded by Captain Moses Swett arrived to support Collector Delesdernier in his 
efforts. They occupied the blockhouse of Fort Sullivan as soon as it was completed.4' 
The American government also stationed two gunboats at Passamaquoddy, No. 42 and 
No. 43. Occasionally larger vessels such as USS Wasp and even USS Chesapeake - the 
same frigate attacked by HMS Leopard in 1807 -joined them. Just across the harbor, 
British war vessels such as HMS Squirrel anchored directly on the boundary line to keep 
an eye on the American military presence and to protect British sovereignty from 
American aggression.42 Armed American revenue cutters patrolled Passamaquoddy as 
well. 
Despite these efforts by the federal government, flour and other American 
products continued to be shipped to Passamaquoddy. Customs officials reported that as 
many as 19,000 barrels of flour entered Passamaquoddy in one week alone in May. 
Newspaper articles supported this figure. One reported in May that "there were entered 
at the custom house in Passamaquoddy, from the 2d to the 7" May, from different ports 
of the U.S. 19,000 bls. flour, 2,700 do. pork and beef, 1,700 do. bread, 3,059 do. naval 
stores, 4,500 bushels corn, besides great amounts of butter, lard, E ~ c . ' ~ ~  When these 
goods arrived at Passamaquoddy, Delesdernier promptly impounded them, and took all 
the keys to the warehouses in his district into his personal custody. Even the owners of 
the warehouses could not enter their buildings unaccompanied by a customs officer.44 
But these measures were not sufficient to stop embargo violators, a fact that came 
to the attention of President Jefferson. He wrote to Gallatin, "I hope you will spare no 
pains or expence to bring the rascals of Passamaquoddy to justice," and asked him to 
cooperate with the secretaries of the navy and army to bring the border under control. By 
the end of May, the USS Wasp arrived with half an artillery company to assist 
Delesdemier. Sentries stood guard at the door of every warehouse, and customs guards 
looked over piles of flour barrels on the beaches. The Wasp, the New Hampshire, and 
other vessels patrolled the harbor. Workmen erected the battery of Fort Sullivan on a 
bluff overlooking a town and harbor thronged with smugglers. The calls and challenges 
of sentries broke the night silence. Gunfire occasionally broke out, but, despite this 
display of force, flour and other contraband continued to flood across the boundary into 
New ~runswick.~ '  Newspapers began to question Jefferson's use of military force 
against civilians. One such article, printed in Virginia, clearly described the situation in 
Passarnaquoddy : 
Come with me, sir, to yonder eminence that overlooks the 
union-- cast your eyes eastward- do you see that vessel-- 
that battery-- those armed men-- it is the Wasp sloop of 
war-- she is stationed there in conjunction with the soldiers- 
- for what? To attack our enemies? No such thing. All the 
energies of Mr. Jefferson are exhausted against our citizens. 
These warlike preparations are intended to prevent our 
merchants from selling their produce to those who would 
purchase.46 
Despite this display of force, smuggling continued. By early June Delesdernier 
complained of the "nefarious schemes of miscreant Individuals having no motive but 
illicit gain." These adventurers bombarded Delesdemier with arguments and pleas to 
permit them to land their cargoes, undoubtedly so that they could be smuggled across the 
border at an appropriate moment. Frequently the meetings between Delesdemier and 
merchants turned into shouting matches. A newspaper described the tensions building in 
Eastport: "we have infonnation that there is no relaxation of Business, at that place, 
notwithstanding the government force stationed there. The inhabitants were employed at 
2 dolls. per day to keep guard over the stores, and yet under cover of every fog, hundreds 
of barrels, a day would find their way across to the British side, where the price was 
12:50. So profitable was the boating business [smuggling], and the standing guard, that 
the poor people had suddenly become Gallatin responded by sending Maine's 
federal district attorney to Passamaquoddy to collect evidence against embargo violators, 
and the secretary of the navy dispatched two gunboats to patrol the region for the 
remainder of the embargo. On the gunboats' arrival, their commander reported: "there 
are nearly a hundred merchants and adventurers with immense quantities of flour etc., 
who do not hesitate to bribe sentinels for the purpose of smuggling their property.'48 
How effective were the federal government's efforts to impose the embargo on 
Passanlaquoddy? Federal court records and newspaper accounts indicate that the 
American government failed despite its extraordinary efforts to control the border at 
Passamaquoddy, just as it did at other border regions such as upstate Vermont, Spanish 
Florida, and New Orleans. Indeed, national control over major seaports such as New 
York and Boston eroded to the point where President Jefferson ordered coastal forts to 
stop ships from leaving port.49 
Because the embargo was a federal law passed by Congress, offenses against it 
went to Maine's federal district court. Delesdernier, assisted by Maine's federal district 
attorney, provided the evidence to condemn contraband goods and to indict individuals 
caught breaking the various embargo acts. The first case Delesdernier brought to the 
district court was against Stephen Humbert's sloop Industry. Ironically, it was the last to 
be resolved, since Humbert appealed the case, which went to the Massachusetts Circuit 
Court. Delesdernier brought approximately fifty cases to trial in 1808, (see Figure 7.1). 
Ths  was more cases than he had initiated in the entire period from 1789 and 1807. 
Delesdernier's seizures resulted in numerous formal proceedings in the district 
federal court held at Wiscasset in September. The beaches of Eastport must have been 
crowded with impounded boats awaiting condemnation in court during the summer of 
1808. Seized goods had to be guarded, too, providing more headaches for Delesdernier. 
Figure 7.1 : Federal Court Cases v. Embargo Violators at Passamaquoddy, 1808 
Source: "Final Record Book," National Archves and Records Administration RG 21, 
Federal District Court Records, Maine District, Ms. at NARA Northeast, Waltharn, 
Massachusetts. [Note: dates could not be determined for 2 cases.] 
In November the U.S. deputy marshal advertised in newspapers that he would auction off 
the numerous seizures at Eastport's customhouse (see Figure 7.2). Yet this number was a 
tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of barrels of flour and other contraband smuggled 
across the border. Delesdernier was neither incompetent nor unwilling to enforce the 
law, but he faced many problems enforcing the embargo. Among those difficulties he 
faced was betrayal by his subordinates and allies. 
Local Resistance to the Embargo 
Passamaquoddy residents on both side of the border increasingly resisted the 
embargo, While resistance was initially non-violent, it grew increasingly deadly over 
time. Much of this resistance was based on the con~munal egalitarian ideals born of 
borderland residents' frontier experiences. Ultimately, this opposition resulted in the 
death of a customs guard and the dismissal of Collector Delesdernier from office. 
Table 7.1 : Contraband Auctioned, November 2 1-22, 1808 
Item 
Boats: 
Source: "Marshal's Sales," Gazette of Maine (Buckstown, ME), November 12, 1808. 
Quantity 
27 
Schooners: 
Flour: 
1 
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The premarket communal egalitarian ideals of Passamaquoddy's settlers had 
always placed them somewhat at odds with the American federal government, but 
because the federal government had relatively little impact on the region there had 
seldom been conflict between locals and federal officials. Delesdernier, the only 
American government official in the area, reduced tension between the state and locals 
through his tolerance of plaster smuggling and by creating tangible benefits such as 
successfully petitioning Congress for a lighthouse on West Quoddy Head. The embargo, 
however, meant that borderland residents now faced massive state intervention into their 
everyday lives. They opposed these unprecedented government actions by invoking their 
egalitarian ideals, especially those regarding property rights, honor, and the use of 
violence in defense of their rights. 
Locals invoked these values to defend themselves against government officials. 
An illustration of these values is related in the region's local history. The American 
military commander, the captain of USS Wasp, and Collector Delesdernier combined 
together to confront Samuel Wheeler, a local merchant and suspected smuggler. The . 
federal officers demanded the merchant place his goods under federal custody. The man 
immediately refused to comply. Despite the threats the merchant knew that he had as yet 
violated no law, and stated to the federal officers: "Gentlemen, I am here on my own soil, 
in defence of my own property, and-as you have seen fit to conduct-f my personal 
honor. Heed me, then, when I say, as I now do, that no man, be he who he may, touches 
a barrel of this flour except at the peril of his life. I have said: now take care of 
yourselves."s0 While this is an uncorroborated anecdote, it touches on the difficulties of 
enforcing an embargo in a nation where property rights were sacrosanct. According to 
the story, the federal officers withdrew, perplexed by the smuggler's self-righteous 
determination and bluster based on premarket values. 
The premarket resistance to state intervention at Passamaquoddy grew both more 
unified and more violent as time passed. Initially, at least some borderland residents 
supported the embargo. Collector Delesdernier and his supporters - many of them family 
members or in-laws - dutifully attempted to enforce the unpopular law, but public support 
eroded and even the customhouse officers bowed to community pressure. One symptom 
of borderland antipathy to the embargo and its enforcers was a notable rise in the use of 
guns to defend smuggling operations or even to attack customs officers. 
The community consensus to oppose the embargo was not immediate, and at least 
some locals stepped forward to enforce the embargo. For example, Eastport resident 
Joseph Livennore joined the crew of the revenue cutter New Hampshire as second 
mate." But others chose to forego federal employment. It proved especially difficult to 
recruit a U.S. deputy marshal for Passamaquoddy. Delesdernier recommended two men 
for the position before finding a third man who finally accepted the post in August, his 
neighbor William 
Nonetheless Delesdernier successfully recruited a number of assistants. But local 
historians noted that the men Delesdernier hired as guards were in fact allied with the 
smugglers. One stated, "the collector received into his service persons whose habits 
rendered them needy, and who had never been trustworthy; and thus, undoubtedly, 
yielding to the temptation which beset them, they were paid by both sides."53 The 
popular account claimed that all but three such guards took bribes. But even those three 
were rumored to assist friends involved in smuggling by going to sleep on duty. The 
communal egalitarianism practiced by the region's inhabitants forbade individuals from 
profiting by other's losses, or interfering in others pursuit of what was regarded as a right 
to trade. Rather than escalate a conflict within the community, the guards arrived at a 
compromise that profited both themselves and the smugglers. While guards received 
$2.00 per day from Delesdernier to watch over the contraband goods stockpiled in 
Eastport, the smugglers paid them fifty cents for every barrel of flour they took away. 
The temptation was clearly too much for the guards, and the piles of contraband goods 
quietly melted away at night or during foggy days. 
If necessary, the smugglers tied up and confined the guards as a ruse to cover the 
latters' cooperation.54 An example of this occurred on May 27, when four men assaulted 
customs guard Thomas Pettigrove Jr. at Schoodic Falls while he was guarding several 
hundred barrels of flour, tar, and other contraband goods. The men captured Pettigrove, 
took him a half-mile from the wharf he guarded, and confined him for six hours. 
There were many other similar incidents, most involving little violen~e.~' Smugglers 
enlisted other tactics against the forces arrayed against them. For example, smugglers 
plied the commander of American gunboat No. 43 with drink. The young officer quickly 
succumbed to this tactic, to the point that he did not appear on deck for weeks at a time, 
and suffered delirium tremens. Not only did the officer's alcoholism neutralize his ability 
to pursue smugglers, but it resulted in the Secretary of the Navy dismissing him from the 
ser~ice . '~  Bribes, liquor, and other encouragements to desert lured soldiers away from 
warehouses full of contraband." Another tactic was to involve British naval units 
stationed at Passamaquoddy. Smugglers sought to convince Royal Navy officers that 
American officials enforcing the embargo violated British sovereignty when pursuing 
smugglers. For example, an American naval commander con~plained that "there is a 
number of fortune-hunters on Moose Island, who, on acct. of being frequently over- 
hauled, and examined by our boats, would willingly embrace any opportunity of 
embroiling us with the subjects of Great ~ r i t a i n . " ~ ~  With American and British naval 
units acting towards opposite ends in close proximity, tensions ran high. In October 
1808, smugglers protested to a Royal Navy captain when an American gunboat seized a 
British-flagged ship for violating the embargo. The Royal Navy officer, in command of a 
frigate, demanded the American gunboat officer surrender the vessel. The American 
officer, despite the fact that his tiny command boasted only one cannon to the British 
vessel's twenty-four, refused and proclaimed that "nothing but bloodshed and hard 
fighting should induce him to give her up." Only the hasty intercession of Captain Swett 
and Collector Delesdemier prevented bloodshed and the outbreak of an Anglo-American 
war. 59 
The smugglers did on occasion resort to violence. While violence was not 
unknown at Passamaquoddy before 1808, murder, beatings and other violent crimes 
dramatically increased during 1808 as the stakes became higher. Royal Navy officers 
noted as early as May that "the conduct of the inhabitants of late has been very improper 
in the conducting the Flour from the opposite side, by using Force, and arming boats with 
Harpoons or Instruments similar by which several custon~ house officers have been 
wounded."60 
Not all of this violence can be traced to the embargo. Some of it was collateral 
violence brought on by the unusual stresses that the embargo brought to Passamaquoddy. 
For instance, British deserters from the 101 st Regiment, brought to New Brunswick 
because of the threat of war with the United States, shot and killed a local magistrate just 
east of Passamaquoddy in October 1808. Charlotte County militia arrested the deserters 
on Pain's Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, just a few miles short of the border that meant 
freedom for them. A court found the men guilty of murder, and hanged two of the men 
publicly a few weeks later.61 
The many unemployed sailors who drifted through Passamaquoddy on their way 
to the British dominions also caused trouble. American farnlers attempting to drive their 
cattle to market in New Brunswick also threatened violence if customs officers interfered. 
With specie and banknotes flooding into the region, robberies became more common, as 
adventurer Richard Hasluck found out to his detriment when he was robbed.62 Even in 
Eastport itself, shop robberies, heretofore unknown, began to occur. Many smugglers 
openly carried arms in the streets; the impression is one of a community suddenly 
swamped with armed men, walking the streets, skulking about hidden coves, all waiting 
for nightfall or a heavy fog to continue their illicit trade.63 
Adventurers such as John McMaster promoted violence by offering cash to locals 
for their services. Residents on both sides of the border eagerly responded to these 
incentives, which could amount to several months of wages for one night of work pulling 
oars and moving barrels.64 Some were prepared to fire back at customhouse authorities, 
as John Swett complained of in the Industry case. Thus when McMaster sought a crew to 
repossess his impounded flour on Isle au Haut, he recruited the men at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  
McMaster's crew of smugglers did not balk at the armaments on board his schooner 
Peggy, which included muskets, blunderbusses, and cutlasses. Only one refused to 
involve himself with attacking the custon~s guards on Isle au ~ a u t . ~ ~  The landing party 
from the Peggy shot and killed one of the guards, and callously threw his body into the 
ocean.67 
Clearly there was a connection between smuggling and violence, as Adam Smith 
noted.68 This is true of the crew of the schooner Mark, an "embargo breaker" whose 
crew later committed piracy and murder. Passamaquoddy's U.S. deputy marshal called 
their actions "the most atrocious and barbarous that has occurred in this country for some 
time."69 The Mark arrived at Passamaquoddy from nearby Addison, Maine, in the late 
autumn of 1808. One night the crew hoisted anchor and pern~itted the vessel to drift into 
British waters, where American authorities held no power. Despite the fact that the 
vessel had no official papers, New Brunswick customs authorities allowed the vessel's 
owner to sell the vessel. They could do so because they acted under power of the Crown 
order that permitted the entry of American vessels despite irregularities in their 
documentation. New Brunswick customs authorities also permitted the vessel to load a 
cargo and clear for Demerara in South America. On the return from that port, the crew 
threw the owner's agent overboard and sold the vessel in Cuba for their own profit.70 On 
their return to Eastport, word soon leaked out, and federal authorities arrested the men 
and placed them in irons in Fort ~ul l ivan.~ '  
Local resistance to the embargo grew more violent as the embargo dragged on. 
Passamaquoddy residents aimed this violence at those who enforced unpopular laws. 
The American state reciprocated by posting military and naval units to the region, but 
even these forces failed to impose order. Frustrated by the government's commercial 
policies, locals and adventurers from both sides of the border, abetted by British colonial 
and imperial govenments, foiled President Jefferson's plan to peacehlly coerce Britain 
into respecting American maritime rights. One of the local impacts of this embargo 
resistance was that the American government removed Collector Delesdernier from 
office. 
Delesdernier Betrayed 
The embargo pulled Passamaquoddy's population in two directions. On the one 
hand locals craved stability, law, and order. On the other hand, they needed to provide 
for their families. The long-established regional smuggling tradition, compounded by 
Delesdernier's own encouragement of illicit border trade, hrther clouded the issue. 
Divided and confused, the community's ability to police itself suffered as societal noms 
collapsed due to the enomous strains placed on it by the freetraders and state agencies. 
Delesdernier ultimately became a victim of the conhsion for which, in part, he was 
responsible. 
The greatest challenge Delesdernier faced stemmed from his inability to stop his 
own guards from colluding with smugglers. Federal court records document only one 
guard prosecuted for cooperating with smugglers. A federal grand jury found that 
William Sheman of Schoodic Falls [modem Calais, Maine] on the night of May 29, 
1808, "in nowise regarding his duty and undertaking aforesaid, took and received 
corruptly and deceitfidly, a bribe, reward, and compensation, for conniving at & 
pernlitting the stores aforesaid to be broken open, & allowing the goods and merchandise 
aforesaid to be taken and carried away." However, Maine's federal district attorney 
refused to pursue the indictment, probably because Sherman had fled to New Brunswick. 
In another indictment the grand jury found that Sherman had participated with others in 
an assault and unlawful confinement of another customs guard. But again, those indicted 
never faced trial. Like the contraband they smuggled, these freetraders simply vanished.72 
Guards such as Sherman were a nightmare for Delesdernier, for he could not trust 
the men he hired. Ultimately it was his own friends and neighbors who betrayed him, 
resulting in his downfall as customs collector. The incident that most contributed to his 
removal occurred on October 27, 1808. The crew of a customhouse boat conspired with 
a sentry guarding contraband goods in a warehouse. The sentry and the boat's crew took 
forty barrels of naval stores and a bale of cotton and delivered it to a British vessel 
anchored in Snug Cove, just a short row across the harbor from Eastport. The master of 
the vessel paid them in cash and with 170 pounds of coffee.73 Delesdernier soon found 
out about the missing goods and was able to recover some of them, and the next day 
initiated proceedings in the local court against his own men. Nathaniel Sevey, the man in 
charge of the revenue boat, posted a bond of $400 for his appearance in court. But sentry 
Stephen H. Kankey was too poor to post bond, and so was sent to the county jail in 
Machias. However, he escaped in March and never faced 
The tinling of this betrayal coincided with the Eliza affair, an event that surely 
alarmed and displeased adventurers and locals alike.75 It seems likely that Delesdernier's 
popularity waned as the embargo continued. A symptom of his weakening influence in 
the community was an assault made by Aaron Olmstead, a local blacksmith and trader. 
Federal court records reveal that on November 17, 1808, Olmstead did "beat bruise 
wound insult & ill treat" Delesdernier's son, Lewis Jr., with "cruel heavy & grievous 
Lewis Jr. was a customs inspector. Like so many other customs collectors at 
the end of Jefferson's embargo, Delesdernier found himself less able to enforce the laws 
as community attitudes hardened against federal interference in their everyday 
livelihoods, 
Delesdernier suffered fiom the criticism of federal officials as well. On arrival at 
Eastport, Capt. Swett wrote to the secretary of war that the situation was made much 
worse by Delesdernier's initial slackness in enforcing the embargo. President Jefferson 
himself made inquiries concerning the collector's abilities; Gallatin had to assure him that 
"the Collector of Passamaquoddy is, as you perceive, a very bad writer, but he is a man of 
great integrity, zeal, and activity, and full reliance may be placed on his facts as on his 
 exertion^."^^ But the treasury secretary's protection, based on his experiences with the 
Delesdernier family during the American Revolution, could only go so far. 
Like other collectors during the final months of the embargo, Delesdemier found 
that it became virtually impossible to enforce the draconian measures passed by 
Congress, Capt. Swett's garrison had shrunk due to desertion; alcoholism incapacitated 
one of the two gunboat's commanders; the revenue cutters were called away to their 
homeports; his own men could not be trusted. After taking vigorous action in the Eliza 
affair, the collector's resistance to popular opinions against the embargo seems to have 
crumbled. He pursued no more actions in Maine's federal court after A U ~ U S ~ . ~ ~  
Delesdemier was an official torn between community loyalties and state demands. 
In typical borderland fashion, he attempted to accommodate both sides. He continued to 
act as a community booster. Even as he seized local shipping for embargo violations, 
workers completed West Quoddy Lighthouse at the western entrance to Passamaquoddy 
Bay. During the embargo Delesdernier poured over $17,000 in payroll into the 
community, an enormous sum of money in 1808. Delesdernier even went so far as to 
assist an Eastport smuggler by paying his fines to the federal court.79 
Despite Gallatin's assurances, Delesdernier's name had been presented in a poor 
light to the secretaries of war, state, and probably navy as well. After an investigation, 
Madison removed Delesdemier from office, and instituted federal legal proceedings 
against the collector that led to his financial ruin. Locals responded by immediately 
voting the man into office in the state legislature.80 The former collector retained local 
popularity despite his role in attempting to enforce the embargo and his fall from power. 
Conclusion: "The Harmony of Social Intercourse" 
Delesdernier rejoiced with the rest of Passamaquoddy when the embargo ended in 
early 1809. After receiving the news he immediately rowed across the border to infoml 
the magistrate on Campobello Island. According to the magistrate, the good news 
brought Delesdemier "great happiness and peace of mind."" When full trade relations 
were reestablished with Britain on June 10, 1809, residents from both sides of the 
boundary joined to celebrate at Eastport; undoubtedly Delesdemier was among their 
number. At noon the cannon of Fort Sullivan and the local militia company fired 
celebratory salutes, after which some fifty notables gathered for a dinner. Sixteen toasts, 
each punctuated by the discharge of a cannon, followed the meal. There were obligatory 
toasts to the American president and the British king, and a waggish toast to "The 
American Fair-We prefer Commerce to Non-Intercourse." But the most relevant toast 
was, "May the 'Harmony of Social Intercourse' remain uninterrupted between the 
Inhabitants of both sides of the Saint Croix." Borderland residents here expressed their 
continuing hope that the border would not divide them, but bring a mutual prosperity.82 
The hope was not unfounded. Borderland residents had combined to defeat the 
embargo at Passamaquoddy and other ports and border communities. But while the 
embargo was repealed in the last days of President Jefferson's tenure in office, the 
underlying diplomatic, commercial, and military problems between the United States and 
Britain remained unsolved. Congress replaced the embargo with the 'Non-Intercourse 
Act," which allowed foreign trade except with Britain and France in an effort to wring 
concessions out of those warring nations. For Passamaquoddy residents this measure 
solved one problem in that owners and operators of small undecked vessels were no 
longer required to load or unload in the presence of a customhouse officer, nor did the 
law require these craft to post expensive bonds to comply with commercial laws. The 
measure had some initial success when the British minister to Washington supported the 
measure, but officials in London rejected the measure. President Madison declared trade 
with Britain and its colonies illegal again on August 9, 1809. Congress allowed that law 
to lapse on May 1, 1 8 1 0 . ~ ~  Within days Congress attempted another effort at peaceful 
coercion through commercial restrictions in May 1810. Known as Macon's Bill No. 2, 
this measure restored commerce with Britain and France if they stopped harassing 
American shipping. Britain failed to do so, and on February 2, 18 11, the American 
government once again stopped all commerce with Britain'and its colonies. This measure 
remained in force until early 1812, when Congress passed a complete embargo on 
American shipping in preparation for its declaration of war on Britain in June. 
These measures created enormous problems for American merchants and British 
merchants. Uncertain of when trade was legal, many began shipping their goods to 
British North American ports such as Montreal, Halifax, and Saint John. Once there, the 
goods could either be sent to the American market on short notice if legal trade opened 
again, or they could be smuggled across the border at places like Passamaquoddy. 
Between 1809 and the declaration of war, Passamaquoddy remained an important 
smuggling center. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
THE WAR OF 1812 
The Venture Incident 
Eastport resident John Burgin had been watching the activities of a large sloop in 
the harbor for some days. Rumored to be loaded with a valuable cargo destined from 
Saint John, New Brunswick, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, the vessel had been skulking about 
Passarnaquoddy Bay for about a week.' Most recently it had anchored close to two 
British warships just over a mile from Eastport's wharves and warehouses. On the 
morning of November 7,181 3, the vessel hoisted anchor and proceeded up the bay, 
apparently destined for St. Andrews. Burgin recalled the following: 
The sloop stood over near the American shore and when 
nearly opposite the fort at Eastport was very near the shore, 
so much so I expected they [the U.S. Army garrison] would 
fire upon her. I looking up to the fort I saw them making 
preparations to fire, and in about a minute they did fire. 
The sloop then bore away for the other side. They fired six 
or seven shots at her when she hove to & some of the 
officers & soldiers went from the shore and boarded her 
and brought her into my wharf.2 
It was the first time that the cannon of Fort Sullivan had fired in anger, although Britain 
and the United States had been at war since June 18, 1812. The region had avoided much 
of the bloodshed that had scarred other regions on the border between the United States 
and British North America. When Fort Sullivan fired on this British vessel - the Venture 
of Saint John - it appeared that the peaceful relations in the Passamaquoddy borderlands 
had come to an end. 
But nobody was in a rush to instigate combat at Passamaquoddy. Captain Henry 
Senhouse, the commander of HMS Martin, witnessed Fort Sullivan firing on the Venture, 
and immediately wrote to the American commandant. He expressed his concern that 
active hostilities had commenced, and outlined how his own actions had minimized the 
impact of the war on the local population: 
As it is the first instance of active hostility that has come 
within my knowledge on the part of the United States 
military force stationed on this part of the frontier, I have to 
request you will be so good as to grant me the following 
information, that under the present circumstances we may 
be acquainted how far it may be desirable to abstain from 
such measures as may be likely to involve the immediate 
inhabitants of the lines on either side in a predatory war 
injurious to individuals, but of little general consequence to 
the two belligerents stated. 
Under the impression that you will receive this 
communication in the favorable light in which it is made, I 
will frankly state to you that since my anchorage in this 
roadstead, I have abstained from all hostility within the 
range of Moose Island, and that I have invariably liberated 
the property of all the inhabitants of the interior of 
Passamaquoddy Bay, that has fallen into my hands, making 
known to them in general that they may continue to trade 
uncontested in the innocent articles they may hitherto have 
been accustomed to barter without any interference or 
annoyance. Other vessels which have been boarded in the 
Quoddy Passage at a distance from Moose Island, with 
cargoes from a distant part of the coast, and which are in no 
way connected as to proprietary right with the inhabitants 
of the approximating boundaries I have detained; and I 
conceived they were not entitled to the neutral character of 
those within the Bay, but these even have been treated with 
as much leniety in their persons & property as could be 
observed in such  occasion^.^ 
Captain Senhouse's letter is the very model of borderlands accommodation. 
Britain and the United States may have been at war, but there was no need to bring that 
conflict to Passamaquoddy. Senhouse himself perniitted local coasters and fishing boats 
to proceed unmolested. Why, Senhouse demanded, had the American garrison engaged 
in an act of aggression?4 
The commander of Fort Sullivan, Capt. Sherman Leland of the United States 34th 
Regiment, had an ingenious answer to that question. He claimed that his primary mission 
was to "act as an auxiliary to the revenue department," and that it was "the uniform 
practice to bring to & examine all boats & small craft of suspicious aspect sailing in the 
American waters."' Leland suspected the Venture was engaged in smuggling, and this 
belief had been upheld by the curious absence of any ship's papers on board the sloop. 
Therefore his actions were not an act of military aggression, but of law enforcement. 
Senhouse replied that he was completely satisfied by Leland's letter, and concluded "It 
will be my study to promote this spirit of conciliation during my continuation on the 
frontier, and in prosecuting this object towards the mitigation of the unnecessary 
penalties of war, I shall be very happy to attend to any communication you may at any 
future period be willing to make."6 Accommodation somehow prevailed over conflict at 
the Passamaquoddy borderlands. 
Accommodation during wartime was one manifestation of how borderland 
residents thwarted state influence, as the Venture incident illustrates. But by looking 
deeper into the written record one discovers that the event was far more complicated than 
mere accommodation, and in fact bordered on treason. Borderlands society not only 
tempered the state's centralizing tendencies during the War of 18 12, but also twisted the 
state's authority against itself in order to pursue illicit trade. 
In the Passamaquoddy borderlands where illicit trade flourished, events were 
seldom what they appeared to be on the surface. The Venture was indeed a smuggling 
vessel, loaded with a valuable cargo of British manufactured goods - valued at fiom 
$100,000 to $200,000 - destined for the American market.' Leland's soldiers found the 
vessel's cargo manifest and other papers concealed between a beam and the vessel's deck 
in the cargo hold.* The owners of the Venture's cargo were in fact two Eastport 
merchants. They had arranged for the sloop to come to Passamaquoddy, where a row- 
boat privateer they owned would conduct a sham capture of the vessel. This would bring 
the goods into the country legally and at a considerably lower tariff rate than otherwise 
possible. However, the presence of the Royal Navy prevented the privateer from 
venturing out, and the strong currents of the bay brought the vessel within range of Fort 
Sullivan's guns.9 
- 
The story did not end there. Maine's federal district court awarded Capt. Leland 
thousands of dollars for capturing the Venture. Although he had used the fort's cannon 
and soldiers under his command to take custody, Leland alone received the "informer's 
part" of the proceeds of the Venture's cargo. When he and his soldiers left Eastport to 
join their regiment in Vermont, Leland received his funds fiom the U.S. marshal at 
Portland. He promptly resigned his commission after receiving the funds, thus avoiding 
active combat on the northern frontier. He next appeared in Dorchester, Massachusetts, 
where he made a patriotic Independence Day speech in which he concluded "None but a 
servile wretch would sell his country's honor for gold." Leland's ideals of American 
patriotism based on the Revolutionary experience appeared to be at odds with his 
personal experience. 10 
Background to the War of 1812 
The road to war was a long and complicated one dating back to the conclusion of 
the American War of Independence. The two nations frequently disagreed over the 
border with British North America, trade policies, relations with revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France, the rights and treatment of Native Americans in the continent's 
interior, and British naval policy toward American merchant shipping. Tension between 
the two was virtually constant, but could usually be handled through diplomatic channels. 
Relations took a dramatic turn for the worse in 1807 after HMS Leopard fired on USS 
Chesapeake and forcibly removed British deserters fiom the crippled American naval 
vessel. While both sides averted war in this episode's aftermath, they also began to 
prepare for a future military conflict. The American government sent spies into British 
North America; the British military governors of Nova Scotia and Upper Canada 
reciprocated by sending their own agents to the United states.'' 
During this pre-war period, the American federal government attempted several 
times to force concessions out of the British government by imposing trade sanctions. 
The first of these was the fourteen-month long Jefferson's embargo, from December, 
1807, to March, 1809, which forbade any cargoes leaving American ports. Less 
sweeping trade restrictions aimed at Britain and its colonies followed under the Non- 
Intercourse Act, which was in force fiom August, 1809 to May, 18 10, and the Non- 
Importation Act, sometimes known as Macon's Bill No. 2, which was in effect from 
February, 18 11, until Congress imposed another total 90-day embargo in the spring of 
1812. These laws faced the same problem the embargo did: a popular lack of support 
that resulted in massive smuggling, especially at Passamaquoddy and other border 
communities. l 2  
Further aggression at sea and ashore exacerbated the situation. On the night of 
May 16, 18 1 1, USS President happened across HMS Little Belt off the Virginia coast; the 
ships fired on one another, with the much smaller British vessel suffering many dead and 
wounded. Americans felt vindicated for the Chesapeake incident, but the British 
government was outraged. The perceived and sometimes real British support for Native 
American peoples resisting American expansion in the west irritated the American 
government and settlers. Revelations that British spies had been operating in the United 
States gauging popular sentiments against the federal government in New England 
further excited anti-British sentiments. 
Many Americans, especially in the West and South, became increasingly hostile 
to the British. The picture was less clear in the Northeast, where a long mutual border 
and commercial and social connections had created fairly close connections between 
American citizens and British subjects. Many Americans had moved to Upper Canada 
and New Brunswick even after the Revolution, and Loyalists moved back and forth 
across the border as well. In general, coastal commercial regions tended to be more pro- 
British, while inland agrarian areas were often anti-British, although there were notable 
exceptions to this rule. The Jefferson and Madison administrations never enjoyed warm 
relations with Britain, and after the Chesapeake affair in 1807 struggled to keep the 
United States out of war. But by 18 12, with the continuing failure of diplomatic efforts, 
non-importation, a fractured Republican party, and Madison's desire for reelection, anti- 
British rhetoric escalated. "War Hawks" quickly dominated the twelfth Congress; 
congressmen and senators from the South and West desired war with Britain, and in June 
they received what they wanted.13 
Historians largely agree that the War of 1812 was fought over maritime 
commercial rights. One of the rallying slogans for Americans was "free trade and 
sailors' rights!"14 In asking Congress to declare war on June 14, President Madison listed 
the numerous American complaints against Britain. The most important and long- 
standing grievances were the Royal Navy's harassment of American merchant vessels, 
such as impressing American sailors and interfering with the United States neutral trade 
with Europe. Congress only narrowly complied with Madison's request, but on June 18, 
he signed an act declaring war on Great Britain.15 
One of the ironies of the War of 1812 was that just as the Americans declared 
war, the British became prepared to concede to almost all their demands. The British 
were fighting against Napoleon, and by 18 12 were on the verge of losing their last 
continental ally as Napoleon marched on Moscow, sweeping aside Russian resistance. 
North America, including both the United States and the colonies to the north of it, was 
very much a sideshow as far as the British were concerned. By 18 12, the British military 
situation both in Europe became serious enough that Parliament considered concessions 
to the United States so that the nation could focus on defeating Napoleon. On June 16, 
even as Congress was considering its declaration of war, the British foreign secretary 
announced to Parliament that most of the restrictions on American maritime commerce 
were to be lifted. The one notable exception was impressment. The war thus proved to 
be an unnecessary one, but the American invasion of Upper Canada in the summer of 
18 12 ensured that the British would finally have to defend their remaining colonies in 
North America.16 
The military actions were only a part of this conflict. Congress declared war 
ostensibly because of trade conflicts. These trade issues did not cease with the 
declaration of war; commerce became another theater of the war. Congress ensured the 
central role of commerce in the war by doubling tariffs on imported goods when it 
declared war. The purpose of that measure was to create additional income to fight the 
war and decrease dependence on foreign  manufacture^.'^ Jeffersonians had long dreamed 
of breaking the American reliance on foreign manufactured goods, and the embargo and 
War of 18 12 did succeed partially in encouraging American manufactures. l8 But 
American merchants generally continued to spurn manufacturing and many continued 
their mercantile pursuits, even if it meant smuggling or trading with the enemy.19 The 
British wanted to ensure their access to American markets after the war. They were 
suffering from over-production at home, and thus they wanted to continue trade as well; 
they also needed American foods t~ f f s .~~  While the American Congress attempted to cut 
off trade with the enemy through legislation, American, British, and colonial merchants 
eluded government trade restrictions. The American government's efforts to interdict 
trade operated on a trial and error basis that left most of the initiative to the smugglers, 
who quickly learned how to elude government measures. Studies of wartime trade have 
found that such illegal intercourse with the enemy is normal, but that it was a central 
issue for the American government during the War of 18 1 2.21 If trade is considered 
another front in the War of 18 12, then Passamaquoddy takes on a great importance in that 
conflict. Smuggling at Eastport would then represent a defeat as profound as the loss of 
Detroit in 18 12, or the capture of USS Cheasapeake in 18 1 3.22 
Historiography of the War of 1812 
The War of 181 2 was an inglorious contest marked by ambiguity, confusion, and 
incompetence. The titles of scholarly monographs on the subject reflect this confusion. 
For example, a standard Anlerican scholarly title is Donald R. Hickey's The War of 1812: 
A Forgotten Another example is the Canadian work by J. Mackay Hitsman: 
The Incredible War of 1 8 1 2 . ~ ~  The titles indicate that the War of 1812 is either obscure 
or difficult to understand. Older titles are scarcely more helpful. The titles to Patrick 
White's A Nation on Trial and Roger Brown's The Republic in Peril clearly indicate 
danger, but who is conducting this trial, and what exactly is the nature of the peril the 
American republic faced?25 
The historiography of the War of 18 12 is further complicated by historians who 
have used it to reinforce nation-building myths. Thus it is a war that everyone can claim 
to have won.26 The Canadians, for whom the war was an important victory that 
successfully established their resistance to American military might, have written the 
most about the conflict and place it high within the events that led to the creation of their 
nation. The most aggressively nationalistic Canadian works are Pierre Berton's popular 
The Invasion of Canada, 181 2-1 81 3 and Flames Across the Border: The Canadian- 
American Tragedy, 181 3-1 81 4.27 For Americans, the conflict is less important in the 
nation's developn~ent, certainly more ambiguous and therefore less interesting to many. 
Some works claim that the war was necessary to establish American identity, seeing it as 
a second American  evolution.^^ Like the Canadians, Americans, too, claim to have won 
the war. The British tend to ignore the conflict as a sideshow to the Napoleonic Wars but 
they, too, claim vict01-y.~~ 
The historiography is also heavily slanted toward military aspects of the war, 
especially tactical-level studies of specific battles fought on or around the Great Lakes. 
Recent years have seen the publication of many monographs and articles, and it is no 
longer possible to claim that the subject is under-studied.30 There is a relative 
overemphasis on military operations, especially in the Great Lakes region, when 
compared to studies on the social and commercial effects of the war. The exceptions are 
Canadian studies of the war's impact on Ontario, such as George Sheppard's Plunder, 
Profit and Paroles: A Social History of the War of 181 2 in Upper ~ a n a d a . ~ '  
New England and the Maritime Provinces, where the primary activity of the war 
was smuggling, remain largely untouched by scholarly inquiry.32 This is largely because 
military operations in the region were minimal, with the exception of the 1814 British 
capture of Eastport in July, and the Castine expedition in September. American scholars 
have done some work on the Hartford Convention, during which New England's 
Federalist leadership contemplated secession, but no efforts have been made to 
understand just how widespread and popular opposition to the war was.33 Canadian 
scholars such as Walter Ronald Copp have published articles on military themes, but 
neither Canadian nor American scholars have published full-length monographs on the 
social or econonlic impact of the War of 1812 in New England or the ~ a r i t i r n e s . ~ ~  
Naval operations in the waters off the Maritime Provinces and northern New 
England are better documented, especially the duels between USS Chesapeake and HMS 
Shannon and USS Enterprise and HMS ~ o x e r . ~ ~  But until Faye Kert published her work 
on Canadian privateers, there were few scholarly works that examined the guerre de 
course as anything but a patriotic endeavor.36 Notably, Kert placed privateering 
alongside smuggling as a means whereby merchants continued their search for profits.37 
The relatively thin historiography of this conflict on both a national and a regional 
scale reflects the complex background to the war. Especially confounding to historians 
are the cross-border links that defy easy categorization or placement within larger 
national frameworks. Smuggling ranked high among those wartime bonds between the 
people of Canada and the United States, and Passamaquoddy ranked preeminent as a 
smuggler's haven. 
The War of 1812 at Passamaquoddy 
The War of 181 2 at Passamaquoddy demonstrated the ability of borderlands 
society to temper the centralizing tendencies of the state. Borderland residents adopted 
three major tactics to frustrate the American government's attempts to exert control over 
the border. Those tactics were neutrality, deception, and twisting the law against the 
federal government. On occasion those tactics required confrontation as well, including 
physical violence against government officials or soldiers. Using these tactics, 
borderland residents paralyzed and ultimately destroyed an entire regiment of soldiers 
sent to stop smuggling. Accommodation rather than conflict was the rule at 
Passamaquoddy during the War of 18 12. Much of that accommodation involved trade 
with the enemy. 
As political scientists have noted, trading with the enemy is a manifestation of 
international, domestic, and personal relationships that are simultaneously cooperative 
and c~nf l ic tua l .~~  Because this ambiguity and accommodation clashed with later ideals 
of patriotism, participants and historians writing about the war have skewed many of its 
events. Scholars should be aware that when considering the War of 18 12 at 
Passamaquoddy, events were seldom what they appeared to be on the surface. 
Researching the War of 18 12 at Passamaquoddy is a difficult task, in large part 
because so much of what happened there was covert or illicit. While local histories have 
emphasized the cross-border accommodation and peacefulness of the region, primary 
documents detail a region rife with treason. For example, many Americans suspected 
that John Brewer of Robbinston, Maine, was a traitor. Despite his military rank as a 
major in the Massachusetts militia and his position as a federal postmaster, some 
Americans suspected he could not be trusted. An American army officer wrote of 
Brewer, "No man in this part of the country has manifested more inveterate hostility to 
the country than he has."39 Across the river in New Brunswick, some people also 
engaged in traitorous activity. In particular, Aaron Rogers, a nearly illiterate American 
who had moved from the Kennebeck region in Maine to St. David in 1809, claimed that 
New Brunswick's population was divided. Rogers believed that the ordinary settlers 
were "for the States which I believe is true republikins the other party is strong for king 
Gorge witch they consist of old Torys and Scotch men." Rogers encouraged Maine's 
militia commander to invade, claiming that the colony's poor would rise up and assist the 
American forces.40 British regulars placed little reliance on Charlotte County's militia; 
one officer estimated less than half were reliable and even Grand Manan's militia 
commander doubted the loyalty of his own men.41 
While not all settlers at Passamaquoddy plotted treason, most seemed to have 
opposed the war and more especially the efforts of governments to extend their influence 
over the everyday lives of locals. People at Passamaquoddy resisted the centralizing 
tendencies of the state via neutrality, deception, and twisting the law in order to continue 
illicit trade. The goal of these tactics was to ensure that trade remained uninterrupted 
during the war, a pragmatic accommodation that sought to ensure the safety and 
continuing prosperity of borderland residents. When these attempts at accommodation 
failed, locals occasionally resorted to violence against the agents of state authority. 
Neutrality was the first and most popular option. News of the declaration of war 
reached Passamaquoddy on June 25 by a U.S. government courier, who roused Collector 
Trescott out of bed to inform him. Trescott's reaction, and that of Passamaquoddy's 
residents in general, was to attempt to see to the safety of the community through 
accommodation. The morning after the news arrived, Eastport residents gathered in a 
meeting and "unanimously agreed to preserve a good understanding with the Inhabitants 
of New-Brunswick, and to discountenance all depredations on the property of each 
other." Toward that end, a committee of safety was forn~ed, with Trescott as its 
chairman. This committee drafted a letter assuring their New Brunswick counterparts of 
their peacefid intentions. They sent it to Robert Pagan in St. Andrews, who in turn 
forwarded it to the lieutenant governor in Fredericton. In the meantime, a number of 
Eastport's inhabitants fled for fear of attack by the Royal Navy, and sought safety in 
Portland, Portsmouth, and Boston. Merchants removed their merchandise, and many 
goods from Indian Island were smuggled across the border in the c o n f ~ s i o n . ~ ~  
A few miles to the north on the St. Croix River, the reaction to war was similarly 
unhappy. The day after the news of war reached the area, parishioners from both sides 
flocked to the Methodist meeting house in St. Stephen. The Methodist minister found 
that his congregation, both American citizens and British subjects wept and sobbed 
loudly, "thinking withal that this should be the last time they could see each other in 
peace.'"3 The Methodist minister, however, soon discovered that he could continue to 
freely cross the border to visit parishioners. Here, too, neutrality and accommodation 
appeared to be the rule. 
Neutrality involved the region's Native American population as well. At the 
outbreak of the war, many of the Passamaquoddy withdrew into the interior. Both 
Americans and Loyalists hastened to make overtures with the Indians, who had played an 
important role in the American War of Independence. New Brunswick council member 
Robert Pagan agreed to protect the Indian's chapel at Pleasant Point; American 
representatives provided gifts. The Passamaquoddy remained neutral and played little 
part in the war.44 
The proprietors of Campobello and Grand Manan sought neutral status as well; 
both resisted the province's efforts to drill militia off-island. David Owen, Campobello's 
proprietor, initially feared privateering attacks on his island estate, and went so far as to 
place all his valuables and documents in a dry well. He also kept loaded muskets in 
every room of his home. Early in the war, Owen captured an American privateersman 
who was raiding his island estate. Instead of turning the man over to provincial 
authorities, Owen returned the man to his vessel earning the gratitude of the crew. As a 
result of this act, Owen was no longer plagued by American raiders.45 Moses Gerrish, the 
proprietor of Grand Manan, also resented efforts to take local militia off-island. Owen 
and Gemsh occasionally joined forces to resist provincial demands for militia.46 
Some of the most jarring evidence of the strength of borderland neutrality was the 
continued acceptance of the enemy at Passamaquoddy. Americans and colonials 
continued to n ix  at church, at Masonic meetings, and dinners. Among those who 
continued to cross the border freely was the American sheriff of Washington County, 
who also held a commission as a general in the Massachusetts militia. Sheriff John 
Cooper made such traitorous statements during after-dinner toasts at St. Andrews that he 
offended even English observers who thought he should have displayed more loyalty to 
his nation.47 But the most common form of accommodation was commercial intercourse. 
The war was seldom allowed to interfere with trade. 
Eastport, the commercial center of Passamaquoddy, offers the most vivid 
examples of tolerance for the enemy. The American Department of State ordered that all 
"enemy aliens" register with deputy marshals to prevent any mischief such as espionage; 
similar provisions were made in the Maritime ~ r o v i n c e s . ~ ~  At Eastport, some 35 heads of 
households registered as enemy aliens; with their families the number was at least 208 
(see Appendix C) out of a total population of approximately 1,200. Many of these enemy 
aliens were merchants engaged in smuggling. Yet the numbers are more dramatic than 
that, for many so-called enemy aliens did not register for fear of persecution. For 
example, Ethel Olmstead, a merchant and captain of Eastport's militia artillery company, 
was an enemy alien. He begged a correspondent not to reveal his true nationality, as "I 
am an Englishman & would be delt [sic] with roughly should some people in this country 
hear of i tyA9 Olmstead was not alone in serving in the Massachusetts militia; at least four 
others in Eastport served in local militia companies as well (See Appendix E). Moreover, 
these militia units had a reputation for pennitting smuggling to proceed unmolested. One 
complaint to Maine's militia commander complained that local militia officers 
encouraged 
The continued presence of enemy aliens at Eastport and their clandestine 
activities indicates a link between neutrality and borderland residents' active deception of 
the state. Like Olmstead, other enemy aliens took advantage of their ambiguous status to 
conduct illicit trade. Thomas H. Woodward had been living in Eastport with his family, 
but left for his father-in-law's hometown of Horton, Nova Scotia, after the war broke out. 
Woodward soon returned to Eastport to continue smuggling flour into the Maritime 
Provinces. He invested everything he had in a scheme to bring flour from Baltimore to 
Eastport in two schooners, and even traveled to Maryland to oversee the matter. Posing 
as an American, he purchased approximately 1,200 barrels of flour that he planned to sell 
at Halifax. Sadly for Woodward, the Royal Navy captured his two American-flagged 
schooners and burned them, despite his protests that he was a British ~ubject .~ '  
Another mixture of neutrality and deception was the use of neutral-flagged 
vessels, especially Spanish and Swedish, to introduce British manufactured goods into 
the American market. Because the United States was not at war with Spain or Sweden, 
trade was legal with those nations. The United States had been a major neutral carrier 
during the Napoleonic Wars. For many years, American officials had argued that the 
cargoes of American-flagged vessels were American, no matter what their origin or 
destination had been. This policy, knows as "fiee ships-fiee goods," was strongly 
opposed by the British. During the War of 1812 smugglers used the principle against the 
government. Swedish merchants, often Americans who became naturalized Swedish 
subjects at St. Bartholomews in the West Indies, bought cargoes of British manufactured 
goods in Halifax and Saint John. Under the "fiee ships-fiee goods" policy those British 
manufactured goods now became Swedish, and therefore could freely enter the United 
Another way to abuse neutral rights was for an American vessel to file clearance 
papers for a neutral port, but then sail for Halifax. The schooner Rebecca sailed with a 
cargo of 570 barrels flour fiom New York with a stated destination of Cadiz, Spain. 
However, HMS Boxer captured the Rebecca off West Quoddy Lighthouse, hundreds of 
miles off course fiom New York to Cadiz. The captain's excuse for his ships presence at 
Passamaquoddy stressed a leak in the vessel's hold. When American privateersmen 
boarded the vessel suspecting it was smuggling flour to New Brunswick, the captain 
opened a pre-prepared leak; after twenty minutes of hard work at the pumps, the 
privateersmen left the vessel to its original crew, convinced that the vessel would sink. 
The captain quickly repaired the leak, but soon fell into the hands of the British warship 
Boxer, upon which he presented his importation license from the lieutenant governor of 
Nova Scotia. The Boxer's commander sent the Rebecca into Saint John where the vice- 
admiralty court could sort out the legal technicalities. In court the Rebecca's captain 
claimed he had to change course to Saint John because the license would expire before he 
could arrive at Halifax. The court found however that the Rebecca was liable to seizure, 
and condemned it.53 
The neutral trade brought adventurers such as Constantino Llufrio, a Spanish 
subject, to Passamaquoddy where they used their nationality to cover their smuggling 
activities. Jonathan D. Weston, an Eastport lawyer, even went so far as to become a 
Swedish vice-consul to facilitate this trade. When the British captured Eastport in 1814, 
they found considerable amounts of allegedly neutral goods stored there. Besides 
Llufrio, fellow Spaniards Joze Deganttes and J. De Sola, and Swedes Johan Nyrnann and 
Andros Armidson made Moose Island their smuggling base, aided and abetted by 
American and colonial n~erchants .~~ 
The use of licenses furnished by the British became another form of deception. 
The British military was reliant on American provisions, and encouraged American 
merchants to ship flour to destinations such as Saint John or Halifax. An example of these 
licenses follows: 
I the undersigned George Stacey Smyth President and 
Commander in Chief of the Province of New Brunswick 
and the territories thereunto belonging in America, in 
pursuance of the authority given to me by order of Council 
bearing date the 1 3th day of October 18 12.--do hereby 
Grant this License, and do hereby authorize and permit Mr. 
James Congdon to import in any ship or vessel, excepting a 
ship or vessel belonging to France, or the subjects thereof, 
into the Ports of Saint Andrew and St. John in New- 
Brunswick, from any Port in the United States of America, 
from which British vessels are excluded, a Cargo of wheat, 
grain, bread, biscuit, flour, pitch, tar or turpentine, without 
molestation on account of the present hostilities and 
notwithstanding the said ship or goods shall be the property 
of any subject or inhabitant of the United States of 
America, or of any British subjects trading therewith. 
This license to continue in force for Four Months, 
dated the eighth day of August one thousand eight hundred 
& thirteen. 
[Signed] G.S. Smyth 
By his Honor Command. 
Signed Jon. 0de11.~~ 
Smyth was the military governor of New Brunswick. In this license for Janles Congdon, 
an Eastport smuggler, Smyth permitted him to import provisions or naval stores into the 
province for four months. Unfortunately for Congdon, this license fell into the hands of 
American federal authorities. Figure 8.1 displays just how much American flour reached 
Halifax during the war. Halifax flour importation peaked in the fourth quarter of 1813, 
when more than 22,000 barrels entered the port from the United ~ t a t e s . ' ~  Most of that 
flour remained in Halifax, feeding not only the local populace, but the burgeoning British 
military and naval forces there. Out of that number, 2 1,474.5 barrels came in American 
vessels that sailed under British licenses." 
After December 1813, a number of factors combined to lessen both the supply 
and demand for American flour. Congress passed another American embargo that 
forbade all ships except privateers from leaving port.58 An increasingly effective British 
blockade prohibited even licensed vessels from leaving American ports, and made it 
easier for American merchants to supply the British fleet directly. Finally, the war in 
Europe turned against Napoleon and freed the Baltic grain lands that traditionally 
supplied Britain's flour demands.59 Passamaquoddy's role in the Halifax flour trade 
peaked in the fourth quarter of 1812. During that period, 2,236 barrels -just over fifty 
percent of the total for that quarter - entered at ~a l i f ax .~ '  
Figure 8.1 : Nova Scotia Flour Imports, 18 12- 18 15 
barrels of flour 
Source: C.O. 22 11 32, 'Nova Scotia Shipping Returns" 
Table 8.1: Flour Prices at Boston v. Halifax, 1812-1815 
Date 
January 1812 
June 1812 
January 1813 
June 1813 
January 1814 
June 1814 
January 1815 
June 1815 
Boston 
$10.25 
$9.50 
$12.50 
$15.25 
$14.50 
$12.50 
$1 1.75 
$7.50 
Source: Boston Gazette and Halifm: ~ o u r n a l . ~ ~  
However, that number is considerably less than the 17,792 barrels of flour exported from 
Saint Andrews during the second quarter of 18 12, despite an American embargo.62 
The licensed flour trade could be very profitable for those willing to take risks. 
British demand inflated prices for much of the war, but by mid-1 814 the increased 
availability brought flour prices down considerably. Table 8.1 indicates the profits a 
Boston merchant could make if he engaged in the licensed flour trade with ~ a l i f a x . ~ ~  
British licenses could be problematic for smugglers, however. If American 
officials, privateersmen, or naval units found an American ship with such a license they 
would seize the vessel and send it back to the United States for trial. Early in 181 3, the 
Supreme Court ruled that such licenses were grounds for seizure.64 Congress reinforced 
that ruling by outlawing licenses. Masters of merchant vessels concealed their licenses 
when boarded by armed vessels until they deternlined the nationality of the boarding 
party. If the boarders were British, it was important to produce the papers; if American, 
they had had to be kept concealed. An example is the case of the American schooner 
Joanna, captured by the New Brunswick privateer Dart in June 18 13. The Joanna's 
papers stated that the vessel was sailing for Eastport with a cargo of corn. Captain 
Alexander Newcomb of the Joanna's claimed he really intended to sail for Halifax, but 
filed a clearance with American customs officers "in order to deceive any American 
Cruizers [privateers or warships] that might chance to fall in with them." At first 
Newcomb thought the Dart was an American privateer and concealed his license. When 
he found out it was a colonial vessel, Newcomb rowed over to his captor in a small boat 
and presented his license to sail to Halifax with provisions. But Captain John Harris of 
the Dart said "he did not care for it, that it was good for nothing, and that he would take 
all vessels worth sending in and told this Deponent if he did not pull away from the 
Privateer he would sink the Boat in which he was and positively refused to give him a 
Passage in either of said vessels."65 Licenses thus offered only limited protection. 
The license trade was a ticklish business; American naval officers often pretended 
to be British officers, and sometimes British naval officers and privateersmen did not 
accept the licenses and sent the vessel into a British port as a prize.66 A typical example 
of this is the case of the American schooner Lucy, captured by HMS Martin off West 
Quoddy Light in March 18 13. The captain of the Martin seized the Lucy and took the 
vessel to Saint John, but when the Lucy's captain produced a British license, the court 
released the 
If deception failed, smugglers could turn to other methods that relied on 
manipulating the legal system to their own benefit. One such scheme was to use regional 
hostility against the national government by pressing cases against federal officials in 
local courts. The use of local courts devastated an American unit known as Ulmer's 
Volunteers, while the second method was an especially well-documented phenomenon 
known as "collusive capture." Both methods built directly upon the long tradition of 
smuggling at Passamaquoddy. 
George Ulmer's War and Woes 
The American military had little interest in Passamaquoddy; in strategic terms the 
region was a backwater. The Madison administration and its generals had determined 
that the Great Lakes region and Upstate New York would be the springboard for an 
invasion of British North America, and thus dedicated most of its resources there. 
Alarmed by the massive smuggling occurring at Passamaquoddy, however, the War 
Department belatedly assigned a regiment of one-year volunteers to guard what was 
termed the "Eastern Frontier." Its primary mission was to suppress smuggling. 
The commander of this unit was George Ulmer, a Revolutionary War veteran, 
failed merchant, and Jeffersonian politician.68 Ulmer received his conmission in 
November, 18 12, and immediately proceeded for Eastport, where he relieved several 
companies of Massachusetts militia commanded by his kinsman, Jacob Ulmer. Ulmer 
made an effort to bring the Passarnaquoddy borderland under control and to stop 
smuggling entirely. His efforts raised the ire of local residents, who successfully struck 
back through a variety of tactics. 
Ulmer faced a number of difficulties. Eastport was packed with adventurers and 
enemy aliens, many of them smugglers who openly wore arms. Ulmer estimated that 
almost two hundred people in Eastport were involved in supplying the British with 
provisions.69 Among these was Jabez Mowry, one of the region's most active smugglers. 
Early in the war, he successfully smuggled $50,107 worth of beef and pork to the British 
commissary at ~a l i f ax .~ '  He also supplied the American garrison on Moose Island, and 
then reported information about American troop strengths to the British commander at St. 
~ n d r e w s . ~ '  
Ulmer faced more problems than just smugglers, however. For example, the 
regular Army officer who commanded Fort Sullivan did not cooperate with a force of 
undisciplined volunteers, and quarreled with ~ l m e r . ~ ~  Furthermore, supply routes to 
Passamaquoddy were tenuous at best, and the Royal Navy and privateers from Maritime 
ports controlled the ocean approaches to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  On at least one occasion the 
master of a vessel destined to Eastport with supplies for Ulrner instead simply sailed for 
New Brunswick, and sold the provisions to the ~ r i t i s h . ~ ~  His troops largely consisted of 
old men and young boys with little equipment and no uniforms, and his officers bickered 
among themselves. Provisions were scarce and expensive. The local contractor who 
supplied them was a prominent local smuggler named Jonathan Bartlett. Ulmer accused 
Bartlett of informing the British about the quantity of provisions he supplied Ulmer, and 
of giving the American soldiers spoiled flour and substandard meat, the salted pork 
mostly pig heads, the salt beef including internal organs.75 
Despite these obstacles Ulmer attempted to perform his duty. His primary 
mission was to suppress smuggling; otherwise his orders were to act strictly on the 
d e f e n ~ i v e . ~ ~  He even refrained from attacking the British when a Royal Navy warship 
lay helpless under the guns of his fort one morning.77 Ulmer was more aggressive in 
acting against Eastport's smuggling community. He required all enemy aliens to register 
with him and take an oath of loyalty or face trial for treason. All persons crossing the 
border required a pass from him; his officers examined all mail going to New Brunswick. 
His actions resulted in a substantial reduction in smuggling, but deeply offended the 
borderlands community, which initiated a campaign to harass him.78 These efforts 
included threats made by smugglers to tar and feather the colonel.79 
Standard techniques used during the embargo were reinitiated, such as bribing 
soldiers who guarded impounded contraband with both liquor and money.80 Local 
merchants and magistrates, adventurers, and even the port's deputy customs collector 
colluded against Ulmer's anti-smuggling campaign. When one of Ulmer's soldiers shot 
and wounded a smuggler, Sheriff Cooper arrested the soldier and sent him to jail at 
Castine to await trial for attempted m ~ r d e r . ~ '  Ulmer eventually forbade magistrates to 
arrest his soldiers.82 Merchants engaged in a letter writing campaign against Ulmer. 
Smugglers actively defied his edicts; on March 20, 18 13, smugglers took nine barrels of 
tobacco from Josiah Little's wharf in Eastport. One of Ulmer's patrol boats pursued, but 
was unable to seize the craft when a nearby British vessel opened fire on them. 
Nonetheless, the officer was able to identify the smugglers and Ulmer ordered his troops 
to keep an eye out for them.83 The post at Robbinston observed the men trying to cross 
back into the United States a few days later, and captured them and the boat they were in. 
Ulmer's men took possession of the boat and made the men prisoners. As one of the 
young soldiers recalled, "We boarded her & found Robert Nowlin Capt. Hutchins a Mr. 
Fowler & a Mr. Monroe. We took possession & the sargeant put myself & Dickey 
another man into Nowlin's boat. Nowlin was still at helm the boat jibed at which 
Hutchins catched & threw our gun over board & with Fowler ketch the other gun & 
Fowler discharged the priming-- They carried us to St. Andrews & delivered us to the 
c~rntnd ' t ."~~ Not only did the smugglers turn the table on the soldiers, but they handed 
them over to the British garrison at St. Andrews. The British commander quickly 
returned one, but discovered that Private John Dicky had only recently emigrated from 
New Brunswick to the United States. Dicky was in fact a British subject bearing arms 
against his king. The British officer therefore kept Dicky a prisoner and made him face 
trial for treason.85 
The masterstroke against Ulmer was a piece of legal trickery made possible by the 
remoteness of Fort Sullivan. The federal government failed to supply Ulmer's troops 
adequately, and thus he went into personal debt to buy them provisions. In addition, he 
had many old debts remaining from before the war. In mid March 18 13, several 
merchants pressed Ulmer to pay his debts to them.86 When he failed to pay, they had him 
incarcerated for debt in the Washington County jail at Machias. Ulmer remained there 
for a few weeks until he persuaded local justices that it was illegal to prevent a military 
officer from performing his duties during wartime. When Ulmer returned to Fort 
Sullivan, he found the garrison in chaos. He attempted to reestablish order through a 
draconian decree that banned civilians from Fort Sullivan, strictly prohibited all cross- 
border traffic, and forbade civilian officials arresting his troops. In effect he declared 
martial law?' But Ulmer's power to control the region was slipping away; even his 
command over the soldiers was rapidly eroding. Ulmer also apparently took to drinking 
too much, further diminishing the confidence of his officers and men.88 
During Independence Day celebrations in 18 13, Ulmer's troops and locals clashed 
in a riot.89 Local residents celebrated the day by fornling a procession that wound its way 
to Eastport's sole schoolhouse, where local worthies read aloud the Declaration of 
Independence and George Washington's "Farewell Address." While locals did this, 
some of Ulmer's troops disrupted the proceedings by celebrating the holiday in their own 
manner, by shooting their muskets in the air, and thereby halted the event in the 
schoolhouse. When the locals continued their parade, some of Ulmer's troops gathered 
to shout insults and hurl pieces of brick, broken kettles, and stones at them. Determined 
to continue their celebrations, the locals proceeded to Young's inn to drink toasts and fire 
salutes from the local militia artillery company's cannon. Notably, Ulmer had 
complained that inn keeper Young was one of the individuals who was most troublesome 
to him, and the commander of Eastport's artillery company was Ethel Olmstead, a 
smuggler and enemy alien.90 About one hundred soldiers vented their many frustrations 
by surrounding Young's inn and terrifying the locals within, throwing rocks and gravel at 
the windows, and shouting that only the American flag displayed for the holiday 
protected the terrified celebrants within. Furthermore, the soldiers seized the militia 
cannon and fired it, and even threatened to throw it over a cliff. The efforts of Ulmer's 
officers to control the rioting troops proved fi-~itless.~' 
When local officials approached Ulmer to do something, he intervened personally 
to stop the rioting. Ulmer went to the barracks where his men were firing muskets in the 
air, and ordered the soldiers to stop. When the soldiers continued to fire their guns, 
Ulmer ordered cannons "to be charged with grape shot & pointed to the barracks, and 
went himself and told the men as sure as they fired again he would have the field pieces 
discharged at them. He had scarcely got at the distance of fifty rods from the barracks 
before they began to fire."92 The soldiers manning the cannon refixed to fire on their 
comrades, and the rioting continued into the night, and culminated in the burning of 
figures in effigy.93 
Ulmer's own officers turned on him as well. Capt. Sherman Leland, a local 
attorney who joined the Volunteers for one year, abruptly left Ulmer's unit when he 
acquired a regular commission in the 34th U.S. Infantry. Leland then began recruiting 
troops away from his former regiment, not only taking away his fornler commander's 
men, but their equipment as well. Leland had a grudge against Ulmer; perhaps because 
Leland as an Eastport resident resented the heavy-handed tactics of an outsider like 
Ulmer. According to one soldier, Leland complained openly about his former 
commander, saying "he believed Ulmer had taken bribes of smuanlers to pay his private 
debts, adding that he did not calculate he would hold his station long. but would soon be 
removed from his post-I have also heard sd. Lealand say, that Ulmer was a ~ a s c a l . " ~ ~  
With some fellow officers, Leland complained to the district commander about 
Ulmer's conduct.95 In August 1813, the region's commander relieved Ulmer of his 
command and placed him under arrest. Leland eventually succeeded Ulmer as the 
commander of Fort Sullivan, and anti-smuggling operations were reduced to a minimum, 
with the exception of the Venture incident in which Leland profited so handsomely. A 
military court of inquiry held in May 1814, found Ulmer innocent of any criminal 
charges, but the damage was already done: the federal government had disbanded his 
regiment entirely in December 1 8 13 .96 
Ulmer's downfall was the product of borderland hostility to his anti-smuggling 
measures. No matter whether one blames the adventurers, local magistrates, or his own 
subordinates, borderland residents effectively removed him from power. Notably, locals 
used local courts to harass a federal official, and even used the military justice system 
against itself; very little direct action had to be taken against Ulmer, although borderland 
residents did threaten to tar and feather him once.97 Eastport continued to be a 
smuggler's haven for the remainder of the war despite the continued presence of a 
diminished American garrison at Fort Sullivan. One of the most aggressive methods used 
was to subvert the legitimate practice of privateering into a form of smuggling. 
Collusive Capture 
Collusive capture was a method of smuggling whereby borderland residents and 
others distorted the state's manner of waging war and turned it against itself. In a 
collusive capture, merchants arranged for a privateer to conduct a pre-arranged sham 
capture of an enemy vessel. Privateers were privately-owned vessels conmissioned by 
the government to conduct war against the enemy. Privateers were a means whereby a 
young and relatively poor nation such as the United States could mount a sort of naval 
guerilla warfare, or guerre de course in the terminology of the day, against a superior 
force such as the Royal Navy. Americans used privateers extensively during the war of 
18 12, and the Maritime Provinces commissioned many privateers as well.'* 
Conducting collusive captures took enormous coordination between American 
privateersmen and Maritimes merchants, and speaks to a tight bond between the two 
regions. While published court records are available in the United States that go into 
great detail concerning this practice, American scholars have overlooked the issue; credit 
is due to Canadian historian Faye Kert for rediscovering the practice.99 A number of 
collusive capture cases went to the United States Supreme Court, all of them concerning 
small privateers operating in northern New England waters. The waters of 
Passamaquoddy, especially around Grand Manan, seem to have been the most popular for 
conducting such operations. These collusive captures were often so blatant as to insult the 
intelligence of the courts. For example, virtually all privateers operated on a shares 
system whereby the crew received a portion of the proceeds from the vessels they 
captured. If the privateer did not capture any enemy vessels, then the crew received no 
prize money. But on board privateers that conducted collusive captures, the crews 
received wages rather than shares. Typically the privateers involved in sham captures 
were also very small; sometimes they were mere open boats. Collusive captures and 
other misdeeds became such an infamous practice that President Madison revoked the 
commissions of all privateers carrying crews of less than twenty.Io0 
In the United States privateering was less popular the closer one traveled toward 
the border. In eastern Maine the opposition was particularly bitter; one state legislator 
even suggested that American privateers be burned at the wharf, and their crews tarred 
and feathered. The streets of Eastport were reported to be unsafe for privateersmen even 
in daylight.'0' The basis of this opposition was not political, ideological, or moral, but 
Private armed vessels interfered with their livelihoods and trade, created an 
enormous number of awkward problems for these isolated communities, and brought 
about the possibility of British reprisals. These problems occurred in the Maritimes as 
well, but their impact was less important both because the British navy provided better 
protection and provincial politics were less discordant than in the United States. 
The Venture incident was really a case of collusive capture gone awry. First the 
Royal Navy suspected the vessel of being a smuggler, but had to let it go for lack of 
evidence, and then the U.S. Army captured the craft. Meanwhile a small American 
privateer called the Mary had been skulking about Passamaquoddy Bay, waiting for an 
appropriate moment to make a sham capture of the Venture and its rich cargo. Virtually 
everything about the Mary was suspicious. It was the only American privateer 
commissioned in the Passamaquoddy district during the entire war. The vessel was tiny, 
a mere six tons. Its captain was a former customhouse inspector at the Passamaquoddy 
district who was sure to have known the best way to smuggle goods into the country.lo3 
The two merchants who gave bonds for the Mary were two Eastport merchants, Jabez 
Mowry and Benjamin Bucknam, both notorious smugglers who previously had been 
outspoken opponents of privateering. The captain of the Mary had even bought his 
gunpowder from colonial merchants in St. hdrews.'04 
Collusive captures were perhaps the ultimate distortion of privateering and the 
state's desire to wage war. Rather than hampering enemy trade, borderland residents 
facilitated it through this deviant form of privateering. Far from acting as patriots, some 
privateersmen actually acted as smugglers. The power of illicit trade thus twisted the 
concept of warfare in the Bay of Fundy. Indeed, the pull of profit proved so strong in this 
periphery that even Royal Navy captains participated in orchestrating collusive captures 
off ~ a m ~ o b e l l o . ' ~ ~  
Conclusion 
War brought confusion and crisis to Passamaquoddy residents, who wanted no 
part of the conflict. New Brunswick, despite its Loyalist heritage, did not spring to arms 
against the American foe. In fact most people in the province seem to have been "well- 
disposed towards the United States." Despite modem feeling that Maritimers showed 
their loyalty to Britain during the War of 1812, rigorous examination reveals little 
enthusiasm for the war.'06 The situation was similar in Maine, which like much of New 
England had deep misgivings about the war, especially given the overwhelming 
superiority of the Royal Navy and the region's vulnerable coastline. For borderland 
residents, moreover, the stakes were even higher; the state of war threatened the intricate 
system of accommodation that defined local life. 
Borderlands society attempted to suppress friction between British subjects and 
American citizens. This tactic of accommodation took many forms, including formal and 
informal transborder agreements to discourage violence, non-compliance of local militia 
units to serve outside of their immediate comnlunity, personal agreements with the 
enemy, and a continued tolerance for "enemy aliens" to live on either side of the border 
as they chose. The background against which all these accommodations operated was a 
continuation of illicit trade across the border. 
In the end, the War of 18 12 made little material difference to Passamaquoddy 
residents. The British retained possession of Moose Island until 18 18, when arbitration 
by the King of the Netherlands restored the border to its pre-1814 form. Perhaps the only 
tangible difference was that a commercial center sprung up in Lubec, Maine, during the 
British occupation of Eastport. There Jabez Mowry and fellow smugglers resumed their 
business, especially in the plaster trade. Less tangible was a renewed determination by 
American, colonial, and imperial officials to assert their control over trade and the border. 
While during the embargo and War of 1812 American officials faced hostile crowds of 
smugglers, after the war New Brunswick learned how difficult it was to control the illicit 
trade at Passarnaquoddy. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
THE PLASTER WAR 
Introduction 
It was the sort of report every colonial administrator dreaded receiving. In a letter 
to Lieutenant Governor George Stracey Smyth, New Brunswick officials on the border 
with the United States in the summer of 1820 reported "a state of actual and unqualified 
Rebellion against His Majesty's Government of this ~rovince."' But Smyth was in a 
ticklish situation; overt military action on the border might arouse the ire of the United 
States, with whlch Britain had been at peace only a few years since the conclusion of the 
War of 18 12. Furthermore, Smyth had only a handful of troops in the colony, and they 
were needed in the provincial capital at Fredericton where they had suppressed a riot only 
a month b e f ~ r e . ~  Beyond that, prudent colonial administrators who wished to continue 
their careers hesitated before reacting to reports fiom panicky officials. 
Smyth knew that smuggling lay at the heart of this revolt, but like other colonial 
administrators he knew that there was more to this problem than simply upholding the 
majesty of the law. Stopping the smugglers and now rebels in the Passarnaquoddy region 
was part of a bigger struggle in which the port city Saint John, New Brunswick, 
attempted to assert economic dominance over the Bay of Fundy. In some ways this 
struggle marked New Brunswick's departure fiom pre-capitalist economics into 
capitalism. Canadian scholars such as Eric Sager, Gerald Panting, and T.W. Acheson 
have outlined the process whereby Saint John merchants assumed control over the Bay of 
Fundy's economic output even when they did not directly control the production 
process.3 But the struggle to stop the plaster trade was more than an economic or 
political contest, it was also closely related to the Loyalist identity of the province. More 
than one observer noted that the smugglers involved in the plaster trade introduced 
American ideas of free trade and democracy into the province.4 
The year 1820 was an inlportant one for New Brunswick, and may be considered 
the date in which it began to develop capitalist institutions, such as the Bank of New 
~runswick .~  Would the colony become more bbAmerican" (egalitarian, tied to American 
markets), or would it retain a more "British" (hierarchical, tied to British markets) 
character? The question was a crucial one in a province founded by American loyalist 
refbgees after the American Revolution. The colony had always possessed some self- 
contradictory attributes; a British colony, nlany of its inhabitants were native-born North 
Americans, whether Acadian, pre-loyalist, loyalist, or later immigrants. While the colony 
was part of the British mercantile system, from its very founding in 1784 it had trouble 
divorcing itself from United States markets, especially American foodstuffs such as 
flour.6 New Brunswick was a remote pioneer society similar to much of the United 
States and British North America, yet it looked to British institutions as social models. 
No small amount of confusion arose out of the question of New Brunswick's search for 
its identity, and on occasion the contradictions within the province's loyalist society 
resulted in violent confrontations, of which the Plaster War was but one. 
Violent crowd protest was not unusual in the Atlantic Provinces in the nineteenth 
century, in either urban or rural settings. Scholars have studied unrest in the region to 
reveal patterns of ethnic tensions, class divisions, social injustice, labor relations, and 
other issues.' An analysis of the so-called Plaster War contributes to this body of 
knowledge by examining crowd protest as a reaction to the rise of capitalism in the 
region.* The plastennen did not willingly give up the means of production to the Saint 
John merchants; it was a struggle that occasionally broke into violence. 
Background to the Plaster War 
Stephen Humbert's problems were the result of a new provincial policy to take 
control of the plaster trade. The plaster trade had been a mixed blessing to both New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia for decades. While it provided a valuable export to the 
United States that supported many fanners, mariners, and small merchants, it also 
encouraged large-scale smuggling as these same entrepreneurs returned from the border 
with holds full of American produce illegally brought into the province without paying 
the stiff customs duties placed on foreign goods.9 This problem was not small; economic 
historians estimate that plaster was British North America's most valuable export to the 
United States in the first decades of the nineteenth century.'' 
But why should plaster be such a widely smuggled item? The answer lies in the 
needs of American agriculture. Plaster, usually known as plaister or plaister paris, is now 
better known as gypsum, the material that fills sheetrock panels in home construction." 
But in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries plaster was the first chemical 
fertilizer, a miracle substance that when ground up and scattered over fields substantially 
increased harvests, especially of wheat. Farmers in the American wheat-raising heartland 
in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia demanded huge amounts of plaster, as did 
farmers as far north as ~ a i n e . ' *  The American market demanded plaster to support 
commercial wheat farming, and consumer demand is an important aspect of the 
smuggling dynamic. But supply, too, played a role in smuggling. Before the 1820s, the 
only known source of plaster in North America was at the head of the Bay of Fundy, 
mostly along the Fundy shore of Nova Scotia, but also in Westmorland County, New 
Brunswick. 
The scale of this trade was large in its day, neither British North America or the 
United States customs officials recorded statistics concerning the gypsum trade. Colonial 
customs administrators largely ignored the smaller coasting craft engaged in the plaster 
trade, except to extract heavy fees from those engaged in it.13 American custom 
regulations allowed plaster to enter duty free, and thus unrecorded. But New Brunswick 
officials knew the trade was growing, and periodically estimated the size of the trade. In 
1794, approximately 100 tons were exported via Passamaquoddy; by 1802 about 13,000 
tons, by 1806, 50,000 tons, and by 1820 over 100,000 tons.14 In 1820, the average price 
of plaster in Eastport was $2.50; in Boston at this time was about $3.12, and in 
Philadelphia about $4.00.'~ In 1802, the Boston Gazette began to regularly report the 
current price of plaster on a per ton basis, an indication of the growing importance of 
plaster to the American market. 
The fluctuating price of plaster also reflects the diplomatic difficulties between 
British North America and the United States and even the state of world markets. Prior 
to 1807, the Napoleonic Wars raging in Europe created a huge demand for American 
flour, which in turn created a demand for gypsum from the Bay of Fundy even as it cut 
off the traditional French supply. Prices rose steadily for gypsum with greater demand 
until 1807, when a crisis in relations between Britain and the United States arose in the 
aftermath of the Chesapeake incident. Jefferson's embargo fiather depressed both flour 
and gypsum prices. When trade resumed in 1809, prices quickly rebounded, and in 
response to the War of 18 12 soared even higher, encouraging the plaster trade even when 
it constituted trade with the enemy. The Nova Scotia Assembly even went to the length 
of legalizing the plaster trade during the War of 1812.'~ Plaster demanded the highest 
prices at the end of the war, when British naval strength cut off supplies from the Bay of 
Fundy. For a few months the price of a ton of plaster even exceeded that of a barrel of 
flour. 
Figure 9.1: Boston Plaster Prices, 1802-1820 
Source: Boston Gazette. All prices reflect low wholesale prices in U.S. dollars as of June 
1 for each year. 
After 18 15, plaster prices declined, reflecting the decline of flour prices after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, and possibly the reappearance of French gypsum on the 
market. By 1820, plaster sold for as little as $3.00 per ton. A closer analysis of the 
Boston price of gypsum in 1820 reveals a surprise: New Brunswick's war on gypsum 
smuggling was so ineffectual that it did not stem the supply enough to raise its value in 
American markets, either in Boston or at Passanlaquoddy, where nine-tenths of the 
gypsum entered the United States. 
Comparing Eastport prices to Boston prices also reveals one of the sources of 
profit in the plaster trade; the commodity itself was valuable, but transporting it reaped 
just as much profit. Plaster bought at $2.00 per ton in Eastport was worth $1.25 more in 
Boston, and yet more in Baltimore and Philadelphia. Transporting gypsum, or "the 
carrying trade" in the parlance of the times, was worth potentially as much as the 
material, a fact that the ambitious merchants of Saint John, New Brunswick were very 
aware. 17 
The Plaster Trade in Operation 
The plaster trade operated in a pre-market mode whereby small independent 
producers individually brought their product to market. The producers controlled the 
production, transportation, and marketing of the product. While these small gypsum 
quarries were not efficient in capitalist tern~s, they provided additional means to augment 
the meager rewards of Nova Scotia agriculture. After 1805, plaster became an 
increasingly important export item. 
Table 9.1: Boston Plaster Prices, 1820 
Date Plaster LowITon Plaster HiddTon 
-3.50 $3.62 
March 1820 $3.50 $3.62 
A ril 1820 
May 1820 $3.50 -- 
June 1820 $3.50 -- 
July 1820 $3.50 $3.75 
August 1820 $3.50 $3.75 
September 1820 $3.50 $3.75 
October 1820 $3.00 $3.25 - - 
November 1820 $3.00 $3.25 
December 1820 $3.00 $3.25 
Source: Boston Gazette, 1820 
Table 9.2: Eastport Plaster Prices, Summer 1820 
Date Plaster LowITon Plaster HighITon 
August 5,1820 $2.50 -- 
August 26,1820 $2.00 $2.25 
September 2, 1820 $2.00 $2.25 
$2.25 
September 20, 1820 $2.00 $2.25 
Source: Eastport Sentinel, 1820 
Gypsum is a soft rock usually found close to the surface, or even exposed on banks and 
hillsides. Locals mined it using gunpowder, which was often bought illicitly at the 
border. Farmers blasted the plaster loose and transported it by the cartload to small 
vessels, where it was dumped into their holds, still in loose, rocky form. The vessel then 
delivered the gypsum to Passarnaquoddy, where it was either lightered ashore in small 
vessels and dumped into piles on shore, or transferred directly to an American vessel, 
either by small boats or actually coming alongside, preferably under cover of night. Once 
in America, the plaster was delivered still in its raw state, and finally at the retail level 
was ground first in a stamping mill and then in a common gristmill into a fine powder, 
placed in casks or barrels, and delivered to fanners for fertilizer or builders for plaster.18 
Experts deemed six to eight bushels of plaster sufficient to fertilize an acre of wheat.19 
While the gypsum trade was modestly profitable for those who lived in the Bay of 
Minas area, their actions were those of a premarket people taking advantage of a local 
resource, rather than of true capitalists. The gypsum trade was never very well 
organized. Wealthier landowners, such as Thomas Chandler Haliburton of Windsor, 
largely conceded control of plaster mining by leasing out their deposits to local farmers 
who mined them part time.20 The quames themselves were small, described as "kettle 
holes," and frequently abandoned for newer, easier to work sites.21 In order to reduce 
competition among themselves, some gypsum producers chose to band together and hire 
an agent to conduct all their buying and selling for them, although this does not seen1 to 
be the rule.22 Furthermore, despite some offrcial feeling that the plaster should be 
processed before exportation, the plastermen seldom ground and barreled their product; 
John DeWolf built the first plaster mill in Nova Scotia in 1 8 1 2 . ~ ~  However, despite their 
lack of organization, these small producers were shrewd enough to appreciate cheap 
labor, and during the Napoleonic Wars were able to hire a number of Bohemian and 
Hungarian laborers. These laborers were termed "Gennans" by the locals, but it seems 
more likely that they were Austrian soldiers captured by the French, but liberated by the 
Royal Navy and set at liberty in ~ a l i f a x . ~ ~  
The mariners who transported the plaster were the neighbors and kinsmen, and 
undoubtedly in some cases the same individuals who quarried it.25 This was somewhat 
unusual; generally cargo producers and ship owners were not the same individuals, but 
the low unit value of plaster, combined with high freight rates - generally higher than the 
value of the plaster itself - encouraged ship ownership by the plaster producers.26 The 
vessels they operated were primarily small schooners of around forty tons burthen, 
operated by a master and a few deckhands. This upset the merchant capitalists of Saint 
John, who wanted to see the plaster carried in their larger vessels directly to market in 
New York and ~hi ladel~hia .~ '  The small schooners went back and forth from the Minas 
Basin to Passamaquoddy several times a year as convenient. Once at Passarnaquoddy, 
they generally anchored in the waters between Moose Island and Campobello, deposited 
their ship's paperwork with the customhouse officer there, and arranged to sell and 
transfer their cargo either to the American shore, especially Allan's or Rice's Islands, or 
directly into an American OAen the plastermen conducted these transfers at 
night, in contravention of both American and British laws, but the dark offered partially 
cloaked their activities. Ideally, the two vessels moored alongside one another and 
transferred their cargo from hold to hold. If that was not possible, the crew transferred 
the cargo in small boats. Working in the dark was far more dangerous than during the 
day; injuries and drownings were c o m n ~ o n . ~ ~  
Assisting the plasternlen in these transactions were a number of merchants who 
specialized in the plaster trade. Among the Americans were Jabez Mowry and the firnl of 
Dana, Wheeler, & Bartlett. Among the New Brunswick merchants were the firm of 
Andrews and Campbell of Campobello. Notably, the senior partner was Israel Andrews, 
who lived in the same household as Thomas Henderson, the British customs officer who 
turned a blind eye to the smuggling trade at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  His junior partner, Colin 
Campbell, Jr., was the son of the region's creole surveyor and searcher of customs, Colin 
Campbell, Sr. Clearly these two had little to fear from the local customs authorities. 
Andrews and Campbell arranged for American provisions, gunpowder, sails, iron, tea, 
and brandy, wine, and gin to be sent to Passamaquoddy in return for their plaster, timber, 
and fish.)' The amount of plaster they moved was large. In July 1805, this firm alone 
had five hundred tons of plaster on hand, and was daily purchasing more.32 While 
immune from the local customs authorities, Andrews and Campbell did have to deal with 
George Leonard's efforts to break up smuggling in Passamaquoddy Bay. In 1805, 
Leonard seized the sloop Falmouth and one hundred and seventy tons of plaster on board 
that belonged to Andrews and ~ a m ~ b e l l . ~ )  Andrews also suffered arrest when HMS 
Porgey attempted to halt smuggling at Passamaquoddy in 1807. A midshipman who 
seized a plaster vessel Andrews happened to be on ordered the merchant into Porgey's 
boat. Andrews replied that he would get into his own boat, upon which "the midshipman 
damned him, and told him he should go into the cutter's boat-a quarrel ensued, when 
the midshipman knocked down Andrews, then put a pistol to his breast, and told him if he 
did not immediately conlply, he would blow him Andrews conlplied, and later 
the commander of the Porgey released him. 
Leonard was correct in that the plasternlen were indeed smuggling American 
goods and produce illegally into both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Leonard 
reported in 1803 that Americans paid for the plaster not with cash, but with "Teas and 
coarse cottons imported from the East Indies by the Americans, adulterated brandies, and 
other spirits, coarse shoes and Boots, and other articles, principally the manufactures of 
the United States, received in return for the Plaister and Grindstones. These contraband 
articles, thus received, are afterwards easily distributed by boats and small craft thro' 
every part of this Province, and also thro' that valuable and populous part of the Province 
of Nova Scotia lying upon the Bay of ~ u n d ~ . " ~ '  By the end of 1810, British officials 
complained that the plaster trade was "most ruinous," and that it was "the means of 
corrupting the morals of the diggers & carriers. It is a cloak for smugglers, and it takes 
off the Farmer from improving and raising grain."36 
By 181 1, American customs officials became equally alarmed by the plaster 
trade. Lemuel Trescott, the American customs collector at Passamaquoddy, reported the 
following: 
there never was a greater quantity Plaister carried to the 
westward in one year than there has been this so far.-This 
Plaister, the greater part of it, has been either taken from 
British vessels in our waters in the night time, or taken on 
board in the British waters, in either case the Americans 
goes immediately to sea after obtaining their cargoes to 
avoid the British Cutter on one side and the American on 
the other.-I have done all in my power to check this 
growing evil, but when it is considered that this Plaister on 
the British side brings only 4$ the ton, it is worth 8$ in our 
waters and when it is seen this District has in it men of 
enterprise in pursuit of gain, and well versed in eluding the 
officers of the Custom House, add to this, there now in this 
place not less by estimation than one hundred Merchants 
from New York and other places, after Plaister to lade their 
vessels I fear it will be impossible to check the unlawhl 
intercourse while the Plaister is freely admitted into all the 
ports westward except yours.37 
The problem was not so much the plaster itself, but that smugglers hid British 
manufactured goods underneath the plaster to introduce them into the forbidden 
American market. Newspapers lampooned merchant tailors, dry-goods merchants, from 
Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York rushing off to Boston where they claimed to buy 
plaster, when in fact they were buying smuggled goods.38 This trade was entirely in 
violation of the American non-intercourse laws that forbade all British and colonial goods 
and produce from entering the United States, both the plaster and the dry goods. By 
18 1 1, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin issued a circular to all customs collectors 
in the nation warning them to be especially vigilant when dealing with vessels from 
Passamaquoddy, and even more so with those carrying plaster.39 
During 18 12, Trescott seized a staggering 2,684 tons of plaster on beaches, 
wharves, and on board vessels at Passamaquoddy (see Appendix C). The problem 
continued even after the declaration of war in late June. Col. George Ulrner found that 
I soon found that a system was adopted by the citizens to 
smuggle by ruse and with the knowledge of the Custom 
House officers. A Quantity of Plaister Paris would be 
landed by a British vessel in the night upon the American 
shore, the Collector is informed of it, seizes it, the owner 
call it four times what it is, appraisers are appointed to 
appraise it, that it may be bonded and generally appraised 
at a quarter of what it is worth, and so with every article 
they judge upon.- A vessel comes in from the westward, 
loaded with provisions, but enters twenty or thirty tons of 
Plaister, and clears the same. Immediately after she enters, 
heaves up her anchor and drifts to the British side, there 
sells and takes a load of Plaister and English goods, & 
proceeds to the ~es tward .~ '  
Plaster was thus intimately linked with smuggling from the trade's inception through the 
War of 18 12. Prior to 18 17, both the American and colonial govemments failed to 
control the plaster trade. Accustomed to the use of a "neutral zone," official corruption, 
and popular support, the plaster trade continued unabated at Passanlaquoddy. 
New Brunswick's Plaster Law 
There were several problems with the plaster trade for colonial administrators and 
those with an interest in economic development. First, the plaster trade produced no 
revenue for the colonial government. Outgoing products seldom had to pay an export fee 
in mercantilist political economy; the idea was that exports would either be exchanged 
for specie, or less ideally, foreign goods taxed at the customhouse on arrival. 
Unfortunately the plaster trade does not seem to have produced much specie payment. 
Instead plaster was traded for goods, such as American flour and provisions, tobacco, 
rum, naval stores, or goods imported to North America in American bottoms, such as tea 
and m~lasses .~ '  These goods entered the Maritime Provinces clandestinely without 
paying imperial duties. The customs officer at Windsor, Nova Scotia, one of the great 
centers of gypsum smuggling, collected a mere eighteen shillings and ten pence in duties 
on imported goods between 18 16 and 1 8 1 9.42 
The Plaster War was partly the result of provincial govemments attempting to 
assert their authority in new ways. Obviously the plaster traders resented this, but so did 
imperial customs officers who fiercely defended their sinecures. New Brunswick's 
Council and Nova Scotia's Legislative Assembly launched investigations into 
customhouse corruption in 1820. The investigations produced some startling results. For 
example, Windsor, Nova Scotia, may have produced only eighteen shillings in revenue 
for the crown between 1 8 16 and 1 8 19, but it produced an estimated £3,000 in fees that 
went directly into customs officials' pockets in the same time.43 Customs officers thus 
opposed regulating the plaster trade, a fact that was to embarrass Stephen Humbert time 
and again during the Plaster War. 
The second problem with the plaster trade was that the profits in temx of 
eighteenth-century political economy were squandered on small producers. The 
merchants of Saint John wanted to control the plaster trade to capture its profits. This 
would not only provide the modest profits offered by the gypsum itself, but the more 
alluring gain from the carrying trade as well. There lay yet another allure to the gypsum 
trade; if the Saint John merchants controlled the plaster trade, the immense traffic in 
American goods, especially provisions, would be stripped from the plastermen and 
placed in their hands. Saint John would become the marketplace for the entire Bay of 
Fundy, concentrating wealth and mercantile power in the hands of the great merchants at 
the expense of self-sufficient independent producers.44 For many years before 1820 Saint 
John merchants expressed a desire to control the plaster trade through legislation. This 
legislation attempted to forbid carrying plaster to any American ports east of either 
Boston or Portland, thereby restricting the trade to the larger vessels only Saint John 
merchants could afford to build, maintain, man, and insure.45 The plaster war was thus 
truly a battle over the means of production, not just involving the vague economic forces 
described in the works of Sager and Panting, but using fists, muskets, and cannon. 
The third problem with the plaster trade was a perception that it induced 
otherwise loyal provincials to conduct themselves in "the manners of sentiments of 
modem  democrat^."^^ Even after the War of 1812, New Brunswick officials constantly 
fretted over the "Americanization" of Charlotte Smuggling, trading as one 
wanted without regard for the state, was feared as a harbinger of egalitarian politics by 
the political and economic leaders of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia-except, 
apparently, when they engaged in it themselves, which was frequently.48 Plaster 
smugglers certainly were not afraid to flaunt the authority of political appointees, as 
Stephen Humbert found out to his dismay in 1820. In 18 17, plastermen at St. Andrews, 
New Brunswick, overwhelmed an official who attempted to interfere with their 
smuggling. The hapless official not only had his boat taken from him, but it was 
pointedly used to smuggle plaster as Even the Royal Navy was not free from this 
abuse.50 The plaster trade undoubtedly did undermine respect for authority; by 1820 
Crown customs officers in Passamaquoddy seem to have given up attempting to regulate 
the plaster trade, instead accepting the trade in order to skim off small fees for their own 
enrichment. 
Government and mercantile interests thus joined to curb the illicit plaster trade in 
the name of good government and greater profits, using worries over provincial identity 
and loyalty as a further excuse to implement the plaster laws. Stephen Humbert, a minor 
government official, Saint John merchant, and loyalist is thus highly representative of the 
sort of people concerned with controlling the plaster trade. Were he successful, Humbert 
had a great deal to gain from New Brunswick plaster regulations. 
Humbert's Dilemma Begins 
Stephen Humbert's problems began even before he left for Passamaquoddy. New 
Brunswick's Lt. Governor charged Humbert with enforcing a new set of laws passed by 
the provincial assembly that regulated the plaster trade at Passamaquoddy, a commerce 
that was well known to encouraging smuggling fiom the United States into the 
province." New Brunswick's 1820 plaster law appointed a "preventative officer" with 
wide powers to control this trade, especially as it existed in Charlotte County, which 
abutted the border with Maine in the United States. Humbert accepted his appointment 
as the provincial preventative officer, had his son John appointed as his deputy, and 
converted his forty-ton vessel into a government cutter by hoisting a distinctive red 
burgee with the word "preventative" stitched on it.52 Yet even before Humbert set sail 
for Passamaquoddy, plaster smugglers had seriously embarrassed him by kidnapping his 
son and assistant John. 
The kidnapping was not a plot against Hunlbert, but it was a painful experience 
nonetheless. The incident began innocently enough; in a spate of dirty weather a Nova 
Scotia schooner loaded with plaster (or a "plasterman," a term describing both the vessels 
and the individuals engaged in the plaster trade), took refuge within Partridge Island in 
the outer reaches of Saint John harbor after having lost its rudder. Hunlbert and his son 
boarded the schooner to ensure its compliance with the new plaster law, The master 
however refused to cooperate by providing his ship's papers, and the preventative 
officers managed to take the vessel into custody only after some resistance. 
Humbert acted well within the law when he seized the schooner, which turned out 
to be the Mary, a forty-ton coasting schooner from Windsor, Nova Scotia, a community 
notorious for its smuggling. The schooner's captain violated three legal requirements of 
provincial and British law. First, the vessel's master refused to present his papers as 
required by New Brunswick's plaster law. Second, the vessel's name did not appear on 
its stem as British navigation law required. Third, the master had actually lied about his 
intentions to report to the preventative office and attempted to escape by sailing out of the 
harbor. Hurnbert placed his son John on board with orders to secure the Mary by 
remaining on board with another guard. The elder Humbert then set sail for 
Passamaquoddy to attend to other duties. That same night, the plaster smugglers 
overwheln~ed John and the other guard, and escaped from Saint John with the 
preventative officers as their prisoners. The smugglers inflicted no further violence on 
the two officials, instead choosing a practical and effective alternative. They dumped 
John Humbert and his assistant on the shores of Nova Scotia, some twenty miles below 
Annapolis. Out of their jurisdiction, lost and without nearby help, the preventative 
officers had to begin the long and embarrassing process of finding their way home.53 
The kidnapping of Humbert's son was but the first of a series of embarrassments 
for the preventative officer. Even as Hurnbert's son landed on a bleak shore in another 
province, the elder Hurnbert faced peril in his own duties. Within minutes of anchoring 
his vessel with its distinctive flag in Passamaquoddy Bay, a sailor on a nearby plastern~an 
fired a musket at Humbert's craft. The shot missed, but naturally it alarnled Hurnbert, in 
no small part because he apparently was not armed himself. Furthermore, the plastern~an 
lay in American waters, outside of Humbert's jurisdiction. An inforn~ant soon told 
Humbert why the shot was fired. The captain of the plasterman Shannon, James 
McArthur, challenged his crew to fire at the preventative vessel, promising to "treat one 
of his men [give him a drink] if he would fire at that D . . .D flag." McArthur then 
boasted of his act in front of several witnesses in the local customs office, including the 
area's deputy customs officer (who notably was not the informer who told Humbert what 
t ran~~ired) . '~  
Faced with violent resistance, Humbert acted with prudence. Instead of creating 
an international incident by entering American waters, Humbert bided his time, waiting 
until McArthur re-entered New Brunswick waters a few days later and seizing the 
Shannon off Head Harbor. McArthur was not prepared to give up so easily. He refused 
to show his ship's papers, and would not give up the Shannon 's tiller. McArthur and 
Humbert scuffled briefly for control of the helm; the plasterman retained control of the 
helm, but steered for Humbert's office at Indian Island, possibly at gunpoint.5' Humbert 
secured the vessel at the customs wharf on Indian Island, seizing the vessel for violations 
of New Brunswick's plaster law. But the law left McArthur free to do as he pleased; the 
law only provided that the Shannon be arrested, and so McArthur borrowed the deputy 
collector's boat and went to Eastport, Maine, in the United States to seek help. 
McArthur soon returned, leading about fifteen men from Eastport with the 
intention of repossessing the Shannon. McArthur had a pistol in his coat, as did the men 
accompanying him. Hunlbert was well prepared; he had a local constable with him, and 
had hired and anned extra men to back up his crew of four. Hard words followed; the 
constable stepped forward to arrest McArthur, who drew his pistol and fled to the cabin 
of the Shannon. McArthur's confederates engaged in more hard words, but balked at 
initiating violence, and eventually returned to Eastport. McArthur in the meanwhile was 
cornered in the Shannon's cabin. A man pointed a musket down the scuttle and said: 
"you damned rascal come up." Finally Humbert's men beat in the cabin door and 
arrested McArthur. McArthur somehow escaped the constable, and fled for the shelter of 
Eastport. 
McArthur, who was nothing if persistent, continued to make trouble for Humbert 
from the safety of Eastport. First, he immediately lodged a legal complaint against 
Humbert with a New Brunswick justice of the peace. The justice was David Owen, the 
proprietor of Campobello. Owen's sympathies lay with the plaster smugglers, for he 
hoped that the plaster trade would bring prosperity to him at last. Furthermore, Owen 
had a long-standing grudge with the colony's loyalist elite, and this opportunity permitted 
him to strike back. Owen hrther complicated matters by sending a copy of McArthur's 
protest to imperial officials in London. 
Bolstered by Owen's support, McArthur then again recruited armed confederates 
to rescue his vessel from Humbert, hoping to ambush the preventative men as they 
escorted the Shannon to Saint John for adjudication. Another informer told Humbert 
what to expect; the preventative officer responded by hiring ten extra men, placing two 
small cannon on his own vessel, loading them with twice the usual shot and ammunition, 
and armed his men with a motley assortment of other weapons. Humbert managed to 
avoid direct conflict by sailing through a dangerous and little-used channel, and arrived at 
Saint John the next day. On arrival Humbert made a hasty report to the provincial 
attorney general before taking the next steamboat to Fredericton to make a report in 
person to the Lieutenant  overn nor.'^ 
Humbert's Dilemma Continues 
Humbert's hasty retreat to the provincial capital seems to have yielded some 
results, although strictly speaking not those he desired. What Humbert initially sought 
was the deployment of British soldiers to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~  What he received instead 
was a promise to ask the British naval commander at Halifax for a vessel to patrol 
Passamaquoddy, and a promise from the Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General to 
investigate into the conduct of the customs officers who were actively hindering him. 
Humbert returned to Saint John and recruited additional men for his own cutter, and set 
sail for Passamaquoddy once again at the end of June. 
Humbert's efforts at Fredericton produced few results. The sloop of war HMS 
Bellette did indeed arrive at Passamaquoddy to assist him, but the vessel's commander 
did not seem inclined to take much interest in his mission, and spent only a few days at 
Campobello, where most plaster vessels unloaded into American ships.58 Attorney 
General Thomas Wetmore's investigation into the conduct of the customhouse officers 
yielded no results. Henry Wright, the province's top-ranked customs officer, stood 
behind the conduct of Robert Annstrong, the deputy collector at Indian Island, who also 
happened to be his son-in-law.59 Humbert was essentially on his own; the inaction of the 
Bellette, the opposition actively fostered by the customs officer on Indian Island, growing 
opposition in the provincial press, and his inadequate force only served to encourage the 
plastermen.60 
The plastermen's resistance increased as the summer passed. Humbert made a 
few seizures, but fog hampered both himself and the plastermen; there simply was not 
much traffic on the water due to lack of visibility and light winds. Drier weather in 
August brought shipping back. Humbert attempted to intercept vessels, but found it 
impossible in the face of armed resistance. When Humbert approached suspected plaster 
vessels, the crews appeared on deck brandishing muskets to keep him away. On occasion 
Hunlbert found boats full of men pursuing him, and he reported that all the plaster vessels 
had anned themselves, some with cannon, an act he considered "open ~ebellion."~' 
The scale of the violence was not insignificant. It ranged from epithets to bullets 
and hurled rocks. When Humbert approached the forty-odd plaster vessels off Lubec in 
mid August, crewmen from seven or eight of the smuggling craft opened fire with 
muskets, forcing him to anchor. The following day Humbert spied two plaster vessels 
approaching Lubec through the difficult westem channel. He pursued in an open 
rowboat, forcing one of the smugglers aground on the American shore, and boarding the 
other just a few feet off shore. A crowd of about sixty Americans in sympathy with the 
smugglers mustered on shore and combined with the plastermen to force Humbert off the 
smuggling craft. Using axes, handspikes, fish shovels (which look a great deal like a 
hayfork), and throwing stones, the crowd forced Humbert to retreat after one of the 
rioters stabbed one of his men in the arm with a fish shovel. Fearing more gunplay, 
Humbert returned to his cutter and retreated to Indian Island. The next day Humbert 
watched while ten plaster vessels sailed from Lubec, lashed together in one enomlous 
raft. Not possessing force sufficient to take on the combined crews, Humbert had to 
content himself with picking off a straggler. The day after that, another raft of nine brigs 
and schooners sailed unopposed. Humbert returned to Saint John despondent, 
complaining about the lack of support he received from the captain of Bellette and the 
active interference he received from the customs officer on Indian Island. He requested 
that either the governor give him the support he required, or release him from his duties.62 
On his arrival at Saint John he reported to Lt. Governor Smyth that the plastemen were 
"in a state of actual and unqualified Rebellion against His Majesty's Government of this 
Province," and requested a military force to quell the opposition to the plaster laws.63 
The Plastermen 
Who were these rebels who so brazenly defied the plaster regulations? Most of 
the plastemen were from the Fundy shore of Nova Scotia, especially from communities 
on the shores of Minas Basin, such as Cornwallis, Falmouth, and   or ton.^^ Many were 
"planters," New Englanders who settled in Nova Scotia in the wake of the Acadian 
expulsion, or, more likely by 1820, their  descendent^.^' 
Crown officials had some idea of whom they were dealing with. The Halifax 
customs collector had his own opinions about who and what these plastermen were. To 
him they were an "unprincipled multitude" engaged in a "lawless intercourse" that drew 
together a "banditti" from both the British provinces and the United States at 
Passarnaquoddy. The collector declared the plaster trade "ruinous to the fair trader, & 
destructive of the interests & morals of the inhabitants." The collector seemed to accept 
that the plastermen attempted to terrorize the sub-collector at Windsor; what shocked him 
was that the plastemen attacked the customhouse by petitioning the Assembly, and even 
voted for representatives based on their hostility to the customs e~tablishment.'~ 
The collector was not alone in condemning Hants County's Planter population. 
Members of the mercantile and religious elite also criticized the plastermen. Merchants 
bridled at the thought of countrymen engaged in commerce, and consistently argued that 
the plasternlen were ruining themselves by speculating in plaster and neglecting their 
farms. Some plastermen mortgaged their homes to buy vessels to transport gypsum to 
Passamaquoddy, and ended up in debtor's prison when their venture failed.67 When the 
plastermen smuggled in West India, East India, and American goods on their return 
voyage from Passamaquoddy, they also threatened the profits of the "fair trader" who 
obeyed the law because the untaxed smuggled goods were cheaper. An additional threat 
posed by the plaster trade was that the repeated violation of the laws introduced moral 
depravity, and trade with Americans infected the plastermen with "Yankee principles." 
Merchants wanted the plastermen to stay on their farms, and leave mercantile pursuits to 
those who knew them best.68 
The Anglican religious establishment also viewed the plastermen with suspicion. 
The Minas Basin region was also the core of the radical evangelical movement; Henry 
Alline himself, Nova Scotia's most famous religious dissenter came from that area.69 
The religious fervor of Nova Scotia's Yankees challenged the ability of the colony's elite 
to impose British and Anglican senses of order, creating a new conception of the bonds 
linking individuals, families and communities together.70 Radical evangelicals had little 
use for government, no sense of civic humanism, and possessed an assertive individuality 
that dispensed with the deference required in a British-ordered society.71 
Little wonder then that the colonial elites regarded Planters with suspicion, or that 
plastermen had little use for authority figures. But plaster smuggling was not primarily a 
means of social protest, but a means of survival for small producers. The state of Nova 
Scotia agriculture before 1820 was not good in terms of practices or productivity, a 
condition compounded by extremely bad weather patterns after 18 15. Acquiring a 
modest "competency" as an independent yeoman farmer required diversification, 
including engaging in wage labor.72 Self sufficiency was a common dream for Maritime 
farmers, but self help was probably a better description of how ordinary people survived 
in pre-industrial Nova Scotia. 
The economic concerns of the plastermen were not the same as the paternalists, 
who sought gain to reinforce social hierarchy, or that of the capitalists who viewed the 
world in terms of profit.73 The plastemlen defied the political economies of mercantilism 
- in its death throes by 1820 - by trading outside of the closed loop of colonial- 
metropolitan trade. The plastermen clearly sought out a profitable trading relationship 
when they smuggled, but they did not follow the economic liberalism of Adam Smith that 
depersonalized and demoralized economic relationships. Famlers viewed the chubby 
coasting craft they built to carry gypsunl as a vital aspect of maintaining their 
independence and local economy, whereas merchants viewed their ships as capital, a 
source of profit that had little to with community values.74 The plastermen, on the other 
hand, believed that since they produced the plaster they should be the direct beneficiaries 
of the gypsum trade, and claimed freedom from the unpopular Plaster A C ~ . ~ '  
Luckily for the plastermen, they had allies in their struggle against the dominance 
of the Saint John merchants, including the inhabitants of Charlotte County, New 
Brunswick, Crown customs officers in New Brunswick, and American merchants in 
Lubec and Eastport. These allies actively supported the plastermen, adding their numbers 
to the crowds that defied Humbert and interfering with the preventative officer's abilities 
to enforce the plaster law. 
Charlotte County's Loyalist population profited from the plaster trade, too, and 
had no desire to see the trade fall into the hands of the Saint John merchants. Wealthy St. 
Andrews plaster merchants such as Harris Hatch were community boosters who wanted 
to make their port community a major competitor with Saint John. The plaster merchants 
of St. Andrews had fought their own plaster war in 1817, overwhelming provincial 
officials and the Royal Navy vessel dispatched to suppress smuggling through crowd 
violence on an only slightly smaller scale than that used in 1 8 2 0 . ~ ~  The proprietor of 
Campobello Island, as previously considered, also supported the plastern~en, and soundly 
cursed the Saint John merchants who thwarted hls ambitions.77 Men of substance were 
just as likely to smuggle as poor ones, and the "crowd" often found allies among the 
powerful. Men like Hatch and Owen wanted to prosper, but were motivated by an older 
paternalist vision that resented and resisted the new market forces of capitalism.78 
A more surprising ally of the plaster smugglers were the New Brunswick customs 
officers, the very officials dedicated to stopping smuggling. But the province's customs 
officers only concerned themselves with imperial statutes, and did not feel bound to 
enforce provincial laws, such as the Plaster Act. Furthermore, New Brunswick's top 
customs officers were fending off a provincial investigation into customhouse fraud and 
corruption in 1820, and thus were not inclined to assist Humbert's efforts.79 The customs 
officer at Passamaquoddy, Richard Armstrong, resented the provincial inquiry into his 
conduct and profited fiom the plaster trade by collecting a small fee fiom plaster vessels 
that entered his jurisdiction. The plastermen gladly paid this fee because it gave their 
activities a veil of legitimacy. Armstrong's office on Indian Island was commonly 
crowded with the masters of plaster vessels, who even boasted there about their defiance 
of the plaster law. Armstrong also warned plastermen when Humbert arrived in the bay, 
on occasion lent his boat to the plaster smugglers, and wrote venomous reports about the 
preventative officer, accusing him of "timidity and incapacity."80 
The American merchants and others engaged in the plaster trade at 
Passamaquoddy also aided and abetted the plastennen. Eastport and Lubec residents 
several times displayed a willingness to cross the boundary line with the intent of 
inflicting violence on the preventative officer, arming themselves with fish shovels, 
pistols, and even cannon. Plastermen sought out and received shelter on the American 
side of the border, within sight of Humbert but outside of his jurisdiction. 
The American residents of Passamaquoddy also effectively prevented United 
States customs officers from assisting the preventative officer. The United States 
customs collector at Lubec had promised Humbert that he would not allow plaster vessels 
to enter American waters, and deployed the local revenue cutter to keep provincial 
shipping in British waters. As a result the American populace tunled on the collector and 
the crew of the U.S. revenue cutter. The local American newspaper published angry 
letters about the collector, and even printed an advertisement posting a reward for the 
capture of the revenue cutter's crew, who were described as pirates and desperadoes. 
During the American collector's frequent absences, his subordinates ignored the 
plastermen and permitted the illicit trade to continue ~nhindered.~' 
Yankees may have allied themselves with the plastermen, but did that mean that 
the Planter population of Hants County was infected with a leveling American ideology 
that threatened the colonial social hierarchy? Given their resounding rejection of the 
American Revolution, alliance with Charlotte County loyalists and New Brunswick's 
custom house officers, there can be no grounds for supposing that the plasternlen were 
son~ehow becoming political radicals. When plastermen took up arms to defend their 
illicit trade they did not adopt a political ideology or a corpus of anti-capitalist beliefs, but 
rather utilized pragmatic tactics that answered their immediate needs.82 This rejection of 
state authority, reflected in their evangelical religion, was the result of the very localized 
worldview of a people hlly engaged in the struggle to achieve an independent 
competency that provided subsistence for their families. 
Conclusion 
Humbert returned to Passamaquoddy one last time to try to stop the plastermen. 
In late September 1820, he returned to Indian Island and awaited the arrival of HMS 
Bellette, which now had strict orders to support Humbert. Most of the plaster vessels lay 
within admittedly American waters close to Lubec, Maine, but in one of his few victories, 
Humbert had secured the promise of the American customs collector not to interfere 
when Humbert boarded provincial vessels, even if they were in United States waters.83 
On September 29, Humbert seized one of the smuggling craft for violating the plaster 
law, and anchored it under the stern of Bellette to prevent any rescue attempts by the 
plastennen. The next day the plasterrnen were prepared to resist, anchoring as close as 
possible to the American shore at Lubec. There the smugglers landed a cannon, stacking 
bars of pig iron next to it for shot to defend their fleet of twenty-odd craft. Undeterred, 
and supported by two boats from Bellette's, Humbert boarded a small plaster vessel. The 
smugglers acted not by opening fire with their cannon, but used an infinitely more subtle, 
acceptable, and effective means of resistance. The smugglers, knowing that Humbert 
acted out of his jurisdiction when he seized the vessel the day before, had an American 
magistrate issue a warrant for his arrest. As Humbert attempted to seize another 
plasterman in Lubec harbor, a boat with a magistrate and a deputy sheriff put off from 
shore with the intent of arresting the preventative officer and putting him in the jail in 
Machias, Maine. Humbert retreated to British waters to guard the vessel anchored near 
Bellette, but perceiving that the plastermen were going to attempt to rescue it, took shelter 
on the warship. The captain of Bellette mounted a cannon on his poop deck aimed at the 
captured smuggler and placed an armed guard to watch the craft. 
By four o'clock the next morning, the plaster smugglers successfully spirited 
away the guarded vessel. Compounding Humbert's difficulties, Bellette's commander 
informed him that the warship was getting under way for Halifax, and would not return 
that year. Bellette sailed at ten a.m.; the vessel was hardly out of sight at noon when 
three boatloads of plastermen came to Indian Island and took by force a suit of sails 
Humbert had seized from another plaster vessel. The preventative officer lacked the 
force to stop them, both in terms of numbers and armament. Fearing that a mob would 
destroy his boat and cutter, Humbert sent them back to Saint John, but remained on 
Indian Island a few days more before returning to report his complete defeat at the hands 
of the plaster smugglers.84 As a final humiliation, plastennen entered fabricated 
complaints at the Indian Island customhouse against Humbert for smuggling American 
foodstuffs into the province.85 
Humbert's defeat was also a defeat for Saint John merchants, as the plaster trade 
continued to elude their grasp. The means of production in this case remained in the 
hands of independent small producers. The plaster smugglers continued their old ways 
long enough to enter Canadian lore through Haliburton's Sam Slick tales, but the trade's 
profits declined as American farmers found domestic sources of gypsum, or moved west 
to more fertile regions.86 The plastermen also pursued an aggressive political agenda, 
electing fellow plaster traders such as Richard Cunningham of Windsor to the Nova 
Scotia Assembly where he busied himself defending the plaster trade. A number of 
petitions by the plastennen to the Nova Scotia Assembly pressured the New Brunswick 
Assembly to reconsider the Plaster A C ~ . ~ '  The Plaster Act forced plastern~en to engage in 
the provincial politics they had previously shunned. Accusations of the plastermen's 
"Yankee tendencies" appear to be the hyperbole of a colonial leadership still traumatized 
by the American Revolution. Far from indicating Planter disloyalty, the plaster trade 
forced them into engaging with the provincial government on a political rather than an 
antagonistic level. 
Few of the Saint John merchants seem to have suffered by their defeat in the 
Plaster War, they quickly moved on to concentrate their abilities on the already profitable 
timber and shipbuilding trades, and eventually succeeded in becoming the marketplace 
for all the Bay of ~ u n d ~ . ~ ~  The New Brunswick Assembly reacted to Humbert's defeat 
by quietly repealing Plaster Act early in 1 82 1. After 1 820, the Assembly concentrated its 
energies on preserving the privileged status of New Brunswick timber within British 
markets and continued its assault on customhouse fees. 
The Plaster War shows that the road to Canadian capitalism was a rocky one. 
Small producers on the resource frontier actively sometimes resisted the attempts of large 
merchants to make them economically subordinate, and sometimes the small producers 
won their battles. The plastermen did not challenge the entire system of provincial 
property and power. Instead, they attacked only those specific aspects that aggravated 
them, suggesting that their crowd protest was really a function of moral economy, rather 
than a revolutionary m~vement. '~ These contests were not only political, or economic, 
but violent physical confrontations in which the small producers displayed unity, bravery 
and intelligence to overwhelm a seemingly formidable state apparatus. 
On a regional level, the Plaster War is an example of how locals accommodated 
and supported others who were combating regulation. Passamaquoddy was truly a 
smuggler's haven. Not only did locals tolerate illicit trade, they turned out in crowd 
actions to defend it, grabbing whatever weapons were on hand. Shouts, fists, tools, and 
even cannon made clear where the sympathies of borderlands residents lay. They may 
have been eager to accommodate one another's needs, but when pushed they were fully 
capable of joining together against state intervention into their lives. 
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CONCLUSION: 
THE MEMORY OF SMUGGLING 
'Squire Weston's History 
In common with other New England communities in the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century, one of Eastport's civic leaders wrote and published a history of the 
community in 1834. Jonathan Delesdemier Weston, the community's leading attorney, 
composed a sweeping history that included native Americans, French explorers, Acadian 
settlers, the Revolutionary War, the War of 18 12, and of course infomlation on Eastport's 
founders. Weston was undoubtedly an excellent choice to write Eastport's history. As a 
lawyer, Harvard graduate, and member of the Maine Historical Society, Weston 
understood that the statements he made at the Lyceum would shape local consciousness 
for a long time.' Weston was also deeply involved with the conlmunity's early years 
himself, as one of its first attorneys, magistrate, sometimes legislative representative, and 
assistant in gathering depositions for the border commission that convened to adjust the 
border between New Brunswick and the United States after the War of 1812. 
Unfortunately for Weston, whose health was failing, he was unable to present his history 
personally. Instead, he arranged to have his son deliver his history in two lectures at the 
Eastport Lyceum in April 1834, and it was published shortly before he died on October 3, 
1 834.2 
The Lyceum itself was located in Trescott Hall, a public venue named in honor of 
one of Weston's deceased friends and a fellow local worthy, Lemuel Trescott. The 
Lyceum's mission was to educate the people of Eastport, especially those young men who 
were to be the next generation of leaders. Weston praised this institution as an asset that 
diffused information and created "a taste for reading in the community."3 The pamphlets 
and books they read at the Lyceum connected the Passamaquoddy region to the world, 
and above all to the American urban centers that published them, allowing the readers to 
absorb current ideas.4 
Not surprisingly, when addressing the pre-War of 18 12 period, when Eastport was 
a leading smuggling haven in North America, Weston began to stray from a strictly 
truthful interpretation of events. Indeed, conceded Weston, there had been smuggling on 
a large scale, but it was conducted mostly by adventurers from outside the con~munity 
who introduced vicious habits to the community, which suffered thereby in terms of 
 moral^.^ While he admitted that there were smuggling problems during the embargo and 
War of 1812, he made no mention of the "Plaster War," nor the rampant smuggling of the 
1820s and 1830s. Weston seems on the surface to have been a man of upstanding morals 
himself; a community leader, owner of pews in both the Baptist and the Congregationalist 
churches in town, a man trusted and esteemed by nearly all in the community. Given 
Weston's credentials and the Lyceum's mission, it is little wonder that he blamed 
smuggling on strangers and discouraged the local youth from taking part in illicit trade. 
Judge Weston's moral faqade, just like his defense of Eastport's populace, is 
decidedly thin in spots. He may never have been an active smuggler, but he clearly 
expedited smuggling in Eastport. Evidence includes Weston's 1814 commission as the 
vice-consular agent to Sweden at Eastport, which places him at the center of the 
questionable "neutral trade" that masked smuggling during the war.6 During the war, 
Weston defended himself from accusations that he actively collaborated with the British 
occupation forces.' In November 1830, he was involved in a strange incident whereby 
one Thomas Bibber took by force a boat that had previously been seized from him by 
customs authorities. The new owners of the boat took it to Eastport one day, where 
Bibber saw it and wrested it from the new owner, one Captain Hook of the British 34th 
Regiment. Bibber then dragged the boat up the streets of Eastport, assisted by a yoke of 
oxen and numerous locals, while a crowd assembled to enjoy Hook's discomfort. Capt. 
Hook looked to Eastport's assistant customs collector for assistance in getting back his 
boat. However, that official was Jonathan D. Weston, who also served as Bibber's 
attorney and had advised him to seize the boat. Weston offered no support to the hapless 
British officer. Eastport's magistrates also proved no help; they insisted that Bibber's 
actions were justifiable. Hook had to find his own way back to Saint ~ n d r e w s . ~  
More ironic yet is that Trescott Hall was named after another leading Eastport 
resident who expedited smuggling, Lemuel Trescott. Trescott died in possession 
fantastic wealth for that time and place: $31,279.30, no small proportion of it in cash.9 
Thus we have Weston twisting the facts about Eastport's smuggling past, in a building 
constructed in the memory of a corrupt customs officer, to an audience that undoubtedly 
knew a thing or two about smuggling on a first-hand basis. 
Smuggling after 1820 
Smuggling was becoming more brazen and more violent in the 1820s and 1830s, 
especially in New Brunswick. In 1822, two smugglers badly beat a customhouse officer 
at Saint John. Later that year there was a gun battle between smugglers and the 
provincial revenue cutter in the Bay of Fundy that reportedly resulted in several deaths.'' 
The following year there was more violent resistance, and troops from the 74th Regiment 
had to defend customhouse authorities from a crowd armed with boathooks and 
bludgeons." In August 1824, an American captain forced the crew of the provincial 
revenue cutter to leap back into their boat from his vessel, which they had attempted to 
seize.12 Timber smuggling continued at Saint Andrews; one English timber ship escaped 
a vigilant customs officer in October 1824, only after pointing a loaded gun at him. The 
captain apologized for the use of force, but explained that he had to because he feared the 
power of the Saint Andrews merchants engaged in the trade.13 In 1827, an American 
captain struck a customhouse officer on a wharf in Saint John after "damning the 
Custon~s and the laws."14 
Particularly striking are the number of crowd actions involving smugglers 
disguised as Indians in the l83Os, especially in the Calais-St. Stephen area. In January 
1830, New Brunswick customs authorities seized some American contraband in a barn in 
St. Stephen. While transporting the goods to a secure warehouse, about twenty-five 
armed men, disguised as Indians with blacked faces, red shirts over their clothes, and 
black hats with feathers in them, attacked the officials and carried the goods across the 
Milltown bridge to American territory. In mid-December 1830, about twenty armed men 
disguised as Indians broke into a St. Stephen store that contained contraband seized by 
New Brunswick customs officials, and carried it across the river to ca1ais.l' In 1832, 
another crowd disguised as Indians rescued contraband goods from colonial customhouse 
officers and brought them to the American side of the border.16 However, these 
"Indians" did not just attack colonial customs officers. In July 1837, about forty men 
dressed as Indians seized two American customs officials at Calais, and took them across 
the border into New Brunswick in a wagon. As the wagon wheels rolled, one of the 
"Indians" sharpened his bayonet on it to intimidate the officers." When they reached the 
woods they terrorized the officials, demanding to know the identity of an informant. 
They also threatened to burn down the house of one of the customhouse officers.'* As 
late as 1846, armed smugglers at St. George's chased away at gunpoint an overly curious 
customs ~ f f i ce r . ' ~  
The disguises are themselves significant. Alan Taylor, in his study of squatters on 
the Maine frontier, found that the disguises not only assured anonymity, but also 
provided a sort of theater that terrified the intended victims.20 While by 1830 this sort of 
theatrical protest had largely been abandoned by pioneering squatters, borderland 
smugglers picked it up in the Calais-St. Stephen area.21 They may well have been 
influenced by the mid-Maine squatter protests; many American settlers in Charlotte 
County were from the very region where these struggles had been fiercest (see Appendix 
D). Notably, these smuggling Indians practiced the same restraint as the squatter Indians, 
frequently threatening violence, but seldom acting on those threats.22 Reluctance to 
engage in killing and the use of disguises marks these smugglers as "social bandits": self- 
help activists acting with the approval of the community in breaking the law in accord 
with traditional values that were at odds with the state.23 The transition to capitalism was 
one of the factors that encouraged social banditry.24 At Passamaquoddy, the smugglers 
effectively defended their "right" to trade across the border, and consistently intimidated 
those who opposed them. Informers were treated harshly; one man went so far as to 
publish a statement - sworn to by revenue cutter and customhouse officers - that he was 
not the infornler in one seizure.25 
The plastermen, too, continued their smuggling and their violent defense of that 
trade. On August 8, 1833, New Brunswick customs officers seized the Nova Scotia 
plasterman schooner Shannon in the waters between Canlpobello and Eastport. The 
stated reason for the seizure was that the vessel had cleared for a return voyage to Nova 
Scotia in ballast without a cargo, but revenue officers discovered a cargo of contraband 
American goods onboard consisting of tea and gunpowder, and therefore impounded the 
vessel. The following day, as the four customhouse officers sailed the Shannon to St. 
Andrews for adjudication, one or more boats put off from Eastport, seized the vessel, and 
brought it to Union 
The community managed to display a remarkable case of collective amnesia 
regarding this event. The British vice-consul for the region arranged for a local lawyer to 
collect depositions regarding the event. The results of his inquiries varied dramatically 
(see Table 10.1). Notably, this investigation was conducted by Jonathan Weston's son, 
also an attorney and the man who read his father's history to the audience assembled in 
Trescott Hall in April 1834. Yet none of these events found their way into Weston's 
history, and undoubtedly he would have become quite unpopular had he actually 
expounded upon the scale of smuggling at Passamaquoddy. 
Table 10.1: The Shannon Incident, 1833 
I 1. Shannon boarded and seized by 50-60 ( 1. Shannon boarded by one boat with five I 
Testimony of New Brunswick 
customhouse officials 
Testimony of American witnesses 
armed men in three boats 
2. Shannon did not enter Eastport harbor 
or six men 
2. Shannon anchored in the harbor before 
until past 4:00 pm 
3. The 50-60 men on board cheered and 
fired their guns until anchored 
4. A crowd on the wharves in Eastport 
abused and insulted them 
I Americans I directly or indirectly 1 
1 : 00 pm 
3. No firing or cheering, and the captors 
left the schooner in one small boat 
4. Less than a dozen men on the wharf, 
and nobody said anything to the captured 
5. At least 3 or 4 of the armed men were 
Source: Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. 2: 256. 
officials 
5. No American citizens were concerned 
Memory in a Borderland 
Weston's history, including its errors of omission, exemplified a borderland 
perspective through its interplay of local and global interests.27 For Weston, born 
immediately after the Revolution to a father who had fought in it, but living in a 
Jacksonian milieu where nationalism and manifest destiny were becoming increasingly 
the order of the day, explaining his community's relationship with the old loyalist foes 
offered some difficult challenges. Weston overcame these problems by downplaying 
conflict. Instead he concentrated on a theme sure to please most: the future prosperity of 
the community and its recent advances toward that goal. This satisfied locals, who were 
eager to have their community's praises sung. It also met national expectations, because 
financial success was rapidly becoming a quality Americans attributed to themselves, 
especially in the commercial ~ o r t h . ~ *  
Weston's history also fit neatly into a wider pattern of community histories 
written by local worthies in the early nineteenth century. These works celebrated the 
success of communities as building blocks in creating national prosperity. In some 
measure, Weston was also healing the wounds of the War of 18 12 and the British 
occupation of Eastport from 18 14 to 18 15, when the community as a whole had been 
demonized in the national press, especially Nile 's Weekly ~ e ~ i s t e r . ~ ~  As early as 18 18, 
immediately after British troops evacuated Moose Island, its American residents 
attempted to redeem the character of the area by addressing the idea that Eastport and 
Lubec thrived only because of smuggling. A newspaper article attempted to correct this 
idea with a rather wan conclusion: "But this notion is not altogether correct."30 This no 
doubt left the readers to conclude on their own that it was not altogether incorrect, either. 
More usefully, the article stated, "Near to every boundary line, that is where the fag ends 
of two governments meet, there is, and always has been and ever will be that sort of 
unshackled traffic; which in Boston, and N. York and Philadelphia would be called 
smuggling." The article's author, who may well have been Weston himself, blamed the 
region's problems on outsiders, for "whenever there has been a prospect of making 
money by an illicit trade, thither speculators and smugglers have straightway resorted, to 
the injury of the character of both  frontier^."^' Weston's history was thus a form of 
boosterism, designed to heal the wounds of the past and pave the way for a prosperous 
future. Weston selectively created a local identity, and exercised the discretion required 
of lawyers such as himself.32 
The same principle operated on the New Brunswick side of the border. An 
anonymous article published in a Saint John newspaper claimed that Charlotte County's 
bbproximity to the American lines, and the uninhabited state of our coast and of the 
County generally, render the temptation to smuggle too strong to be easily resisted." The 
borderland spirit expedited smuggling. The anonymous author complained, "A British 
subject assisting an American to evade the laws of the U. States today; and in his turn 
assisted to-morrow by an American," and described how people on both sides of the 
border combined in a smuggling trade that brought most of the colony's West India 
goods through Passamaquoddy. 33 
Lorenzo Sabine, a fellow Eastport resident of Weston's, also wrote history in the 
mid-nineteenth century.34 But Sabine was a better scholar and more interested in 
examining the conflicts raised by living on the border. Sabine admitted that locals 
engaged in smuggling, although he cautioned, "As the world knows, the tales of 
smugglers and fishermen are always long and frequently adorned."35 Sabine was also 
aware of the many contradictions brought out on the border. As a young clerk to an 
Eastport merchant, Sabine had noticed the enthusiasm with which Loyalists smuggled, 
and their practice of throwing contraband tea overboard to avoid confiscation of both 
cargo and vessel. Sabine thought this practice humorously akin to the Boston Tea Party 
of 1 7 7 3 . ~ ~  
New Brunswick writers also commemorated and mythologized their past in this 
period. In contrast to American ideals of liberty and independence, New Brunswick's 
ideology typically extolled the prosperity and order inherent to British colonial society.37 
On May 18, 1833, New Brunswickers celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the first 
landing of loyalists at Saint John. Among the speakers were some of the original 
loyalists, including Supreme Court Justice Ward Chipman. Chipman had suffered cruelly 
during the Revolution and found refuge in New Brunswick after the war. Yet Chipman, 
who had sent his own son to Harvard, participated in several border commissions, and 
who was accused of engaging in smuggling himself, had a conciliatory message for his 
audience that was devoid of anti-~mericanism.~~ 
In Charlotte County, formal historical consciousness developed much later; 
community histories did not appear until after Confederation in 1867. But more casual 
inquiries sometimes touched on the smuggling issue. One of the earliest statements made 
by a local was in 1835, when an old Loyalist named Peter Clinch wrote that smuggling 
was one of the region's major trades, "which some are in the habit of styling 
Contraband-but which we call free trade. Our geographical position exposes us to great 
temptations in this respect."39 
None of these histories emphasized the differences between American citizens 
and colonial subjects. Because Maine and New Brunswick were culturally very similar, 
even in terms of religion, then the consciousness of their distinctiveness could easily be 
lost. In this sort of milieu, national declarations become changeable, shaped according to 
the current state of affairs.40 In some ways a much better place to look for declarations of 
ideology is not the allegedly factual community histories, but in the realm of fiction. In 
novels and short stories, authors could safely rise above the immediate community's 
consciousness and make sweeping declarations with little fear of unpleasant 
repercussions. For Passamaquoddy, the fictional adventures of "Sam Slick," a Yankee 
clockmaker who frequently traveled to Nova Scotia from his Connecticut home, offers an 
intriguing glimpse into how Maritimers felt about the region. Written in 1835, these 
stories invariably connected Passamaquoddy with smuggling, and the ruinous temptation 
for Nova Scotians to engage in the plaster trade.41 
The suppression or absence of nationalistic prejudice is perhaps more 
understandable in the Maritimes. These colonies had no or little affiliation to one 
another, usually had limited contacts with distant Britain, and were often dominated by 
elitist cliques that did their best to control the political, economic, and social agendas.42 
In the United States one might to expect a more bombastic attitude, especially during the 
heady Jacksonian era, but this does not seem to be the case for Passamaquoddy. In part 
this was a result of the War of 18 12, during which the British military occupied all of 
eastern Maine, thereby muting Yankee pretensions to manifest destiny long after the war 
ended. Direct conflict did not arise between Maine and New Brunswick until the late 
1830s with the events leading up to the so-called "Aroostook War" of 1 8 3 9 . ~ ~  
Selective memory at Passamaquoddy did not lay in the public sphere alone. 
Individuals and families twisted events as well. This is best illustrated in the death of 
William Newcomb in 1796. Newcomb attempted to rescue a schooner seized for 
smuggling by New Brunswick custon~s officers. On the night of October 2, 1795, 
Newcomb and eight to eleven others attempted to take the schooner back from the 
authorities, and fired at the men guarding the vessel. The guards "being hard pushed and 
fired at with three musquets, were unavoidably obliged to defend themselves," returned 
fire and shot Newcomb dead on the vessel's forecastle. A New Brunswick court 
subsequently acquitted the guards of murder charges.44 Yet the published Newcomb 
family genealogy makes no mention of his death, while faithfully recording its date.45 
Clearly someone in the Newcomb family decided that William's violent death was 
unseemly, and actively changed the record. 
The Transition to Capitalism 
While local historians celebrated Passamaquoddy's transition fiom a frontier to a 
settled region with modem railroads, steamboats, banks, insurance companies, and other 
hallmarks of capitalist enterprise, smuggling continued. How are we to understand the 
pre-capitalist rituals of smugglers dressed as Indians with the community's increasing 
engagement with a market economy? 
The answer seems to be that the agendas of the traditional, pre-market society in 
Passamaquoddy fused with those of the aggressive capitalists. Conmunity goals of self- 
help mixed rather easily with capitalistic individualism at Passamaquoddy, in part 
because the loser in smuggling was not an individual, but the state. At Passamaquoddy, 
crowd actions that defended community values might have taken place on behalf of 
capitalist ventures, in contrast to E.P. Thompson's statement that the moral economy was 
a continuously regenerating anti-capitalist critique.46 This was particularly noticeable in 
the 1833 Shannon incident, in which the entire community either maintained silence or 
altered events to stymie customs authorities that interfered with smuggling. Furthermore, 
the smugglers who styled themselves "free traders" could also claim to be at the forefront 
of early nineteenth-century economic thought, which increasingly insisted on reducing 
trade barriers, such as British preferences on New Brunswick timber. However, these 
same "fiee traders" were above all pragmatic and self-serving in their approach. Saint 
Andrews timber merchants had long benefited from illegally shipping American timber 
to Britain while claiming it was from New Brunswick. When these colonial preferences 
were endangered, Saint Andrews merchants engaged in boisterous protests that peaked 
with the burning of a British member of parliament in effigy and the fiery destruction of a 
boat in the harbor.47 Furthermore, when the United States and Britain finally agreed to 
open colonial ports to American vessels in 1830, the long sought-after "free trade" and 
reciprocity some merchants wanted, it yielded new opportunities to smuggle because 
tariffs remained high, especially on manufactured goods. Other merchants, especially 
New Brunswick's timber barons, opposed free trade and non-timber based industrial 
development.48 Merchants wanted both protection from foreigners at home, and 
unrestricted access to foreign markets. When they could not trade honestly, they easily 
made the transition to illicit trade, and laborers, fishermen, and others seemed glad to 
assist for a cut of the profits. In part, this may have been a result of the occupational 
pluralism practiced by borderland residents; they had to weave together a number of 
occupations to provide themselves with a living.49 Eventually the call for free trade 
overwhelmed the protectionist ideals, culminating in the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, 
which pem~itted natural products to cross the border duty-free. 
In Passamaquoddy the backdrop to both smuggling and the transition to 
capitalism was the almost complete failure of the state to control the border. After 18 18, 
there was usually an American garrison at Fort Sullivan in Eastport and a British garrison 
at Fort Tipperary in Saint A n d r e ~ s . ' ~  The British and American navies and revenue 
cutters increasingly patrolled the border to suppress smuggling and regulate fisheries, but 
with little result, for they could not distinguish colonial fishermen from their American 
co~nterparts.~' The number of customs officers on both sides grew, and in 1821 Saint 
Andrews finally became a customs district in its own right, distinct from Saint ~ o h n . ' ~  
Yet despite the growth of state intervention, resistance continued. The British, colonial, 
and United States governments failed to adequately cope with or control the growing 
numbers of impoverished Irish immigrants flooding through the region on their way to 
American urban centers, and on occasion unscrupulous shipmasters unceremoniously 
dumped entire shiploads of foreigners at Passamaquoddy, and left them to fend for 
them~elves.'~ Criminals, deserters, and debtors continued to slip across the boundary, as 
they did all along the United States-British North American border.54 Moreover, 
contraband unrelentingly moved across the border. 
In a bigger context, smuggling at Passamaquoddy brings into question statements 
that American capitalists operated within a strictly American milieu and spurned British 
norms, and that New Brunswickers remained independent of American influences and 
clung to purely British markets." American and colonial economies always remained 
intertwined, for capitalism tends to ignore borders. From an early date this meant that 
American corporations penetrated New Brunswick. One example was the Aetna 
Insurance Company, based in Hartford, Connecticut, which advertised in Saint John 
newspapers in the 1830s.'~ More troubling for New Brunswick was the neighboring 
republic's siren call of prosperity. In the 1850s many young people left for California 
and New England cotton mills actively recruited the colony's single women as a cheap 
source of labor." The strength of these cross-border flows of commerce, goods, and 
people meant that informal, and often illicit, exchanges continued at the border. 
Conclusions 
Smuggling was an international phenomenon, as the illicit trade at 
Passarnaquoddy demonstrates. In part, smuggling was a reaction against changing 
regulation and the rising power of the nation-state. The rise of market capitalism 
disrupted traditional economies, completely rearranged the social order, and broke down 
the trade barriers erected by mercantilist policies. As such, smuggling reflected and 
furthered the social upheavals that grew in intensity in the 1830s and 1840s. 
The Euro-American settlers who displaced the Native American presence soon 
found they had more in common with each other than they had with their respective 
metrapoles. Rituals of allegiance continued on both sides of the border, but with some 
startling deviations. Calais saluted the Fourth of July with gunpowder borrowed from St. 
Stephen's armory; and Calais children insisted on taking a half-day off from school on 
Queen Victoria's birthday.58 These popular demonstrations indicate the subtle and 
benign power of the borderland attitudes of Passamaquoddy residents. 
More alarming were the street rituals of smugglers as they intimidated and 
assaulted both colonial and federal customs authorities. The white "Indians" who struck 
terror in the hearts of customs officers indicated the disdain, and even contempt, that 
borderland peoples felt for the state. This sentiment was common throughout North 
America, but on the border, where governing agencies were weak, it further undermined 
the already feeble authorities. Furthermore, representatives of state power often 
sympathized with the local populace. They often subverted the laws themselves, thus 
benefiting the periphery at the expense of the center. The increased politicization of 
officeholding in New Brunswick under the guise of "responsible government" and in the 
United States as part of "Jacksonian democracy," seems to have worsened the problem.59 
It was not until after Canadian Confederation in 1867, and the American Civil War, that 
bureaucrats became more professional and detached from local interests. 
The borderland population continued to build transborder ties, based on family, 
trade, and a shared culture. At times this sentiment was strained, as during the 
"Aroostook War," but friendly relations were the norm. Governments at times 
unwittingly encouraged cross-border ties, as with the reciprocity agreements of 1830 and 
1854, which substantially freed trade from bothersome tariffs. But at other times 
governments suddenly attempted to close the border. Meanwhile, the borderland 
populace consistently insisted on de-emphasizing the importance of the border; it was the 
various governments that frequently changed their policies. This complex set of 
borderland attitudes encouraged outsiders, including criminals and economic adventurers, 
to come to Passamaquoddy. Conversely, it also attracted state agencies, such as military 
units, revenue cutters, and customs officers. The borderland populace developed ways of 
dealing with both, essentially rejecting troublemakers and co-opting outsiders' values to 
their own advantage. Frequently this meant paying lip-service to the state even as locals 
'undermined its local representatives. The smuggling trade reveals the effectiveness of 
locals in so doing. 
Jefferson's embargo, remembered locally as the "Flour War," was one 
manifestation of the local ability to overwhelm and subvert government agencies that 
interfered with smuggling. Notably, competing governments undermined their 
counterpart's efforts to control the border, as when British imperial and colonial 
governments actively worked against Jefferson's embargo. The War of 18 12 saw a 
repeat of the embargo, but with an even larger military intervention. As occurred during 
the embargo, a considerable number of adventurers appeared at Passamaquoddy. Their 
often troublesome presence is one indicator that the local views concerning illicit trade 
were held by many others in North American society, some of them destined to become 
the leading lights of nineteenth-century commerce in both British North America and the 
United States. The third conflict, known as the "Plaster War," revisited many of these 
themes, but on this occasion colonial smugglers defied British and colonial authorities 
and defeated elite Saint John merchants who aspired to economically dominate the 
region. Accustomed to operating under the privileges of the mercantilist system, they 
found themselves ill-equipped to fight the economic principles of free trade that the 
American government advocated. Nor did New Brunswick's merchant community forget 
this bitter lesson about American economic power. The result was a deep insecurity 
about their reliance on British trade preferences.60 Despite frequent lip-service to British 
mercantilism, the size of the American economy and its cheaper foodstuffs forced 
colonial businessmen to compromise their principles, even if they had to engage in 
smuggling. 
Smuggling was thus an ongoing problem at Passamaquoddy, one that is still not 
resolved, and may never be so long as a border runs through the region.6' Nor have 
borderland attitudes diminished in the region. Native Americans, Mainers, and New 
Brunswickers each continue to reassess their relationship with the invisible line through 
Passamaquoddy Bay that separates Canada from the United States. Both Canadian and 
American governments maintain numerous officials and agencies to control the border 
which remains contested around Machias Seal Island. The benefits of capitalism have 
proved elusive to the region, which is now an impoverished comer of Maine and New 
Brunswick, which are respectively a poor state and province in national contexts. 
Poverty and the region's geography have combined to make drug smuggling a common 
practice into the twenty-first century. Passamaquoddy residents retain a strong regional 
identity that spans the border, assisted by trans-border cultural groups such as the Border 
Historical Society, the Quoddy Regional History Board, and the Tides Institute, with its 
logo "Region ~ a t t e r s . " ~ ~  One is left to wonder what the smugglers themselves, the 
rogues of 'Quoddy, would have made of these formal efforts to institutionalize cross- 
border bonds. 
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APPENDIX A: United States Vessel Tonnage, Passamaquoddy Customs District, 1796-1821 
Table Al: Registered, Enrolled, and Other Tonnage at Passamaquoddy. 
I Year I Registered Enrolled I Vessels under 20 tons I Aggregate ( Coasting I Cod I 
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Fishery Coasting Cod 
Fishery 
Cod 
Fishery 
24.24 
99.27 
182.71 
- 
323.46 
Source: American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States. Class IV: Commerce and 
Navigation (Washington, DC : Gales and Seaton, 1 832). 
Aggregate 
4,538.20 
5,142.16 
5,508.10 
5,835.02 
Coasting 
433.64 
701.62 
795.44 
774.52 
Year 
1818 
1819 
1820 
1821 
Vessels under 20 tons 
Coasting 
246.69 
269.64 
319.22 
~~~~~- 
351.84 
Enrolled 
Cod 
Fishery 
53.84 
82.68 
119.69 
132.20 
Registered 
Permanent 
295.05 
638.06 
815.32 
935.15 
Permanent 
498.66 
527.69 
503.90 
-- 
904.38 
Temporary 
162.83 
162.83 
162.83 
162.83 
Temporary 
3,280.93 
3,461.11 
3,586.94 
3,348.47 



APPENDIX C: Customs Seizures, 1812-1814 
Table C1: Collector Trescott's Schedule 
Date Seized 
April22, 1812 
April22,1812 
April24, 1812 
April25,1812 
April 27, 18 12 
April 27,1812 
April27, 1812 
May22, 1812 
May 22,1812 
May22,1812 
May22,1812 
June 6,1812 
June 11,1812 
June 20,1812 
June 24,1812 
August 12, 1812 
August 13,1812 
September 1,18 12 
October 9, 18 12 
October 28, 1812 
November 4,18 12 
November 13, 18 12 
November 25,1812 
Seized Items 
80 tons plaster 
74 tons plaster 
2 1 5 tons plaster 
80 tons plaster 
60 tons plaster 
60 tons plaster 
200 tons plaster 
60 tons plaster 
460 tons plaster 
125 tons plaster 
125 tons plaster 
moses boat & 1 hhd. rum 
Schooner Experiment & lading 
skiff& 4 bales of blankets 
125 tons plaster 
Sloop Sally of Portland & 84 bbls. flour 
78 casks & bales of goods 
1,426 grindstones 
Sloop Rover, and tackle etc. 
300 tons plaster 
250 tons plaster 
1800 bushels salt 
1000 bushels salt 
December 7, 18 12 470 tons plaster 
Where Seized 
Robert Little's wharf 
Daniel Swett's beach 
S. Rice's beach 
Pleasant Point 
Bates Island 
Dudley Island 
S. Rice's Island 
Robert Little's wharf 
S. Rice's Island 
Pleasant Point 
Pleasant Point 
Schooner Experiment 
- 
Schooner Cleopatra 
Sloop Sally 
- 
Sloop Rover 
S. Rice's Island 
Paul Johnson's wharf 
- 
Kendal's store 
Solomon Rice's Island 
Claimant 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Baker and Chaney 
Baker and Chaney 
Jabez Mowry 
Robert Little 
Solomon Rice 
Daniel Power 
Wm. Woodbury 
- 
- 
- 
Dan'l Powers 
- 
S. Tony 
Jabez Mowry 
- 
Isaac Lalunan or C. Cuny 
Dana, Wheeler, & Bartlett 
Dana, Wheeler, & Bartlett 
Rob't Duck 
J. Mowry 
January 5,1813 
January5, 1813 
January21,1813 
February 11,1813 
February 11, 1813 
February 1 1, 18 13 
March 12,1813 
March 29,1813 
March 30,1813 
March 30,1813 
April4,1813 
April4,1813 
April 7, 1813 
April9, 1813 
April 24,1813 
May 5,1813 
August 14,1813 
August 27,18 13 
September 8, 1813 
September 12,1813 
September 29, 18 13 
October 2, 18 13 
October 20,18 13 
October 30,1813 
November 8, 1 8 13 
November 13,1813 
December 6,18 13 
December 16,18 13 
123 tons plaster 
40 tons plaster 
46 grindstones, 20 tons plaster 
Schooner Success and cargo 
Schooner True American and cargo 
Sloop Betsey and cargo 
12 tons plaster, 102 grindstones 
46 grindstones, 20 tons plaster 
yawl boat & 1,000 lbs. beef 
reach boat & 3 bbls. flour, 5 bbls. apples 
43 packages British manufactured goods 
94 crates & parcels earthenware 
3 bbls sugar 
2 "harnpton built boats," 130 bushels salt 
40 tons plaster 
1 bbl. foreign rum 
6 oxen 
1 cask "foreign rum," 1 cask coffee 
4 oxen 
12 oxen 
4 oxen 
"two mast boat called Black Snake," 1 
hhd. molasses 
14 oxen 
1 barrel "foreign rum" 
1 barrel 'Yoreign rum" 
200 tons plaster 
"reach boat & cargo," 10 bbls. apples 
"whale boat & cargo," 4 boxes candles, 
Solomon Rice's Island 
Schooner Hazard 
Schooner Stork 
Schooner Success 
Schooner True American 
Sloop Betsey 
"at or near Egar's beach" 
S. Rice's Island 
- 
- 
Sloop Sally of Freeport 
- 
- 
Shackford's Head 
- 
- 
Leighton's boat 
- 
Thomas Wisgate, master 
Jonathan Bray, master 
Isaac Snow, master 
Elisha Blake, master 
Ephrairn Tibbets, master 
J. Mowry 
J. Mowry 
- 
Gillpatrick 
- 
- 
- 
Samuel Wheeler 
125 sable skins, 5 otter skins 
December 17,18 13 
December 23, 1 8 13 
January 14, 1814 
January 15,1814 
January 17,1814 
January 19,1814 
March 27, 18 14 
April 13,1814 
April 24,1814 
May 21,1814 
June 2,1814 
June 12,1814 
June 16, 1814 
boat Boxer and cargo 
1 hhd. molasses 
Schooner ~tlantic' 
1 hhd. molasses 
190 tons plaster 
40 tons plaster 
6 boxes tin* 
"Richardson's boatw* 
"two masted boat" & Sbbls. rum* 
1 hhd. foreign rum* 
sundry goods* 
2 boats & cargoes, 5 casks saddlery ware* 
"1 barrel pimentom* 
- 
Schooner Atlantic 
- 
Little River 
- 
- 
"Richardson's boat" 
- 
town landing 
J. Kendal's 
*Captured with Eastport by the British. 
Source: "Items of Seizures not settled at the Treasury Dep't Oct. 1, 18 14, taken fi-om Collector Trescott's schedule March 2, 18 15 
at Wiscasset," Thomas G. Thornton Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine. 
' Restored to owners 
APPENDIX D: Americans in Charlotte County 
Table Dl: U.S. Citizens who Swore an Oath of Loyalty to King George 111,1810-1817 
Date of Name ofSettlers Occupation Family Time in Last Place of Place of Nativily Cert$ed by 
Oath NB Residence 
312911 8 10 Henw Witcher Farmer Wife & 2 9 months Palermo, ME Deerfield MA C. Hatch, Esq. 
Love1 Lang 
Israel Gliding 
Rueben Witcher 
David Leighton 
William Garcelon 
Amos Ordway 
Ebenezer Rolf 
Charles Gleding 
Thomas Burton 
John Menil (7) 
Joseph Raymond 
Arnmon Rice 
David Basset 
Elias Jacobs 
Joiner 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Shoe Maker 
Farmer 
Joiner 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Trader 
Baker 
Farmer 
Trader 
Farmer 
Joiner 
children 
Wife & 4 
children 
None 
None 
Wife & 4 
children 
Wife & 11 
children 
Wife & 2 
children 
None 
None 
Wife & 3 
children 
Wife & 2 
children 
Wife & 6 
children 
Wife & 4 
children 
Wife & 5 
children 
Wife & 1 
child 
12 months 
5 months 
9 months 
6 months 
20 months 
4 months 
5 years 
12 months 
7 years 
3 months 
12 months 
8 months 
2 years 
2 years 
Lincolnville, ME 
Patrick Town, ME 
Palermo, ME 
Patrick Town, ME 
Free Town, ME 
North Yarmouth, 
ME 
Reading, MA 
Vassalbourough, 
ME 
Saco, ME 
Belfast, ME 
Union River 
Buxton, ME 
Lisbon, ME 
Portland, ME 
Hamptm, (NH?) 
Mill ford 
Palermo, ME 
Newcastle, ME 
Cape Ann, MA 
Lynsborough (7) 
Reading, MA 
Vassalborough, 
ME 
Cushing, ME 
Portland, ME 
Middleburgh? 
Middleburgh? 
Bridgewater, 
MA 
Wells, ME 
Dan'l Hill 
66 
Cert. fiom C. 
Hatch 
~ a n ' i  f i l l  
C. Hatch 
Thos. Wyer, Esq. 
N. Frink & C. 
Hatch 
LC 
Joseph Porter & 
Peter Crisly 
James Beny & 
Wm. Monro 
Colin Campbell 
J. Berry & G. 
Gilchrist 
J. Dunn 
J. Dunn, J. 
Beny, & G. 
Oath NB Residence 
4121181 1 Elias Steams Trader Wife & 1 2 years Waltham, MA Gorham, ME Dr. Caleff & J. 
Enos Varney 
Robert Brockway 
Benjamin Tollet 
Samuel Earle 
R. Brockway 
Thomas Davis 
David Peasley 
Joseph Stevens 
Freeman Hyde 
Daniel Stone 
Samuel Lovejoy 
William Chalmers 
Levy Weston 
George Martin 
Leonard Bartlett 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Trader 
Mill Man 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Mill Man 
Laborer 
Farmer 
Doctor 
Joiner 
Mill Man 
child 
Wife & 3 
children 
Wife & 3 
children 
None 
Wife &3 
children 
Wife & 5 
children 
Wife & 3 
children 
Wife & 4 
children 
Wife & 1 
child 
Wife & 1 
child 
Wife & 5 
children 
Wife & 7 
children 
None 
Wife & 2 
children 
None 
Wife & 5 
children 
7 years 
8 years 
12 months 
12 months 
7 years 
4 years 
2 years 
2 years 
6 years 
24 years 
2 years 
3 years 
5 years 
2 years 
6 years 
Rochester, NH 
Walsingham, MA 
Augusta, ME 
Berwick, ME 
Washington, ME 
Washington, ME 
Whitefield, ME 
Durham, NH 
Woodstock, NH 
Scarborough, ME 
Arnherst, MA 
Woolwich, ME 
Hopkinton, MA 
Southerland (7) 
New Milford 
Rochester, NH 
Walsingham, 
MA 
Redfield (7) 
Eastport, ME' 
Washington, ME 
Clermont, NH 
Whitefield, ME 
Lee (?) 
Strafford, NH 
Machias, MEZ 
Kennebeck, ME 
Ill. 
Hopkinton, MA 
Gouldsborough, 
ME 
Ball Town (?) 
Campbell 
H. MacKay, Esq. 
N. Gilman & D. 
Hall 
T. Wyer & J. 
Campbell 
H. MacKay, Esq. 
J. Dunn & B. 
Johnson 
P. Crisly & N. 
Frink 
H. MacKay 
A. Humphrey & 
M. Shaw 
D. Scofield & D. 
McFarlane 
Messrs. Andrews 
& Clarke 
N. Johnson & J. 
Lanners 
S. Conuck & N. 
' These places seem to be reversed; Earle's last place of residence was probably Eastport, his birthplace Berwick. Earle varies as Earl. 
z Places probably reversed. 
Date of  Name of Settlers Occupation Family Time in Last Place of Place of Nativity Certified by 
Oath NB Residence 
91 1411 8 1 3 Jonathan Robinson Mariner Wife & 1 Bradford Hallowell, ME " 4 years 
14 years 
5 years 
2 years 
4 years 
3 years 
2years 
5 years 
4 years 
2 years 
3 years 
4 years 
3 years 
9 years 
6 years 
5 years 
21 years 
10 years 
9 years 
child 
Wife & 5 
children 
None 
Wife & 8 
children 
None 
Wife & 1 
child 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Wife & 1 
child 
Wife & 1 
child 
None 
Wife & 9 
children 
None 
None 
Wife & 6 
children 
Wife & 3 
children 
Wife & 1 
child 
Trader 
Trader 
Trader 
Trader 
Farmer 
Painter 
Carpenter 
Carpenter 
School 
Master 
Farmer 
Joiner 
Farmer 
Ship 
Builder 
Joiner 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Mariner 
Farmer 
Ware, NH J. Porter & J. 
Cristy 
66 
66 
Aaron Upton 
Ill. 
Gosstown 
Billerica, MA 
North Yarmouth, 
ME 
Litchfield 
Acton, MA 
James Stewart 
William Todd 
Litchfield 
Drysden (?) 
James J. Bixby 
D. Weatherby J. Parker & N. 
Lindsay 
66 Steven Mitchell Eastport ME N. Yarmouth, 
ME 
Lewiston, ME William Crabtree Lewiston, ME P. Crisly & N. 
Lindsay 
T. Porter & P. 
Crisly 
66 
Machias, ME Machias, ME John Blyth 
Boston, MA Boston, MA John Elliot 
Penobscot Dunbarton A. Smith, J. 
Connuck, & T. 
Moor 
J. Porter & P. 
Crisly 
66 
66 
Andrew Buntin 
Dover, NH Dover, NH Thomas Waldron 
Litchfield 
C. River (?) 
Bath ME 
P. River (?) 
P. Richardson 
S. Bucknam 
Sanborn Portsmouth, NH Joseph Porter & 
P. Cristy 
bL 
H. MacKay 
Daniel Robinson 
Lisbon 
Gouldsborough, 
ME 
Claremont 
Lisbon 
Cobscook 
Benjamin Henderson 
James Ash 
Claremont J. McIntosh and 
N. Johnson 
H. Mackay & P. 
Steven Ford 
Beltcher (?) Portland, ME Jacob Hanks 
Clinch 
Date of  Name of Settlers Occupation Family Time in Last Place of Place of Nativity Certifed by 
Oath NB Residence 
1211 311 8 14 Henry Sherland Tanner None 2 years Kennebeck, ME Acton, MA J. Porter & P. 
Daniel Sherman 
Daniel Gray 
Benjamin Byram 
Aaron Rogers 
Daniel Scott 
Lewis Vining 
John Huff 
David Potter 
James D. Scott 
James Hall 
Samuel Gardner 
S. G. Town 
David Howes 
J. Garcelon 
Daniel Whitney 
Daniel McCurdv 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Baker 
Trader 
Mill Man 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Mill Man 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Trader 
Mariner 
Mariner 
Farmer 
Wife & 3 
children 
None 
None 
Wife & 2 
children 
Wife & 3 
children 
Wife & 3 
children 
Wife & 2 
children 
Wife & 1 
child 
Wife & 4 
children 
Wife & 2 
children 
Wife & 12 
children 
None 
Wife & 5 
children 
Wife & 1 
child 
Wife & 5 
children 
11 years 
5 years 
4 years 
7 years 
17 years 
10 years 
7 years 
7 years 
15 years 
6 years 
4 years 
4 years 
4 years 
6 years 
20 years 
Camenter Wife & 7 3 vears 
Lisbon 
Belfast, ME 
Bath, ME 
Machias 
Stueben 
Anmdel 
Washington 
Machias 
Damariscotta 
Penobscot 
Deer Isle, ME 
Buckstown, ME 
Lewiston, ME 
Little River, ME 
Bridgewater, 
MA 
Lisbon 
North Yarmouth, 
ME 
Bnmswick, ME 
Machias 
Ball Town 
Augusta 
Machias 
Damariscotta 
Rochester 
Cape Cod, MA 
Lewiston, ME 
Little River, ME 
Clinch 
D. McLauchlan, 
T. Wyer & A. 
Grenlaw 
J. and W. 
Hitchings & W. 
Moor 
J. Campbell & 
D.W. Jack 
C. & H. Hatch & 
C. Campbell 
H. MacKay Esq. 
H. Mackay & P. 
Clinch 
H. Mackay 
J. Campbell & 
D. McLauchlan 
J. Campbell & 
D. McLauchlan 
T. Wyer & J. 
Campbell 
J. Porter & P. 
Cristy 
66 
Oath NB Residence 
children 
B. Bordman 
Daniel Woodcock 
John Smith 
L.S. Sherman 
N. Farrow 
Benjamin Robinson 
N. Waldron 
Daniel Hall 
James Hams 
Henry E P P ~ ~  
James Bracket 
Tyler P. Shaw 
Nick Hall 
John Walker 
HC. Barton 
Thomas Ash 
N. Varney 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Carpenter 
Farmer 
Joiner 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Fanner 
Farmer 
Carpenter 
Trader 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Fanner 
Farmer 
Farmer 
Wife & 1 
child 
Wife & 1 
children 
Wife & 2 
children 
None 
Wife & 1 
child 
None 
Wife& 6 
children 
Wife & 1 
child 
None 
Wife & 5 
children 
Wife 
Wife & 5 
children 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Wife & 1 
child 
None 
6 months Penobscot, ME Lynn, MA 
1 4 years Jonesborough, ME 
Date of Name of Settlers Occupation Family Time in Last Place of Place of Nativity Certifed by 
-- 
I 
7 years Machias, ME 
3 years Bangor, ME 
2 years Islesborough, ME 
12months Lynn, MA 
12 months Brunswick, ME 
2 years Brunswick, ME 
5 years Machias, ME 
8 years Pittston, ME 
7 years Union River 
2 years Vassalborough, 
ME 
12 months Northport, ME 
2 years Brunswick, ME 
3 years North Yarmouth, 
ME 
2 years Winslow, ME 
3 years Sullivan, ME 
12 months Fairfield 
Islebourough, 
ME 
Machias, ME J. Porter 
London 
Bristol, ME 
Exeter, NH 
Barrington, MA 
Topsham, ME 
Wiscasset, ME 
New Glouster, 
ME 
Ill. 
Berwick, ME 
Newbury, MA 
Brunswick, ME 
North Yarmouth, 
ME 
Winslow, ME 
Sullivan, ME 
Dachester 
J. Campbell & 
H. Hatch 
J. Porter & T. 
Moore 
H Hatch, T. 
Wyer & D.W. 
Jack 
H. Mackay 
J. Porter & N. 
Lindsay 
66 
H. Mackay 
66 
H. Mackay & T. 
WYW 
H Mackay 
66 
J. Porter & W. 
Moor 
Date of Name of Settlers Occupation Family Time in Last Place of Place of Nativity Certijied by 
Oath NB Residence 
12/12/1816 J. Murphey Farmer Wife & 9 14 months Lincoln Lincoln J. Campbell & C. 
children Hatch 
12/12/1816 J.Jackson Farmer None 14 months Green, ME Bnmswick,ME " 
121261 1 8 16 Asa Benson Farmer Wife 3 years Hampden, ME Middleburgh J. Porter & P. 
Cristy 
12/30/1816 Ill. Farmer Wife 3 years Ill. Ill. H. Mackay 
1/7/1817 G.Lynch Farmer None 12 months Provincetown, ME Wareham, MA J. Campbell & C. 
Hatch 
111211 8 17 J.D. Woodbery Carpenter Wife & 6 12 years Ware, NH Ill. H. Mackay & J. 
children Campbell 
1/16/1817 J. S. Williams Farmer None 7 months Redfield Redfield J. Porter & T. 
Moor 
St. Andrews 1 6th January 1 81 7 
I certify that the foregoing is a correct list of the names of persons to whom the Oath of Allegiance has been administered by me.-In 
virtue of a commission given me for that purpose under the hand and seal of the Honble. Martin Hunter Esquire, Dated at Fredericton 
this seventh day of March, 18 10.- 
Robert Pagan J.P. 
Commissioner 
Source: "Return of Persons who have come fiom the United States of America to Reside and Settle in the Province of New 
Brunswick, to whom the Requisite Oaths have been administered by Robert Pagan appointed Commissioner for that purpose in the 
County of Charlotte," PANB RS 7, "Executive Council: Papers, 1784-1 877: Naturalizations." 
APPENDIX E: Enemy Aliens, Eastport 
Table El: Deputy Marshal's Records of Enemy Aliens, Eastport, 1812 
- - - - - 
Name Age Years Family Trade Took 1810 Mats. 
in size Oath Census Militia 
U.S. 
O'Donald, Michael 35 .75 3 
---- 
no no 
- ---- EE - 
Parker, Timothy 53 2 5 victualer yes no 
----- - ------ -- - - -- - -- - 
Pendlebury, 24 1 3 laborer no no Yes 
Thomas 
- - -- -- -- - - 
Strut, George 23 16 0 cordwainer no no 
- - - - 
Txlor, William 40 23 11 - - fisherman - Y E T s  -- _ 
- 
Van Buskirk, 50 6 10 cooper yes yes 
Abraham 
----------- - - - -- -  
50 2 9 laborer yes no Wa%r,James - - _  - -- - - -- 
-ley, J o q h  34 2 5 blacksmith y e s  yes 
--- - 
--- -- 
6 Woodwith, James 34 6 --Seamseamanan!F.Yes-- - 
- 
Woodworth, 64 6 5 victualer yes yes 
Samuel 
pp -- -- - -- -- - 
35 Heads of households 
208 Enemy aliens total 
Source: Returns of enemy aliens fiom Eastport in the District of Maine extracted fiom 
the returns of enemy aliens by Maine's U.S. Marshall, Thomas G. Thornton in the 
autumn of 1812, found in National Archives RG 59, M-558, "U.S. Department of State: 
War of 1812 Papers." Statement of aliens taking oaths of loyalty to the U.S. in January, 
18 13, found in William King Papers, Maine Historical Society. Militia rolls in "Edridge 
Collection," Eastport Sentinel, February 20, 1 907. 
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